30.04.2026

Second round in Islamabad

On-off negotiations are happening under the shadow of a prolonged blockade and the threat of the fragile ceasefire suddenly giving way to another round of shock and awe. Yassamine Mather looks beyond the talks about talks

Discussions between the United States and Iran should not be understood as substantive negotiations. They remain, in essence, ‘talks about talks’. While expectations were already low, even limited procedural progress has proven difficult to secure.

Disregarding the theatrical elements - attendance, delays and absences - the core issue remains the format and structure of diplomacy itself. The US continues to push for direct, face-to-face negotiations. Iran, however, is not currently in a position to accept this format. Instead, discussions have taken place through intermediaries - crucially Pakistan - with the two delegations physically separated.

One point of contention remains the relationship between sanctions and restoring maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz. The dispute is still centred around a particular sequence of events. Iran will not negotiate on Hormuz or de-escalation while under economic blockade. Meanwhile, the US position is that of continued economic pressure and a naval presence as the necessary means to extract concessions. Because the US navy has effectively shut major export terminals like Kharg Island, Iran is pumping oil, but has nowhere to send it. The US president is reportedly relying on estimates that Iran has only two to three weeks of unused storage left. Once those tanks are full, they physically cannot pump another barrel. Admittedly, a disputed narrative: after all, Trump now talks of maintaining the US naval blockade “for months if necessary”.

No limitations

Then there is the nuclear issue. The US insists that Iran can never be allowed to have the bomb. Iran insists that is an inalienable right to develop nuclear technology. In the last few days Iran’s ‘reformist’ president and foreign minister have confirmed this as their stance, echoing what is known to be a ‘red line’ for the leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

There are, however, differences regarding enrichment levels and stockpile limits. All factions agree that Iran should not accept a permanent or long-term prohibition on enrichment, which means that US demands for long-term guarantees (20 years has been mentioned) against future enrichment remain a no-go area. But before the war the ‘reformist’ faction was happy to negotiate a shorter pause - according to some, up to five years.

This week Iran attempted to break that deadlock by offering a ‘phased framework’ via Russia. In Moscow, Iranian foreign minister Abbas Arghchi presented what Iran believes to be a significant tactical shift, proposing to decouple the Hormuz crisis from the nuclear issue.

The goal is to secure immediate economic relief without conceding strategic ground. Iran has offered to reopen or stabilise the Strait of Hormuz and, in return, the US would lift or ease naval/economic restrictions. Meantime the nuclear issue is parked for future negotiations. However, this does not resolve the sequencing issue: it ‘repackages’ it. The US remains reluctant to separate nuclear concessions from broader de-escalation, and the divide over Iran’s nuclear programme remains fundamental.

Influential Guards

One thing is certain: the IRGC has played a much enhanced role in wartime decision-making, even after losing senior commanders. The result is a determined, more militarised line in the Tehran regime, especially around drone and missile attacks across the region. The IRGC has been involved in all major decisions since the war began, giving it more influence over the state than before.

As I have written before, command had been decentralised in what looks like long-term plans, should more IRGC top commanders be assassinated by the US-Israel, by giving more authority to lower and mid-ranking officers. This made the force more resilient, but also, according to some, more dangerous, because local commanders may act more aggressively or miscalculate more easily.

According to western media, this has made them more hardline, when it comes to strategic questions: they are pushing for a sustained drone-and-missile campaign, rather than a cautious diplomatic approach. Western news agencies present this as giving more strength to the hardliners in Tehran, thus increasing the risk of a wider war - a view echoed by the US president and his allies.

However, academics who have studied the IRGC for a couple of decades or more express the opposite view. They point out that IRGC is not just a military force: it is also deeply embedded in Iran’s economy, in its politics. It is well represented in the majles and, of course, Mohammad Ghalibaf, the parliamentary speaker and Iranian representative in the negotiations, is a former IRGC commander himself.

The political landscape in Iran is currently defined by a rare cross-partisan consensus favouring diplomacy with the US, leaving hardliner Saeed Jalili and his lobby groups increasingly isolated. In a massive show of solidarity, 261 out of 290 members of parliament signed a statement on April 27 supporting speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, who has been the lead negotiator with the United States.

