10.04.1997

Private debate on independence

This document by Alan McCombes - a leading member of both the Scottish Socialist Alliance and Scottish Militant Labour - is an important one. In addition to Jack Conrad’s more particular criticisms (‘The call for an active boycott’, printed below) it is worthwhile making some general points about openness in the workers’ movement.

For despite the fact that the text actually contains an explicit (and thoroughly inaccurate) attack on our organisation’s position on the key question of Blair’s referendum and important proposals on SML’s answer to the growing challenge of nationalism, this is an internal SML document. It has been sent to us anonymously by a comrade who evidently has a clearer understanding of how politics in the workers’ movement should be debated and clarified than many of his/her comrades in SML.

Ironically, SML members in Scotland have recently targeted the CPGB for ridicule because of the critical exchange between this committee and our Party Centre, in particular with the national organiser.

This document - an opportunist rationalisation of a growing accommodation to nationalism on the part of SML - illustrates neatly the simple truth that “organisations like SML and the Socialist Party are fraught with unexplored differences and lines of fissure” (Mark Fischer, ‘Party Notes’ Weekly Worker March 27). The difference, comrades, is that we debate our disagreements openly, in a principled way.

Far from hiding our real politics away in internal documents, the CPGB operates according to Lenin’s maxim that a genuine party of the class cannot be built

“... without an open struggle between various tendencies, without informing the masses as to which leaders and which organisations of the Party are pursuing this or that line. Without this, a party worthy of the name cannot be built, and we are building it” (VI Lenin CW Vol 13, Moscow 1973, p159).

We wonder when SML and the Socialist Party will start to take these profound words of Lenin to heart.

Scottish Committee,
CPGB

Referenda statement

In Britain as a whole the two key battlegrounds of the coming general election will be Europe and Scotland.

Never before this century have the major political parties been so preoccupied with the national question in Scotland in the run-up to a general election. This partly reflects the political convergence of the main British parties on the decisive questions of social and economic policy. But it also reflects the genuine fear of sections of the ruling class that Scotland is now on a slippery slope towards separation; and that after three centuries the continued existence of Britain can no longer be taken for granted. In Scotland, the next general election will be dominated by this constitutional debate - although it is the task of our organisation and the Scottish Socialist Alliance to drag onto the centre of the political arena the big ideological issues which the mainstream political parties would prefer to bury completely.

Not just New Labour, but also the Scottish National Party, will squirm with embarrassment when they are put on the spot on issues such as poverty, inequality, privatisation, taxation, public ownership and socialism.

Nonetheless, if the Alliance is to be taken seriously as a credible force in Scottish policies, it must be prepared to tackle not just the broad constitutional questions facing Scotland, but also the detailed questions which will repeatedly arise in the heat of the coming general election.

This means we should be prepared to state clearly where we stand on Labour’s referendum proposals - and where we stand on the SNP’s counter-proposal for a multi-option referendum.

Labour has already begun to taunt the SNP over its attitude to Labour’s planned devolution referendum. Constrained by the fundamentalist wing within its own party and the fear of provoking a damaging internal conflict on the eve of the general election, the SNP leadership has refused to indicate whether or not it will campaign for a double yes vote.

As the general election intensifies, Labour will step up these attacks on the SNP, sensing that they have discovered the Achilles heel of the SNP.

In retaliation, the SNP reply that they will move an amendment calling for a multi-option referendum - and they demand to know what will be the first, second and third preferences of Labour.

Inevitably, the Scottish Socialist Alliance will be caught in this constitutional crossfire. Although it would not be a catastrophe if we were not able to work out an agreed position in advance of the general election, it would nevertheless give the Alliance a substantial advantage if we were prepared to answer both questions clearly and decisively.

On Labour’s proposed double-barrelled referendum, we have already called for the Alliance to adopt a position of unequivocal support for a double ‘yes’ vote - while continuing to criticise the rigged nature of Labour’s proposed referendum, which blatantly excludes the independence option.

