15.01.2026

Reject all dead ends

We support the mass protests against the dictatorial regime, writes Yassamine Mather. However, we must also intransigently oppose Trump’s threat of US intervention and any kind of return of the monarchy

As readers will know, the current wave of protests in Iran began with bazaar merchants mobilising against the collapsing rial, rampant inflation and the deepening cost-of-living crisis.¹ They were quickly joined by wider layers of the population confronting the unbearable economic realities. As in every dictatorship - and Iran is no exception - economic protest rapidly became political. The slogans shifted decisively: “Death to the dictator”, calls for the clerics to leave the country, and open rejection of the regime as a whole. That dynamic has continued ever since.

On January 8, the Islamic Republic responded by imposing a nationwide shutdown of internet and phone access. This did not, as the regime may have hoped, prevent images and short clips from reaching the outside world. What it did achieve was far more insidious: it choked the flow of information from inside the country and distorted the picture internationally. By January 11, even phone lines were cut. The internet blackout created a vacuum in which misinformation flourished. On January 9 and 10 in particular, fake news surged.

Fabrication and disinformation were already present, as I noted last week. But the blackout dramatically amplified their impact. It produced a grotesquely misleading portrayal of Reza Pahlavi, son of the last shah before the 1979 Islamic revolution, in international coverage. With most Iranians silenced, the narrative space was monopolised by a tiny, privileged layer with access to Starlink - socially better-off and mainly sympathetic to reactionary, monarchist alternatives. Western media, eager for a simplistic storyline and politically conditioned to believe that “protests must have a leader”, swallowed this hook, line and sinker. The result was an extraordinary and wholly artificial media blitz around Pahlavi.

This was no coincidence. It was the product of a well-oiled publicity operation, widely reported months earlier - including in Haaretz - as a Mossad-linked media campaign. Yet, during the blackout, western outlets rushed to amplify it, recycling content uncritically and presenting Pahlavi as a credible figurehead for a movement he does not represent.

Consequently, the blackout coincided with a flood of fabricated videos and doctored audios promoting Pahlavi. Unlike the previous week - when protestors inside Iran had systematically exposed these forgeries - ordinary Iranians were now deprived of the means to respond. They could no longer upload side-by-side comparisons showing the real chants from demonstrations - anti-dictatorship, anti-regime, anti-shah - alongside the falsified, Mossad-manufactured, monarchist versions circulated abroad.

Let me be absolutely clear: a vast section of those risking their lives in the streets despise the Islamic Republic - but they also despise the shah and everything he represented. Before the blackout, they made this unmistakably clear themselves. The silence imposed by the regime did not erase that reality: it merely allowed others to speak over it.

This is the continuation of years of activity by Mossad. They show a very large number of supporters for Pahlavi social media accounts and generate a vile, rude response as soon as you publish anything against the ex-shah or his son. If you are an Iranian and you defend the Palestinians and write against Zionism or against Pahlavi on social media, you are bombarded with slogans, accusations of supporting the Islamic Republic, and, not to forget, death threats. After a while, you realise these are bots, because you see the same comments under other posts with similar views.

Most Iranians consider the monarchy to have been corrupt, elitist and imposed by force through a CIA coup. Even the Iranian aristocracy did not like it, considering them a bunch of ignorant nouveaux riches.

The failures of the current dictatorship - in terms of corruption, the rentier economy and the existence of a massive gap between the rich and the poor - mean that a small portion of the population (mainly those who do not know much about Iran’s recent history) have accepted the relentless propaganda by Israeli- and Saudi-financed satellite TV stations and have developed nostalgia for that period. However, this is not as widespread as sections of the western media claim.

In fact, it is only Pahlavi’s grandfather, Reza Shah, who has some credibility, as the father of the country’s modernisation. However, those who support him have forgotten that he came to power via a British coup and was deposed in 1942 by the Allies because of his sympathies and cooperation with Hitler.

This week, someone asked me, “What is your assessment of Pahlavi’s proposed 100-day plan for an interim administration?” My reply was that this is daydreaming. Unlike Israel, Trump is not keen on him (I am not sure why). If he is imposed through regime change or a coup (ie, if Israel convinces Trump), he will not last 100 days.

So far, he has not even managed to keep his inner circle of 10-12 people. They have all appeared in videos and interviews over the last few months, exposing their personal behaviour and shortcomings.

US and Israel

Now, obviously, we have come to a stage which is changed dramatically from the first week or so of the protests into a much more violent situation. There are different accusations from both sides in terms of the level of violence and the number of victims.

