14.05.2026

Living in dangerous times

Mainstream media has the government in Iran deeply divided. This seems largely unfounded. Meanwhile the Strait of Hormuz remains doubly blockaded. The risk of a sudden escalation is obvious. Scott Evans reports on the May 10 CPGB aggregate

Last weekend, the CPGB held one of our regular all-member meetings, where we primarily discussed the war on Iran, followed by a brief report on the organisation’s financial situation, before completing the election of the Provisional Central Committee, which had been deferred at the AGM.¹

Comrade Farzad Kamangar opened with an introduction attempting to look beyond the immediate situation regarding the war on Iran by raising questions about its implications for our theory of imperialism and the current world order. Why has a deal not emerged yet? What is holding things up? She pointed to a number of unsatisfactory explanations floating around the media. For example, some allude to Tehran making Trump wait by refusing to act according to the USA’s imposed deadlines. Some claim significant internal divisions within the Iranian government, though this is largely wishcasting - the regime is not hugely divided. There are factions outside, such as the Front For Resistance, which has only nine of the 290 seats in the Majles, who oppose negotiations. There are also voices on the left outside Iran making similar claims - that Iran is winning, so why bother negotiating? But the regime itself does not think like this, except when it pretends to in the propaganda it promotes. The Iranian economy is on its knees, and the country cannot win militarily.

Israel played an important role in triggering the conflict, but the war was actually due to the logic of the USA-China rivalry. Iran was an obvious proxy target after Iraq; the USA’s veto control over the flow of Middle Eastern oil is strategically important, and China’s ongoing access to cheap Iranian oil is damaging to the US position. Other regional countries are also unhappy with the dangers posed by US bases early in the war. The USA’s relative decline and its increasing appetite for risk may also explain why Trump, unlike previous presidents, finally went along with Netanyahu’s long-standing plans.

We may need to revise how we conceive of the working of imperialism, continued comrade Kamangar. We should dismiss any idea of multiple global imperial powers. Comrade Mike Macnair, she recalled, has argued that any capitalist power has elements of imperialism within its logic: it is not merely ‘the highest stage’. We should nevertheless be careful not to underestimate the significance of the hierarchy of imperialist power, which leaves, at the end of the day, a single global hegemon. And then there are the competitors - the only realistic one today being China. Iran has had bigger ambitions in the past, especially in its early days, but those are much diminished. It has exerted influence in the region through proxies and allies, but these have never been about ‘imperialist ambitions’: rather they are insurance policies.

Statements from some of the pro-Nato ‘left’ who claim that Iran had played a significant role in starting the war because of its nuclear ambitions and its (delusional) desire to become a regional imperialist power. Nor have the Kurdish or Balochi sections of Iran ever been as separatist as such people claim.

China will likely benefit, however, with Iran increasing its alignment with Beijing, whatever else happens. China is playing an important diplomatic role as the power behind Pakistan in these negotiations. All that said, the threat to the global economic outlook threatens China too: it is more insulated than most, but not immune from a global economic collapse. The situation raises many questions: how should we understand China, how does US decline work in this transitional period?

Comrade Kamangar concluded by noting that there have been four major protest movements in Iran since 2017, largely driven by economic conditions, but significant sections of society are still rallying behind the regime - though this will erode if the war drags on.

She was followed by guest speaker Moshé Machover, who disagreed that imperialist concerns about China are central. This is primarily Netanyahu’s war, he claimed, although he did refer to us now being in a ‘bipolar world’. He pointed out that Netanyahu had campaigned for the USA to attack Iran for decades and was ultimately behind the withdrawal from the nuclear deal. The main cause of Trump choosing this war was not to weaken China - the actual effect has been the opposite: preventing the USA from continuing its pivot to Asia and even pulling weapons away from the Pacific. The Trump administration is obviously irrational, while Netanyahu used his skills as a conman to sell his plans to the USA. In an asymmetric conflict it does not make sense to talk of winners and losers, concluded comrade Machover, but clearly the USA has not achieved its stated aim of a quick victory, capitulation or disintegration of the Iranian state.