The Alliance National Council has not yet adopted this position. In a preliminary discussion, members of the Communist Party of Great Britain argued to defer any decision until after the general election - although the real position of the CPGB is to argue for a boycott of the referendum on the grounds that it is rigged.

This position is completely ludicrous.

Under capitalism all referenda - and for that matter, all elections - are rigged to one degree or another. In the coming general election, the Alliance and other small parties will be competing at a severe disadvantage for a host of reasons: the nature of the electoral system, the multi-million budgets of the big political parties, the manipulation of public opinion by the media, etc. If the CPGB’s attitude towards Labour’s referendum was followed through to its logical conclusion, they would also advocate boycotting elections.

A boycott would at best relegate the Alliance to the status of a complete irrelevance. Insofar as a boycott had any effect, it would only play into the hands of the Labour leadership and of the Tories - both of which would prefer a low turn-out. Of course a low turn-out would not be put down to the success of any boycott campaign: it would be attributed to apathy and lack of interest. In fact, it could provide the Labour leadership with the perfect excuse to bury the entire project.

Supporting a double ‘yes’ vote is consistent with our general approach towards the national question in Scotland, which is to support any step - no matter how small or inadequate - in the direction of greater autonomy for the Scottish people.

More complicated, however, is our attitude to the multi-option referendum. In the aftermath of the 1992 general election we participated in the demonstrations called by Scotland United in support of a three-option referendum. At that stage, we declared in favour of devolution as our preferred option. But we now have to carefully consider whether that position is still applicable today.

Certainly, there have been important changes since 1992. In the first place, the attitude towards Labour on the part of the most advanced workers and youth has hardened significantly since 1992. At that stage, Labour still formally adhered to socialism. Our organisation still orientated towards Labour. Although a section had begun to break with Labour - especially in Scotland - the process of transforming the party into an openly capitalist party was still at an early stage.

Devolution is inextricably linked with Labour - and, to a lesser extent, the Liberal Democrats. The hostility towards Labour on the part of a key section of Scottish workers and youth inevitably spills over onto the constitutional debate itself.

In the second place, Labour’s own devolution proposals have been significantly watered down since 1992 - as has Labour’s political commitment to home rule. In 1995, Labour ditched its long-standing policy of allocating ‘assigned revenues’ (ie, taxes raised in Scotland) to a Scottish parliament in favour of the old block grant policy of the 1970s. It is now questionable whether Labour’s plan could accurately be described as a parliament. At the same time, there has been a conspicuous downgrading of the issue of constitutional change by the party leadership. In contrast to former Labour leader John Smith, Blair is blatantly lukewarm towards devolution. It is clear that, behind the scenes, Blair and his spin-doctors are consciously nurturing a unionist wing within the Scottish Labour party. Although they have had to call a temporary truce in the run-up to the general election, Blair fully expects that this anti-home rule faction will take control of the party machine before a Scottish Assembly is set up. In the meantime, they are consciously dampening down expectations in devolution precisely [because] they intend a Scottish assembly to be no more than a glorified local authority.

In the third place, our programme for a Scottish parliament has been fleshed out in much greater detail than ever before. We have to consider whether it is straining credibility to call for a socialist Scotland, involving the public ownership of North Sea oil and the finance industry and the removal of nuclear weapons from the Clyde - and simultaneously back Labour’s assembly as our first preference in a three-option referendum.

Fourthly, we have to take account of the different layers of Scottish society and how they are likely to move in the event of a multi-option referendum.

In general, the ruling classes support the status quo - although a significant section of big business interests in Scotland have now begun to shift towards acceptance of some devolution - in part reassured that a New Labour dominated assembly would pose no threat. The status quo would also attract the support of the Tory voting middle classes, particularly middle class pensioners. Another section of the middle class would support devolution; and yet another section, especially of students, would be attracted to independence.

