19.03.2026

Peering through the fog of war

One leader after another is being assassinated. Apart from that, Trump’s war aims remain contradictory and unclear. The regime is certainly not going to spontaneously collapse, argues Yassamine Mather

It is often said that truth is the first casualty of war. The events of the past few weeks have confirmed this once again.

I have been inundated with messages presenting completely contradictory claims. Some insist that Iran is on the brink of collapse - that the regime is finished. Others cite headlines from established outlets such as Foreign Policy and The Guardian, suggesting instead that the United States and Israel may be “biting off more than they can chew”.

Both narratives should be treated with caution. The reality is that we simply do not know what is happening with any certainty. Both sides are highly secretive, and reliable information is scarce. Israel, for example, has imposed strict limits on reporting. There is virtually no independent verification of damage to its infrastructure, casualties or military outcomes. Even journalists on the ground in Israel - such as BBC correspondents - are forced into shelters by sirens and subsequently admit that they cannot confirm what targets have been hit and what raids intercepted.

The limited visual evidence available from Israeli cities - such as footage broadcast by Al Jazeera - does show damage to buildings, including what Iran claims are Mossad-related facilities, but whether these claims are accurate remains unclear. One conclusion, however, is unavoidable: the claim that Israel’s Iron Dome has provided total protection is false. Meanwhile, discussions - reported in outlets such as Haaretz - about the potential use of nuclear weapons underline the dangerous pathways under consideration. While it is hoped that such options will remain hypothetical, their mere discussion reflects the severity of the strategic impasse.

At the same time, Iran’s own reporting is selective and curated. It highlights damage within its territory - possibly to generate nationalism or stoke up anger. For example, the destruction of the Institute for Aeronautic Studies - a facility combining academic and military aerospace functions - has been widely shown.

Importantly, not all targets appear to be strictly military. Civilian areas and infrastructure - such as food depots - have also been struck. This suggests a broader strategy aimed at undermining morale and creating a sense of vulnerability among the population.

Ambiguity

Both sides claim that the other is seeking a ceasefire, while presenting themselves as unwilling to concede. Whether this is bluffing or for real is impossible to determine.

Donald Trump’s war objectives have been somewhat ambiguous, oscillating between limiting Iran’s nuclear programme, getting an acceptable supreme leader, to forcing total surrender. Initial expectations from the US leadership appear to have been based on a flawed assumption: that the elimination of key figures would trigger collapse. Well, Ali Khamenei, Mohammad Pakpour, Gholamreza Soleimani, Ali Larijani, and now Esmaeil Khatib have been killed and, of course, the regime has not collapsed.

Some of Trump’s statements suggest confusion. According to various accounts, people such as Benjamin Netanyahu and Jared Kushner may have reinforced this expectation, presenting an image of widespread internal opposition and the readiness of unarmed civilians to overthrow the regime. But, in fact, so-called hardliners continue to strengthen their position in Tehran. That, and rising oil prices due to the partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz, are increasing domestic pressure on Trump to end the ‘costly war’.

Within the Iranian regime there are certainly those who are determined to fight for as long as possible. Their perspective draws on the claim that after the 12-day war in June 2025 Israel sought a ceasefire, which Iran accepted, despite knowing that war would soon be restarted. In retrospect, many in the current leadership now appear to regret that decision. The ceasefire allowed Israel time to re-equip, foment internal unrest and gather intelligence in preparation for further strikes.

This line of reasoning seems to shape Iran’s current posture. There is a growing perception within the regime that this must be a decisive confrontation - either the system survives and neutralises the threat, or it collapses entirely. What is rejected is a prolonged, cyclical conflict marked by temporary pauses and renewed escalation.

Some of the most significant effects of the war are psychological rather than purely military. The bombing of oil reserves near Tehran illustrates this clearly. Residents describe waking to skies darkened by smoke, with one observer likening it to a solar eclipse. Although rainfall later cleared the air, the immediate impact was profound. Religious narratives quickly emerged, interpreting the weather as divine intervention - showing how ideology can interact with wartime experience.

Similarly, the attack on Kharg Island, while directly targeting military facilities rather than oil production, exposed vulnerabilities in Iran’s energy infrastructure. The island’s proximity to Kish - a major destination for affluent Iranians - has heightened fears among those who had fled Tehran seeking safety. These developments demonstrate that the war is not only about destroying assets, but also about reshaping perceptions of security and stability across different social classes.

Reports suggesting widespread support for Reza Pahlavi have clearly been exaggerated, in part due to coordinated online amplification. Even institutions such as the BBC acknowledge privately that they have been misled by such campaigns.

Internal dynamics

However, the absence of support for opposition figures does not equate to support for the regime. Instead, what is emerging is a more complex phenomenon: a form of defensive nationalism. Recent statements by Trump - particularly those hinting at redrawing Iran’s borders or employing racist generalisations about all Iranians - have had a counterproductive effect. Rather than weakening the regime, such rhetoric has pushed segments of the population to rally around the state, even if they remain politically opposed to it. This is visible in mass demonstrations, where participants avoid official slogans or symbols, but still mobilise against foreign aggression. It is also reflected in everyday acts, such as volunteering to donate blood, with reports of long queues in Tehran. In this sense, the war has generated a ‘wartime society’ dynamic, where national solidarity temporarily overrides internal divisions.

