12.03.2026

Satellite-guided war of terror

Not so long ago Trump was saying that there would be a popular welcome for US intervention. A big lie: the working class has always opposed regime change from above. Yassamine Mather assesses the battle for hearts and minds

In the weeks before the US-Israel attack on Iran, we had a lot of statements by famous Iranians, from Nobel peace prize winners to film directors, ex-football players, as well as liberal bourgeois groups inside and outside the country, calling for ‘foreign intervention’ to get rid of the Islamic Republic. And, of course, outlets such as the BBC and US and Israeli media were promoting them all. Many consumers might well have thought: ‘Wow, these people are all in favour of US military intervention’. They would perhaps conclude that this was the only way to ‘save the Iranian people’.

During that same period, I was reading the leaflets issued by workers of the Haft Tappeh sugarcane plant - workers who have been protesting for a long time now. I was reading statements from workers in the Vahed Bus Company, as well as the oil workers who are trying to set up a national oil workers’ organisation that will include contract workers and workers in the many privatised companies of the industry. Each raised a lot of demands. They were for the separation of state and religion. They cannot speak openly because some of them are semi-official organisations - they do not use the word ‘overthrow’ - but, if you read their statements, it was clear they were for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. However, they all had one thing in common: no to any foreign intervention.

Of course, now that the country is being heavily bombarded daily, now that parts of Tehran are beginning to look like Gaza, the celebrities mentioned above are distancing themselves from US-Israeli military intervention: ‘We didn’t mean this kind of intervention. The US should have stopped after the first day, when they killed Khamenei!’ Ironically the same is true of some exiled broadcasters, who until March 1 were gung-ho for military action.

A text from a worker inside Iran sums it up: “Almost all major cities have been bombed. 40,000 residential homes have so far been destroyed, as far as figures tell; 56 schools have been destroyed; 11 hospitals have been targeted. Warplanes do not fall on the heads of governments, but on working class people.”

Now, add to this the March 8 oil refinery fires and the heavy bombings during the nights of March 9 and 10 (described by the regime as ‘carpet bombing’). You can see pictures of flames and plumes of thick black smoke over Tehran. The CNN reporter, who managed to remain in Iran, was telling us on March 7 that everything was reasonably quiet: “Last week everyone was telling me the government is trying to pretend nothing has happened. This week all that has changed - most people open their windows and can see destroyed buildings. I have seen images of some horrific destruction.”

In most of central Tehran I do not think you can find a street that has not been bombed. The main square, Enqelab (Revolution), as well as Ferdowsi Square, Mehrabad Airport and nearby buildings have been destroyed. The central stadium is completely flattened.

Iran has complained to Unesco about historic sites that have been damaged, including Golestan Palace - originally built in the 16th century and modernised in the 19th century during the rule of the Qajar dynasty. In the main square in Isfahan, Chehel Sotoun Palace, built 379 years ago, is also badly damaged. None of these historic buildings were anywhere near military installations. By targeting such historic sites one can only assume the Israelis or the US (or both) want to cause demoralisation and despair.

Global power

Can Iran win this war? Absolutely not - that would be impossible. However, you have to recognise that surviving for over two weeks now is considered by some inside the Iranian regime as a kind of victory. The longer they survive, the more powerful they will get internally, in the region and globally.

In Iranian governing circles some say, ‘We lasted the eight-year war against Iraq [Saddam Hussein era]; we can last a long time.’ Of course, that is over-optimistic. Yes, the US supported Saddam, but was not directly involved in the military operations. Some European countries, such as the UK, were selling arms to both sides. Today Iran is not getting arms from anywhere. It is apparently getting some AI support from China, but it is not clear if that is propaganda or real support.

As far as I know, all the claims about Russia sending missiles or new aircraft are just wishful thinking. However, Russia is providing satellite intelligence, according to US officials. On March 6 they reported that Russia is sharing high-quality satellite imagery and targeting data with Tehran. This includes the real-time locations of US warships and aircraft in the Middle East. It is also reported that Russia deployed or shared electronic warfare operational lessons from its Krasukha jamming systems to help Iran disrupt GPS-guided western munitions. Russia is also presenting itself as a mediator - thus maintaining its relationship with the Trump administration, which Vladimir Putin views as essential to achieving Russian goals in Ukraine. This explains why Putin has avoided personal criticism of Trump despite the war. There is speculation that the US might waive certain oil sanctions to stabilise global supply, which Volodymyr Zelenskyy has warned would be a “serious blow” to Ukraine.

