WeeklyWorker

19.11.2026
W Bagg ‘Melancholy passing into mania’ drawing on stone from photo taken by Hugh Welch Diamond (1858)

Socialism, gentrification and abjection

Paul Demarty reviews Fredrik deBoer All in your head Simon & Schuster 2026, pp291, £20

In 2017, Fredrik deBoer, a popular but divisive writer on the American left, committed an act that ruined his life.

He made allegations of sexual assault against fellow writer Malcolm Harris. These allegations, as he later admitted, were entirely false. He publicly apologised for what he acknowledged was a heinous act, disappeared off the face of the internet, and little was heard from him for years.

The reality of the matter is that deBoer was decades into his battle with severe bipolar disorder. He had been on and off medication, in and out of psychiatric institutions and, by his own account, ruining friendships and relationships all over the place. His mania was characterised, as it often is in such cases, by intense paranoia. It was during one of these manias that he lodged his allegations against Harris.

In the near-decade since, something called ‘mental health’ has been all the rage among bien-pensant liberals. Enormous efforts have been made to destigmatise mental illness. The rise of the so-called ‘neurodiversity’ movement has led to the idea that conditions such as autism should not even be viewed as disabilities at all - perhaps, indeed, they are superpowers! Attempts to maintain medical control over such diagnoses are denounced as ‘gatekeeping’. At the same time, in Britain and the US alike, treatment of the severely debilitated - psychotic patients, or the severely autistic who cannot take care of their own needs at all - is dismal. These people are invisible to us, unless we encounter them screaming at nothing in the streets.

Gatekeepers

All in your head is deBoer’s extensive polemic against this state of affairs. Though it is not a mental health memoir, deBoer makes clear that this is not a question of merely academic interest for him. And his argument is precisely that the two sides of the issue are connected: the relentless positivity and wars against stigma, the identity politics of the ‘neurodiverse’, the invasion of social media by woo-woo wellness influencers - all add up to an enabling condition for the maltreatment of the seriously ill.

His argument is somewhat fragmentary, which is something of a defect of the book, but there are a few clear strands of argument. The most important one is intellectual history: of anti-psychiatry, from its distant antecedents to its true pioneers in the 1960s, like RD Laing, Michel Foucault and especially Thomas Szasz (the closest thing this book has to a villain); and later of the so-called social model of disability, in which disability is supposed to be wholly the creation of an unresponsive society rather than an irreducible result of actual impairments. Then comes, importantly in his view, the advent of the mass internet, which enables vulgarised fragments of these ideas to yield whole subcultures, like a fig growing around the body of a wasp.

Now, pushback against the psychiatric profession could become truly fearsome and organised, since it could spread so quickly outside the old circles of activist malcontents. One example cited by deBoer is the strange phenomenon a few years ago, when TikTok was suddenly dominated by a fad for dissociative identity disorder (DID), formerly known as multiple-personality disorder. This is a severe condition, invariably associated with childhood abuse and other crippling traumas, and indeed so rare that its very existence is controversial in the clinical literature.

Yet here, all of a sudden, were thousands of people - overwhelmingly middle class, adolescent and female - exhibiting symptoms for their adoring casual audience, sometimes with their personalities in conversation with each other (an entirely unknown phenomenon in earlier case histories). No ordinarily well-informed person can disagree, really, with deBoer’s deadpan statement that “basically none of the people performing DID on TikTok actually have the disorder”.

Were they to agree with him in public, however, they might face pushback. Thus, the story of a minor flap at the prestigious McLean psychiatric hospital:

In the days following the easing of Covid-19 lockdowns, [Dr Matthew] Robinson received a flood of referrals and school requests to evaluate supposed cases of DID, many of which were plainly unconvincing. Psychiatric resources are scarce … [so] these dubious DID diagnoses presented Robinson with a genuine practical problem. He complained about it at a conference hosted at McLean, pointing out that these cases of ‘dissociative identity disorder’ were very likely illegitimate. TikTok discovered Robinson’s presentation on McLean’s website, and the predictable backlash followed: bad online reviews, threats, calls to strip his credentials, and enough general harassment that, to forestall institutional embarrassment, McLean pulled Robinson’s lecture from their website.

The ‘cancellation’ consequence here is very mild, as these things go. But the underlying problem remains: triage of serious disorders was, at a time of great strain on the system, disrupted by a flood of obviously factitious complaints, and the institutions capitulated in the face of an online mob rather than openly standing by their diagnostic practices.

Disability

Among other things, this is an example of the “gentrification of disability” - a phrase coined by deBoer some years ago that has achieved some wider usage, and which, of course, gets a whole chapter of his book. Like urban gentrification, it is a matter of the better-off moving in and squeezing out the existing population. Some debility, perhaps previously stigmatised, undergoes a change in the cultural consciousness, and before long it is a plaything of the highly functional middle classes: “Like a local bar favored by working class residents being flooded with affluent new arrivals, intellectual and discursive spaces once dedicated to the interests of the most afflicted have become fixated instead on a class of patients whose disorders range from mild to dubious, thanks in part to the way that diagnoses become fads.”