But among the working class in the towns and cities, the split would be between devolution and independence. In general, the more cautious sections of the working class - especially older workers, pensioners and Labour loyalists - will back devolution. So too would the trade union bureaucracy - which would have a certain effect on a layer of trade unionists. On the other hand, the more combative sections of the working class are more likely to support independence. Recent polls suggest that a clear majority of young people under 25 now support independence. Among pensioners on the other hand, support for independence is very weak. There is a similar co-relation between social class and support for independence. Among the poorest sections of the working class, support for independence is strongest. In contrast, support for independence steadily weakens among the more affluent social categories.

Even now, before Scotland has undergone the experience of a devolved assembly, one third of Labour voters support independence as their preferred option. After the general election, there could be a big increase in support for independence in tandem with the growing unpopularity of a new Labour government.

And of course if Labour fails to win the next election, there would almost certainly be a massive swing towards independence on the part of working class Labour voters. Particularly if another Tory victory in Britain coincided with a Tory slump in Scotland with the Tories reduced to just a handful of MPs, the stage would be set for serious political upheaval in Scotland with the demand for independence at the forefront. Among those who support independence today there are various strands. Some sections are Little Scotlanders whose support for independence mirrors the British nationalism of the Tory Eurosceptics.

Another section supports independence and the SNP because it promises the type of social democratic-type reforms - and none of the big British parties offer increased pensions, the restoration of benefits to l6-and 17 year olds, or a big increase in public spending. But there is another growing section of the working class who are socialists and support much of our programme - but do not believe it is feasible in a British context because of the strength of the Tories, the weight of ‘Middle England’ and the idea that whole tracts of southern England could never be won over to socialism. For this layer, the attraction of independence is that the socialist movement would be a much more powerful force in an independent Scotland.

At this stage, the debate around the question of a multi-option referendum is less concrete than the debate around Labour’s two-question referendum for the simple reason that neither Labour nor the Tories are likely to concede such a referendum.

Labour fears opening up such a debate in Scotland, precisely because the party leadership is afraid that in the course of a referendum, when all the options are publicly debated and scrutinised, independence may prove more popular than devolution.

Nonetheless, it is not totally ruled out that under certain conditions Blair could be forced to reluctantly concede such a referendum. For example, if there was a hung parliament and a large bloc of SNP MPs united with the Liberal Democrats to amend Labour’s referendum bill, it is possible that the Tories would support the amendment in order to muddy the waters and to polarise the debate around the options of independence versus the status quo. Alternatively, if the Tories did succeed in clinging to power at the next general election, Labour local authorities - or even the government itself - could be forced to organise such a referendum under the pressure of a mass movement from below.

Although both of these scenarios are unlikely at this stage, they cannot be totally ruled out. In any case, it would be inconsistent for our organisation and for the Scottish Socialist Alliance to support the call for a multi-option referendum as an alternative to Labour’s rigged referendum - but then refuse to say how we would vote.

Faced with the stark choice between Labour’s devolved assembly within the UK or independence (or independence in Europe, as it probably would be worded) we should now consider stating a preference for independence. At the same time, we should continue to advance our internationalist perspective; our demand for the unity of the working class and trade union movement; and our distinctive policy of a voluntary socialist federation of Britain as the first step towards an all-European socialist federation.

There is no contradiction between standing for working class unity and internationalism, while at the same time giving critical support to the demand for independence. There are essentially three reasons why we should now consider making this adjustment.

First, because under the conditions of a multi-option referendum, the demand for independence would be potentially the most revolutionary. The ruling classes could easily live with a tame Labour assembly; but a vote for independence would threaten to shatter the United Kingdom itself with potentially revolutionary consequences for Scotland, England, Wales and Ireland. To support independence would be to support what would be seen as the boldest, clearest challenge to the ruling class; to support anything less would be seen as timid and hesitant and lining up with the Lib-Lab political establishment in Scotland.