Meanwhile, China has maintained a policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’, providing significant indirect and technical support to Iran, while refusing any direct arms transfers. One of the most controversial developments in the last two weeks has been the reported sale of the CM-302 (YJ-12) supersonic anti-ship missile. On February 24 and March 1, multiple sources claimed Iran was finalising a deal for these mach 3 missiles to counter US aircraft carriers. On March 2, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning officially denied these reports, calling them “disinformation”.

Reports from early March indicate that China is utilising its BeiDou-3 navigation system and a fleet of over 500 satellites to provide Tehran with real-time tracking of US naval movements in the Persian Gulf. Since January, China has been helping Iran transition its military and government infrastructure to closed Chinese software systems to prevent cyber sabotage by western intelligence agencies. China has also supplied advanced UHF-band radars, which are designed to detect ‘low-observable’ (stealth) aircraft like the F-35s which are being used in the current strikes. None of this has stopped most US and Israeli aircraft striking numerous Iranian military, economic and civilian targets.

Where Iran is doing better than expected is in its use of drones. On February 28, announcing the start of US airstrikes, Trump said that Iran’s missiles and missile industry would be “completely destroyed”. but made no mention of drones. Almost two weeks later, and in response to the US and Israeli attacks, Iran has launched more than 2,000 low-cost drones at targets across the Middle East to overwhelm defence systems and spread fear in the region. Shahed’s carry an explosive charge that detonates on impact and can cause considerable damage. The deadliest attack on American forces so far occurred when a drone struck a base in Kuwait, resulting in the death of six American soldiers.

Iran says it is only targeting US military bases; however, these drones are notoriously inaccurate. Some have landed in densely populated cities, causing panic on the streets and expressions of strong concern among the governments of Gulf countries. A video verified by a number of media outlets shows an Iranian drone descending at high speed before striking what appears to be a radar system at the headquarters of the US navy’s Fifth Fleet in Manama, Bahrain. The impact sends debris flying into the air and causes the structure to collapse. Another video from the United Arab Emirates shows a drone hitting one of the hotels at Palm Jumeirah, a luxury artificial island complex in Dubai, causing a massive fireball.

Saudi Arabia’s largest oil refinery, located in Ras Tanura on the coast of the Persian Gulf, halted production after a blaze caused by debris from an intercepted drone. In Qatar, the world’s largest liquefied natural gas export terminal was also shut down after being targeted by Iranian drones.

Despite their simple design and relatively low production cost, these drones have caused significant damage across the region. The production cost of the long-range Shahed 136 drone, manufactured in Iran, is estimated to be between $20,000 and $50,000. A snippet compared with Patriot ant-missile missiles: launchers cost $10 million, each missile about £4 million. Iran, of course, is relying on quantity overwhelming quality.

By launching swarms of 50 to 100 drones at once, they aim to overwhelm the number of available tracking channels on radar systems. There is also success through ‘failure’: if 90% are shot down, the remaining 10% that ‘leak’ through can cause disproportionate damage. A key example is from March 1: a single Shahed that evaded defences in Bahrain struck an AN/TPS-59 radar site. The drone costs say $20,000; the radar system it destroyed is valued at $300 million, representing a 10,000x return on investment for Iran.

As for infrastructure strikes (March 7-9), drones successfully struck Amazon Web Services data centres in the UAE and Bahrain, disrupting regional digital infrastructure despite heavy air defence cover.

Beyond money, the issue is inventory. Iran can produce hundreds of Shaheds per month - well it could do that before the war. However, the US and its allies cannot manufacture complex interceptor missiles at the same level. By forcing the coalition to ‘empty their magazines’ on cheap drones, Iran is attempting to leave them vulnerable to its remaining more dangerous (but limited) stockpile of precision ballistic missiles.

