25.03.1999

Socialist Party split - Merseyside’s view, part 2

The Merseyside Socialists, who recently left or were suspended from the Socialist Party in England and Wales, continue their critique of the leadership

Europe, the unions and crisis

In the 1980s we predicted the effects of monetarism and recession would sweep Thatcher away. But the political issue of the Falklands war cut across this process. Following this there was a period of heightened class war. Important as these events were, the underlying issues were much more important. These can be briefly characterised as the restructuring of the economy, developing globalisation and the imposition of neo-liberal policies.

If there had existed a revolutionary leadership, capable of winning the support of the leading layers of the working class, then the possibility of socialist change could have been posed, but this was not the case. Instead the destruction of the old traditional industries paved the way for service industries and information technology, which, together with the setbacks and defeats of the period, especially the miners’ strike, fundamentally affected the consciousness of the working class.

The Labour leadership during the 1980s played a disgraceful and baleful role, but the key factors were de-industrialisation, unemployment, changing work patterns and industries - all combining and interacting with the class defeats, acting to drive working class consciousness backwards, particularly amongst the most advanced layers. The Labour Party leadership was only able to get away with their shift to the right because of this. The debilitation of the rank and file movements also arose due to these conditions. The 1980s threw up class battles, but any renewed economic crisis in Britain starts from a totally different vista. There have been 15-20 years of neo-liberal policies worldwide. Globalisation and the information society is radically changing economic and class relationships.

So the questions which should be asked are: if there is a recession how long will it last? Will capitalism be able to find a way out? What economic counter-measures will be employed? And critically how will the working class respond? Central to this last point should also be the question, will a recession/slump stun or activate a response from workers? Over the past decade, movements have been of a defensive, often local nature. Why? Because of the impact of neo-liberal policies, globalisation, defeats and lowering of class-consciousness.

Globalisation was denied as a concept by the SP leadership, except in regard to financial transactions. The Asian tigers were regarded initially as not important to the world economy and not important in the globalisation process. Now the opposite is stated. This region accounts for one third of world trade, and from this statistic the Socialist Party draw the conclusion that there will be a worldwide crisis. Moreover, we are told that there is now globalisation of finance and trade. Not only this, but it is acknowledged that new technology and the changing nature of the advanced economies has played a role in “facilitating” globalisation (L Walsh Socialism Today October 1998).

Globalisation can be summarised as: privatisation, deregulation, liberalisation, the attacks on middle class and working class living standards, the exploding movements of capital, which together have created the conditions for the present crisis. Additionally the nature of the information society has dramatically changed the systems of communications and financial transactions and is therefore another key factor. Socialist Party predictions of a global slump, something which has never happened before, are currently way off the mark. Recession and slump encompasses 40% of the world economy, but markets in Europe and the US are still growing, albeit at a reduced rate. It would be foolish, because capitalism is unplanned and inherently is a system of crisis, to rule out completely the possibility of a world ‘crash’ or even a ‘slump’. But the key question would be of the impact this will have on consciousness and working class struggle. For the moment we have no reliable way of estimating this: it only amounts to either lucky guesswork or idle speculation.

(....)

Post-World War II, the existence of workers’ states (albeit deformed), the strength of the working class - the expectations and crucially the experiences of workers and the traditions of mass and revolutionary struggle - provided the consciousness to underpin alternative rank and file traditions and movements. In turn this motivated the leading layers of the class, and formed the backdrop to a whole historical period. This workers’ power posed a central threat to the ruling class in the 60s and 70s. Combined with the women’s, black and other emerging movements, this created a turbulent and radical period, partly based on the factors above. In the ex-colonial world this was of a revolutionary character.

These movements came about because it was a time of change. Capitalism in the advanced industrial economies was moving away from Fordist models of large-scale production to a service/information-based economy. Allied to this, the ruling class had to challenge the power of organised labour. There was a crisis of capitalism in the sense that in Britain, in particular, the old imperial traditions could no longer exist in a rapidly changing world economy. That is why Britain in many respects was catapulted to the forefront of class struggle.

