28.08.1997

Socialist democracy and democratic centralism

We reprint a document of an organised tendency within the Socialist Party involving John Bulaitis, Phil Hearse, Sarah Parker, David Lyons, Paul Morehouse and James White.

[It is healthy that these comrades are allowed to form a faction with their material being widely distributed by the SP Centre, including in the latest Members Bulletin. Yet this debate cannot remain the property of the SP alone. What will be the attitude of the party leadership to the open expression of factional views? Hannah Sell - SP’s campaign’s organiser - suggests that anyone interested in the debates of the organisation are “more than welcome to get hold of our internal documents” (Weekly Worker May 8) - which sort of stops them being “internal documents”, of course. The appearance of such discussions in the SP’s open publications would be a gain for the entire left – Editor]

In Members Bulletin no16 Peter Taaffe wrote a document entitled ‘A debate on democratic centralism’. It began: “Recent discussions within the ranks of Militant Labour ... underlined the necessity for a discussion within our ranks on the issue of the party, the character of the party, the character of the party structures, party democracy, etc.” This document is a contribution to the discussion called for by the general secretary.

The questions raised by PT are vital. The relationship of the socialist movement to democracy and the democratic functioning of revolutionary organisations has always been of critical importance, but is particularly so now in the aftermath of the collapse of Stalinism. One of the most important effects of this great historical change has been the increased sensibilities to the question of democracy amongst the broad mass, but also amongst the labour movement, within social movements and on the left generally. It is no exaggeration to say that it will be impossible to build a large revolutionary organisation in this period without recognising this new situation and drawing the appropriate conclusions in terms of our programme, public profile and internal organisational methods.

It is not a question of abandoning any of the principles of democratic centralism. Quite the opposite. The task of the period is twofold. Firstly, to re-examine how we apply democratic centralism and present ourselves in the new post-Stalinist era. And secondly, to rescue the real principles of democratic centralism and, indeed, Leninism from the influence and distortions of Stalinism.

PT’s document does not seem to us to address these important questions in the round. Perhaps this is inevitable, given that it concentrated on two specific and isolated polemical targets - a person or persons unnamed who threatened to withhold national dues; and a member of the USFI, probably not named for security reasons, who apparently argued that a continual absence of tendencies and factions is the mark of an “unhealthy” regime. Unfortunately, as a result, it seems to us that the balance of the document’s arguments is one-sided and partial.

A particular weakness is the presentation of a selection of comments from Trotsky on the significance of factions and tendencies inside a revolutionary organisation. PT correctly draws out Trotsky’s defence of democratic centralism. But he omits all reference to Trotsky’s repeated insistence on the inevitability (and, to a certain extent, the necessity) of internal tendencies and groupings. Also ignored is Trotsky’s conclusion that the Communist International itself was shipwrecked “on the question of factions”. In our view, the document leaves the reader with a misleading account of the history of the Bolshevik Party and Trotsky’s arguments on the question of party democracy. We will return to Trotsky’s arguments later in this document. First, however, it is necessary to examine the context and conditions within which the functioning of democratic centralism is to be applied today.

(...)

Socialist democracy - in other words, the proletarian democracy of a workers’ state - would be qualitatively different to bourgeois democracy. As Lenin pointed out in State and revolution, bourgeois democracy puts a “diaphragm between the masses and politics”. Socialist democracy would mean the active participation of the masses in decision making at every level, the democratisation of access to the media, the right of instant recall of all elected representatives, the freedom to organise of all currents, except those actively trying to overthrow the workers’ state. Socialist democracy is premised on the destruction of the divide between politics and the masses.

Democracy inside the workers’ movement - that is, the right to organise for every political current, the right to hold meetings, have publications, the right for different currents to exist within the labour movement, is fundamental. This is not just a moral question, but based on the inevitable existence of different layers, and different levels of consciousness, and different political viewpoints within the working class itself.

Political differences are inevitable inside the working class movement. Democracy - the free interplay and debate around different ideas and proposals for action - is essential for the working class to test out alternative programmes and strategies for taking forward the working class movement and the movements of the oppressed. The crushing, outlawing, banning or proscription of different currents in the workers’ movement is a product of the bureaucratisation, first of the social democrats, then of the communist parties. Only the bureaucracy has anything to gain from proscriptions in the labour movement.

The fall of Stalinism has had a deep effect on the left, both from the viewpoint of its conception of socialism, and on the question of democratic functioning in the left and among the oppressed.