Three people

Talking to the Washington Post last week, Donald Trump said he has three people in mind inside Iran to take over, adding that one of these ‘contenders’ had been killed. It was not clear if the person he was referring to was killed by US or Israeli bombing. A day later he said, “No, I just want to be involved in electing the leader, in nominating the leader.” And then he said it has to be a strongman - someone respected inside the country. So who are the contenders for Trump-style regime ‘transformation’ à la Venezuela? Trump is obviously ruling out Reza Pahlavi, whom he has dismissed as a “nice guy, but not significant”.

Despite many rumours, no-one seems to have a clear idea of who Trump has in mind as the new “leader” or indeed if there is one.

Internal rivalry is not limited to the clerical leadership. The Kurdish groups that Trump is putting some hope in seem ready to fight … including, though, each other. First of all, the claim of Abdullah Mohtadi, secretary-general of the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, that his group can mobilise many thousands in Kurdistan should not be taken seriously. Kurds are said to constitute 15% of Iran’s population. However, many do not live in Kurdistan. They live in Mashhad, Tehran, and other major cities; they are assimilated into the rest of the population - a bit like Scots or Welsh in England.

Two major Kurdish organisations have completely denounced the pro-Trump Kurdish alliance. They include Ibrahim Alizadeh’s Communist Party of Iran, from which Mohtadi split. The nationalists - the ones who wanted to approach anybody for money - went with Mohtadi; the slightly more principled stayed with Alizadeh’s group. I would say that inside Iranian Kurdistan Alizadeh’s group has more support and can mobilise more than Mohtadi’s. The statement the CPI has issued is very clear: No to any acceptance of support from the US, and no to this kind of siding in the war.

The other group is the Worker-communist Party of Iran - Hekmatist. It has fewer people in Kurdistan, but in terms of propaganda, what it says is important. Both in Iranian and Iraqi Kurdistan it has supporters, and in the last week I have seen a number of videos of prominent activist Azar Majedi arguing very strongly against Mohtadi supporters. So, if the pro-US/Israeli Kurdish alliance actually manages to organise itself, we will see civil wars in Kurdistan before it can ‘liberate’ Iran for Trump.

We also hear a lot about other national minorities. The Azeris are more assimilated in Iranian society, in both Persian and Kurdish areas, than the Kurds. A long time ago, someone told me that 50% of the Tehran population has an Azeri background. I think that is probably true. So this could make things very difficult for Azerbaijan and Turkey. Turkey right now is supporting Iran’s Islamic Republic. Before the current war, we heard quite extensively that Tabriz and other major cities in Iranian Azerbaijan had seen the biggest anti-American and anti-Pahlavi demonstrations.

Propaganda claims

I am not sure who is giving this line to BBC reporters, but both in English and in Farsi they seem to claim that the overwhelming majority in Iran is quite happy to see bombs falling. Apparently they are just waiting for all of this to finish, and then they will go onto the streets to support Trump’s regime change. First of all, it is true that the overwhelming mass of the population are against the regime; around 20% genuinely support it. However, that does not mean that the 80% are pro-war. Even many expatriates who did support the war in the first few days are now thinking maybe there won’t be much of the country left for them to go back to.

No-one in their right mind would underestimate how bombs and wars actually engender an enraged sense of patriotism and nationalism. In the last few days, most of what I have had to struggle with is to try to convince young Iranians - who until last week were strongly critical of the Islamic Republic and now say this is not the time to criticise the Islamic Republic - that this is precisely the time to do so and to organise for its overthrow from below. You can be against this war and not fall into the trap of becoming a supporter of the new supreme leader or the current interim council.

Reports from CNN and Al Jazeera show large demonstrations, where, after being bombed, people go out on the streets against the US and Israel, of course. These are partly organised, partly spontaneous. I cannot understand what the logic was, but in January the US administration decided that getting involved in the protests against the rulers by military action would make the regime less unpopular. For sections of the population, at least for the short term, this is precisely what Trump or Netanyahu have achieved.