The reformist president, Masoud Pezeshkian, gave an interview on January 11, in which he said that Mossad agents had infiltrated the demonstrations, set fire to mosques and the Rasht Bazaar, and claimed that they had even beheaded people during demonstrations to create terror. On January 12, Hamid Dabashi, professor of Iranian studies at Columbia University, told Al Jazeera TV: “Mossad agents are hiding among Iranian demonstrators.”

There is no doubt that Israel has physical spies and agents in Iran, and uses them, in addition to AI and bots, in the same way that the Islamic Republic of Iran has agents in Israel and uses hacking and AI to damage the Zionist state. However, even if some Mossad agents acted as agents provocateurs in the protests, no-one watching the videos, before or after the internet blackout, can be in any doubt that hundreds of thousands of Iranians are very angry. They are not Mossad agents! I am sure many young Iranians would not hesitate to set fire to mosques if they could. They hate the mosque because it represents religious repression.

At this stage, given the blackout, it is very difficult to be precise about how many people have been killed. The so-called human rights organisations quoted by the BBC, CNN and others are not reliable. Many are funded by neoconservative US Republicans. Having said that, there is no doubt that the Islamic Republic has used extreme violence against the demonstrators. I do not think anyone who has followed the four and a half decades of Islamic Republic rule has any doubts that it is capable of unleashing absolute terror against its own population.

Social repression has been slightly moderated in terms of women’s clothing, but many aspects of it remain. Political repression is very strong - we know that. Even if you run a website that publishes leftwing articles - which was tolerated during a certain period - in recent months, they have arrested people associated with such activity. If you are a worker demanding unpaid wages, you are likely to end up in prison, as many bus company workers have. If you are a woman who continues to fight for ‘Women, Life, Freedom’, you might end up in prison. And so on.

One thing that seems clear is that the regime is still reluctant to use the army; instead it is relying on the Revolutionary Guards and the basij - a kind of Islamic militia. Why would they not use the army? They might later, but at this stage I think that, for people like the supreme leader, doing that would be too close to a repetition of the way the shah dealt with similar protests in 1978-79. That history, that background - and the fact that they may not fully trust everyone in the army, despite closer connections with the Revolutionary Guards - has so far stopped them going for that option. However, if these protests continue, we do not know what will happen.

And you have to remember that this cycle of violence creates more violence. Suppose, say, 100 people are killed - or perhaps fewer. There will be burial ceremonies for these people. Today, I noticed reports that a three-year-old child was killed in Carmel Shores. There was a huge demonstration, although the government claims that it was the protestors who killed the child! Regardless, there was a popular manifestation of anger. There will be similar outpouring at every funeral, and this will culminate - if we look at the history of 1979 - in bigger and bigger demonstrations.

The main problem for the regime is that, unlike during the Women, Life, Freedom movement, when major concessions were made regarding the compulsory hijab - it cannot do much to improve the economy unless it accepts all of Trump’s terms for a ‘deal’. The economy cannot be reformed, and attempts by the Pezeshkian government to reform the exchange rates for the dollar - one for the state and the IRGC, another for the market and ordinary Iranians - did not work.

By January 12, the religious state had managed to impose a degree of control. We saw well-organised, state-sponsored, pro-government demonstrations in major cities to downplay the continuing nationwide protest movement. Tens of thousands attended these demonstrations. However, this tactic is one of the few weapons left for the regime.

State TV on January 12 showed crowds of people streaming through the streets of Tehran, before gathering in Enghelab Square for the ‘Iranian uprising against American-Zionist terrorism’ rally. There, they listened to a speech by the speaker of parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who railed against western intervention. Ghalibaf said Iran was fighting a four-front war: an “economic war, psychological warfare, a military war against the US and Israel, and today a war against terrorism”.

Of course, the US and Israel want regime change in Iran. However, despite Trump threatening military intervention and the media frenzy this created, that has not happened yet. Of course, it could happen at any time, but why have we not seen a US or Israeli military attack so far? One reason is that the US president’s advisors have told him that such an intervention could risk ending the protests, because an attack on a country inevitably makes people defensive of their country, as happened in June 2025 during the 12-day war. There is also the fact that, in the last couple of weeks, someone has reminded Trump of the US failures to rescue the hostages held in the Tehran embassy in the early 1980s. He mentioned the botched operations of the Carter era after the kidnapping of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro in Caracas. He is concerned that a failure to kill or capture Khamenei or other senior Iranian leaders might backfire.

Last week, Trump gave his excuses on Fox News for why US military force had not been used: “Quite a lot of these people who’ve died weren’t actually killed by the regime. That’s why we can’t intervene. They were killed in stampedes. There were large crowds and they were killed.” This is exactly the excuse used by the Islamic Republic. At that time, he was repeating Islamic Republic claims because his advisors were calculating various ways of dealing with the situation. I would argue that some of these threats are part of his negotiating tactics.

