03.10.2024

Itching for war on four fronts

Tehran’s theocratic regime has fallen into a ‘trap’ of Netanyahu’s making. With Israel wanting to fight Gaza, West Bank, Lebanon and Iran, the whole region looks in danger of being dragged down into a terrible conflagration. Yassamine Mather looks to the revolutionary politics of the working class

Benjamin Netanyahu finally got what he wanted. On October 1 Iran launched between 180 and 200 ballistic missiles. As every intelligent observer of the region is aware: Iran has fallen into his “trap”.

Over the last few months, Netanyahu’s far-right coalition government has done all it can to provoke the Islamic Republic, not least the pager explosions in Lebanon and the assassination of close allies, including in Iran itself. Israel is not only confident in its own military prowess: it knows that the United States will fully back it.

As expected, both sides made contradictory claims about the success and failure of the October 1 strike. However, we know that the Israeli Iron Dome, helped by US and UK air interventions, failed to stop all the incoming missiles. Some got through and left behind deep craters. Sillier Middle East social media pundits were quick to label Israel’s acclaimed air defence system a “paper dome”, while the White House called Iran’s attack “ineffective”. Most news agencies, however, agree that there were direct hits on Israeli targets, showing the limitations of Israel’s famed air defence systems.

Iran’s Revolutionary Guards claim that Fattaha-2 hypersonic missiles took less than 12 minutes to reach Tel Aviv, while a BBC fact check confirms that the Nevatim air base, housing F-35 jets, was hit. There is also video footage of an oil rig burning in Ashkelon in southern Israel.

With western news agencies continuing to expose their hypocrisy when it comes to reporting events in the Middle East, a CNN reporter saw no irony in saying that Israel’s Mossad headquarters are located in a “densely populated area” in Tel Aviv: “The concern is if you’re firing, even though Iran might consider that a military target, it is in a densely populated city with civilians around it” - repeating almost word for word the accusations against Hamas and Hezbollah for more than a year.

Confirming that Mossad headquarters was a target, according to US senior journalist Nick Schifrin, an Iranian rocket struck just outside the Mossad’s HQ. This a clear message from Tehran, confirming that its intelligence capabilities and missile reach could target strategic Israeli assets. According to the US government-affiliated Peace Institute, Iran has the largest and most diverse arsenal of ballistic missiles in the Middle East - some with a range of more than 2,000 kilometres. Reuters quoted a senior Iranian official claiming that Tehran had informed the US of the planned attack “shortly before” it took place, but this was later denied by Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s vice-president for strategic affairs.

Either way, global security researcher William Alberque, a former director of Nato’s arms control programme, says the October 1 attack has dramatically changed the equation in the Middle East … because of what comes next. Netanyahu has already said Iran “made a big mistake” and “will pay for it.” IDF chief of staff, Herzi Halevi promises that the response will come as a shock to Tehran. “We will choose when to exact the price, and prove our precise and surprising attack capabilities, in accordance with the guidance of the political echelon,” he ominously warns.

It might be said that Iran’s leaders were left with very few choices. The night before, on September 30, a couple of days after the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and less than 10 days after the mass mutilation of thousands of Hezbollah cadre and Lebanese citizens, Israel launched its ground invasion of southern Lebanon, in what the Israeli Defence Forces called “limited, localised and targeted” attack, as various facilities located close to the border posed “an immediate threat to Israeli communities”. The emphasis on the nature of the attack, limited and localised, is supposed to differentiate this latest attempt from previous Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1982 and 2006, both of which ended in defeat for the Zionist state.

Unanswered

On September 30, Iranian president Massoud Pezeshkian denounced the Israeli attacks against Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis and made a promise of responding: “We cannot accept such actions and they will not be left unanswered.” The following day, he added: “Netanyahu needs to know that Iran is not a warmonger, but it stands firmly against any threat. This is only a small part of our power. Do not enter into a conflict with Iran.”

In Iran itself, until the October 1 missile attack, he and his government were facing a major backlash from conservative factions angry at the failure to respond to the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in July. There are rumours and accusations that the Zionist state must have spies in the highest echelons of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards - who gave details of Haniyeh’s residence in Tehran, his travel plans and where he was staying in Beirut. All this adds to fears about who will be Israel’s next victim - the supreme leader, ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has reportedly been moved to a secret location.

Last week Pezeshkian, his deputy Javad Zarif and foreign minister Abbas Araqchi went out of their way to present a conciliatory message to the west, repeatedly arguing they are keen on resuming diplomacy and nuclear negotiations. As I wrote last week, Pezeshkian was quoted as saying that Iran would give up all weapons if Israel did the same.¹ In his UN speech, the Iranian president lamented the death of 40,000 Palestinians, but did not issue any threats against Israel.