The collapse of Stalinism, of course, pushed some formally leftwing forces towards the right. The bourgeois offensive around the ‘end of socialism’ and the ‘end of history’ has cut deep swathes in the socialist movement. But for those who have not succumbed to the rightwing offensive, the collapse of Stalinism has forced important rethinking on the issue of the nature of socialism itself, and the issue of democracy within the left and among the movements of the oppressed.

The Stalinist conception of socialism was always of the single-party regime, the claim that only one party could in any way really represent the working class, and totally monolithic and dictatorial state structures. Even among those anti-Stalinists who accepted the democracy of soviets, of workers’ councils, scepticism was often expressed as to whether there could be more than one legitimate party within the soviets. Confusion about this was compounded by some positions taken by Trotsky at the beginning of the struggle against incipient Stalinism in the 1920s, when for example he argued (in The new course) that the existence of a one-party state was inevitable during the period of the dictatorship (of the proletariat). This position is false, and indeed contrary to the practice of the Bolsheviks in the aftermath of the seizure of power, when the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries were still functioning as legal political parties. (The position argued by Trotsky when he gave evidence to the Dewey commission was entirely different.) Theoretically, there is absolutely no reason why under a socialist democracy there could not be several competing parties, all committed to the socialist project.

The uneven development of consciousness within the working class always gives rise to different trends and shades of opinion. What would be the political function of soviets if only one party, one trend, is allowed to organise for its political views? In such a case, as indeed happened in the USSR, the one organised trend will always win its position in soviet meetings: the soviets therefore become reduced to mere rubber stamps of the party’s opinion, and will have an in-built tendency towards atrophy. Why bother to turn up to a meeting when the outcome has been decided in advance? At best, one-party soviets are mechanisms for mobilising the opinion of the masses behind the prior decisions of the party.

Particularly in the advanced countries, it is ruled out that a single-party and authoritarian conception of socialism could ever again get wide support. The balance sheet of Stalinism is too telling for this to become a possibility. Whereas there are in the semi-colonial world some large Stalinist survivals from the previous period, for example the TDKP in Turkey, it is almost inconceivable that such organisations could be built again.

The ‘democracy wave’ has also had a profound effect on the conduct and organisation methods of the contemporary left. An important result is the open and pluralistic character of some of the new left mass formations: for example, the Communist Refound-ation, the PDS in Germany and the United Left in Spain. All of these formations allow the adherence of a wide variety of groupings, including trends claiming to represent Marxism or Trotskyism. Even the French Communist Party, famed for decades for the brutality of its internal regime and indeed its external relations with other currents in the labour movement, has been forced to allow a certain democratic opening, resulting in different trends and tendencies being able to express themselves openly, inside and outside the party.

All this, of course, leads to big political changes, because it delegiti-mises witch hunting inside the left and the labour movement. It means that what the Stalinists did in the past - making certain ideas an anathema - is now more difficult. In a situation where ideas have to be debated openly on their merits, where (as in France) Trotskyist speakers can appear on platforms in front of thousands of CP members, this is bound to change the relations between different political currents. This is an historic gain, an historic victory for the Marxist critique of Stalinism. And there is no going back. The Stalinist caricatures of democratic centralism, and its denial of workers’ democracy, have suffered a major defeat.

In this context it is necessary to understand that huge sections of the left - even the revolutionary left and some ‘Trotskyists’ - were in the past deeply pressured by Stalinism in relation to their internal regimes. The Mao-Stalinist organisations in the 1960s and 70s naturally adopted Stalinist forms of organisation. More surprising is the ‘verticalist’ and hierarchical forms of organisation adopted by some Trotskyists in the name of ‘democratic centralism’. The material basis of this was the isolation of much of the Trotskyist movement, which led to the sectarian-dogmatic degeneration of a wing of the Trotskyist movement - especially the Healy-Lambert current, but aspects of the same thing today can be seen in the British SWP and other organisations.

It is a deeply ironic fact that as Stalinism collapses, these caricatures of Marxism maintain utterly bureaucratic outlooks within their own organisations. While entirely happy to champion democracy in the wider labour movement, such currents invariably deny it internally. Even if the bulk of the members of such sectarian currents put up with such a contradiction, it is too glaring to be unnoticed by the advanced workers and youth.

(...)

All the factors dealt with so far must condition the way that democratic centralism is posed today and need to be taken into account by our party and international. It is natural in this period that there will be a scepticism amongst wide layers of anything perceived as Leninist methods. PT himself points out in his document that there is a tendency within many movements today - and particularly amongst the youth - of hostility to anything that has a “top-down approach”. Suspicions of anything perceived as anti-democratic and bureaucratic have been enormously enhanced precisely because of the experience of Stalinism. And, as PT points out, this is an extremely positive development.