Professor Vali Nasr of Johns Hopkins in Washington, as well as other academics who have been following details of factional fighting in the Islamic Republic, argue that the war has created a situation where the various factions are more united than ever before. True, Nasr states, divisions have not disappeared: there are still internal tensions between religious hardliners, diplomats, the IRGC and elected politicians. But the war has narrowed the political space for such divisions.

Maryam Alamzadeh from Oxford University suggests that hardline politics may have helped the regime survive the war, but moderation may be necessary for it to survive the aftermath. A negotiated settlement that includes limited gains could allow the regime to claim victory without continuing endless confrontation. The author suggests that parts of the IRGC may become more pragmatic, especially after experiencing the real limits of Iran’s military power. Of course that might just be wishful thinking. After all, a negotiated settlement could amount to surrender, or at least be represented as surrender, and therefore unleash a popular storm of protest which splits the regime.

Under those circumstances the forces of the left, above all the working class, will be severely tested. The danger of aligning with one or another regime faction must be avoided at all costs. No faith must be invested in the ‘reformists’. Our forces need to fashion their own independent programme as a matter of extreme urgency, a communist programme which must necessarily generate the mass Communist Party which alone can turn revolutionary words into genuinely liberating revolutionary deeds.

For the moment, though, as far as I can tell, contrary to what the western media tells us, those in power are more united than ever. The Iranian state presents a coordinated front, leadership statements emphasise cohesion and negotiators include supporters of several factions, now represented among the leadership of the Revolutionary Guards.

The war has paradoxically hardened the position of Iran’s reformists and given hegemony to the new generation of IRGC leaders. Leading negotiators (Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Abbas Araghchi and aligned figures) have powerful allies in the IRGC, who support negotiations as a necessary tactical tool. The slogan they promote is “Diplomacy backed by strength” and they accept conditional engagement with the US, with the aim of seeking sanction relief and controlled de-escalation

The opposition comes from conservative mosques and hardline currents in media outlets such as Raja News, who are sceptical or openly hostile to any negotiations. They emphasise complete distrust of the US and the ‘success’ of Iranian resistance. They talk of the dangers arising from concessions and frame negotiations as potential capitulation and unnecessary under current conditions. However, it is difficult to assess how much support they have in wider religious and military circles. Tasnim, the main (IRGC-linked) media outlet, supports negotiations, with some conditions: it emphasises strength, distrust and Iran’s initiative. This group is closely aligned with IRGC leadership, and Ghalibaf, as head of negotiations, definitely represents their views.

It is true that inside Iran some groups that are not currently in positions of power want a continuation of the confrontation. They believe Iran can win. So the country is not fully unified, but neither is it disintegrating in a way that might produce regime change.

Meanwhile, the maritime situation remains volatile and closely tied to economic pressures. Iran’s control over shipping continues to operate through a semi-formal system: the fact that certain ships are receiving Iranian guarantees reportedly functions as a revenue-generating mechanism. But recent incidents, including the seizure of vessels linked (according to Iran) to Israeli trade networks, highlight the continued risk of escalation. Trump, for example, could conceivably give the go-ahead for erasing Iran’s civilization. Benjamin Netanyahu and his far right coalition are certainly itching for the renewal of the war.

Second front

Neither side has achieved a decisive advantage, yet both - yes, even some leading Iranian figures - continue to act as though they have one. This has produced a stand-off.

Not that Iran is locked in and powerless. Blockading the Strait of Hormuz is causing economic dislocation throughout the world. China, India and other Asian countries have been particularly hit. It can open another front too. Coordination with the Houthis in Yemen could possibly threaten the Bab-el-Mandab link from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden by using asymmetric naval tactics (eg, missiles, drones and fast-attack boats). Of course, such a second front would have potentially cataclysmic economic consequences and risk alienating key allies, not least China.

The core structure of the conflict remains intact, but Iran’s tactics have evolved: it no longer adopts a defensive refusal to delay negotiation attempts. On the contrary, a confident, new generation of the IRGC leadership is telling the government to be more proactive by making new counter-proposals, such as the one made in St Petersburg.

Iran’s refusal to enter further talks is partly aimed at the US, but also partly aimed at the Iranian masses themselves. The regime does not want to look as if it has surrendered after so many people have died, been injured, made homeless or put out of a job. So its public posture of firmness is its way of maintaining what domestic support it has and countering any impression that it can be bullied into making forced concessions.