Ali Motahari, a well-known conservative political activist in Iran, tweeted earlier this week that Iran’s hesitation in responding to the assassination of “martyr Ismail Haniyeh” in Tehran encouraged Israel to “dare” to kill Hassan Nasrallah in Beruit: “We were deceived by the United States, which repeatedly sent messages saying, ‘Don’t retaliate, we will establish a ceasefire next week’.”

Amir Hossein Sabati - a member of parliament and a supporter of Saeed Jalili, a political rival of Massoud Pezeshkian - agreed: “Why should 80 million Iranians and the Resistance Front pay the price for the naivety of a few individuals?” In response, the president’s son, Yousef Pezeshkian, wrote: “The overall policies of the regime and matters of war and peace are under the authority of the supreme leader, and Pezeshkian is loyal to the leadership and will never disobey the orders of the commander-in-chief. The insinuation that the president disobeyed the leader’s orders is in line with Israeli operations.”

Javad Emam, spokesperson for Iran’s Reformist Front, also criticised Sabati’s statements, calling them “demagoguery.” He called for Sabati to refrain from creating a “polarised” environment and provoking the public under current conditions. Emam urged Sabati first to seek answers from Iran’s security officials regarding the assassination of Haniyeh and the “suspicions of infiltration and its connection to Israel”. He commented that decisions regarding military actions are beyond the president’s authority and require the endorsement of the supreme leader, adding that Khamenei had “wisely and prudently” prevented the country from being dragged into a pre-planned Israeli trap by taking “extreme and emotional decisions”,

In fact, the cost of not responding to Israeli assassinations was far higher than expected in Iran - extreme rhetoric and unfulfilled promises of liberating ‘Quds’ (Palestine) had paved the way for a psychological war on the Axis of Resistance. The government, the military and the supreme leader had no choice but to act.

Hours before the land invasion in Lebanon we heard Netanyahu addressing the Iranian people with what amounted to a regime change message:

Israel stands with you. You’ll be free sooner than people think ... with every passing moment, the regime is bringing you - the noble Persian people - closer to the abyss ... Imagine if all the vast money the regime wasted on nuclear weapons and foreign wars were invested in your children’s education, in improving your healthcare, in building your nation’s infrastructure, water, sewage, all the other things that you need.

When Iran is finally free - and that moment will come a lot sooner than people think - everything will be different. Our two ancient peoples, the Jewish people and the Persian people, will finally be at peace. Our two countries, Israel and Iran, will be at peace.

When that day comes, the terror network that the regime built on five continents will be bankrupt, and dismantled. Iran will thrive as never before: Global investment; massive tourism; and brilliant technological innovation based on the tremendous talents inside Iran. Doesn’t that sound better than endless poverty, repression and war?

All this reminded Iranians of the Israeli premier’s message to the people of Lebanon before the current onslaught, prompting the expectation of yet another Israeli terrorist assassination inside Iran or - even worse - an air onslaught against the country’s nuclear facilities.

Historically, Israel has been cautious in directly attacking Iran for several reasons: regional instability, a potential international backlash and the fear of triggering a broader conflict with Iran’s network of support: Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis.

However, until yesterday the unspoken deterrents that might have once constrained Israel’s actions seemed to have drained away. The Israeli state compares Iran to an octopus, with tentacles in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen and its head in Tehran. According to this analogy, the killing of Hezbollah’s leader in Lebanon, the dismantling of Hamas in Gaza, and airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen all aim at cutting off arms before going for the head itself.

No doubt with recent developments Israel feels emboldened, calculating that the regional power balance has shifted in its favour, making a confrontation with Iran seem less daunting or more strategically viable. However, there are many false assumptions in any such calculation.

First of all, Iran’s ballistic programme had been underestimated. It has plenty more missiles available to launch at any time. Secondly, Hezbollah fighters thrive in martyrdom, and the assassination of the group’s leader has unleashed unprecedented anger among the organisation’s rank and file, who will continue to fight in south Lebanon. Contrary to western media propaganda, Hezbollah is no longer just a Shia sectarian militia in Lebanon. As I keep saying, it is now an integral and important part of Lebanon’s capitalist economy and state. Many non-Shia Lebanese see the current Israeli air raids and land invasion as an attack on their country and the current Lebanese government is calling on all its allies to support a ceasefire.

