09.10.2025
_art_full.jpg)
‘First phase’ will not bring peace
Negotiations between Hamas and Israel in Sharm El-Sheikh are likely to lead to a ceasefire and a prisoner exchange; however, Gaza’s long-term future remains uncertain. Yassamine Mather explains why Donald Trump’s 20-point plan is nothing more than colonialism dressed up as peace
We are told that the indirect talks between Israel and Hamas, which began on October 6, have resulted in a “first phase” agreement. Israel will withdraw its forces to an “agreed-upon line” and Hamas will release its war captives and, soon, accept the transfer of power to a technocratic government of some kind.
However, far from offering a credible path toward a regional peace and Palestinian statehood, Donald Trump’s 20-point US plan , the Gaza International Transitional Authority (Gita), is riddled with omissions, contradictions and slippery phrases.
Both Israel and Hamas have already rejected key long-term elements of it, and what remains appears less a framework - more a mechanism to entrench occupation under a new name. It carries the familiar hallmarks of Trump-brokered proposals - grandiose promises to bring a “strong, durable and everlasting peace” - but the substance is designed to extend imperial power and smooth the way for the Zionist plan to colonise the whole of Palestine.
The ‘first phase’ of the plan calls for an immediate ceasefire and the return of Israeli hostages, followed by Palestinian prisoner releases and resumed aid flows. This now appears to have been agreed. Yet crucial details are absent: there is no timeline or guarantee for Israeli withdrawal, no provision for disarmament oversight, and no clarity on who will be the so-called ‘technocrats’ governing Gaza. Even the fate of the 1.5-1.8 million displaced Palestinians - where they will live, how they will rebuild, and whether they will have any political rights during the reconstruction period - remains unaddressed.
Imposed peace
In its current form, the proposal echoes the worst traditions of imposed peace. It replaces overt annexation with managerial control by what is called, in leaked documents, the Gaza International Transitional Authority - a body headed by Tony Blair and overseen by US and Gulf financiers. Palestinians are left as subjects of reconstruction, without even any pretence of consultation. If the Trump-Netanyahu plan represents an evolution from the earlier grotesque ‘Riviera’ fantasy, it is only in tone, not intention. The same colonial logic persists: Palestinians are to have no role in determining their fate.
The joint press conference on September 29 between Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu announcing the 20-point plan to end the conflict was predictable: a calculated gesture designed to hide coercion and present it as diplomacy. It occurred at a time of growing international outrage over Israel’s genocidal assault on Gaza. People have taken to the streets in their millions and governments have responded with a combination of gestures and oppression. In America there is plenty of oppression … and the 20-point plan is no more than a gesture.
Trump, frustrated with his failure to get a quick deal with Russia and an end to the war in Ukraine, perhaps seriously thinks he can bring peace to the Middle East … and thus secure the Nobel Prize he covets. The 20-point plan was hailed as a breakthrough by the US and its allies. However, if you look at it closely, you will see it is little more than a recycled script. Like previous US-led proposals, it offers symbolic concessions, while institutionalising dependency. What was presented as an end to war is in fact a restructuring of control.
Netanyahu’s own remarks on September 29 were full of threats, even when he tried to give reassurances. While stressing Israel’s “right to security”, he simultaneously endorsed the rhetoric relating to the ‘cleansing’ of Gaza under the guise of reconstruction. His political calculations were obvious: pacify his ultranationalist coalition, while appearing compliant with American dictates. Former US negotiator Brett McGurk, who does support the deal, observed that it “mirrored phase two of the earlier ceasefire deal implemented in January and terminated by Israel in March”. What has changed is that it is repackaged and comes with lukewarm Arab endorsement.
Declaring that neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority would ever rule Gaza again, Netanyahu effectively undermined the plan’s core premise. His stance confirmed that the deal’s purpose was not any kind of reconciliation, but a reoccupation dressed up in diplomatic language. Israel’s military would remain in most of Gaza indefinitely. In this way, Israel could continue its domination under the guise of international governance, while Trump could present it as a victory for peace.
Acceptance
Hamas’s acceptance of indirect negotiations in Sharm El-Sheikh in Egypt was driven less by hope than exhaustion. Facing catastrophic losses and a starving population, the group agreed in principle to a ceasefire and the exchange of captives. True, instead of Tony Blair and Gita, Hamas proposes a technocratic administration made up of Palestinians. Yet even this ‘defiance’ was quickly coopted. Hamas had, after all, conceded a ‘depoliticised reconstruction’.
