16.10.2025

Heads of state, prime ministers and secretary generals

Deal, doubts and power dynamics

Infamous words come to mind: the Gaza deal is full of ‘known unknowns’ and even more ‘unknown unknowns’. Yassamine Mather looks behind the photo-ops, handshakes and bonhomie at Sharm El-Sheikh

On October 13, what was billed as a “peace summit” over Gaza was co-hosted in Egypt by president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and, of course, Donald Trump.

But, beneath the diplomatic facade, Sharm El-Sheikh played out very much like a day of photo-ops, handshakes and theatrical posturing. Trump greeted, patted and joked with each of head of state and prime minister in turn - the boss acknowledging his subordinates. He referred to the emir of the United Arab Emirates as a “rich man” and, in a patronising manner, announced that French president, Emmanuel Macron, and presumably others had answered his call within 20 minutes. And then came the crack about Italian premier Giorgia Meloni being okay with being called a “beautiful woman”, unlike some Americans!

Mahmoud Abbas, the corrupt and incompetent leader of the Palestinian Authority, was kept very much in the background. However, while Benjamin Netanyahu was invited, he declined to attend - his office gave the proximity to the Jewish holiday, Simchat Torah, as the official reason. Iran’s Islamic Republic was invited too but also declined to send anyone (more on this below).

Despite all the media attention and the bonhomie, we still do not know anything concrete about the deal that now carries the signatures of European and Middle Eastern leaders. In the infamous words of Donald Rumsfeld, former US defence secretary, the so called ‘peace’ deal is full of ‘known unknowns’ - and, of course, even more ‘unknown unknowns’.

Second stage

What follows are some of the obvious points of contention that are expected to dominate the upcoming negotiations. However, this is very limited in the absence of any details regarding the substantial issues.

Firstly, Hamas has consistently refused to disarm, insisting it will only do so once a sovereign Palestinian state is established. In its initial response to the new plan, the group again made no mention of surrendering weapons - suggesting its position remains unchanged.

For its part, Israel, while publicly accepting the Trump-backed plan in full, has opposed the idea of the Palestinian Authority taking part in the governing of post-war Gaza - Netanyahu’s stance is clear. Hamas, meanwhile, has declared it expects to participate in Gaza’s future as part of “a unified Palestinian movement”. Some Arab media outlets suggest that the Beijing Accord, which facilitated reconciliation between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, could be revived.

Of course, the plan itself does not clarify who will actually govern Gaza, once Israeli forces have withdrawn. It refers to a vague entity - a “technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee” - being responsible for daily administrative matters (provided that none of its members belong to Hamas!). However, there is no explanation of who will appoint these technocrats, how they will be chosen, or by what authority they will act. Reports suggest that clan heads and community figures are being discreetly consulted for potential names, but there is no transparent process.

Similarly, a mysterious ‘Board of Peace’ is mentioned as having ultimate authority over Gaza’s governance, though its composition, selection mechanism and powers are entirely undefined.

It remains unclear who the other guarantors of the agreement will be. Will they include Qatar, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, or the Palestinian Authority - or some combination of the above? The identity of these parties is not a trivial matter: in any agreement, the first step toward accountability is knowing who is bound by it, what obligations they assume and what rights they have.

Will these regional actors merely endorse the plan, or will they act as guarantors responsible for enforcing it? Will they participate in the post-withdrawal security or governance mechanisms in Gaza? None of these essential questions are answered.

The plan also makes no mention of which laws or legal principles will govern its implementation. Even basic contracts specify which state’s law applies. For intergovernmental accords, reference is usually made to international law. Of course, as Ziyad Motala in Middle East Eye reminds us, “If Gaza has taught us anything, it is not that the so-called rules-based international order has collapsed; it is that it never truly existed.”¹

International law has long served as a tool of power - a way for the strong to mask their domination with legality. The west has treated it as a moral badge, even while breaking it without consequence. To confirm this, in the proposed peace deal, there is nothing - no jurisdiction, no rules of interpretation, no dispute-resolution mechanism. If disagreements arise, who will adjudicate them? There is no provision for arbitration, mediation or referral to international courts. Without such mechanisms, each party can interpret the plan however they wish, guaranteeing chaos during implementation.

Another key sticking point concerns the timeline and scope of Israeli troop withdrawals. Israel’s initial pull-back leaves it in control of roughly 58% of Gaza; subsequent stages would reduce this to 40% and later 18%, according to the White House.

The final stage envisions a “security perimeter” to remain “until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat”. The wording is again deliberately vague, providing no clear timeline or verification mechanism for a complete Israeli withdrawal - something Hamas will almost certainly challenge.

Article 16 states that withdrawal will be based on the “standards, milestones and time frames linked to demilitarisation” agreed upon by Israel, the International Security Force, unnamed guarantors and the US. Since neither the ISF nor the guarantors have been established, this provision basically gives Israel veto power over its withdrawal.

It also opens a dangerous loophole: withdrawal is conditional not only on the absence of “threats” to Israel, but also on “security for Gaza’s citizens”. This could allow Israel - or allied forces - to claim that Palestinian groups or internal unrest justify indefinite delay.

Historical echoes

The rule has long been clear: America tolerates Israeli actions against Palestinians, but not when they endanger US interests or regional stability. When Washington concludes that Israel has gone too far, it says ‘Enough!’ - and Israeli leaders retreat.

Back in late 1948, during Operation Horev, Israeli forces pushed briefly into Sinai to encircle the remnants of the Egyptian army. The Truman administration reacted at once, instructing US ambassador James McDonald to deliver a sharp warning to prime minister David Ben-Gurion, demanding an immediate withdrawal. Under pressure, Ben-Gurion complied within days. The pattern has not changed much today. According to Haaretz, Trump leaned hard on Netanyahu to accept the Gaza plan, especially after the Doha attack shifted US priorities. Once again, the ‘US dog wags the Israeli tail’.