After a year of war against the Palestinians in Gaza, conducted under the claim of “destroying Hamas”, the Israeli state has failed to achieve its stated military aims. But, the reality is that what the Netanyahu government really wants is the opportunity to expel millions of Palestinians, a second nakba. Many believe the extension of the war to Lebanon should be seen in that light. Add war with Iran to that and the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza will appear as a mere detail for much of the western media and political class. Given the support Netanyahu has received from Biden and his officials over the assassination of Nasrallah and the incursion into Lebanon, it is clear that, irrespective of who wins the US presidential election, Netanyahu can rely on the new president to support his next step.

Hezbollah

The western media is full of misinformation about Hezbollah and its leadership, and it is therefore important to look at the group’s origins, as well as its evolution from a militia to a major regional political force.

In the 1960s and 70s, the Shia population in Lebanon was not mobilised along sectarian lines. In the south of the country, many joined left organisations like the Lebanese Communist Party. However, in the 1970s, Musa al-Sadr, a charismatic cleric educated in Iraq, began challenging the left. He formed the Movement of the Deprived to advocate for the rights of marginalised groups, and its military wing, Amal, that emerged with the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975.

Events between 1978 and 1982 further pushed the Shia population away from the left: Israel invaded twice during this period, displacing hundreds of thousands of people. Additionally, the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran offered a new ideological model for Shia Muslims, diverging from both western capitalism and leftist ideology.

The most critical event in Hezbollah’s formation was the Israeli invasion of 1982, which was aimed at driving out the Palestine Liberation Organisation from Lebanon. The invasion resulted in mass displacement, including the Sabra and Shatila massacre, where thousands of refugees under the ‘protection’ of the Israeli military, including many Shia, were killed. The invasion and the massacre proved pivotal in galvanising the Shia community.

Hezbollah was formed in 1982 by a group of Muslim clerics in close cooperation with Iranian Revolutionary Guards, who had been stationed in Lebanon’s Bekka Valley in response to the Israeli invasion. Iran’s role was to help consolidate several Shia groups committed to resisting Israeli forces and participating in the ongoing Lebanese civil war. The Islamic Republic initially provided military training and equipment for the Shia militias. Over time, these various groups unified under the banner of Hezbollah, through the formal announcement of the ‘Party of God’ and its armed wing, the Islamic Resistance.

The group also gained political power and widespread support through the provision of social services and healthcare, and its influential media outlet, Al-Manar TV.

Another key moment for Hezbollah came in 2006 when it conducted a cross-border raid, capturing two Israeli soldiers and killing several others. This provoked a month-long war with Israel that ended in a ceasefire. Despite heavy losses, Hezbollah claimed victory, and this bolstered its standing across much of the Arab world.

While the organisation promotes an Islamic way of life, it has moderated some of its early religious strictness. Initially, Hezbollah imposed Islamic codes of behaviour in southern Lebanon, though this met with mixed reactions. As the group expanded its political and economic activities, it became more lenient when it came to social customs, including dress codes. This change is even evident on al-Manar TV, where female presenters do not abide by any type of Islamic stricture on attire. Hezbollah’s political strategy emphasises that its Islamic vision is not aimed at imposing a theocratic system on Lebanon.

Since 1985, Hezbollah has developed a sophisticated internal structure. In the 1980s, it formed the majlis al-shura, a religious council of prominent leaders, which oversees multiple aspects of the organisations operations, including financial, judicial, social, political and military functions. The organisation also established regional councils in Beirut, the Bekka Valley and southern Lebanon. As Hezbollah entered mainstream Lebanese politics towards the end of the civil war, it created additional decision-making bodies, including an executive council and a politburo.

Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah is often referred to as Hezbollah’s ‘spiritual leader’. However, both he and the party repeatedly denied this religious connection. A rift existed between Iranian and Lebanese Shia over the role of the marja’iyya - the institution through which Shia Muslims follow a marja al-taqlid (source of religious guidance). Fadlallah believed that religious scholars should not affiliate to a single political party or involve themselves in governmental affairs. His views align with traditional Shia jurisprudence and differ from the doctrine of velayat-e faqih (rule of the clerics), advocated by ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran.

Hezbollah’s majlis al-shura officially follows Khamenei, Khomeini’s successor as supreme leader of Iran. However, individual members or supporters are free to follow other marja’, with many choosing Fadlallah. This illustrates the distinction between political allegiance and religious emulation within the party.

Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah was Hezbollah’s secretary-general since 1992, following the assassination of his predecessor, Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, by Israel. Though a religious scholar trained in Najaf, he was not ranked as a marja al-taqlid and instead followed Khamenei. Nasrallah was known for his direct leadership style and became the figurehead, as Hezbollah transitioned into mainstream Lebanese politics - a shift that distanced some more radical clerics from the party’s leadership.

