10.06.1999
Kosova deal
Imperialist peace opens up new phase
Time is running out for Slobodan Milosevic. Despite some characteristic attempts at prevarication and diplomatic chicanery, and a show of truculence by his generals, a UN Security Council resolution enshrining the G8 principles should effectively remove all grounds for delaying the withdrawal of Serbian forces from the territory of Kosova.
The reasons for Serbia’s abject capitulation in the face of Nato’s 10-week bombing offensive are evident: the industrial infrastructure of Yugoslavia has sustained massive damage, to the point where talk of economic catastrophe is no exaggeration; thousands of Serbian troops have been killed or seriously injured; perhaps most important, however, was the treachery of Russia, Serbia’s ally against the western powers. For Yeltsin’s regime, access to IMF dollars and the desire to be a big player in a post-war settlement were more important than its rhetorical commitment to Slav brotherhood or even its real concerns about Nato’s aggressive geopolitical goals in the region.
In the bourgeois media attention George Robertson, Labour’s defence secretary, focused on the military-technical aspects of the peace settlement, but what matters is the politics. This paper has consistently championed the cause of Kosovar self-determination and independence, something for which we have been castigated as ‘objective supporters’ of imperialism. But as we have said all along, the imperialists never had any intention of allowing Kosova to attain its freedom. The text of the G8 principles proves this point beyond any doubt.
Paragraph 8 talks in the vaguest terms of
“a political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarisation of the UCK [KLA] ...”
The paragraph is a masterpiece of equivocation and mealy-mouthed qualification. At its heart there is also a blatant contradiction. “Taking full account of the Rambouillet accords” would mean granting the Kosovar people a referendum on independence within three years. Such a referendum would almost certainly lead to independence. Yet the G8 countries’ avowed commitment to “the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” essentially means preserving the status quo. It effectively pre-empts any democratic test of the Kosovars’ demands - Kosova must remain a part of Yugoslavia. So much for the claims by some of our comrades on the left (the ‘Yugoslav defencists’) who would have us believe that the imperialists embarked on this war with the aim of dismembering their beloved ‘former workers’ state’. In fact, their friends in Belgrade are in a better position now than had they signed the Rambouillet agreement.
Britain’s foreign secretary, Robin Cook, made the imperialists’ attitude to Kosova abundantly clear, when he stated that:
“The accord agreed in Belgrade does not specifically refer to a referendum on independence from Serbia within three years, as did the agreement set out at Rambouillet in February. There is no commitment in the accord to a referendum, but there is recognition that the interim administration would have at some stage to take account of the people of Kosovo. That is the democratic reality. It does not necessarily mean that it will be settled by a referendum. There will be international mediation, but that is a long way down the track ... just to build up the basic tool of democracy, an electoral register, will take nine months. Once we have had free and fair elections, in a year or so we have the basis of a dialogue for the long-term status of Kosovo” (The Observer June 6).
This is exactly the sort of hypocritical nonsense we are accustomed to hearing from our ‘ethical’ foreign secretary: mere sound without substance. The “democratic reality” is that the people of Kosova, having been subjected to terror by Milosevic’s equivalent of Hitler’s SS, will never willingly agree to remain a part of Yugoslavia. Independence is not merely their desire: it is their right - a right which the UK and the other imperialist powers have no intention of conceding.
The imperialists’ decision to defer any consideration of democratic elections for “a year or so” is driven not only by their strategic plan for preserving the “territorial integrity” of Yugoslavia, but by their need to resolve a more pressing problem - what to do about the KLA? This is what lies behind Nato’s determination to avoid what they refer to as a “vacuum” in Kosova: ie, the 20,000 or so KLA guerrillas, whose ranks are likely to be swelled significantly in the immediate future, must not be allowed to become a de facto Kosovar army and launch an offensive against the retreating Serbs.
Commenting on the G8 demand that the KLA must disarm, Cook tells us that “If you have seen your villages wiped out and your friends shot, demilitarisation is not the first thing on your mind.” Quite so, Mr Cook. People also remember what happened at Srebrenica, when the Bosnians put their faith in Nato protection. Having seen their aspirations to independence written off by their Nato ‘allies’, and witnessing the anxiety of Nato to protect the Serbian army, the KLA are hardly in a mood to place any trust in Nato’s supposed good faith. Nonetheless, Cook goes on to say that
“We expect to see that attitude transformed when they no longer have Serb forces to fight and they see there are Nato forces able to offer far better protection to Albanian civilians. We will be holding them [the KLA] to demilitarisation” (ibid).
