17.04.2025

Jaw-jaw flipside of war-war

US-Iran negotiations appear to have gone well. Leave aside Israel, there has been a positive response across the Middle East. Even the EU, China and Russia are happy. So, asks Yassamine Mather, what could possibly go wrong?

On April 12, US Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff participated in the Trump administration’s inaugural indirect negotiations with Iranian representatives, including foreign minister Abbas Araqchi, held in Muscat, the capital of Oman. Both sides claimed the talks were going well.

Araqchi stated that the recent discussions between the Islamic Republic and the United States (the first such talks involving a Trump administration, including during his 2017-21 term) were held in a “productive, calm and positive atmosphere”. He emphasised that both parties had reached a mutual understanding to continue the dialogue, with the next meeting likely to occur a week later. According to Araqchi, there is a shared desire from both Iran and the US to reach an agreement shortly. He stressed that neither side is interested in prolonging negotiations just for talking: rather, the goal is to achieve tangible results.

From the American side, the White House echoed this sentiment, characterising the talks as “very positive and constructive”. In an official statement, the White House acknowledged the complexity of the issues at hand, but noted that direct communication from Witkoff marked a step forward in the effort to reach a mutually beneficial outcome. It confirmed that both delegations agreed to reconvene next Saturday to continue the discussions. The first round was summed up as “substantive, excellent”.

Iran’s supreme leader seemed to remain optimistic. In his first comments on the Oman talks, ayatollah Ali Khamenei said the “first steps” in the negotiations were “good” and that, despite “pessimism toward the other side”, he was “neither too pessimistic nor too optimistic” about the talks - adding that the country’s entire political agenda should not be tied to talks with the US, as was the case during the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear negotiations in 2015.

According to Iran’s deputy foreign minister Majid Takht-Ravanchi, these were indirect negotiations, with the delegations seated in separate rooms. However, according to unnamed sources, Araqchi and Witkoff did meet in a corridor and exchanged pleasantries. Given this bizarre scenario, Iran’s Islamic Republic could maintain the claim that its delegation did not directly negotiate, while Trump can continue telling his audience that the two sides met face-to-face.

However, as with any other negotiations involving Trump and his administration, by April 14 the US president was blaming Iran for delaying the outcome. He told reporters that he believes Iran is deliberately stalling. It is difficult to understand what he means, as a schedule had been agreed in Oman. Trump also warned once again that Iran must stop any efforts to build nuclear weapons or face “severe consequences” that could include “a military attack on nuclear facilities”.

There is some confusion about where the second round of talks will take place. Iran is claiming they will continue in Oman, while the US says the talks will resume in Rome.

As for both sides’ negotiators, while Iran’s foreign minister is a veteran of nuclear negotiations, having worked as Zarif’s deputy in the first round of the JCPOA talks, Steve Witkoff is very much a newcomer. However, given the many disadvantages that Iran’s Islamic Republic faces in dialogue with the world hegemon power, none of this matters, when it comes to the US upper hand.

Witkoff is a billionaire real-estate investor, and former attorney. He is the founder and CEO of the Witkoff Group, known for acquiring high-profile properties like the Woolworth Building and the Park Lane Hotel. Witkoff began his career as a real estate lawyer, before moving into investment and development, amassing a fortune that reached $2 billion by 2025.

Though he lacked formal diplomatic experience, Witkoff played a significant role in brokering a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in January 2025. We are told that his direct and forceful approach was essential to securing a six-week truce and a large-scale hostage-prisoner exchange. However, a subsequent Israeli ceasefire plan - reportedly based on Witkoff’s proposal - sparked a backlash and was rejected by Hamas.

Witkoff also acts as Trump’s unofficial liaison to Russian president Vladimir Putin. He was involved in negotiating a US-Russia prisoner exchange and took part in discussions aimed at ending the war in Ukraine. His favourable remarks about Putin and controversial statements regarding Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories attracted criticism from Ukraine and some US lawmakers. Witkoff has long been close to Donald Trump and was a speaker at the 2024 Republican National Convention.

As for Abbas Araqchi, he has served as Iran’s minister of foreign affairs since August 2024. He previously held roles as foreign ministry spokesperson and ambassador to Finland and Japan, and was Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator under president Hassan Rouhani. He holds degrees in international relations and political science, and a PhD in political thought from the University of Kent. Araqchi joined the foreign ministry in 1989 and previously held various senior roles, including deputy foreign minister and dean of the School of International Relations. As the current foreign minister under president Masoud Pezeshkian, he has emphasised the importance of 2025 for Iran’s nuclear policy, amid tensions related to a returning Trump presidency and economic pressures.