America will always shield Israel from destruction, but it will not let Jerusalem shape the region’s balance of power. Netanyahu knows US support is becoming a political headache in Washington - even for Republicans - so he is walking a tightrope. His current deference to Trump shows just how careful that balancing act has become.

The ‘peace plan’ also references earlier proposals, including Trump’s 2020 plan and the Saudi-French initiative, yet these documents contradict each other. They fail to define what “reform” of the Palestinian Authority means or who will judge whether it has met those conditions. Since Israel’s staged withdrawals are tied to PA “reform”, this vagueness provides a perfect pretext to exclude the PA from governance altogether - consistent with Netanyahu’s public statements and Trump’s comments on his flight back to the US.

No penalties are defined for breaches of the agreement. While the plan mentions that regional parties (unnamed) will guarantee Hamas’s compliance, no-one is assigned to guarantee that Israel fulfils its obligations. Given Israel’s repeated violations of past accords - and Netanyahu’s declaration that the Israel Defence Forces will remain in most of Gaza indefinitely - this uneven playing field lets one side get away with anything.

The initial ceasefire of January 15 2025 provides a worrying example: after Hamas released many of its captives, as agreed, Israel unilaterally resumed blockades and bombing, claiming the deal’s conditions had not been met. Nothing prevents a similar scenario here. Netanyahu has expanded the definition of “demilitarisation” to include “all military, terror and offensive infrastructure” - language so broad that it could indefinitely delay withdrawal.

The 58% currently under Israeli control includes Gaza’s agricultural heartland. Without access to these lands, Gazans will remain dependent on international aid indefinitely. Meanwhile, Israeli settlers wait at the borders, ready to move in, as soon as the opportunity arises. But, even if Hamas accepts the plan in full, Israel could maintain its hold on 40% of Gaza indefinitely, claiming ongoing “security threats”. The vague language allows Israel to frame any resistance as a violation of the ceasefire.

Berlin Wall

Effectively, Israel has established a Berlin Wall-style division within Gaza - one that could endure for years. Reconstruction, economic revival and governance all remain subject to Israeli discretion. The plan’s first phase mentions rebuilding hospitals and bakeries, but not the 92% of homes destroyed.

Even as key Arab states publicly condemn Israel’s war, leaked US documents reveal growing security coordination with Israel’s military. Those same networks - strained after Israel’s airstrike in Qatar - may now oversee the ceasefire’s enforcement. Over the past three years, facilitated by the US, senior military officials from Israel and six Arab states met for joint planning in Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan and Qatar.

Inside Gaza, internal rivalries have surfaced. The Doghmush clan - long infamous for kidnappings, smuggling and recently collaborating with the Israelis - is engaged in armed clashes with Hamas. Dozens have been killed as Hamas “restores order”.

Netanyahu’s pledge to annihilate Hamas has predictably come to nothing. It was, after all, nothing more than an excuse for continuing the war in Gaza (along with getting the captives back). But excuses can have a life of their own. Hence the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth claims that Netanyahu’s acceptance of Trump’s 20-point plan amounted to a “complete surrender to Hamas”: Gaza was neither demilitarised nor cleared, and Hamas remains intact - evidence that, beneath the rhetoric, the deal merely freezes the conflict under a new name.

Like the people in Gaza we may celebrate the pause in fighting and the release of hundreds of prisoners, but the future remains completely uncertain.

Iran

Iran’s refusal to go to Sharm El-Sheikh is a major point of contention inside the country. Officially the decision was announced by deputy foreign minister Abbas Araghchi, who stated Iran cannot engage with nations that have attacked and continue to threaten and sanction its people. This stance is consistent with Iran’s long-standing foreign policy - particularly its refusal to participate in conferences involving Israel, which it views as a continuation of initiatives like the Abraham Accords, aimed at ‘normalising’ Arab-Israeli relations.

During Trump’s Knesset speech (during which two leftwing members, Ofer Kassif and Ayman Odeih of the ‘official communist’ Hadash party, were dragged out, having displayed a banner calling for the recognition of Palestine) he said: “It would be great if we could make a peace deal with [Iran]”.² He added that the “hand of friendship and cooperation is open” when Tehran is ready.³

Supporters of Iran attending Sharm El-Sheikh argue it was a missed “golden diplomatic opportunity”, while others pointed to historical precedents of engaging with adversaries. There is, in fact, a clear pattern: Iran has consistently been absent from or excluded from major peace conferences involving Israel (such as those in Madrid, Oslo and Annapolis). Therefore, Iran’s ‘no’ to the Sharm El-Sheikh was to be expected.

All this comes a few days after Vladimir Putin stated that Moscow had “received messages from Israel” that it is “not seeking military confrontation” over the nuclear crisis, and wanted to “avoid miscalculation by Iran”. According to Putin, Israel asked Russia to “convey reassuring messages … that it is interested in continuing the discussion and reducing tensions, without being dragged into confrontation”.⁴

Iran’s foreign minister confirmed receiving the “calming messages”. However, we only have this claim from Putin and Russian sources - no confirmation from Israeli sources (eg, Israeli government spokespeople) affirming that they had indeed asked Russia to convey such a message. Russia could be trying to look like the go-between or ‘peacekeeper’ here, boosting its influence in the region.

All this means the embattled Iranian people feel slightly less threatened than a few weeks ago. However, given all the uncertainties around the Palestine ‘peace deal’, the possibility of another war in the region remains as high as ever.