Initial assessments suggest that the KLA leadership under Hashim Thaci will reluctantly agree to formal demilitarisation. The possibility of splits within the organisation - perhaps even involving some form of partisan activity directed against the Nato occupation force - cannot, however, be excluded, especially in the event of Nato troops adopting a heavy hand in attempting to enforce demilitarisation. In our view, the Kosovar people have every reason and every right to reject imperialism’s peace and look to their own armed forces.
Turning to the post-war political situation in Serbia, our first conclusion must be that the position of Milosevic has been seriously, perhaps fatally damaged by the Kosova debacle. He is vulnerable from every angle. Not only is he now an indicted war criminal - effectively an outlaw in every country that is a member of the United Nations - he is also a pariah in terms of political relations with Nato. Tony Blair, while not calling directly for the overthrow of Milosevic, has made it clear that “There really isn’t a place for Serbia in the family of nations while they have Milosevic at their head as an indicted war criminal (ibid). Leaving aside the guff about “the family of nations” and Blair’s bogus fastidiousness about dealing with “war criminals”, his statement amounts to fairly crude blackmail. So long as Milosevic remains in charge of the Yugoslav regime, then Serbia will not receive any money from the west to help rebuild its devastated infrastructure. This consideration must surely be a powerful weapon in the hands of Milosevic’s opponents. They can offer the masses a programme for reconstruction and renewal. Milosevic can offer them nothing but isolation and penury.
So far as the political opposition to Milosevic is concerned, none of the likely contenders is untainted by Serbian national chauvinism. Vuk Draskovic, the mercurial leader of the Serbian Renewal movement, would probably be Nato’s preferred successor and apparently has growing support among the population. Considerable influence might also be exercised by the leader of the Radical Party, Vojislav Seselj, a rabid ultra-nationalist and anti-communist who is reported to enjoy strong backing from the commanders of the Yugoslav 3rd army, which bore the brunt of Nato’s air attacks in the south of Kosova.
The majority of his party’s 87 deputies in the Serbian parliament voted against accepting the G8 principles, and Seselj has announced that he will stand down as deputy prime minister on the day when Nato forces enter Kosova. If he carries out this threat and withdraws the Radical Party’s support from Milosevic, then the Socialist Party bloc will lose its majority and elections will have to be held - elections which Milosevic would probably lose. In order to stave off the threat of electoral defeat, Milosevic might well introduce martial law and foment a confrontation with Montenegro, where secessionist sentiment is running high under the impact of the war.
However, the manoeuvrings of bourgeois nationalist politicians are not the primary focus of our interest, as communists, in what the political future of Yugoslavia might be. The question that interests us is the extent to which Serbian workers begin to act as a class. With Milosevic’s Greater Serbia project in tatters, there will at least be the space for a working class alternative. In the next days and weeks tens of thousands of reservists will return from Kosova. To the humiliation of defeat will be added the fact that many will find that their factories and workplaces have been destroyed and their jobs lost. For them, as for the war-weary Serb civilian population, prospects look grim. In this situation, wide-scale unrest must be on the cards. Economic discontent will surely interweave with issues of democracy and accountability.
In such circumstances, the key subjective factor is the emergence of a genuinely socialist movement among the Serb working class. Much will depend on whether the Milosevic regime can remain in power. Revolution begins above. If the Milosevic regime is unable to cling to power, or is unwilling or unable to hand over to a stable alternative, those below will have their opportunity. However, it cannot be emphasised too strongly that the working class will get nowhere without becoming the first and foremost champion of democracy.
A litmus test of any new mass movement among the Serbian working class will be its attitude to the question of Kosova. Despite Nato’s efforts to push it onto the sidelines with vacuous talk of “dialogue” about the long-term status of this “province” of Yugoslavia, the national question still exists. The principled Leninist approach retains all its strength and vitality: the Kosovar people must be allowed to exercise self-determination as a right - up to and including independence.
Michael Malkin