Beginning of end?

Supporters of the regime claim there will be no military intervention, because the US is afraid of Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz, almost stopping oil flows, or because of Iran’s missile capabilities. This is nonsense: clearly the US and even Israel on its own has air superiority and does not fear Iranian retaliation. As far as I can tell, the US is pursuing three simultaneous options for replacing the Islamic Republic and is carefully calculating its approach. Trump is often presented as an idiot who jumps into things, but I think he is actually more calculating, when it comes to long-term plans.

The pro-shah forces are mainly concentrated in the western and southern provinces, and Mossad is clearly active there. It is quite clear that Netanyahu - having met Pahlavi and having overseen almost two and a half years of close association between Zionist supporters and pro-shah supporters outside Iran - sees this as an opportunity to create a pro-Zionist regime in the Middle East that he can support. However, this is not necessarily the policy being pursued by Trump.

The Trump administration is also closely connected with sections of the Kurdish opposition, which is anti-Pahlavi and not royalist. We saw this clearly in videos from Kurdish cities, where very strong anti-Pahlavi slogans were being shouted during demonstrations. This ‘coalition’ includes the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, which has some significance, and a faction of the Komala organisation that is not involved in the royalist camp. However, there are also rumours that the Trump administration is involved in negotiations - and plots with some figures inside the regime - for what is described as a ‘smooth transfer of power’, possibly echoing its Venezuela strategy.

Remove Khamenei

The problem with this scenario is that the demonstrators want ayatollah Khamenei removed. He is unlikely to leave voluntarily. He is not the kind of leader who would step aside to save the Islamic Republic, and his immediate security apparatus appears extremely difficult to penetrate. There has been speculation, including in The Times, about figures such as Ali Larijani, the former parliamentary speaker, a former IRGC officer and current secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, as someone who might oversee a “smooth transition” of power. He has grievances against the regime, including the fact that he was blocked as a presidential candidate by the Council of Guardians more than once. However, I do not see him as someone who would rebel against the supreme leader.

I guess that a collapse among regime supporters will only occur if protests continue, but the last few days have been relatively quiet. If protests resume on the scale we saw last week, regime insiders might decide to work with the Trump administration to ensure a managed transition to a military Islamic state, primarily to avoid war. But this is speculation: we simply do not know.

The question of the survival of the Islamic Republic has been posed many times, and the regime’s ability to suppress dissent, re-invent itself and compromise when necessary is in no doubt. But the present crisis is different. Several factors - profound economic distress, a plummeting currency, severely eroded political legitimacy, external threats and what looks like institutional fatigue - are putting unprecedented strain on the system, making its long-term future more precarious than before.

That is why we hear predictions varying from imminent downfall to arguments for its continued survival, eroded existence or a transformation short of total collapse. BBC Persian has looked at a variety of views on this issue, and I have summarised and translated some of these:

• Economy and livelihoods: a catalyst or a structural determinant? While the protests started over economic hardship, they escalated into overt calls for systemic change, proving that the economy is not merely an ignition point, but a structural reality that broadens dissent, while crippling the state’s capacity to offer substantive relief. Javad Salehi-Isfahani of Virginia Tech suggests that, even if the regime endures, its survival will be “erosive, unstable and marked by recurring crises”. He contrasts the current moment with 2022, when the government could offer low-cost social concessions. Now, with a broken economy and currency collapse at the core of grievances, the state lacks credible tools for rapid stabilisation. The only viable pressure valve - reducing external tensions - is far more costly and complex than social compromises.

  Michael Doran of the Hudson Institute agrees, asserting that the confluence of economic failure, lost legitimacy and weakened deterrence has brought the regime to a juncture where ‘survival’ may not entail preserving the current system. He envisages three potential scenarios: collapse via elite fracture; an “incomplete transformation” with new leadership; or erosive survival through repression. In all cases, a return to the pre-crisis status quo is deemed impossible.

• Repression and power: the cohesion of the security apparatus. So far, despite the scale of the protests, no-one can deny the unity and obedience of the security forces, particularly the IRGC and basij. In the absence of such fragmentation, and at this stage ruling out foreign military intervention, protests alone will not bring down the regime. However, the IRGC is both the ultimate pillar of regime survival and a symptom of critical vulnerability. Continued instability and casualties could test its cohesion. Vali Nasr of Johns Hopkins University argues that the regime is trapped, unable to repress without great cost or to retreat meaningfully. This creates paralysis at the top, exacerbated by economic crisis and the risk of foreign intervention. While immediate collapse is not likely, a return to past stability is also impossible. Some predict an ‘erosive ending’ - not necessarily a sudden fall, but a gradual decay of governing capacity, political cohesion and effective power. Survival, if it occurs, is forecast to be fragile, costly and increasingly unstable.