Regional actors like Qatar, Egypt, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates pressured Hamas’s political wing to participate in Sharm El-Sheikh, while Iran’s cautious, late endorsement revealed how the Twelve Day War has changed the regional power balance. Iran is reeling under renewed sanctions and is terrified by the prospect of a renewed air assault by Israel (and perhaps the US). Even as the Hamas leadership sought to present participation as strategic pragmatism, critics within the Palestinian milieu have certainly described it as capitulation - one that risks formalising Gaza’s transition from an occupied territory to a ‘managed protectorate’. Reports suggest that the Hamas military wing, al-Qassam Brigades, is far from happy. Looking at the composition of Gita, it is easy to see why. Tony Blair’s record - from the Iraq war to post-war privatisation - epitomises the failures of externally imposed governance. Then there is Aryeh Lightstone, Naguib Sawiris, Marc Rowan - each symbolising the increasing interventions of billionaires in politics!
Unveiling the Gaza 20-point plan coincided with intensifying tensions between Israel and Iran. Yet this too served US strategic aims: to maintain a region perpetually on edge, where ceasefire is celebrated as ‘peace’.
The stand-off between Israel and Iran is no longer about intent, but anticipation. Having failed to restart nuclear negotiations with the US, Iran fears another pre-emptive Israeli strike, supported by the US. Though Iran’s foreign-sourced weapons have proven ineffective, its domestic arms industry - one of its few successful post-shah institutions - has developed drones and missiles that have prevented its collapse. Key assets include the Khorramshahr 4 missile, which has a 2,000-kilometre range and a 1,500-kilogram warhead. However, there is a strategic ceiling. These systems are insufficient to match the power of the US or Israel, meaning Iran’s doctrine is likely limited to deterrence and the ability to retaliate and inflict wounds, not to win a full-scale war. The US is adamant that Iran should give up missiles with a range above 500 kilometres.
The Islamic Republic is also seeking military support from Russia and China to deter future attacks. However, the relationship between Iran and the Sino-Russian axis is one of strategic convenience rather than genuine alliance. Both Beijing and Moscow maintain a degree of distance from Tehran, driven by conflicting geopolitical priorities and a fundamental aversion to its Islamist ideology. Their reliability as partners is questionable too: Russia balances its ties with Iran against its strong relationship with Israel, while China’s economic engagements with Iran’s Arab neighbours and Israel far surpass those with Iran itself. This transactional dynamic was evident when Russia accepted Iranian drones for its war in Ukraine, but offered no support to Iran during its clashes with Israel. Furthermore, neither power has provided Iran with their most advanced military technology.
So this week, on the second anniversary of October 7, after two years of Israeli genocide in Gaza, military aggression in the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria and Iran, and after countless political assassinations, we are looking at a Middle East very different from 2023.
Hezbollah has suffered a crushing defeat - both secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah and his successor were killed, much of its military and financial network was destroyed, and the group has been forced to withdraw north of the Litani river and hand over its weapons. Internal opposition in Lebanon to Hezbollah’s armed presence is growing too.
In December 2024, Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed, ending Iran’s influence in Syria. Israel quickly moved into border areas, advancing to within 25km of Damascus. Syria is now fragmenting along sectarian lines - Druze, Sunni, Kurdish and Alawite.
Then Israel launched its Twelve Day War against Iran, destroying much of its air defences and missile programme. Iran’s long-range strikes caused damage, but Israeli intelligence and cyber superiority proved decisive. Then in September, Israel carried out its missile strike in Doha from 15 aircraft - which, as it turned out, failed to take out the Hamas political leadership. Nonetheless, it was the first attack by Israel on a Gulf state ... and a step too far as far as Donald Trump was concerned. Using uncharacteristically diplomatic language, he said that the missile strike did not “advance Israel or America’s goals.” The “decision” to attack was made by Netanyahu: “it was not a decision made by me,” he said, before praising Qatar as a “strong ally and friend”. Note, late last month, Trump issued an executive order instructing the US military to take all “lawful and appropriate measures” to defend Qatar from any attack.
Assessments
Historian Avi Shlaim believes Israel’s current strategy aims to reshape the region’s geopolitics through a broad regional war designed to secure military dominance across the Middle East - not only against Hamas but against all its neighbouring adversaries. Speaking to the BBC, he stated that these policies make it “highly unlikely that Saudi Arabia will join the normalisation agreements known as the Abraham Accords”, adding that the countries which have already signed them are now “deeply angered” by Israel’s conduct, even though they have little room to withdraw from those deals.1
Lebanese journalist Hazem Saghieh echoes Shlaim’s assessment, arguing that Israel is moving toward greater extremes of bellicosity. Yet he stresses that, despite its battlefield successes, Israel has suffered “major moral defeats”, as its global reputation has been gravely damaged.
As the region enters the third year since the October 7 attacks, the so-called Axis of Resistance is now little more than an empty shell. Israel, meanwhile, stands militarily triumphant and seemingly prepared for prolonged conflict on multiple fronts. But converting those military gains into a historically sustainable regional domination is surely impossible. America remains the global hegemon but its Arab allies in the Middle East are all deeply unpopular with their populations.
Revolution in Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and crucially Egypt, would change everything.