Reaction

Russia: The Iranian foreign minister is travelling to Moscow before the second round. However, it is unlikely that Trump is concerned about such a visit. Russia and China support the diplomatic resolution of the nuclear dispute between Iran and the west. It is unlikely that Russia would welcome nuclear weapons in a country so close to its southern borders and at the moment it is not keen on another war in the Middle East.

Russia has voiced support for renewed nuclear negotiations between Iran and the US, with Moscow publicly endorsing the dialogue as a positive move toward easing Middle East tensions. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov affirmed Russia’s full backing for the talks, stating they could foster “de-escalation” around Iran’s nuclear activities.

Moscow has proposed acting as a mediator between Washington and Tehran to advance a peaceful resolution. This aligns with Russia’s broader strategy of leveraging diplomacy to reinforce its influence in the region, while safeguarding its geopolitical interests.

Despite advocating dialogue, Russia has explicitly ruled out military support for Iran in the event of US or Israeli strikes. Deputy foreign minister Andrei Rudenko clarified that Moscow would not intervene militarily, underscoring Russia’s intent to avoid direct involvement in a potential conflict.

China: Beijing has consistently opposed US unilateral sanctions against Iran, urging a revival of multilateral diplomacy and full compliance with the JCPOA. In March 2025, Beijing hosted trilateral discussions with Iran and Russia, emphasising the importance of dialogue and mutual respect in resolving disputes over Iran’s nuclear activities.

As Iran’s largest trading partner, China continues to import substantial volumes of Iranian oil despite US restrictions. To bypass sanctions, Chinese entities employ tactics such as routing transactions through small-scale ‘teapot’ refineries and conducting trade in yuan via regional banks, thereby avoiding US-controlled financial channels. Additionally, China has faced allegations of supplying dual-use materials that may bolster Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, reflecting some strategic alignment between the two countries.

Beijing has denounced US sanctions targeting Chinese firms engaged with Iran as breaches of international law. In response, China has implemented countermeasures, including tariffs and sanctions against American corporations.

European Union: Although the EU has publicly expressed cautious support for renewed nuclear negotiations between the US and Iran, EU leaders feel left out of these negotiations. After the US withdrawal from the JCPOA during the first term of Trump’s presidency, most European countries contemplating economic or trade deals with Iran faced secondary sanctions and this hurt European capital. In addition, the EU’s engagement with the US on Iran’s nuclear programme occurs amid broader transatlantic tensions. The EU has paused retaliatory tariffs on the US for 90 days to allow for negotiations following Trump’s suspension of certain global tariffs.

This week, French foreign minister Jean-Noël Barrot voiced serious concerns over the ongoing nuclear negotiations. According to Barrot, any potential agreement must be compatible with European security interests and he called for rigorous oversight of the talks to prevent the undermining of ‘regional and global stability’.

The French minister cautioned that failure to establish a verifiable, lasting agreement to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions could escalate into military conflict - a scenario he deemed “nearly unavoidable”. He pointed to the urgency of the matter, stressing that the window for diplomatic solutions is rapidly closing, as the 2015 nuclear deal reaches its expiration point in October 2025.

Arab states

There is little free press in the Arab countries. However, official and semi-official media outlets in Persian Gulf countries - particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates - have expressed cautious optimism regarding the talks. The deployment of US aircraft carriers to the region, coinciding with the negotiations, is seen as a tactical move to apply pressure on Iran and deter regional escalation.

The Arab press has emphasised what they described as “US dominance”, referring to the weakened “axis of resistance” and declaring that it would be a major drive for Tehran to reach a deal. According to the website of Saudi-funded Al Arabia TV, “US power dominates the negotiations”, while the US aircraft carrier, USS Carl Vinson, has neared Iran to mark increased military presence in the region.

Lebanese political writer and academic Radwan al-Sayed wrote in the prominent pan-Arab Saudi daily Asharq al-Awsat that Iran is entering negotiations with Trump “from a position of weakness,” highlighting its failure to unify the various “resistance” fronts as it has long aimed to do.

Al-Sayed notes that several of Iran’s so-called regional proxies - especially Hamas and Hezbollah - have become “scattered” and have endured setbacks, while Iraqi Shia militias are currently preoccupied with upcoming elections, as the Iraqi government warns against “any defiance to the US.”

