WeeklyWorker

02.07.2026
Trump signs the MoU in France

More than a matter of words

Negotiations are happening, but their significance is much disputed and there are those, not least inside Iran, who want no agreement. Then there is Lebanon and the danger of civil war. Yassamine Mather reports

Despite repeated breaches of the ceasefire, the US‑Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) remains alive for the time being. It has paused or reduced direct fighting, opened a 60-day negotiating window and placed the Strait of Hormuz at the centre of any agreement. But the two sides are already disputing what the next step means and who has the authority to define it.

The possibility of holding further negotiations in the capital of Qatar, Doha, has become one of the first disputed tests of MoU. On June 29, Donald Trump claimed Iran had requested a meeting in Doha and said “it will perhaps be important”, adding that US envoys would attend. Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff arrived in Doha on June 30.

Experts

Iran’s position was different: Tehran said there was “no negotiation at any level” scheduled with the US, while acknowledging an expert-level visit to Qatar, connected to implementation of the MoU and the release of frozen funds. That means Doha talks are happening, but more likely as mediated, technical contacts rather than formal, direct US-Iran negotiations. A spokesperson for the foreign ministry stated that Iran would have no negotiations at any level with the US in the coming days, and that the Iranian delegation’s trip to Doha would be “to follow up on the implementation of the terms of the memorandum of understanding”, including the release of Iran’s frozen assets.

Ultimately, this is a fight over far more than language: is it toll-free navigation, or is it paid management services?

Oman and Iran are cooperating and competing at the same time. They have discussed a joint working group on Hormuz management, which signals technical cooperation. But there is also political conflict: Oman wants a “lawful, stabilising” framework that preserves safe passage and protects its mediator role. Iran wants to prove that no Hormuz settlement can happen without Tehran’s consent. This is why the Hormuz question is not simply about shipping lanes: it is also about recognition, regional authority and whether Iran can convert military pressure into a recognised management role over maritime security.

A major political problem is about the order of operations. The US wants a step-by-step deal: Iran stops attacks first, keeps the Strait of Hormuz open, and accepts nuclear limits - then gets sanctions relief, oil benefits and unfrozen funds. Iran wants to keep its bargaining power, so is willing to talk, but does not want to look like it is caving in to US pressure. That is why it sends negotiators to Doha, while publicly denying it is actually negotiating with the US.

Going forward, talks will likely focus on four issues, each with a clear gap:

In short, the US wants ‘Behave first, get rewarded later’ and Iran wants ‘Get something now, and tie it to everything else’.

The bottom line is that the MoU is already being stress-tested. The current reality is that there is a negotiation track, but not yet a clean, direct US-Iran negotiation. The next decisive signs will be whether shipping normalises through Hormuz, whether Iran stops trying to impose route approval or fees, whether Qatar releases or administers the frozen funds, and whether both sides publicly confirm the same meeting format.

Opposition

Inside Iran, the continuation of open or secret talks with the US has produced some, if limited, political opposition. President Masoud Pezeshkian has stated that all stages of the negotiations with the US have progressed “within the framework of the regime’s macro-policies and with the full and continuous coordination” of Mojtaba Khamenei, the current supreme leader.

In a recent meeting, Pezeshkian called the agreement to end the war with the US a “diplomatic achievement” and argued that some factions, aligned with the psychological operations of hostile media, were trying to undermine this achievement by attacking the negotiation team and questioning national decisions. The Iranian president added that the government had refrained from responding to certain statements in order to maintain the country’s cohesion.

The opposition includes a couple of political factions, which have harshly attacked the agreement, and the criticism became sharper after the release of a message attributed to Khamenei regarding the agreement. The criticism remains marginal; however, last week a maddah, a religious singer or eulogist, reportedly threatened Pezeshkian in connection with the negotiations. This domestic conflict shows that the MoU is not only an international arrangement: it is also an internal struggle over who can claim legitimacy for negotiation, who can accuse others of capitulation, and who controls the political meaning of de-escalation.

At the same time, Iranian officials are trying to present the agreement as both a diplomatic achievement and a military ceasefire that can be reversed if violated. Acting minister of defence Majid Ebn-e-Reza stated that “undoubtedly, in the event of any violation of the ceasefire terms, we will take appropriate and necessary action and reaction”. According to the official IRNA news agency, he raised this issue during a phone call with Qatar’s deputy prime minister and defence minister, while also expressing Iran’s readiness to expand defence cooperation with Qatar. Ebn-e-Reza added: “We do not trust the enemy, and our hands are on the trigger.” This language is designed to reassure hardliners that the government has not disarmed politically or militarily, even while it pursues implementation talks through Qatar.