Despite the pressures of war, the state has managed - at least for now - to maintain a degree of economic stability. Prices have reportedly been kept under control, likely through coercive measures such as threats of arrest or intervention in markets. This is facilitated by the structure of Iran’s political economy. Many of the individuals who profit from sanctions and market distortions are themselves connected to the ruling elite. This enables the regime to enforce discipline within its own networks.

The introduction of digital credit systems for essential goods represents another mechanism of control. These support systems are targeted at low-income households, though the criteria for eligibility remain opaque. Questions arise as to whether political loyalty or other forms of discrimination influence access. While these measures may stabilise conditions in the short term, their sustainability remains uncertain, as the war continues.

On the surface, speculation about leadership succession has been clarified. However, many questions about the health and whereabouts of the new Vali Faqih (supreme leader) remain unanswered. The hurried selection reflects a desire to maintain continuity and avoid signalling weakness. Ali Khamenei reportedly left specific instructions not to appoint his son, mentioning, among other reasons, concerns about Mojtaba’s “personal issues”. However, the Council of Experts decided to avoid an appointment that might indicate a change in line - one that could be interpreted as a shift in political direction, thereby increasing factional tensions within the regime.

Regional impact

The Strait of Hormuz remains a critical chokepoint - not only for oil exports, but also for the import of essential goods into Gulf states, such as Qatar, the UAE and Kuwait. Even without direct military action, the threat of disruption has significant consequences - particularly through increased insurance costs and logistical uncertainty. These countries are now forced to consider alternative supply routes, such as overland through Saudi Arabia: expensive but far from impossible.

Moreover, the war is reshaping the social and economic landscape of the area. Cities like Dubai and Doha, which functioned as safe havens for expatriates, investors and elites, are experiencing massive outflows. With airports disrupted and security concerns rising, many are reconsidering their presence in the region. This represents a deeper structural impact that may persist long after the conflict ends. Add to all this the political implications of the conflict.

Conspiracy theories suggesting that Iran deliberately targeted Gulf states to enhance its regional position overlook the reality of economic interdependence. Despite political tensions, Iran has relied heavily on networks in places like Dubai for financial transactions, including the conversion of funds into hard currency. Similarly, economic ties with Qatar have played a role in sustaining elements of the Iranian economy. The disruption of these relationships is therefore not due to strategic calculation, but an unintended consequence of war - illustrating how conflict can undermine the very systems that states depend upon. Jeremy Bowen, the BBC’s international editor, summed up the political consequences on March 17:

The Gulf states are looking at the ‘terrible mess’ being left in the region and realising the Americans have no plan for what comes next. Their strategy was to stay close to Washington and, while that won’t end overnight, they are now concluding they must diversify. This isn’t just about trade anymore: it’s a strategic pivot toward Beijing as a more stable partner that didn’t just drag them into a war of choice (BBC World Service March 17).

Future

Iran’s political system is resilient, compared to others in the region. Rather than a centralised dictatorship based on a single leader, Iran operates as a ‘multi-layered’ system - a coalition of ideological, institutional and economic forces. Power is distributed across clerical bodies, military organisations and economic networks. However, institutions such as the Guardian Council play a crucial role in maintaining control by vetting candidates and limiting political competition. This reduces the likelihood of internal challenges emerging through formal channels.

If state institutions form the skeleton of the system, the security apparatus constitutes its muscle, the IRGC playing more than a military role. It has extensive economic and political influence, supported by auxiliaries such as the Basij militia. Crucially, these forces have remained cohesive during periods of unrest. Their ideological commitment - rooted in notions of martyrdom and revolutionary duty - reinforces their loyalty.

Continuity is also built into the command structure. Successors are designated multiple levels down, ensuring that leadership losses do not disrupt operational capacity. Meanwhile, economic power is concentrated within state-affiliated institutions, including para-governmental trusts (bonyads) and IRGC-linked enterprises. These entities control large segments of the economy and distribute resources through patronage networks.

Such structures bind the ruling class to the nezam (governmental system), reducing the likelihood of elite defections. Even under sanctions, these networks have preserved the material interests of those within the system.

The ideological legacy of the revolution continues to shape the system. Religious, educational and bureaucratic institutions repeat and reinforce a shared worldview that sustains the regime - even though many within these institutions no longer believe in what they preach. This ideological infrastructure functions not only as a tool of control, but also as a source of cohesion and mobilisation.

Opposition to the Islamic Republic remains deeply fragmented. It includes reformists, monarchists, leftist groups, exile organisations and ethnic movements. Historical factors - such as the Iran-Iraq war and sustained repression - have prevented the development of unified political alternatives. Even major protest movements have lacked central leadership and have been met with severe crackdowns.

Most agree that three conditions are typically required for the collapse of such a regime - mass popular mobilisation, divisions within the ruling elite and large scale defections from within the security forces. The first condition has occurred repeatedly. There was the green movement in 2009, led by regime insiders Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. But they were successfully marginalised and put under long-term house arrest. The war could easily open up divisions at the top once again.

Nor should we forget that in February 1979, at the height of the revolution, the Shah’s military machine began to disintegrate, allowing leftwing militants to gain access to arsenals. They handed out weapons to eager crowds. That can happen again, but such a development would rely on the left organising into a serious revolutionary party and winning leadership of the urban and rural working classes.