But what implications does this have for us? It is vital in this new period that we examine and re-examine our own democratic profile. We have to demonstrate in our propaganda, but more importantly in practice, that democracy and the open expression of different tendencies and views is one of our most central concerns.

We have to continue to be the champions of the democratic rights, as well as the social rights of the working class and the specially oppressed. We have to continue to fight against the abuses of the trade union officialdoms and against all trends of bureaucracy in the workers’ movement and within the organisations of the oppressed. We have to continue to struggle for the fullest freedom of expression and democracy, including the right of tendencies to organise, within the workers’ movement. Our arguments at the time of the launch of the SLP for an open, democratic structure with the right of different trends and organisations to participate were entirely correct.

We have to develop our profile as the most open, democratic force within the workers’ movement. To do this we have to show a willingness to take seriously the ideas put forward by other important currents and trends and be prepared to debate with them in our journals and meetings, while of course defending our own political critique.

We have to also openly demonstrate the democracy within our own organisation. Of importance here is the need for a written constitution outlining the responsibilities and rights of membership, procedures for debates, etc. We should open a serious discussion about other questions: for example, the functioning of the slate system and the general methods of elections within the party at national, regional and local level.

Of fundamental importance is the way we deal with internal differences and minority viewpoints. Not only must we ensure, through a written constitution, the rights of all comrades to freely express and argue their views and, if necessary, organise tendencies or factions, but we must actively encourage an atmosphere that is conducive to encouraging comrades to express differences and argue their case within the organisation. Political debate, a clash of ideas, is a key part of the process through which a party matures, sharpens its understanding and intervention and develops a critical and educated membership.

It is not a matter of abandoning the principles of democratic centralism. The task of the period is to mount a defence of democratic centralism. In effect, we have to wage a struggle in defence of the real methods of Leninism, rather than the caricatured and deformed varieties which are a heritage of the effect of Stalinism. We have to rescue democratic centralism from the distortions of Stalinism and the perceived orthodoxy that it is by its nature a recipe for bureaucratism, political repression, and monolithic political formations.

The idea that the Bolsheviks were a politically monolithic, authoritarian-led organisation is, of course, an invention of Stalinism and various bourgeois academics. Lenin himself constantly stressed the need for the fullest and freest exchange of views. He saw that it would be absolutely impossible to build a party that could act together as one without “universal and full freedom to criticise” within its ranks (VI Lenin CW vol 10, p442).

Not only that: he saw that it was important that the workers outside the party, particularly the most advanced workers that the Bolsheviks were trying to reach, would know when a clash of ideas existed and could follow the debate. For example, he wrote: “We desire our publications to become organs for the discussion of all questions by all Russian social-democrats of the most diverse shades of opinion. We do not reject polemics between comrades, but, on the contrary, are prepared to give them considerable space in our columns. Open polemics, conducted in full view of all Russian social democrats and class conscious workers are necessary and desirable in order to clarify differences” (ibid vol 14, p330). And further:

“There can be no mass party, no party of a class, without full clarity of essential shadings, without an open struggle between various tendencies, without informing the masses as to which leaders and which organisations of the party are pursuing this or that line” (ibid vol 13, p159).

That is why the French comrades, while fighting on the agreed political line, were entirely correct to publish in their paper the views of the comrades who held a minority position over the recent French elections. Showing to the working class, particularly the most politically advanced layers, not just the conclusions of our debates but the fact that we have them and the considerations that were taken in reaching our conclusions is vital, especially in this period. Marxism is a science: and a scientist does not publish a new scientific thesis without also showing the method used and the possible alternatives to it that were considered during the research stage.

For Lenin, democratic centralism was primarily a method that attempted to synthesise the ideas and experience of the party into a common line for action. It was not a method that imposed a political and theoretical monolithism on the party, nor an attempt to prevent a public expression of the diversity of views within the party. For example, he wrote: “The principle of democratic centralism and autonomy for local party organisations implies universal and full freedom to criticise, so long as this does not disturb the unity of a definite action” (our emphasis, ibid vol 10, p442). The dialectic of this, however, is that the party can only achieve effective unity in action if there exists within its ranks the fullest and freest democracy.