In Britain, New Zealand, America the changing nature of the economic foundations resulted in the 1980s in political assaults of the capitalist class, tough monetarism, privatisation, deregulation and neo-liberal policies. Significantly there is a body of evidence showing that in these countries the results have been very much along similar lines. The working class movement was in many cases confronted with decisive challenges. In Britain with the miners, New Zealand (seamen and dockers), America (air traffic controllers), and now in Australia (dockers). Failing to rise to these challenges (except in the case of Australia), the movement has been forced onto the defensive, and is fragmented. (In Britain TU membership is now at 30%, down from 50%. NZ likewise: down to 36%.) The result has been a falling away in class-consciousness, in rank and file and trade union organisation.

Europe

The mistaken perspectives for monetary union were fully revealed at the national conference in 1997. Throughout the 1990s the leadership followed on with the orthodox line inherited from Ted Grant, who frequently predicted the collapse of the Common Market and European project. In the early 90s the national leadership were initially repeating this line, with a slight modification: “A shattering of the EC is only likely in the event of a deep slump” (A world in crisis - a Marxist analysis for the 1990s CWI pamphlet, March 1994).

In 1993 in an article for Militant International Review, written by a comrade from Liverpool (unpublished, presumably because it took a position contrary to that of the leadership), it was argued:

“Deflationary policies will lead to class conflicts ... nevertheless, it is likely, though not certain, that five or six countries could implement a single European currency ... Can political union be achieved? That is unlikely due to the separate interests of each capitalist class ... International solidarity has been undermined through the role of the Stalinist parties and social democracy in the last decade. The seeming triumph of the market and the collapse of the Stalinist states has reinforced this. European monetary union will bring back onto the agenda the pressing need for international solidarity” (Unpublished article, full text available).

Instead of taking such points into account the analysis centred on European Monetary Union and its inevitable non-completion. There is no need to overburden the text here; a few quotations will suffice to show the main trend, especially those taken from the latter part of the 90s, when it was increasingly likely that the project would be completed. In 1994 predictions were being made that Maastricht was in tatters and would be “shredded” by the time of the EU summit in 1996. Then when that did not happen the prediction changed to the impossibility of the other eight EU members meeting the Maastricht criteria.

The statement presented to the 1997 conference said:

“One of the by-products of the French events is the shipwrecking of European Monetary Union (Emu). For the first time, there is an admission from bourgeois spokespersons, like Clarke, that ‘it [Emu] might not happen at all’. Despite all the efforts of Kohl to plough on regardless, even the ‘core group’ of countries around German capitalism will not be able to adhere to the Maastricht criteria by 1999. The defeat of Juppé and his plan, which is what the French election signified, was a shattering blow to Maastricht and Emu. The softening of the criteria for Emu will completely undermine the idea of a strong ‘euro’. This in turn could lead to currency turmoil and competitive devaluations” (‘General election and perspectives for Marxism’).

In opposition to this Merseyside argued: “The election of Jospin in France has not fundamentally altered the prospects for European Monetary Union (Emu). The government is staffed with those who believe that monetary union must go ahead and the view of the governor of the Bank of France is that there is no possibility of postponement. There is great uncertainty surrounding the project, but the underlying tendencies now point in the direction of its eventual completion - even if it is postponed for a period. These tendencies are rooted in the competition of the major world economic powers. The blocs which have emerged in America, Japan and Europe push in the direction of free trade areas, and a common currency is a necessity within Europe for the multinationals and financial institutions.

“Whilst in France and Germany there are political ambitions of creating a united Europe as a counterweight to Germany, the most important underlying issue initially is economic monetary union. The prospects of political union are a far distant prospect and on the basis of capitalism it is very hard to see anything like this being achieved. With monetary union only one and half years away there is likely to be a core of countries who will jump onto the train and the other countries will not be far away. Even if the convergence criteria were to be softened this would not automatically undermine the moves in this direction, though it could bring deleterious effects for European capitalism in future years. Neither will a renewed recession, which could coincide with the launch of the project, in the world or European economies fundamentally undermine the process” (Members Bulletin No24, August 1997).

