06.04.2023

Erdoğan’s power play

Esen Uslu investigates the vote for Finland’s membership and then stonewalling over Sweden’s

Turkey has been a member of Nato since 1952, and it has approved all expansionist leaps and bounds since then. Suddenly, however, it was blocking Nato’s latest enlargement attempt into Scandinavia, even though it is well known that both Sweden and Finland had been closely cooperating with the military bloc.

The ruling classes of both countries have been preparing public opinion for joining, and gradually overcoming internal opposition with their traditional ‘neutrality’ policy (Finland has been part of Nato’s ‘partnership in peace’ programme since 1994, while Sweden has been a member of the Nato Response Force since 2013, and both countries have taken part in Nato’s military planning).

So why did president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan throw a monkey wrench into the works and act as the show-stopper? Was there something to be gained by opposing the joint bid of Sweden and Finland to became Nato members? Taken as a whole, Turkey’s foreign policy seems to have been following a few lines that have gradually become more distinct. Let us look at the background.

The balance of forces in the Middle East, as well as in central Asia, seems to be changing in favour of China, and every part of the region is feeling the effects. As China’s influence grows, the US stance has become more and more blurred and incoherent. China has acted as a mediator to bring the old enemies, Iran and Saudi Arabia, together, while Saudi Arabia and Israel are in a new rapprochement, and for the first time in decades Israel has not acted in unison with the US, over Ukraine. Even Russia feels compelled to seek the support of Xi Jinping, and gave his visit great prominence.

This gradual change of fortunes nowadays affects every aspect of politics in the region, and has brought Erdoğan and co new opportunities to perform a balancing act, milking as much as they can from both the Russians and the US/Nato. In 2004 Turkey’s military rulers first became aware of this shift and since then it has become more and more a trait of Turkish foreign policy. At the same time its expansionist aims (named neo-Ottomanism by some pundits) became more visible.

Recently the regime has clung to the hope that, by playing Russia against the west, its brinkmanship would help Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) win the general and presidential elections in May, as it would be able to present its actions as not only upholding the national interests of Turkey, but defending Islam against the ‘onslaught of anti-Islamism’.

Its short-term aims in foreign policy are focussed on Turkey’s relations with the US - in particular with regard to the Kurds, as well as Greece and Cyprus. Those relations have been deteriorating since the attempted coup of 2016, and in recent years the Turkish occupation of northern Syria, while at the same time the US has found Kurdish fighting forces ready and willing to support US-led opposition to Islamic State, which has put further strains on relations with Turkey. The US has stopped Turkish incursions into Syrian territory and the suppression of Kurdish-controlled territories, while seeking to eradicate IS in Syria’s Idlip province, which was ‘under the protection’ of thousands of Turkish soldiers deployed there.

Kurdish fighters

The cooperation between Syrian-based US forces and Kurdish freedom fighters has given rise to some strange happenings. For example, an unmarked helicopter carrying seven Kurdish freedom fighters within the territory of the Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq (KRG) crashed in bad weather, killing all on board. They were identified as members of the People’s Defence Units (YPG), trained by US forces, and it is obvious that the operation of helicopters in that fashion could not be done without the consent - or direction - of US forces.

In the aftermath, flights from Turkey to Sulaymaniyah in Iraqi Kurdistan, which provided lifelines to the region, were cancelled. This came on top of a ruling of the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce ordering Ankara to pay Baghdad $1.4 billion for damages in 2014-18 for exporting oil without authorisation in collusion with the KRG. But Washington intervened: “Disruptions to global energy supply would not serve anyone’s interest,” said the US energy department.

As a well-known consequence of its purchase of S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems from Russia, Turkey was kicked out of the F-35 fighter project despite having been a member of the consortium from the very start. At one stage there was a plan to make Turkey one of the repair bases for F-35 engines, which was changed at the last minute. Some parts were earmarked to be produced in Turkey, but the orders were cancelled and all investment in the production facilities went down the drain. Since then Turkey has begged the US to help provide it with updated F-16 fighters - while the Biden administration has come out with a few positive words, it is not acting until it gets what it wants from Erdoğan.

Meanwhile, around 30,000 Turkish troops have been stationed in Cyprus since 1974, and a UN peacekeeping force has been on the ‘green line’ separating Greek and Turkish Cypriots since 1963.