It is now necessary to turn to some of the arguments in PT’s document, particularly those where he deals with the significance or otherwise of factions and tendencies within a revolutionary organisation. In the document, PT polemicises against the argument that the absence of organised tendencies or factions is in itself the symptom of an “unhealthy internal regime”. To back up his argument he quotes Trotsky’s statement that: “An organisation that is smaller but unanimous can have enormous success with a correct policy, while an organisation which is torn by internal strife is condemned to rot.”

This, of course, is true. But it is vital to understand that it was only one side of Trotsky’s argument. Just as the argument that the absence of tendencies or factions in and of itself equals an unhealthy regime is false, so equally is the one that maintains that the very existence of factions is an unhealthy development, and something to be frowned upon.

This was never the position of Trotsky. He did not glorify factional struggle but, on the contrary, recognised the dangers in it. He pointed out that a common programme put definite limits on internal ideological struggle in advance and noted that “Where endless discussion feeds endless discussion, there can be only decay and disintegration” (L Trotsky, ‘Factions and the Fourth International’ Writings 1935-36). Yet he also constantly stressed the fundamental point that when there are serious differences in perspectives or strategy then this almost inevitably leads to the organisation of tendencies and factions.

Trotsky actually put it thus: “The discussion of serious questions is inconceivable without groupings” (ibid). He explains why this was the case in The new course (pp 79/80): “To have the party as a whole participate in the working out and adoption of resolutions, is to promote temporary ideological groupings that risk transformation into durable groupings and even factions.” Further:

“What follows from this? If factions are not wanted, there must not be any permanent groupings; if permanent groupings are not wanted, temporary groupings must be avoided; finally, in order that there be no temporary groupings, there must be no differences of opinion, for whenever there are two opinions, people group together.”

Trotsky, on numerous occasions, pointed to the role of faction struggle in the history of the Bolshevik party itself. He went as far as saying that the whole “history of Bolshevism is the history of the struggle of factions”. For example, in Revolution betrayed he writes:

“The inner regime of the Bolshevik party was characterised by the method of democratic centralism ... Freedom of criticism and ideological struggle was an irrevocable content of party democracy. The present doctrine that Bolshevism does not tolerate factions is a myth of the epoch of decline. In reality the history of Bolshevism is the history of the struggle of factions. And, indeed, how could a genuinely revolutionary organisation, setting itself the task of overthrowing the world and uniting under its banner the most audacious iconoclasts, fighters and insurgents, live and develop without intellectual conflicts, without groupings and temporary formations?” (our emphasis, pp94-95, Pathfinder edition).

On another occasion he wrote:

“The entire history of Bolshevism was one of free struggle of tendencies and factions. In different periods, Bolshevism passed through the struggle of pro- and anti-boycottists, ‘otzovists’, ultimatists, conciliationists, partisans of ‘proletarian culture’, partisans and opponents of armed insurrection in October, partisans and opponents of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, left communists, partisans and opponents of the official military policy, etc, etc. The Bolshevik central committee never dreamed of demanding that an opponent ‘abandon factional methods’, if the opponent held that the policy of the central committee was false. Patience and loyalty to the opposition were among the most important traits of Lenin’s leadership” (our emphasis, Trotskyism and the PSOP July 15 1939).

Marxists, of course, always strive for the highest possible level of political homogeneity within their organisations. However, this cannot be done artificially, only by democratic discussion and debate. In fact, without the freest and most open discussion, and above all a theoretically educated and critical membership, a high level of political homogeneity will be impossible to obtain.

The possibilities of building a more or less homogeneous party depend not only on the capacities of the leadership, but also on the objective situation. In this period, it will be extremely difficult to construct as homogeneous a tendency as was possible in the past. We are in a period of major political and theoretical turmoil, with major unanswered questions about how events will develop and new programmatic questions being posed - and old ones being posed in a new way. In such an historical period, there are bound to be major disputes and disagreements among Marxists. Indeed, it would be amazing, literally incredible, if the changes in the world up to and after the collapse of Stalinism did not give rise to such a clash of ideas, and differences of appreciation, among the Marxist forces, and the socialist movement more generally. Debates among Marxists, sharp clashes of opinion, are inevitable, as well as being the way that ideas are sharpened and developed. Only if you think there exists an infallible leadership, can you dispense with internal debates. And from internal debates on major issues rises, inevitably, the question of tendencies and factions.

Peter Taaffe further quotes Trotsky as pointing out:

“The conversion of groupings into permanent factions is in itself a disturbing symptom that signifies either that the struggling tendencies are totally irreconcilable although [NB: the actual text says ‘or’ not ‘although’] the party as a whole has reached a deadlock. It is impossible of course to reverse such a situation by simply banning factions. To wage war against the symptom does not mean to cure the disease. Only a correct policy and a healthy administrative structure and procedure can prevent the conversion of temporary groupings into ossified faction[s].”