On this issue the leadership were hopelessly at sea - so much so that they could marshal little support from the rank and file delegates. The majority of speakers in the debate around Emu opposed the leadership. Sensing that the debate was heading in the direction of a defeat, the executive committee proposed that the sections of the document and the amendments tabled by the branches be remitted and the EC draw up a document on the issue. Such a document, at the time of writing, has never been produced or distributed to the national committee or the party. Instead the leadership, continuing to ignore the very facts, insisted that Emu would not be launched in January 1999! Peter Taaffe at the March 1998 national committee declared that on balance it was unlikely that monetary union would be launched (in January 1999), but if it was it would not go through to completion (in 2002). In fact he was categorical: “Emu will blow - take it down, write it down” (Speech by Peter Taaffe - written notes from national committee meeting).

In June 1998 a CWI statement/update on the world economy was circulated, once again predicting a 1929 crash. Significantly nowhere in the statement is there any mention of the actual social and political movements of the working class, except that there will be the re-emerging of an anti-capitalist mood (note: nothing about socialist consciousness). But there were no predictions about the impossibility of Emu in 1999. Instead the document said this:

“Now the EU countries have decided to set up the world’s biggest peg on the basis of superficial economic convergence. The looming world recession will put enormous pressure on that peg ... a new world recession, political and social unrest in Europe itself will tend to blow the continent’s currency union apart” (CWI statement, ‘The threat of financial meltdown, mark two’).

This position was repeated in The Socialist: “Emu could be shattered by massive currency turmoil even before the fixing of exchange rates and interest rates in January 1999. If that does not happen, then in all probability it will break down under the pressure of economic collapse, currency turmoil and huge social revolts before the euro replaces national currencies in January 2002” (J Beishon The Socialist June 12 1998). In other words the past position of Emu not being completed in 1999 has been conveniently forgotten, and a new prediction now takes its place.

(....)

Sitting back and waiting for the collapse of the euro will do nothing to assist the struggles of the working class. Understanding what the representatives of capital are planning, and trying to organise against this can impact on the euro’s future. The only force likely to stop the completion of European Monetary Union is the political, social and economic struggle of the working class on a European-wide basis - otherwise the euro will be the common currency in 2002.

(....)

Too much has already been invested in Emu by the banks, the multinationals and national governments to go back. Additionally Emu is part of a political strategy to attack the living standards, especially the social wage of the working class and middle classes. The only way in which it could be halted or stopped would be on the basis of revolutionary upheavals. Recession, if it unfolds, will drive in the direction of even greater concentrations of industry and finance, and further attacks on the working class.

(....)

Monetary union is not an abstract economic issue: it has enormous practical consequences for British and European politics. In November 1998, Ken Jackson, the leader of the AEEU, urged Blair to abandon the pledge to hold a referendum and instead make joining Emu an election issue. In the days prior to this the CBI and the Chamber of Commerce both came out enthusiastically backing Emu. The TUC leaders almost to a man enthusiastically support joining Emu. Top foreign industrialists are warming up the debate by asserting that jobs may be lost if Britain does not join. The social democrats throughout Europe are openly urging Blair to announce a target date for joining. Mandelson and Brown are softening up the ground for Blair. The chancellor will spend millions selling the euro and indirectly this will play a part in re-electing Labour. What will be the impact on the Tories? Such a campaign in an election will split them down the middle and could result in further electoral isolation.

Such issues are not abstruse, they raise practical consequences issues. How will parties respond to this? What will be the impact on the political alliances between Labour and the Liberals? How will it impact throughout Europe? And what strategy should workers adopt in relation to European-wide alliances (already top trade union leaders are talking about pay bargaining on a European basis)? How can working class resistance be organised on a European basis?

