10.10.2024
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Waiting for the payback
Though they have been repeatedly condemned as haram, some leading elements in the Iranian regime want to go for nuclear weapons, warns Yassamine Mather
On October 4, three days after Iran’s ballistic missile attack on Israel, Friday prayers in Tehran were led, for the first time in five years, by the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei.
Rumours on social media were predicting an assassination attempt, this time on Khamenei himself, but nothing came of it, although the atmosphere was tense. His speech was designed to boost morale after several bruising attacks that have no doubt weakened the Islamic Republic and its allies. Sometimes speaking in Arabic, the Shia supreme leader, sought to directly address the Arab street (mainly Sunnis) in a bid to outflank other regional dictatorships, with the defiant promise of defeating both Israel and the United States.
None of this could hide the nervousness in Tehran - not just about an imminent Israeli retaliation, but also the severe setbacks suffered by Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and the whole axis of resistance, despite the restraint shown over the last 12 months. Alike, Iran and Hezbollah have carefully ‘calibrated’ their response to Israeli attacks and its ongoing genocidal war in Gaza.
Amongst insiders, the fragile health of the 85-year-old supreme leader is also a cause of concern. This at a time when the tensions and conflicts between the various factions in the Islamic Republic are heating up. As I wrote last week, Iran’s new president, Massoud Pezeshkian, was under a lot of pressure to launch some form of missile attack on Israel. ‘Conservative’ factions were criticising his government for a failure to respond to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on the day of the presidential inauguration.1 That paved the way for the killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut on September 27. Now many of the president’s ‘reformist’ allies are worried about the retaliation the country can expect from Israel.
Nuclear option
Meanwhile, the website/paper of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Javan, is advocating a rethink about the nuclear option.
On October 3, Gholam-Reza Sadeqian, the editor, wrote:
I’m not discussing the religious aspects of the legality [of nuclear weapons], but the scientific aspects of the nuclear programme. From a scientific point of view, we can’t bar ourselves from research. One thing is the taboo of using nuclear weapons, but mastering the science of nuclear weapons and reaching the point of building a weapon when we wish to do so is an altogether different subject.2
Turning to the religious legality of building a nuclear bomb according to Shia theology, Sadeqian continued:
Some experts in Iranian studies and Shia theology may tell [western governments] that the religious prohibition … is not deception … However, there will certainly also be others who will tell the Americans that Shia theology is dynamic and issues new rulings at inflection points … This keeps the Americans in a state of constant guessing … For them, Iran will remain a state that has no nuclear weapons, but may opt to have one … It can have it instantaneously.
His deputy, Ali Qanadi, also wrote a piece with the same theme:
What is the solution …? The past year has shown that diplomacy based on international public opinion could not stop the super-destructiveness of Israel. The limited military response option, such as Operation Truthful Covenant II [Iran’s October 1 retaliatory attack against Israel] was effective … but may not have established deterrence, and there is a risk for further escalation … Other people may offer creative solutions to contain [Israel], but there is also an immediate solution ready at hand: changing Iran’s nuclear doctrine.3
Here the more radical factions of the Revolutionary Guards have an issue with the current supreme leader. He has time and time again declared nuclear weapons to be haram (forbidden or proscribed by Islamic law) and, although he can change his mind on day-to-day political and military issues, changing a major religious pronunciation is more problematic.
This brings me to the thorny issue of Khamenei’s future replacement as supreme leader. There is no heir apparent. Many of the potential ‘candidates’ have already died.
Undoubtedly, one of the most important figures whose death changed the political equation in Iran was president Ebrahim Raisi. There is a lot of speculation about the exact cause of the helicopter crash that killed him. While most sane observers gave little credence to the sabotage story, after the assassination of Haniyeh in a secure zone in Tehran and the death of Nasrallah in Beirut, some are pointing the finger at Mossad. There can be no doubt that the role of Ibrahim Raisi was considered very important, assuming the survival of the regime after Khamenei dies.
For many years, he was mentioned as a possible successor to the supreme leader. However, even if he was not going to take over himself, he would have played a significant role in the nomination process and the subsequent transfer of power.
Of course, other important figures who could have played a decisive role were Nasrallah and, before him, Revolutionary Guards leader Qasem Soleimani, who was popular among internal and external supporters of the Islamic Republic until his death, at the hands of Israel, in 2020.
A couple of months ago, after Raisi died there were rumours in Iran that in the absence of an ideal Iranian candidate for the position of ‘legal guardian’ (vali faghih/supreme leader) of Shia Islam, there were no constitutional obstacles to Hassan Nasrallah (who by all accounts was also a fluent Farsi speaker) taking up the post.
All this explains the importance of Nasrallah for Iran’s Shia clerics and Khamenei. It helps explain the ballistic missile attack on Israel launched on October 1 and why last week’s Friday prayers were so significant.
US-Israel
As Israel continues to pound Beirut and south Lebanon, the world awaits its next retaliation against Iran. Benjamin Netanyahu has postponed Yoav Gallant’s trip to Washington. His defence minister was scheduled to meet his US counterpart, Lloyd Austin. A Pentagon spokesperson denied any “tension” between the two defence chiefs: “You can have frank and direct conversations with your friends. It’s not the case that you always agree on everything. But that doesn’t mean there is tension.”
In fact the Israeli media reports that it was Netanyahu who prevented Gallant’s trip, as he himself wants to discuss Israel’s plans with Joe Biden first. Not that they are kindred spirits. According to veteran journalist Bob Woodward, Biden once referred to him in the following uncomplimentary manner: “that son of a bitch, Bibi Netanyahu, he’s a bad guy. He’s a bad fucking guy.”4
Of course, all this could be related to the US presidential race and the fact that the Kamala Harris is losing ground - not just among Arab Americans, but young voters too. When it comes to November’s elections, Iran is a hot topic: for example, Donald Trump has blasted the Biden administration’s attempts to restrain Israel from bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Hot topic
Discussion of Israel’s pending attack and its possible impact in triggering the downfall of the Islamic Republic has also become a hot topic among Iranians - in particular exiles. The royalists, who these days act as the Israel Defence Forces’ fifth column, claim that Netanyahu’s promise to make Iran “pay” will lead to people taking to the streets and massive demonstrations will sweep away the regime.
Those who entertain such delusions underestimate the regime’s ability to control and repress protests. They also ignore the continued allegiance of a definite section of the population to the Islamic Republic. In addition, there is no doubt that an Israeli attack will inflame nationalist sentiments - already there are ever wider divisions among the supporters of the ex-shah’s son. Many argue that, even if the expected Israeli attack succeeds militarily, in the absence of any seriously organised opposition, even if it were a bourgeois one, the country will face ‘anarchy’ and civil war, leading to the breakaway of some regions. National minorities will apparently see their opportunity for ‘independence’. Others point out that, even in these regions - Kurdistan, Baluchistan, Azerbaijan, Khuzestan, etc - Iranian nationalism might well prevail and there will be no major support for independence. But there will be huge civil unrest.
All speculation, of course.
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‘Itching for war on four fronts’ Weekly Worker October 3: weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/1509/itching-for-war-on-four-fronts.↩︎
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Ibid.↩︎
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www.haaretz.com/us-news/2024-10-08/ty-article/.premium/hes-a-bad-fucking-guy-woodward-book-gives-unfiltered-view-of-biden-netanyahu-rift/00000192-6c66-d08e-ad9a-ee6fc0e30000.↩︎