This quote comes from ‘Factions and the Fourth International’ (Writings 1935-36 p188). This is, in fact, the most complete statement by Trotsky on the issue, and is worth studying in detail. In it Trotsky notes that when the Communist International banned factions this police ban was alleged to be in the Bolshevik tradition. “It is difficult to imagine a worse slander on the history of Bolshevism,” he says. He then points out that the very fact that factions were banned by a special resolution at the Tenth Party Congress in 1921 shows that

“In the previous period - ie, during the 17 years when Bolshevism arose, grew, gained strength and came to power - factions were a legitimate part of party life. And this was reflected in practice” (our emphasis, pp184-5).

Next he lists a litany of factional struggle between 1906 and 1918, outlining no less than nine factions in that 12-year period. Was this, we may ask, the symptom of an unhealthy regime? Or even, in PT’s words, the product of “intellectuals of petty bourgeois origin, who prefer a debating society rather than an organisation seriously challenging for mass influence and ultimately power”? Of course not. The need for factions stemmed from the need of the Bolshevik activists to sharpen their strategy for achieving and defending the socialist revolution.

Trotsky further comments: “It is possible to regard the decision of the Tenth Congress as a grave necessity. But in the light of later events, one thing is absolutely clear: the banning of factions brought the heroic history of Bolshevism to an end and made way for its bureaucratic degeneration.” He goes on to argue that the extension of the banning of factions and stifling of factional struggle into the new, young sections of the Comintern “doom[ed] them to degeneration before they had time to grow and develop”.

What can be drawn from this? While homogeneity is a goal to strive for, in a revolutionary organisation, particularly in a period of political flux and social upheaval differences between Marxists are inevitable. From this almost certainly will flow the formation of tendencies and factions. Factional struggle is not necessarily a sign of weakness, or a symptom of “deadlock”, but as in the Bolshevik Party can, if handled correctly, enhance the party’s ideological clarity, help educate its members and strengthen the party’s ability to act. Moreover, any stifling of political debate - whether by the banning of tendencies or factions or the existence of an atmosphere that comrades, by being involved in them, are acting in a disloyal fashion or against the ‘interests of the party’, etc - will have a detrimental effect on the party’s development and poses the risk of bureaucratic degeneration.

There is possibly a feeling among some members of the Socialist Party that factions equal split and therefore they are something to be avoided at all costs. This arises from the fact that in our own history every factional struggle has indeed led to precisely a split. But such an approach is wrong. Controversy over the ideas of a faction or tendency is healthy, but controversy over its right to exist is dangerous. As Trotsky said:

“From the standpoint of Bolshevik ideas on party democracy I would consider it an outright scandal to accuse an opponent who happened to be in the minority of employing factional ‘methods’, instead of engaging in discussions with him over the gist of the question. If differences are serious ones then factional methods are justified.”

If comrades feel there is a culture that prevents them from organising openly to present their views to the party then this is the recipe for all sorts of clandestine factional activity which cannot serve the interests of clarifying any contentious issues through discussion in front of the whole membership. This is a point made by Lynn Walsh in the debate around the setting up of the SLP last year. He said:

“Only a politically monolithic party, with centralised, top-down control by the leadership, could eliminate the existence of different groups and factions. In reality, restrictive party regimes ... merely reinforce the fiction that there are no groupings, forcing political trends to operate in a covert or semi-clandestine way. This inevitably distorts political debate and restricts genuine party democracy” (Socialism Today February 1996).

The collapse of Stalinism has posed a number of new questions for Marxists in relation to the question of democracy, questions that are fundamental for ‘our political profile’ in the next period. This means taking into account the increased democratic sensibilities when formulating our programme and demands. It means championing struggles for democratic rights, popular sovereignty, equality, supporting self-organisation, etc. It means skillfully explaining the limitations of bourgeois democracy and, in a popular fashion, explaining our alternative to Stalinised-socialism. And it means showing that we are the most consistent and best fighters for the fullest democracy in the workers’ movement itself. It also mean demonstrating to the working class and youth we are trying to reach that we are totally open, democratic and pluralistic in our approach to internal organisation, debates and differences.

An approach outlined above will show that we have thoroughly integrated, programmatically and strategically, the lessons of the collapse of Stalinism, including into our own internal and external functioning.