Trade unions

Militant identified, in the 1960s, ad hoc and shop stewards committees, post-war, as going over the heads of the official structures, but it had warned that “the taking of issues away from the official organisations at the present time is fatal” (Trade union document, February 1968). This position, whilst broadly correct, has now taken on a one-sided interpretation. It was not always like this. In the early 1990s after strikes at Barrow, Dover, in the NHS and post office the analysis was: “All the major strikes ... developed from below. Ad hoc rank and file organisations will be thrown up during the strikes ... new broad lefts will spring to life” (‘Building in the workplaces’, April 1991).

Generally in this period the emphasis was on ad hoc, rank and file bodies and our role in initiating such activities. However, the EC also had a mistaken perspective of major industrial disputes, local and national general strikes leading to an increase in trade union membership and pressure from below forcing the leaders into action. Even up until 1993-94 the Socialist Party nationally were still calling on the TUC to organise a general strike.

Merseyside as far back as September 1989 were suggesting caution. In a letter about the draft British perspectives, it was argued that the outcome of the industrial struggles over the previous 10 years had to be taken into account:

“Central to this is the attitude of the labour and trade union leadership to the industrial relations legislation and the way in which they are paralysed by their inability to take on the government. The docks dispute (1989) being the worst example. Linked to this is the question of the collapse of the left and the disappearance of the broad left structures, which at this stage hamper effective opposition ... the nature of the [future] disputes mean that local or sectoral actions will take place, but national actions involving a number of unions together are unlikely ... general strike actions are not likely this side of the general election” (Letter to EC, 1989).

In the early 90s Merseyside’s position was to warn against putting all our forces into the broad lefts and instead favoured setting up rank and file ad hoc bodies. At the 1993 conference the national leadership, supported by comrades from Merseyside, argued for the setting up of a Public Sector Alliance to fight cuts and for a campaign to organise not just trade unions, but also community groups. In the report of the trade union commission it states: “Whenever we are blocked using the official structures of the movement, like in Nupe and TGWU, we must turn our attention to the unofficial bodies” (Members Bulletin March 1993). Such was the opposition to this proposal from trade union comrades that Lynn Walsh from the EC had to intervene to tell comrades that “trade union work had developed out of our political work we did: eg, the anti-poll tax and Liverpool” (Members Bulletin March 1993). This position was further ratified at the 1994 congress when the leadership argued for a patient and skilful intervention into strikes and picket lines: “The best way of doing this is through initiatives such as the PSA” (Congress document, February 1994, p17).

But this correct position was also accompanied by the optimistic perspective, which was still very much in evidence in 1994. The EC were arguing: “Union leaders, as in Europe, could be compelled to sanction a one-day strike”; “Workers [will] flood back into the unions” - and the best way for Militant to work would be through the PSA. By 1995 reality seemed to be creeping in: “Superficially there appears to be a deadlock in the class struggle” (Members Bulletin No12, 1995).

Industrially the expectation was not quite as confident as previous predictions, but once again it was expected that there would be an upsurge in the struggle, though there might be no ‘big bang’ of national strike action. In fact it was printed in bold that, “nothing is more fatal for a Marxist organisation than to base itself merely on the idea of an industrial ‘big bang’” (ibid). By December of 1995, one month before the 1996 conference, the organisation was beginning to acknowledge, without openly saying it, that there was a crisis in the unions, but in doing so they were making new mistakes:

“The decline in union numbers throughout the 80s was primarily due to the decline in manufacturing industry ... the internal life of the unions might have seen a decline in activity ... this conference agrees that 1996 will be the year of a turn to the workplaces” (Members Bulletin No14, pre-conference special, December 1995).

The PSA was consequently dropped in favour of broad left work - something which completely ignored the opportunities presented by the Liverpool dockers and national post office workers (just to mention two examples). But incredibly by 1997 the national position was both for fighting broad lefts and to understand the possibilities of splits taking place in the unions: “This may entail going with workers ... including being temporarily placed outside the official union structures.” Moreover, “It would be fatal for us to concentrate our trade union work on working solely within the official structures” (General election and perspectives for Marxism 1997).