Debate

Following the two opening speeches, Jack Conrad said he never took the stated war aims seriously. You cannot achieve regime change from 20,000 feet, and there is no alternative regime waiting in the wings. There are irrational elements, as in the two world wars, but this must be understood in the context of the USA looking to reverse its relative decline. The fear is of a stalemate, in which eventually all hell breaks out.

Mike Macnair quoted a leading US central command figure: in the Middle East, the USA has its hands on the throat of the Chinese economy. The ‘pivot to Asia’ was always nonsense: it is through negative control over oil access that the USA aimed to strangle China. Israel has its own interests in overthrowing the Iranian regime, but there is a clear US interest too. On the current ‘stalemate’, America is not politically willing to take the casualties required to force open the Strait of Hormuz, which would require boots on the ground. Escalation of some kind remains likely. On risks to the world economy, comrade Macnair was sceptical: as long as the USA is doing all right, the world economy will not collapse.

Comrade Tom Cormack suggested that some in the CPGB may be underestimating the decline of US hegemony, and that adventures like Iran are intended as advertisements of US power. We should not just look at a snapshot of military might, but the fact that China’s economic strength - reflected in GDP growth - is much greater than the USA’s, he claimed. But comrade Conrad replied that this analysis is facile - nothing grows linearly forever. For his part, comrade Ken Smith emphasised the unpredictability of the war’s course. A mistake or rush of blood could trigger an escalation beyond anyone’s control.

Comrade Kamangar responded to Moshé Machover by stating that she is not denying Israel’s role as a trigger, but the lack of Republican pushback and Biden’s failure to restore the nuclear deal show that the US does want this war.

Comrade Jim Moody raised the question of nuclear weapons, arguing that people are becoming complacent about the so-called ‘nuclear option’. To which comrade Conrad responded that there is no modern practical military use for tactical nuclear weapons: conventional weapons are sufficient.

Moshé Machover’s closing response made two main points. First, people make mistakes because they convince themselves circumstances are ‘different this time’ - the USA believed the Iranian regime was so unpopular it would collapse if you merely blew a puff of air at it. The USA has plainly not achieved its war aims, he said. Second, the comparison with the world wars is wrong: this war was entirely one-sided, initiated by the USA, and, had Washington known it would drag on this long, it is possible Trump would not have started it. Only JD Vance has shown any inkling of rational thinking on the war, though he did commit himself to falling in behind Trump.

Comrade Kamangar concluded the debate by pointing out that Mossad-back media seemed to have convinced much of the Iranian left that the regime’s collapse was imminent. The Iran war is showing again that in asymmetric warfare there is much you can do in terms of defence on the cheap. The fact that China is in no position to take on the USA as a military power is fundamental, she stated: the gap is still huge. And, even if a negotiated peace is signed soon, that does not mean this conflict is over. We should expect worse to come.

PCC election

At the AGM in March, the PCC had proposed re-electing the existing committee of three plus a fourth, younger, comrade as a candidate PCC member - ie, without voting rights. It seems that comrade Conrad had mistakenly suggested that a current PCC member, who was not present, might walk if the extra member was elected with voting rights - which the majority present seemed to prefer. This, I suppose, would have been an amendment to the PCC motion. However, it was never confirmed by a formal vote. Instead, the AGM had decided to defer the PCC election to the next aggregate, while re-electing the existing three-member PCC in the interim.

Back to the present aggregate. Comrade Conrad, for his part, was surprised by the pushback against the proposed use of candidate membership for a new PCC member, which had been a common practice in communist parties.

A somewhat heated back-and-forth resulted in the clarification that the PCC member absent at the AGM had not threatened to quit if the additional comrade was elected with voting rights. Comrade Stan Keable’s prompting helped to clarify this. However, the proposed fourth candidate had now decided to withdraw their nomination, at least for the time being, as changed personal circumstances meant they would not be able to devote their full energy to the role.

There is a recognition in the organisation of the need to expand the PCC with younger blood, if the organisation is to reproduce itself. This serious problem thus continues unresolved, and will hopefully be treated - alongside the need to recruit, even in small numbers - as a matter of some urgency.

1. See ‘Through the slough of despond’ Weekly Worker March 26: weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/1578/through-the-slough-of-despond.↩︎