The “paradigmatic” case, for deBoer, is autism. Rates of diagnosis have skyrocketed in recent years, including crucially among adults. Part of this is the folding of Asperger syndrome - a diagnosis typically used for milder presentations, particularly without delayed language acquisition - into a new diagnosis of ‘autism spectrum disorder’ with discrete levels of severity. Level 1 covers, roughly, the old Asperger’s territory, where people suffer some impairments in social life, but little or no intellectual disability and are typically able to live independently; level 3 the most severe cases of extreme intellectual disability, where patients often lack the power of speech at all, and will need constant support throughout their lives; and level 2 cases in between. The popular image of the autistic savant is definitely level 1.

Diagnosis of autism, of course, is a matter of expert judgment. There is no biomarker: the assessor must evaluate descriptions of particular behaviours and make a decision. The boundary between ASD-1 and ‘normal’ development is thus fuzzy; there are certainly those with particular personality quirks and eccentricities that overlap the diagnostic criteria of ASD-1 (I would count myself among them, for that matter). Throw in the assault on ‘gatekeeping’ here, and there is at least a danger of the ASD-1 population swelling with people who are, essentially, self-diagnosed (either literally or by doctor-shopping), and moreover extremely attached to their diagnoses by the logic of modern identity politics.

These are the people most able to speak as if for all autists, because they are the least impaired, if impaired at all (there is no identity politics of non-verbal ASD-3 children, that is for sure). And, because of that, it is to them that the accommodations of wider society will naturally accrue. The most severely afflicted have only their carers to speak for them; by definition, their carers are short on free time to make TikToks; and, in any case, the average TikTok user does not want to gawp at somebody stimming with such violence that they are at constant risk of serious self-injury.

For all the talk of visibility, the result is that the most severely disabled are rendered invisible, and eventually evicted from the neighbourhood. It is reasonable for the mildly autistic to see their interest in obtaining some extra understanding, as they live their lives mostly according to the usual script of their societies; yet level-3 autists need something like the exact opposite, since their wellbeing is more or less purely a function of the level of care they are able to obtain from others, who must be empowered in some reasonable way to take decisions on their behalf.

If ‘autism’ becomes - as it has - a political identity, the result is therefore disastrous: fulfilling the needs of the most afflicted is taken as an assault on the autonomy of the least, whose condition becomes reified as autism as such. The obvious credibility gap is filled in largely with preposterous ‘just-so’ stories, such as the idea, mentioned by deBoer, that non-verbal autists are merely choosing not to speak.

It should be clear that I concur with much of this analysis. In some places, I disagree. Though internet culture should not be discounted as a causal factor in all this, it is overweighted here. Why should performance of disability be so attractive, and so infectious? Anything, after all, can become a fad. In his chapter on factitious illness (hypochondria, Munchausen’s and friends), deBoer finds the motive force in blunt human nature: the desire for attention, and for the appearance of control. Yet the latter surely needs unpacking further.

Neoliberalism

For we do not have control. We are moving, as the years of neoliberalism grind ever onwards, from a political culture in which need is acknowledged as a primary concern - a sop to shore up the home front in the cold war - to one where the prevailing ideology is a matter of survival of the fittest. Yet the ‘losers’ do not want to be sacrificed, and a truly dog-eat-dog world would simply devolve into state failure and warlordism. So some regime is needed to negotiate between claims for clemency. We are in a world divided, that is, between the deserving and undeserving poor.

This forms a material basis for the sectional politics of identity: whether disability, race or gender, these are specific extenuating circumstances which can be put to the bureaucracies of the capitalist firms and the state within the rules of the fake-meritocratic governing ideology. There is thus a reason why people self-reify in these remarkably homogeneous ways. While not everyone in the online subcultures in fact negotiates with the wider world in this way, the fact that some among them do provides some legitimating moral force to the others.

Therefore, deBoer’s closing recommendations are too limited. He is right to declare that nothing can be done without achieving universal free healthcare - which, of course, the USA does not have. However, dealing with the ideological side of the equation requires much more drastic surgery to American (and certainly also British) society than the tweaks to social media algorithms and pious wishes for a better culture he offers. As a self-styled Marxist, deBoer ought to have understood this.

He has, however, alighted on a more profound blind spot on the left. Our focus, especially since the ‘new left’ years, has been on self-liberation. In some ways, this is all to the good; but there is an ambiguity about who the subject of self-liberation is. For Marx, it was the working class; for post-new-left identitarians, it became particular groups of the oppressed. This was of dubious value at best, but in the case of disability ‘self-liberation’, it is fatally confused.

We do not have a place, in this schema, for the truly abject. We do not have a meaningful way of even thinking about the politics of caring for those who cannot care for themselves - we prefer, in many cases, to deceive ourselves into thinking that such people do not exist. The left proponents of eugenics, in an earlier era, were at least honest on this point. If we take it that the eugenic conclusion was wrong, as I hope we all do, then harder thinking is necessary.

This book is a worthwhile and courageous contribution on a sore point in leftwing politics.