It has to be said that for all the emphasis on broad left work, no real effort has been put into uniting the broad lefts from the various unions. In other words a complete zigzagging in policy. Yet in practice everything has been concentrated around broad left electoral work within the official structures. When Merseyside opposed the bland perspectives for the transformation of the unions they were accused of abandoning the official structures.

Merseyside throughout the 1990s had raised points in relation to these perspectives. An amendment to the 1997 document (Members Bulletin No24, August 1997) argued that the process in the unions would be much more complicated, and particularly tried to combat the illusions that the SP leadership were sowing in the potential for change at the top of the unions, when they argued: “The unions will swing towards the left at a certain stage ... some of these [official] leaders can shift to the left under mass pressure” (General election and perspectives for Marxism 1997).

The area further sought to steer away from sole reliance on broad left work which primarily concentrated on winning positions. The leadership, however, went in the opposite direction. The statement on trade union work to the 1997 conference goes as far as announcing which comrades have won elected positions in the unions (Members Bulletin No24, August 1997). The Liverpool dockers managed a cursory, one-sentence mention (better perhaps than the 1997 CWI school in Belgium, where a London comrade, leading off on trade union work, failed to even mention the dockers). The reference, however, was to only obliquely lecture Merseyside on using the dispute to “campaign for an open democratic broad left in the TGWU as another means of furthering the dockers’ struggle itself” (Members Bulletin No25, December 1997. For further material on this subject read ‘Docks dispute 1995-98 - Merseyside’s record of solidarity’).

In contrast, Merseyside argued: “Rank and file activity may move some trade union leaders. But in the main the trade union leaders are moving in the direction of isolating themselves from this kind of pressure. The process of closing down democratic structures in the trade unions, restricting the rights of trade union activists, is at an advanced stage and is likely to be taken further. This will meet with resistance as the rank and file see the bureaucracy acting as policemen for a Labour government. Whilst in some unions there could be a shift to the left or even splits, there is also the possibility of further decline in the unions. Therefore, the tendency could develop for a smaller percentage of workers being organised in the unions, with disputes being localised and marginalised. In the past couple of years in Britain, disputes nationally have been characterised by long drawn-out battles. New, generalised movements cannot, of course, be entirely ruled out but, given the attitude of the union leaders, the anti-trade union legislation and the weakness of the rank-and-file structures, the most likely perspective is of a continuation of present trends.

“Movements outside of the unions could also begin to have an effect of radicalising struggles. The anti-poll tax movement was an example of this and the environmental movements may, at a certain stage, begin to impact on the activities of the rank and file activists. In this sense, new and varied coalitions may develop, especially through the construction of solidarity networks, though there will be considerable difficulties in uniting these. Nevertheless, such developments could encompass both official and unofficial characteristics. We need to emphasise the importance of the unions as organised expressions of the working class. Especially for union activists there will be a tremendous loyalty to these bodies but, at the same time, if the unions only encompass a minority of the working class we have to see the possibility of new formations arising alongside and complementing their activities. In this sense, issues such as disaffiliation from the Labour Party could be used to actively draw new alliances - in the unions and outside of them - towards the idea of creating a new independent, mass party of the working class” (Members Bulletin No24, August 1997).

These ideas were unfortunately rejected by the conference, though in the debate there was substantial support. Part of the reason for the rejection by the leadership - although not openly stated - to the idea of disaffiliation from the Labour Party is the opposition from leading trade union comrades, who see this demand as being ahead of the present consciousness. Yet opinion polls show only 28% of trade unionists currently identify with the Labour Party. Consequently the demand, whilst being raised in Scotland and occasionally surfacing in some of the areas, is not featured in the national material.

The arguments against Merseyside largely centred around the idea, put around by the EC, of the comrades wishing to abandon trade union work, which is palpably not true - the very opposite is stated in the amendments. Secondly, the area was accused of drawing incorrect comparisons with the process of bourgeoisification in the Labour Party. Thirdly, for good measure, comrades were accused of ultra-leftism.