In terms of non-Pahlavi positions, there has been a strong campaign by the right. The British foreign office appears particularly favourable to Pahlavi. If you saw the recent demonstration in London, you will have noticed that protestors were allowed to climb above the embassy balcony, remove the official Iranian flag and replace it with the royalist flag. Compare this with the level of protection given to the Israeli embassy, where demonstrators were not allowed anywhere near. It is therefore clear that there is significant sympathy for Pahlavi at official levels.

We have seen Zionist-aligned Labour ministers repeating what Benjamin Netanyahu wants them to say: open support for Pahlavi. The BBC is now in an awkward position and, in my view, has broadcast fake videos without adequate warnings. Last week, when people were posting fake videos next to the real ones - where crowds were chanting anti-shah slogans - the BBC aired those comparisons. This week, it has not. I guess that the BBC is under pressure from the foreign office, but also that royalist and Mossad-linked publicity efforts have been highly effective.

Royalists used to call the BBC “Ayatollah BBC” (much like the Daily Express calls it leftwing!). Because the BBC is institutionally weak and sensitive to such accusations, it has overcorrected. I should not say too much here: I refused an invitation to speak on BBC Persian on January 13, but perhaps I should have pushed harder.

Class forces

The mainstream press insists that movements require figureheads. As a result, two bourgeois-liberal opposition blocs have emerged, as they inevitably do in periods of upheaval. Neither deserves support.

The first is associated with Shirin Ebadi and a reactionary, pro-Zionist faction of Kurdish politics around the Komala party in Iranian Kurdistan, as well as former supporters of Pahlavi who have fallen out with him. Inevitably, this alliance supports foreign intervention. It lacks legitimacy inside Iran: it is seen as elite-driven, western-oriented and with a limited chance of getting anywhere.

The second bloc is led by the Nobel laureate Narges Mohammadi and, more importantly, by filmmaker Jafar Panahi and former reformist Mostafa Tajzadeh. Their initial statement made no mention of opposition to US intervention or Israeli genocide. I am informed that they are under pressure to revise this, and they may well do so, but it remains a bourgeois alternative that offers nothing to the working class.

What about the working class then? There are now six or seven leaflets issued by workers’ organisations. These groups are very clear: they support the protests; they have been saying for years that wages are unpaid and living conditions are unbearable; and, when they protest, they are arrested. But they are equally clear that they oppose foreign intervention. They reject the old shah, whose regime was as corrupt and unequal as the current one.

This includes the bus workers, who issued a long statement that has appeared on many websites. Former oil workers - who were striking for months with little media coverage, due, in part, to the fragmented structure of the industry - have also issued statements. There are the sugar-cane workers too, who have been protesting for years. New formations have emerged as well, including the Electricity and Metal Workers Association and the Council for Organising Contract Oil Workers.

Unlike in 1979, it is extremely difficult to organise a nationwide oil strike. Neoliberal policies and privatisation have fragmented the industry into hundreds of contractors. However, organisers are trying to adapt. Their voices are ignored by British and US media, but they were prominently represented at solidarity demonstrations in Berlin and Stockholm, where anti-Pahlavi and anti-intervention slogans dominated.

What does this mean for the immediate future? It is very difficult to say. Repression over the last few days has been severe, and it takes immense courage to protest, while unarmed, against such a brutal regime. Calls for US military intervention actively deter participation, because people do not want Iran destroyed like Iraq or Libya. The comparison may not be exact, but the fear is real and widespread.

Donald Trump has announced that any country that continues trading with Iran will face a 25% tariff on all its exports to the US. We do not have details of how that would be enforced; however, if Iran’s economic partners reduce trade to avoid US tariffs, Iran’s exports and foreign exchange earnings could fall further (especially oil and petrochemicals), squeezing the country’s revenue, and there will be more protests, even if they are temporarily suppressed.

What can we do? We must, above all else, condemn and campaign against any foreign intervention. It will be the Iranian people who will pay the price of military attacks, air raids, etc. We must show solidarity with the Iranian people, not the Iranian state. We must amplify the voices of independent working class organisations - bus workers, oil workers, sugar-cane workers - and break the false binary between the Islamic Republic and the shah.

Finally, a word on responsibility. The international left is rightly horrified by the re-emergence of royalist slogans. But we must also place responsibility where it belongs. It is the corruption, inequality and betrayal of the 1979 revolution by the Islamic Republic that has allowed such reactionary nostalgia to resurface.

1. ‘Divided regime, divided opposition’ Weekly Worker January 8 2026: weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/1567/divided-regime-divided-opposition.↩︎