Secondly, it would be much easier to raise our full-blooded socialist alternative by supporting the independence option as our first preference. It can appear contradictory and even incoherent to call for radical socialist change in Scotland - then to call on people to vote for Labour’s feeble Scottish Assembly in order to achieve radical change. Especially for those workers and youth who have moved beyond devolution to what they see as a more radical option, our position would not appear to make any sense.

And thirdly, if we were to line up with Labour and the Liberal Democrats against independence in a referendum campaign, we would allow the SNP a completely free hand to influence and lead the most radicalised section of the working class.

Under the leadership of the SNP, this movement would be safely channelled in a parochial, nationalistic, capitalist direction.

By supporting such a demand, while we strengthen the demand for independence we would paradoxically weaken the grip of the SNP; and would ensure that in cities like Glasgow where we have a sizable influence, the demand for independence would be given a certain socialist and internationalist content.

In any tactical turn we take, it is necessary to weigh up the long-term and the short-term consequences. It is correct that at this stage we put forward an open-ended position on the national question in order that we can appeal to supporters of independence and to the supporters of devolution.

On the other hand, we cannot merely sit on the fence. Sooner or later we will be forced to choose - or at least indicate our first and second preference.

Irrespective of which option we choose, we will encounter opposition. The worst mistake we could make in this period would be to antagonise the most radical and combative sections of the working class and youth for fear of offending the more cautious, conservative layers.

But we also have to link our short tern tactics with our long term perspectives. At this stage it is impossible to categorically predict how the national question in Britain will unfold in the future. It is possible that the next few years could see the emergence of a mass socialist movement on an all-Britain scale - or at least a huge tidal wave of industrial social upheaval. In that case, the demand for Scottish independence could become submerged within a wider movement - although, even then, it would not disappear completely. In the heat of such events, we would not place the same emphasis on the national question.

However, unless such a movement led directly to the taking of power by the working class, the national question could re-emerge with a vengeance after a period of time. Either way, provided we do not succumb to nationalism - and provided we continue to fight for the unity of the working class across Britain - our ability in such a movement would not be undermined by supporting Scottish independence in a referendum.

On the other hand, if we opposed Scottish independence in a referendum and the national question continued to escalate, we could be seriously undermined in the long run. Eighteen years after the devolution referendum of 1979, the stance taken by various individuals and organisations continues to haunt them. Thus one of the reasons why neither Robin Cook nor Brian Wilson have been allowed to play a major role in Scottish politics is because both are vulnerable to attack by the SNP because of the role they played in opposing devolution back in 1979.

Given the combination of various historical and contemporary factors, it is likely that the long-term trend in Scotland towards independence will continue. For several centuries, the union of Scotland and England was cemented by the advance of the British empire and the corresponding development of the British economy. During the 20th century, Britain’s involvement in two world wars, followed by the post-war economic boom and the rise of the welfare state, helped preserve the United Kingdom.

Britain today is sinking rapidly down the world’s economic league tables. Even the Republic of Ireland has recently overtaken the UK in terms of economic production per head of population. And while the British Labour Party offers undiluted Toryism, the SNP promises far-reaching social reforms in an independent Scotland.

Given the extreme weakness of the socialist left on an all-Britain scale it is unlikely that the national question in Scotland will be superseded in the near future by a resurgence of British socialism.

In the meantime, with a Labour government poised to take power, the general movement in the direction of independence is likely to accelerate. By the time of the general election after this coming election - in 2002 or 2003 - it is possible that the idea of Scottish independence will have become unstoppable. Even if events do not move so fast, there is an unmistakable long term trend that we ignore at our peril.

Any decisions we take now will require to be justified not just in this general election but in the years to come. Sometimes it is correct to hesitate in order to see more clearly how events are likely to emerge in the future. But there is also a danger that by hesitating for too long we can end up appearing indecisive and incapable of providing a clear lead.

Given the changes we have outlined in this statement, and given the mass activity we are about to conduct, it would be better to make this significant tactical change sooner rather than later.

February 10 1997