Here insults take the place of analysis and not surprisingly result in all sorts of confusion over the trade unions. This can be seen in the article written by Roger Bannister, one month before the end of the Liverpool dockers’ dispute. In this article Roger was belatedly arguing that the dockers should have used their dispute to launch a campaign to transform the union: “It is in this light that the demand to make the dispute official has to be viewed, rather than opening up a ‘second front’ ... It is common for workers in struggle to move on to democratise their union ... an opportunity may be missed if the official structures of the union are ignored ... A dispute with such wide support as the dockers enjoy provides an excellent basis for campaigning within the TGWU for change” (Members Bulletin No25, December 1997). Roger conveniently ignored the fact that the dockers had campaigned for official action by the union.

Yet Peter Taaffe, speaking to the Australian Democratic Socialist Party, had this to say about campaigning to make the dispute official:

“... when it was raised by some sections of the left that we demand the official intervention of the Transport and General Workers Union, the dockers said ‘no’ and we agreed with them” (Links, journal of the DSP, No9, November 1997).

But these abstract expressions take no account of the existing reality. In 1989 the broad left effectively ‘controlled’ the union. The union gave official backing during the national dock dispute, as did the International Transport Federation, who issued instructions telling affiliated members to take solidarity action. But such appeals failed. Even in Liverpool, where road transport had built a powerful position, the majority of lorry drivers crossed the picket lines. The dock shop stewards in 1989, as in 1995-98, combined unofficial action with working through the union. Ron Todd in 1989 not only betrayed the dockers: he effectively destroyed trade unionism in the ports. So any analysis in the present period, if it is not going to turn into an abstraction, has to take this into account.

(....)

The SP leadership cannot have it both ways - if they want to argue, as they did in the name change debate, that consciousness of the advanced layers has gone back and even the numbers involved from this layer have declined, then they cannot expect that intoning the need to work within the official structures will result in immediate radical transformations. As argued by Merseyside in the amendments to the British perspectives document in 1997, the union leaders have largely isolated themselves from the pressures of the rank and file by altering the democratic structures. This may not be a generalised process and it is not completed, but this is the general tendency. In the international discussions it seems that the leadership agree with this. Lynn Walsh referred to the “bourgeoisification” taking place (Report of the IEC, November 1997). Such terms are obviously considered indiscreet in Britain.

Even in the case of Unison, where there are genuine rank and file bodies, the pressure of union activists could not prevent the bureaucracy from isolating the Hillingdon women, who ‘won’ primarily because they broadened the struggle beyond their own union. Union democracy has to be fought for, but how will it be achieved? Struggle is the most likely avenue. The unofficial bodies, such as those in the CWU, may turn away from BL activities, but that is not to say they will split or entirely ignore the official structures.

Roger Bannister also points to the need to call for a new workers’ party (with no mention of the demand to disaffiliate from the Labour Party), yet goes on to say: “We would not call for new unions.” Yet the national leadership had argued that the leaders of unofficial actions could be expelled by the unions and

“could be forced to organise new formations [our emphasis] to keep their struggles going ... our role would be to help develop the struggle, whatever organisational form it took” (General election and perspectives for Marxism 1997).

Apart from these two references nothing else was said about the need for the dockers to campaign for a fighting broad left. Peter Taaffe did not raise it in an article which coincided with the second anniversary of the dockers’ dispute. Instead he concentrated on trade union trends and pointed to the fact that where trade unionism was weak the “spontaneous” struggles of the working class were much more successful than in those countries were trade union power was still strong and the bureaucracy acted on behalf of capitalism. Realising the contradiction in his own argument, he went on to write that it would be erroneous to conclude that if the British workers had relied purely on ad hoc “spontaneous” forms of organisation they would never have been able to conquer the rights and conditions which they enjoyed throughout most of the post-war period (Socialism Today September 1997).

This strange interpretation of trade union history seems to pose the issue that the official trade unions were responsible for gaining all sorts of reforms. This ignores the economic boom, the partnerships between trade union leaders and business, the social partnerships intended to buy off sections of the class and most importantly the role of the shop stewards and rank and file bodies, who acted as the main catalyst in forcing the union leaders to act on behalf of the members in the 1960s and 1970s.