In 2018 the US and Cyprus signed a statement of intent on bilateral security cooperation and in 2019, the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act became law. Afterwards Cyprus participated in the US International Military Education Training Program, and US soldiers were deployed on the island. The US Congress lifted its decades-old arms embargo on Cyprus and the decision to formally lift the restrictions preventing Cyprus from acquiring US weapons came as a major rebuff to Erdoğan’s regime.

Since the war between Ukraine and Russia began last year, Turkey started to enforce the Montreux Convention restrictions on Black Sea entry on Russia. However, Turkey also asked Nato allies not to access the Black Sea despite their being “non-combatants”. This caused a major headache, but to date has been strictly observed. In return Turkey also asked Russia not to bring in its warships attached to the Russian Black Sea Fleet despite Moscow having the right to do so under the convention.

Despite that, Turkey provides open channels to both Russia and Ukraine, although it does not accept the 2014 ‘incorporation’ of the Crimean peninsula into Russia. It has several joint economic and military-industrial agreements with Ukraine, and has provided unmanned aerial combat vehicles to Kyiv. But to this day, Erdoğan still has regular chats with Vladimir Putin which has been useful in developing the so-called ‘grain corridor’ - a shipping lane for exporting Ukrainian wheat abroad, thus helping to maintain normal prices. Turkey has also helped facilitate prisoner exchanges - commanders of the Azov regiment captured at the end of the siege of Mariupol were released with the proviso that they stay in Turkey while the conflict continues.

With all this going on, Erdoğan grasped the chance provided by the bid of Finland and Sweden to join Nato in 2022 - Sweden has been an old foe providing asylum to Turkish and Kurdish oppositionists, as well lending a certain support for the Kurdish freedom movement. In addition Sweden’s liberal stance on rights for oppositionists have been a source of annoyance - not least this week’s decision of a Swedish court to overturn the ban on burning the Quran during protests.

Back in June 2022, after several rounds of talks, Turkey signed a deal with Finland and Sweden committing them to tighten their ‘anti-terror’ laws, address Turkish extradition requests for terrorist suspects and clamp down on the activities of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). However, despite the legal changes made by the two countries, Turkey has stuck to the argument that progress has been insufficient.

Eventually its actions forced Finland to go it alone, separate from Sweden. As Aslı Aydıntaşbaş of the Brookings Institution said, “The Turkish idea of splitting the membership, and approving Finland was very smart. It has helped Turkey immensely to make a case that their opposition to Sweden is not done at Russia’s request, but it is to do with Turkey’s own interests and demands.”

Now Sweden has to wait the outcome of the May elections in Turkey. The main opposition parties have clearly stated that they would remove restrictions on Sweden’s Nato membership - and even if Erdoğan is re-elected it looks likely that Sweden will be joining in Nato very soon.

In reality Nato and Turkey are in a marriage of convenience: Turkey has the second-largest army in Nato and actively contributes to alliance operations unlike some members. But Erdoğan needed to be convinced that the US and Nato will not leave Turkey exposed in any confrontation with Russia or in Syria, for instance. US support to Turkey has been wavering - the White House did not invite Erdoğan’s officials to its 2023 ‘Summit for Democracy’, which has just taken place. And some in Nato are openly wondering how Turkey fits in the organisation.

Brain-dead

On March 30 the Turkish parliament took a vote on Finland’s membership, where 276 members of parliament from Erdoğan’s AKP, its MHP coalition partner, as well as the main opposition parties voted in favour. While there were no votes against, members of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) abstained.

An HDP spokesperson said:

It is a shameless policy to bargain on the Kurds, who were prosecuted in Turkey, and sought and obtained asylum in Finland and Sweden. We understand the security concerns of the Finnish and Swedish people. However, we call upon you not to bargain on the Kurds, who fought for asylum in your countries … The HDP principally stands against all military agreement. We are proud that we have never supported any military agreement in this chamber. That is a matter of principle for us.

However, the speech on behalf of the HDP did not contain a word specifically against Nato or its enlargement. Another spokesperson after the vote said in a press conference: “We have always voted against military agreements. For the first time we decided not to take part in voting, as we regard the security concerns of Finland as legitimate.”

This lack of a backbone over Nato stands out as a black mark on both the Kurdish freedom movement and the so-called left opposition. In the 1960s and 70s taking a hard stance against Nato was seen as the core of being a genuine socialist and many sacrificed their lives in that cause. Alas, in the 21st century, a peculiar coincidence of circumstances has been sufficient to leave this ‘opposition’ brain-dead.