Regarding the royalists, the last two weeks have been disastrous for them. Unlike the celebrities mentioned earlier, Reza Pahlavi is still cheering on the US military. He failed to mention the schoolchildren killed by what we now know was a US Tomahawk missile; however, he sent condolences to Trump for the death of US soldiers. His supporters are diminishing in number, but those who have remained still appear on the streets of western cities with the Zionists. Israeli and royalist flags are happily waved together.

Last week the car-crash meeting with Russian pranksters was described by many as Reza Pahlavi’s ‘Newsnight’ moment, comparing it to Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor’s Epstein interview. The prank is widely considered one of the most embarrassing moments for Reza Pahlavi because of how obvious the set-up was.

Here are the details of the call. The pranksters contacted Pahlavi’s team, pretending to be aides of the German chancellor Friedrich Merz. During the video call, one of the pranksters appeared on screen using the name, ‘Adolf’, and sporting a distinct, Hitler-style moustache. They told Pahlavi that his grandfather (Reza Shah) had been a German agent in the 1940s and that Germany was now ready to “join a crusade” and support a military strike against the Iranian regime.

The video, which circulated heavily on social media (including X and Telegram) and a number of mainstream TV stations, showed a few startling moments that critics have used to question Pahlavi’s political judgement: he was recorded saying he would welcome a broader international coalition, including Germany, to join what he called a “crusade” to neutralise the IRGC (Revolutionary Guards). Despite the prankster’s heavy Russian accent and the absurd ‘Adolf’ persona, Pahlavi continued the conversation seriously for several minutes. When the fake ‘Adolf’ mentioned that his own grandfather served in the German army and knew Pahlavi’s father in Tehran in the 1940s, Pahlavi reportedly replied, “That’s very interesting - good to know.”

Support for military attacks and calling on Germany to join the war against his own country have not improved Pahlavi’s popularity. Let me remind you of one of the reasons the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK)  are so unpopular in Iran - you can find a huge number of people who will tell you that the one thing they can’t stand is the Mujahedin. You ask why, and they say, because in the last days of the Iran-Iraq war they fought alongside Saddam Hussein’s forces.

Right now, I think the royalists are in exactly the same position. People are saying, ‘Well, we didn’t want this regime, but we want to live!’ Reuters correspondents have highlighted that, while the diaspora remains overwhelmingly opposed to the Islamic Republic, the sheer scale of the destruction has made it impossible for many to continue “celebrating”. A Reuters dispatch on March 6 noted that many who were in the streets on day one are now staying home, glued to messaging apps trying to reach family members during internet blackouts. Similar reports have appeared in The Guardian amongst other papers.

Supreme leader

In the middle of a war Iran has a dynastic succession. The appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei - son of the previous supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, who was deliberately targeted and assassinated on February 28 - follows a chaotic week of conflicting reports and the bombing of the clerical council’s facilities. Hardliners, led by Hossein Taeb, a controversial figure within the Iranian security establishment, who has been described as the “architect of the shadow state and the IRGC”, pushed the appointment through to project stability.

However, the choice is highly controversial: Mojtaba lacks the required elective experience, and his appointment breaks the foundational anti-monarchical principles of the 1979 revolution. Mojtaba’s own health is uncertain (some reports suggest a possible coma). Apparently the IRGC and hardliners fast-tracked the vote to ensure a “strong voice” and signal defiance, ignoring opposition from figures like security leader Ali Larijani. The appointment likely violates the late Khamenei’s written criteria and his son faced immediate assassination threats from Israel and warnings from Donald Trump.

There are exaggerated reports in the western media about his personal wealth. On March 10, the Telegraph claimed that Iran’s new supreme leader had bought two luxury flats yards from the Israeli embassy in London. The apartments were bought through Ali Ansari, an Iranian banker, who was sanctioned by the British government in October last year for financing the IRGC. The UK government has branded Ansari as “corrupt” and has taken the step of freezing his assets and banning him from entering the country. Britain’s intelligence services are aware of the existence of the properties. What the paper fails to show is any proof that Ansari bought the properties for Mojtaba Khamenei (see below for more on this). However, even if that was the case, the flats could be part of sanction-busting efforts by the Islamic Republic and Revolutionary Guards. So far, Mojtaba’s lifestyle suggests no appetite for a luxurious life in the UK or elsewhere. He was residing in his father’s modest home in north Tehran on the day of the US attack, where he sustained his reported injuries.