The MoU has also sparked debate inside Iran over whether it requires parliamentary approval. Proponents of parliamentary oversight state that binding MoUs are legally equivalent to contracts, and note that the word “commits” appears eight times in the current text. Conversely, some officials argue that MoUs do not carry the same legal weight as treaties and are therefore exempt from legislative voting. Historically, during similar episodes such as the Algiers Accords and the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal, the government bypassed direct parliamentary ratification through general authorisations or separate legislation. Currently, despite calls from dozens of lawmakers to hold in-person sessions to oversee the pact, the national leadership has shown little intention of involving parliament, and parts of the agreement have already been put into effect.

Pezeshkian has also said that, under the plan currently in place, $6 billion of the $12 billion in Iranian assets frozen in Qatar will be released and returned to Iran - although, as I write, neither the US nor Qatar has confirmed that an actual transfer has taken place. Meanwhile the Iranian insistence that the Doha visit concerns implementation rather than negotiations allows Tehran to accept financial benefits, while denying that it is entering direct talks with the US. Following the Israeli and American attacks that began on February 28, Iran launched retaliatory strikes, including targeting objectives in Qatar. According to the IRNA report, the acting defence minister said that the region must not be exploited by extra-regional countries, and that the presence of foreign forces not only fails to bring security, but also increases misunderstanding, distrust and insecurity. Qatar, along with Pakistan, is currently mediating between Iran and the US in an effort to reach a permanent peace agreement.

Regional turmoil

The position of Israel and the Gulf states is another important part of the MoU’s regional meaning. Some view Israel as the biggest strategic loser because of the depletion of its political and military capital in Washington and the damage to its public image in the west. On the other hand, the Persian Gulf states are seen as relative winners - not because they achieved massive gains, but because they averted an existential and devastating war. Arab nations nevertheless remain deeply concerned about the lack of restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile programme in the MoU, especially given that Trump has notably moderated his rhetoric on this issue. It is likely that, rather than demanding total Iranian disarmament, Persian Gulf states will respond practically by upgrading their missile defence systems.

The proposed $300 billion reconstruction fund for Iran - a real provision in the MoU, though its funding mechanism is still undetermined and disputed in Washington - has also sparked concern that Gulf states might end up paying “the price of both war and peace”. However, this financial participation will not be a blank cheque. It is more likely to take the form of conditional, commercial investments aimed at creating economic interdependence and restraining Tehran’s regional hegemony. Ultimately, some believe that, if the Gulf states maintain unity, their hosting of US military bases and their influence over energy markets could give them even greater leverage over Washington’s future Middle East policy than Israel.

Then there is the US-brokered framework agreement between Israel and Lebanon. It is meant to end the latest Israel-Hezbollah/Lebanon conflict and create a path towards a broader settlement. The main points reported are: the Lebanese army taking control of some areas in southern Lebanon; a process aimed at removing Hezbollah’s armed presence from the south; and eventual Israeli withdrawal steps.

A key condition is that Hezbollah disarms or is removed from southern Lebanon, especially the area south of the Litani River. Earlier US-Lebanon-Israel statements said the ceasefire depended on a complete halt to Hezbollah operations and the evacuation of Hezbollah militants from the South of Litani sector.

The biggest controversy is sequencing: many Lebanese critics say the deal demands Hezbollah’s disarmament first, while giving no firm guarantee or timetable for full Israeli withdrawal. Reporting has noted that this has generated an intense reaction inside Lebanon. Hezbollah rejected the deal outright, calling it humiliating and “null and void”. Along with its allies, it argues that the deal amounts to a surrender of Lebanese sovereignty, because it accepts Israeli ‘security’ demands, while Israel keeps leverage on the ground.

Even some Lebanese who oppose Hezbollah are uneasy. Their concern is not necessarily defending Hezbollah’s armed forces, but that forcing the Lebanese army to implement disarmament under Israeli and US pressure could risk an internal explosion. Hezbollah-aligned lawmakers have openly warned that any attempt by the Lebanese army to enforce the deal could lead to “civil war”.

There is also a legal and human-rights backlash. Reports have highlighted concern over a clause requiring both sides to stop “hostile or negative actions” in international legal or political forums. Lebanese legal experts worry this could weaken efforts to pursue accountability for alleged Israeli war crimes in Lebanon.

So, in short: the deal is being presented by the US and Israel as a path to ceasefire, state authority in south Lebanon, and possible peace. But inside Lebanon, especially among Hezbollah and many sovereignty-focused critics, it is widely seen as one-sided. The central danger is that the deal tries to solve Lebanon’s external war by forcing an internal confrontation over Hezbollah’s weapons.