An unnamed Arab diplomatic source told Al Arabiya TV’s website that Iran is “showing great flexibility” regarding the nuclear issue and “may be ready” to open discussions on its allied militias in the region, especially now that these groups have “failed to achieve their goals.”

Iraqi writer and political analyst Yahya al-Kubisi argued in the London-based daily Al-Arab that the “Iraq card” is likely to feature prominently in the US-Iran discussions. He questioned whether the American demand for the disarmament of Iraqi Shia militias is a genuine objective or simply a “bargaining chip” to trade against concessions on Iran’s nuclear programme and regional role.

Several Arab media outlets referenced a Reuters report noting that Europeans are being “sidelined in US-Iran nuclear talks despite holding the key card”.¹

The Qatar-linked Al-Araby al-Jadeed described the situation in a headline as “a US marginalisation of the Europeans”, while the website of Qatari-based Al Jazeera ran a piece citing warnings from observers and diplomats about Washington’s decision not to coordinate with Europe in the upcoming negotiations.

Arab street

Iran positions itself as a foremost opponent of western “arrogance”, notably challenging US and Israeli policies. Contrary to its supporters in the west, Iran’s Islamic Republic does not use the term, ‘imperialism’, as it is associated with Marxism. However, its stance against the west, although illusory, has many supporters among ordinary Arabs, through discontent with their own governments - perceived rightly as corrupt and too close to the western powers.

Iran’s slogans in support of Hamas and Islamic Jihad mean it has gained support across the Arab world, even among Sunnis. The Islamic Republic has been very successful in promoting its message of “Islamic unity” and opposition to Zionism and the US through Arab-language TV channels, religious networks and social media.

In Lebanon Hezbollah’s base remains loyal to Iran, while in Iraq the poorer sections of the Shia population are aligned with the pro-Iran militia. However, there have also been large protests against Iran’s influence. Meanwhile, in Palestine Iran is praised for standing by Gaza. As for North Africa (eg, Algeria and Tunisia), Iran is less influential there, but is respected by some leftists and pan-Arabists.

So it is understandable why the current talks will have consequences for Iran’s standing on the Arab street. If US-Iran talks lead to a deal or rapprochement, Iran’s image will take a hit among ordinary Arabs. The Islamic Republic has built much of this grassroots appeal on being anti-American.

If it suddenly appears to be cosying up to the US, some ordinary Arabs might feel betrayed or see it as hypocritical. Groups that once looked to Iran for ideological leadership might distance themselves or lose enthusiasm. On the other hand, if there is economic improvement for the Shia republic, the country’s soft power will be boosted, potentially allowing Iran to spend more on regional allies, such as Hezbollah or militias in Iraq, and increase support for Gaza.

If this translates to stronger ‘resistance’ movements, some parts of the Arab street might still admire Iran for supporting ‘the cause’, regardless of the US talks.

If the talks fail, or escalate into increased tension, Iran may regain its ‘resistance’ aura. The US will be seen as being aggressive or unreasonable, and Iran could frame itself as the defiant underdog again. Arab public opinion would likely split - some will see Iran as the only power standing up to the US/Israel/Saudi-led order, while others will see it as fuelling instability.

What we have to remember is that the Arab street dynamics are fluid: ideology, class, sect and local grievances all shape how people respond. A student protester in Egypt or Tunisia or a Shi’a farmer in southern Iraq will view US-Iran talks very differently. However, Iran’s rulers have worked hard to gain their current position among ordinary Arabs and they will be conscious of the consequences of various scenarios unfolding with these talks.

Iranian response

Unusually for the Iranian press, which is often divided along factional lines, reporting and analysis of the talks in ‘reformist’ and ‘conservative’ sections of the media have been remarkably similar.

Pro-reform papers like Sharq have expressed hope for “real negotiations”, while others have framed the first meeting as a step toward lifting US sanctions. Conservative outlets such as Qods and Khorasan emphasised “constructive signs”, while Jaam-e Jam and Agah stressed Iran’s “upper hand” and preconditions for negotiations. As for the hard-line Vatan-e Emruz, it supported the talks, but underscored Iran’s refusal to concede anything beyond nuclear issues, calling the process “calculated”.

