29.04.1999

Questioning the KLA

Pleurat Sejdiu is the diplomatic representative of the interim government of Kosova. Tom Ball spoke to him earlier this week

Like most of the Kosovar political leadership within the interim government, Dr Sejdiu is young and a professional (in his case, a physician). He was a member of the People’s Movement of Kosova (LPK), founded in 1982.

The LPK never recognised the powerless parliament set up by Kosova’s liberal forces. Sejdiu claims that the LPK took on its Enverist political complexion merely because it needed the support of Albania, which was ruled by Enver Hoxha. He volunteered that the LPK would have looked for support from Albania even had it been fascist.

The Kosova Liberation Army has not had a political structure since its political directorate members became ministers in the interim government of Kosova. Since then, no political discussions have taken place within the ranks of the KLA at all. Indeed, overtures by various political parties and groups have been rebuffed: the KLA leadership did not and does not want it to become the armed wing of any one political trend. Accordingly, it now functions solely as the army of the interim government.

Recently ex-prime minister Bukoshi, based in Germany and heading the Kosova Information Centre, set up the Military Force of the Republic of Kosova (FARK) as a competitor for the KLA, but with the Serbian government pogrom it collapsed. Unfortunately, it was this ‘usurper’ force which sent two unprepared British volunteers to the Balkans: they related their disappointment on BBC2’s Newsnight last Monday. However, the pair are in close contact with the KLA for the first time now they are back in Britain. Although fielding several enquiries daily from keen British ex-squaddies, Sejdiu was anxious to discourage non-ethnic Albanians who might want to go to fight; none are going from Britain nor, according to KLA policy, from anywhere else. It is just too difficult, he says, to check on the bona fides of anyone outside the Albanian communities.

This does not mean that the KLA has no need of military assistance, of course; it does. Over 25,000 of its fighters are armed, but there are another 20,000 waiting for arms. Most KLA fighters carry only small arms. Sejdiu is pessimistic about getting heavy weaponry in the short term. The KLA refused an offer from the Iranian government. Not wanting to provide the Serbian regime with a propaganda coup of the ‘muslim fundamentalist support’ variety. Instead, says Sejdiu, “We want to be part of Europe,” and therefore the KLA looks only to Nato for arms, a source which looks set to keep it starved for the foreseeable future.

He considers that the main stumbling block to Nato arming the KLA was the existence of Bukoshi’s FARK: Nato’s military leaders may have been concerned that an intra-Albanian conflict could erupt, as happened between western-supplied armed groups in Afghanistan. While of late the KLA has been unable to obtain weapons beyond small arms, the overwhelming bulk of its weapons originate in Albania; it is likely that most were made available during the 1997 crisis.

Nato’s arms embargo and the KLA’s reluctance to go elsewhere leads the KLA to distinct conclusions over the next stages of the conflict: it aggressively supports the idea of Nato ground troops and accepts as inevitable that a protectorate would then be established under Nato tutelage. While the KLA realises this does not mean independence, it sees this as a necessary stage. Even were Nato to arm the KLA, it is unlikely that it would want to go it alone anyway, given the desperate situation now in Kosova. It is unclear how the KLA might operate during a Nato ground attack, though interim government prime minister Thaci is in almost daily telephone contact with western government leaders.

Sejdiu said he was “disappointed in people like Tony Benn” who have come out against Nato’s air war. Predictably disagreeing with the CPGB’s position against Nato - as not facing the realities of the situation in his view -  Sejdiu nonetheless welcomed our support for independence for Kosova and for the KLA.

Former KLA leader Adem Demaqi, who retired to private life during the Rambouillet talks when outvoted (he opposed accepting the Nato proposals), floated the concept of Balkanija, or voluntary union with Serbia and Montenegro. But the concept is presently a complete non-starter. As Sejdiu noted, this was an old idea. It was first floated in slightly different form by Georgi Dimitrov - the last president of Comintern and first leader of ‘socialist’ Bulgaria. Anyway “it’s been tried before … it was called Yugoslavia” said Sejdiu.

While the KLA discounts the possibility of any trans-Balkan federation or confederation, however, its attitude to ‘ethnic Albania’ is not dismissive. This is the term applied to a potential fusion of territories containing Albanian populations, such as Albania itself, Kosova, and areas in Macedonia. Sejdiu was at pains to state that this is not an aim of the KLA, which asserts the democratic right of the people of Kosova to determine their own future, including who they will unite with. It is merely one possibility among others.

Following the Milosevic regime’s attack on Kosova, the KLA tightened up its organisation. No-one thereafter was able simply to proclaim themselves a KLA unit or battalion, as sometimes happened previously. There is a fixed command structure, and the KLA has become more disciplined. As its daily reports make clear, KLA commando and regular units, organised within brigades, have been able to strike back at Serbian forces.

Lack of arms remains the KLA’s greatest handicap, it says. There is evident frustration that Nato has not yet delivered, either by arming the KLA or sending in ground troops to drive out the Serbian forces.