03.06.1999

Beginning of the end?

Despite talk of a Balkans settlement, Kosovar self-determination does not figure in Nato’s plans

Is ‘peace’ about to break out in the Balkans? President Milosevic’s reported willingness to accept the G8 ‘principles’ formulated on May 6 needs to be treated with great caution. It is too early to speak of a “breakthrough”, let alone a “swift end to the Kosova war” (The Times June 1).

Understandably, the Russian special envoy, Viktor Chernomyrdin, whose frenetic diplomatic efforts have induced Milosevic to accept the G8 agreement “in principle”, is talking up the prospects for a settlement, claiming that “a basis has been found for a positive decision on solving the Yugoslav conflict” (ibid); Russia’s new prime minister, Sergei Stepashin, likewise speaks of “real chances” for an end to the war (The Daily Telegraph June 1).

A careful reading of Milosevic’s statement, issued through the Yugoslav news agency Tanjug on May 31, makes it clear, however, that a wide gulf still separates the parties to the conflict. The statement says that “Yugoslavia has accepted the G8 principles and thinks a UN Security Council resolution ... should enable the transfer of the resolution of the crisis from the military to the political sphere” (The Daily Telegraph June 1). No specific mention is made of any of the imperialist powers’ demands agreed in Bonn, acceptance of which, in their present form, would amount to a capitulation by Belgrade. The primary stumbling blocks to a ‘compromise’ solution remain the same: Nato’s demand that the Serbian regime should withdraw its forces from Kosova, and Nato’s insistence that it should play the core role in any putative ‘peace-keeping’ force entering Kosova in the event of an agreement.

So far as the first is concerned, despite Nato’s hard-line rhetoric there has been a largely unremarked, if subtle, softening in their position. Whereas the imperialists’ original demands called for the removal of all Serbian forces from Kosova, in the aftermath of the G8 accord, they categorically stipulate only the withdrawal of the bulk of such forces, specifically the military police and special forces. A symbolic Serbian army presence, designed formally to validate the Yugoslav Republic’s territorial claims to Kosova, remains an option. Any such ‘peace’ agreement, would merely serve to confirm what we have been saying from the outset, namely that the imperialists never had any interest in upholding the right of Kosova to anything other than a purely notional ‘autonomy’ under Nato supervision within the existing state structure of Yugoslavia. Real Kosovar self-determination and independence never formed part of Nato’s political strategy. Talk of a “political process aimed at self-government” (Daily Mail June 1) is transparent window-dressing.

On the question of the composition of the ‘international security presence’ that will police Kosova in the event of an end to hostilities, there seems little room for compromise. Milosevic insists that the Nato powers involved in the air war (specifically the USA, UK, Germany and France) should be excluded from any such ‘presence’. Instead, a force under UN auspices and composed of ‘neutral’ Nato states, together with Russia, should fill the peace-keeping role. This demand is clearly totally unacceptable to the major Nato powers. Furthermore, Milosevic is said currently to favour the Chernomyrdin plan for a settlement, which envisages the partition of Kosova: under the terms of this scheme, the northern sector would be occupied by Russian and other neutral forces, whereas the southern sector would be in the hand of Nato forces, but again excluding the participants in the air offensive.

Since the major western powers have already rejected any question of a partition and obviously could not accept their exclusion from the post-war army of occupation, there appears to be no possibility of an agreement unless Milosevic makes major concessions. This may happen, but, given Milosevic’s record, it would be unwise to bet on it. One reading of the current situation, perhaps a more realistic one, is that Milosevic’s latest ‘peace feelers’ are meant to bring pressure to bear on the EU summit due to take place in Cologne as we go to press. By sending the Finnish president, Martti Ahtisaari, to the latest round of talks in Belgrade, the EU has indicated its desire to play a more influential role in bringing about a solution. The EU has even gone so far as to offer the Serbs a juicy bribe in the form of eventual membership, backed up by the promise of immediate financial assistance to the tune of some £3.6 billion a year, of which the UK would be committed to provide £500 million annually.

Despite the Clinton administration’s eagerness for any compromise that would avoid the necessity of deploying ground troops in an offensive role - US public support for the Nato air offensive is falling all the time - it seems very unlikely that the imperialists could accept any agreement that fell short of a total implementation of the G8 proposals. To do so would be to face grave political humiliation. Given these circumstances, an eventual ground offensive still seems probable. At a meeting in Bonn on May 27, the UK government reportedly committed itself to providing 50,000 troops (almost half the entire British army of 103,000 men). So eager is bomber Blair to help sweeten the pill for reluctant US imperialism, that, according to some reports, he has undertaken to ensure that Europe will not only provide the bulk of Nato’s ground troops, but will also foot the lion’s share of the bill (Financial Times May 31).

Nato spokesmen have refused to confirm any plans for a ground war, but the truth, whatever it is, must soon emerge. Large-scale deployment of forces - including the call-up of reservists - will have to begin by the middle of June if a campaign is to be launched and concluded successfully before the onset of winter.

Predictably, the Kosovars themselves and their own armed forces in the shape of the KLA, have received no attention in recent official statements. Nato’s ‘humanitarian’ commitment applies exclusively to the question of resettling refugees. A just political solution to the Kosovar demand for self-determination and independence was never and is not now part of Nato’s plans for the region. No doubt Nato will seek to make use of the KLA in the event of an opposed entry into Kosova by a Nato army of invasion, but one wonders how long it will be thereafter before the KLA itself becomes ‘the enemy’. It is worth remembering that the G8 principles include the disarming of the KLA.

The imperialists’ treachery towards their KLA ‘allies’ and towards the just demands of the Kosovar population as a whole is the one thing in the current situation about which there can be little doubt.

Michael Malkin