While Hezbollah has a strong connection with Iran, including military and economic support, the party’s decisions are independent and centred around Lebanese interests. Hezbollah’s relationship with Syria has also been close, though Syria has no control over the party’s actions. After the assassination of Lebanese prime minister Rafic al-Hariri in 2005, Hezbollah carefully supported his position on Syria’s withdrawal from the country, framing it as a step that would not sever ties between Lebanon and Syria.

Hezbollah presents itself as a nationalist party but in contrast to the Phoenician-based nationalism of Maronite Christian groups and the neoliberal, US-backed nationalism of parties like that of Hariri. Hezbollah’s vision of Lebanon is of an Arab state which is closely tied to regional causes, such as Palestine. Despite its Islamic outlook, Hezbollah has consistently emphasised: “We don’t want Islam to reign in Lebanon by force.”

Hezbollah’s nationalism has evolved, as it transitioned from a resistance movement to a major political player. After the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, it successfully increased its parliamentary representation and entered the cabinet for the first time.

In addition to its military and political activities, Hezbollah championed a social agenda in the early years and it used to portray itself as a representative of the poor, especially within the Shia community. In the 2005 elections, Hezbollah demonstrated its political flexibility by aligning with various non-Shia figures, including Bahiyya al-Hariri, sister of the assassinated prime minister. Since then, Hezbollah’s most significant political ally has been Michel Aoun, an ‘anti-Syrian’ figure in Lebanese politics. Together, they have collaborated in major initiatives, such as opposing government privatisation plans that threaten public-sector jobs.

Emerging during a period of economic stagnation exacerbated by the Lebanese civil war, Hezbollah’s welfare institutions filled significant gaps in healthcare, education and housing - areas where the crippled Lebanese state struggled. The party’s social services are largely funded by donations, religious taxes like the khums (a Shia tithe), and financial contributions from the Lebanese diaspora. As I wrote in March 2024, an organisation called Friends of Shia Lebanon acts globally to collect financial support from wealthy Lebanese individuals who live abroad. Amongst the wealthiest are owners of major multinational companies with interests throughout the Middle East and Africa (for example, Car Care Center ERS, which has numerous international branches).²

Hezbollah’s social services and military presence continue to coexist with its involvement in Lebanese politics, and its popularity is closely tied to its role as both a resistance group and a provider of essential services. This dual role helps explain why Hezbollah remains deeply entrenched in the social and political life of Lebanon despite the various pressures it faces, both internally and externally.

Its adoption of neoliberal economic policies has also brought it political alliances with Christian groups, such as Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, reflecting its broader political strategy of cross-sectarian alliances. This strategy allowed Hezbollah to cement itself within Lebanon’s official political structure. For instance, Christian leaders have eulogised Hezbollah figures like Hassan Nasrallah.

On September 28, soon after the assassination of the Hezbollah leader, former Lebanese president, Aoun, wrote on X (Twitter):

With the martyrdom of His Eminence, Hassan Nasrallah, Lebanon lost a distinguished and honourable leader who guided the national resistance on the path to victory and liberation. He remained true to his word, loyal to his people and deeply committed to their cause. In turn, they reciprocated his devotion with trust, love and respect.

Aoun, describing Nasrallah as “a noble friend”, expressed concern over the current challenges Lebanon faces amid ongoing Israeli aggression and called for national unity in the face of these dangers, adding: “May God grant the great martyr a place in heaven, and my deepest condolences to his family, the resistance, his loved ones and all of Lebanon.”

Reaction

Over the last week, Nasrallah’s death has been considered a major victory in Israel. His supporters in Beirut and Iran admitted they were shocked and stunned by the event and raised questions about the future direction of Hezbollah. There are doubts about its ability to continue its armed struggles against Israel. Again all this might have prompted Iran’s missile attacks.

But Israel has, of course, continued its own attacks on targets in Lebanon over the last few days, killing leaders of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, as well as the most senior Hamas commander in Lebanon.

In his first comments, before the official announcement of Nasrallah’s death, Ali Khamenei condemned the killing of civilians in Lebanon, labelling it a sign of “the short-sightedness and foolishness” of Israeli leaders. Khamenei also called on Muslims to show their solidarity with the people of Lebanon and Hezbollah in their confrontation with the “usurping and oppressive regime”.

However, the reality is that Iran, for all its ballistic arsenal, has limited ability to retaliate against a rogue settler colony - not just due to the Zionists’ military strength, but because Israel is deeply intertwined with its allies in the US and Europe.

