25.09.1997

No profits in safety

On Friday September 19 at approximately 1.20pm, a packed Intercity 125 high speed train (HST) approaching Paddington station collided at Southall, west London, with a freight train crossing its path. Six passengers were killed and 150 injured, some of them seriously.

The train was loaded with politicians and media personnel returning from the Welsh referendum campaign. Before the dust had settled, news reports were emanating live from the crash scene. The accident has since been the subject of major media speculation, and John Prescott has announced a public inquiry.

The reaction of the privatised rail companies has been all too typical - try to blame someone else. Railtrack, responsible for the infrastructure, pointed the finger at the driver of the HST, hinting that he had passed a red signal. At 7pm the driver reported voluntarily to Southall police station, where he was questioned for five hours then released.

Simon Lupin, the press officer for British Transport Police, then put out a press release, stating that the driver had been arrested and was ‘helping with enquiries’ into possible charges of manslaughter. As a result Saturday’s headlines read, ‘Death crash driver arrested’. Who funds BTP? Surprise, surprise - Railtrack.

Meanwhile Great Western Trains, unhappy that driver error would place responsibility - not to mention the huge bill for repairs and compensation - squarely on its own shoulders, started putting it about that “senior management” were “uneasy” at the new signalling just installed at Southall by Railtrack.

By Tuesday of this week it became clear that the automatic warning system (AWS) had been isolated (switched off). The AWS is triggered by magnets placed 200 metres before a signal and gives an audible warning in the cab - a bell for green, or a buzzer (followed by the automatic application of the brakes unless the driver reacts) for any cautionary aspects.

This system - ironically introduced by Great Western Railway in the 1920s - has been the main means of alerting drivers as they approach a red signal. It has not however been installed on all lines and it is common practice for trains to run with it isolated. This is enshrined within the rule book.

Other facts not highlighted have been the removal of the second driver from trains running at over 100mph, and the extension by Great Western of the driver’s working day to as many as 11 hours as part of a productivity drive.

There then arises the question of automatic train protection (ATP). This is a computerised system that stops a train from passing a red signal or from speeding. This system, widely used on the continent, was recommended by the chair of the inquiry into the 1988 Clapham train crash that killed 35 people. Although the Tory transport secretary promised at the time that cash would be no object and that ATP would be installed, his successor, Brian Mawhinney, scrapped it during the run-up to privatisation in 1995 on the grounds of cost.

This demonstrates clearly how issues of safety are relegated in pursuit of profit and how capitalism turns human beings into commodities. The price of this particular commodity has been put at £860,000 - the maximum rail companies are prepared to invest on safety for each projected fatality avoided. ATP would have cost £6 billion - £14 million per life saved, according to management figures. Far too expensive.

Crocodile tears from transport secretaries and jailing drivers for manslaughter is far more cost effective.

Aslef driver,
Manchester