The exception to all this was Keyhan, an ultra-conservative outlet, which stood out as the primary sceptic, warning against trusting the US and advising against tying Iran’s fate to negotiations. However, its editor, Hossein Shariatmadari, acknowledged via the Fars News Agency that the US draft focused on trust-building, omitting prior demands like dismantling Iran’s nuclear programme.

The English-language Tehran Times questioned whether the positive start would yield lasting results, while Press TV and the Fars News Agency highlighted discrepancies between US private and public stances, noting that closed-door talks reportedly focused solely on nuclear issues, contrasting with Washington’s aggressive public rhetoric.

This rare consensus among reformist and conservative media suggests a strategic alignment in Iran’s approach to easing sanctions and reducing tensions. The recovery of the Iranian currency, the rial, underlines domestic stakes in successful diplomacy,² while critical voices like Keyhan reflect a lingering distrust of US intentions. The coverage indicates Tehran’s emphasis on projecting strength and unity, while cautiously exploring diplomatic conclusions.

As for Iranians in exile, in response to the threats of the US government, more than 300 “civil society activists” - some of them former prisoners of the Islamic Republic and some on the left - have issued a statement addressed to the UN secretary-general, reminding him that the Iran-Iraq war was not merely a conflict against Saddam Hussein’s regime, but a broader struggle against global powers that backed him.

In spite of Saddam’s use of chemical weapons, supplied by countries like Germany, and widespread international political and military support (including from eastern as well as western blocs), the letter talks of the devastating legacy of these chemical attacks for many victims today and reminds the UN general secretary that Saddam Hussein acted as a proxy for foreign powers, highlighting Iran’s perception of facing not just Iraq, but a coalition of hostile international forces:

Despite our criticisms of the government and its policies, we believe that Iran’s independence, security and democracy must be shaped by the people themselves, without foreign interference. Democracy cannot be achieved through the intervention of foreign powers, especially those that openly display tyrannical tendencies and support the criminal Israeli regime, sending advanced weapons and financial and political support to support it. We are not just concerned about Iran, but we are concerned about world peace. For the past 15 months, the Israeli regime has blatantly violated all human rights norms and rules of international humanitarian law, the values of peace, democracy, humanity, and the credibility of international institutions, and has continued to violate human rights with the support of the United States and some European governments ...³

Although it is understandable why some Iranian activists have felt the need to issue such a public statement, I do not see any value in such efforts. The Iranian government has used the US withdrawal from the JCPOA to enhance its nuclear programme, and the left should call for a nuclear-free Middle East, including when it comes to Israel and Iran. Addressing the UN is irrelevant, as the institution is not in a position to make a difference as far as Trump’s war plans are concerned. Some of the signatories have been accused of appeasing Iran’s rulers.

Having said that, let me add that we are not in the same position as 2007 or 2009, when Hands Off the People of Iran was active in the Stop the War Coalition. Mechanical repetition of the slogans of that period only demonstrates the irrelevance of those on the British left who do not understand global politics and seem to be oblivious to basic facts. The world situation has changed, and the war in Gaza has changed the region. Iran’s Islamic Republic is in a much weaker position.

Doubts

This week I was asked by a reporter why I thought Trump wanted to revive a nuclear deal, from which he walked out eight years ago. It is very difficult to know what has caused this change of heart (if that is genuinely the case). One reason could be that the US president wants to clear the deck as far as lingering cold wars are concerned, so that he can concentrate on a trade war with China. Closing down China’s access to cheap Iranian oil can be an incentive.

In 2016 Trump’s excuse for reneging on JCPOA was that Barack Obama had made “a bad deal”, and that it had not been ratified by Congress and the Senate. Now that he controls both houses, he can easily rely on their approval, whatever the outcome of the talks.

Questions remain about what the US is demanding now. Iran seems to be celebrating the fact that there is no demand for dismantling all of Iran’s nuclear facilities. Such a call will not be acceptable in Tehran.

Both Iran and the US want speedy negotiations and, in the case of Iran, need them, as sanctions have paralysed its economy. However, as always, negotiations can also lead to war and again we can envisage a rapid military response by the US, should talks fail.

www.reuters.com/world/europeans-sidelined-us-iran-nuclear-talks-despite-holding-key-card-2025-04-10.↩︎
The rial’s rebound from over 1,050,000 to 876,000 against the US dollar was widely covered, with Setareh Sobh linking its recovery to optimism about a potential deal.↩︎
www.etemadonline.com/بخش-سیاسی-9/706406-ایران-ترامپ-جامعه-مدنی (summary and translation by YM).↩︎