Mohammad Ali Maqed, a wishful-thinking university professor and journalist, believes that recent events may provide Hezbollah with an opportunity to return to a “more moderate position and seek agreements that allow the Lebanese government to regain sovereignty over all its territory”. He also believes that Nasrallah’s death might open the door to a political solution in Lebanon, including creating conditions for holding presidential elections in the country.

Maqed also raises the possibility of a rift among Hezbollah members. He outlines a passably plausible scenario, where a small hard-line faction continues to fight, while a larger section returns to the embrace of the Lebanese government and distances itself from Iran.

In Beirut, the significance of Nasrallah’s assassination was evident. A group of Hezbollah supporters took to the streets to express their sorrow and anger, while another group mourned on social media. The unveiled woman who was presenting the coverage on Al-Manar TV, broke down in tears, as she announced the death of the group’s leader. Meanwhile, around one million displaced individuals continue to live in the streets without shelter, as they suffer Israeli attacks that have, according to the Lebanese ministry of health, resulted in over 1,000 deaths.

After Hezbollah confirmed the news of Nasrallah’s death, BBC Arabic spoke with several displaced individuals in Ain al-Mreisseh, a neighbourhood in Beirut, many of whom were unable to accept or bear the news. Some fell to the ground, while others began to shout, run and cry. One woman said, “I wish they would kill us all and leave him alive.”

So far 19 senior Hezbollah officials have been killed and Nasrallah’s assassination raises questions about the ability of his successor to fill the significant void he left in both the political and military arenas. But no doubt Iranian leaders will emphasise that Nasrallah’s death will not impact Hezbollah’s capacity or standing in the region.

Ahmad Vahidi, a former commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard and former Iranian minister of the interior, stated: “Hezbollah has trained many commanders and, whenever one commander is martyred, another commander rises to the forefront, and Hezbollah has never been weakened.”

Where next?

Since 1948, the peoples of the entire region have been victims of the consequences of the nakba and settler-colonialism. Irrespective of their religious affiliation or background, they feel a sense of solidarity with the Palestinians. Repeating war crimes which have been a common feature of Israel’s genocide in Gaza, this time in Lebanon, far from bringing ‘safety’, will endanger the lives of Israelis living close to the Lebanese border.

Netanyahu’s arrogant threats in his September 30 message and subsequent warnings of retaliation after Iran’s October 1 attack, implied, of course, military retaliation against Iran’s Islamic Republic. But that would only lead to increased Iranian nationalism. Those Iranian activists who underestimate the strength of that nationalism might pay a heavy price. Whether we like it or not, Iran is now gaining increasing support on the Arab street and none of the dictators of the region can afford to take their populations for granted.

As far as Israel is concerned, an editorial in the Israeli daily, Haaretz, sums up the despair of liberal Zionism:

The sad fact is that there is no real opposition in Israel, army operations aren’t a substitute for diplomacy. The last thing Israel needs are proposals for another occupation or new targets for assassination. Israel requires a determined, moral opposition that will challenge the security hubris of the Israeli right, which now feels that it has an opportunity to do anything it pleases. Such an opposition is needed not only because our enemies - from Iran to Hezbollah and Hamas - can still respond, but also to think about the day after the war.

Death and destruction aren’t goals in and of themselves, and the opposition mustn’t be the one calling for expanding a war that would end with the army once again sinking in the Lebanese quagmire.³

The only answer is the politics of the working class and the perspective of socialism. Liberal Zionism, reactionary Islamic organisations such as Hamas and Hezbollah, the Iranian theocracy or Syria’s Ba’athists - all offer nothing but the dead-end of blood, destruction and tears.

However pathetically weak at this present moment in time, the left can and must be revived. Not on the basis of technocratic modernisation, guerrillaism, pan-Arabic nationalism or ‘official communism’. That hardly needs saying.

But a strategy of working class leadership of the Arab movement for national unity and sweeping away the emirs, sultans and kings, the Shia and Sunni religious misleaders, the divisive sectarian politicians, the Ba’athist kleptocrats, El-Sisi’s military-bureaucratic dictatorship in Egypt; and reaching out to the masses in Turkey, Kurdistan and crucially Iran - that could, surely would, split Israeli society along class lines, with the prospect, not of the workers being an ever poorer labour aristocracy, but part of the ruling class.

Now that would be something.

1. See ‘Third war begins’ Weekly Worker September 26: weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/1508/third-war-begins.↩︎

2. ‘Part of the establishment’ Weekly Worker March 21 2024: weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/1483/part-of-the-establishment.↩︎

3. www.haaretz.com/opinion/editorial/2024-10-01/ty-article-opinion/where-is-the-israeli-opposition-thats-against-more-death-and-destruction/00000192-4490-d07b-aff3-57f673d50000.↩︎