Beyond these details, his true character and political leanings remain an enigma.

To summarise all this, the conflict in Iran shows a sharp gap between high-level military strategy and the reality on the ground. The US and Israel rely on expensive, high-precision weapons to destroy infrastructure, while Iran responds with large numbers of cheap Shahed drones. This creates a ‘war of attrition’, where even successful defence against the drones by the US and Israel is extremely costly. The result is a kind of military stalemate based on economic exhaustion rather than a decisive victory.

Inside Iran, the war has made regime change more complicated. Promises of ‘liberation’ from exiled figures have been undermined by civilian deaths and suffering and widespread destruction. At the same time, the rise of Mojtaba Khamenei - seen as lacking ‘legitimacy’ - suggests the regime is narrowing into a more closed, survival-focused ‘shadow state’.

Khamenei family

Questions persist regarding the Khamenei family’s connections and their wealth. The extended family has faced frequent accusations of corruption, with several members regarded as part of the ‘oligarchy’ detested by the public. The following summary outlines the key figures (and details how they have financially profited from their family ties), as well those who remain dissidents.

Vahid Reza Taleghani (son-in-law of Mohammad Khamenei, Ali’s older brother) and Ahmad Hosseini Khamenei (cousin of the new leader) are involved in the Karavan Transport Company, under the supervision of the Hikmat-e-Islami Sadra Foundation. According to some documents - the accuracy of which cannot be independently verified - on March 8 2022 a prosecutor in Iran recorded “breach of trust, obtaining property through illegitimate means and embezzlement of public funds” by Karavan.

The new supreme leader’s maternal family (surname: Khojasteh) have benefited politically and financially from family connections. Mohammad Khojasteh Bagherzadeh (brother-in-law of the deceased Khamenei) ran the Khojasteh Charity Foundation in Mashhad. His son, Komeil Khojasteh, was former CEO of Tebyan (affiliated with the Islamic Propagation Organisation) and manager of Ali Khamenei’s official website. Farshad Mehdipour (married into the family) was the editor of the conservative Sobh-e-No newspaper and former deputy for culture at the Supreme National Security Council.

The family has also many dissenters: Badri Khamenei Robabeh, the younger sister of Ali, had directly and publicly criticised her brother. In 2022, following the death of Mahsa (Jina) Amini in police custody following her arrest for failure to wear the hijab, Badri Khamenei distanced herself from her brother, stating that he did not hear the real voice of the people or listen to critics. She emphasised that she had cut ties with him because of his “continued path of suppression and the killing of innocent people”.

Ali Moradkhani Arangeh was the husband of Badri Khamenei. He moved to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war and publicly opposed the Islamic Republic. He returned to Iran in 1994 after seven years in Iraq and was sentenced to prison. He passed away three years ago in Tehran at the age of 96.

Hadi Khamenei, Ali’s ‘reformist’ younger brother, attended university in Mashhad for two years before being arrested and barred from continuing his studies. After the revolution, he was an active member of groups close to Khomeini. Hadi managed the newspapers Jahan-e Islam and Hayat-e-No. The latter was critical of the establishment and was banned in 2002 (and again in 2009). As the secretary-general of the Assembly of Forces of Imam’s Line, he supported protestors during the controversial 2009 election and criticised the house arrest of Mehdi Karroubi and Mir-Hossein Mousavi. He once stated in an interview that he has not had much of a relationship with his brother in recent years. However he currently directs the Research Institute for the History of Islam, which receives government funding.

Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the wartime prime minister, is a second cousin to Ali Khamenei. Despite their familial ties, they had fundamental disputes during their times as prime minister and president. Mousavi stood against Khamenei in 2009 and has been under house arrest since.

It is true that there is significant corruption within the Islamic Republic of Iran, much of which is associated with senior members of the IRGC, ‘elected’ officials and ministers. However, the narrative regarding the Khamenei family pocketing huge profits appears more complex than is often reported in the mainstream media.