12.12.2024
Changing balance of forces
The new regime in Damascus is being widely celebrated, but continued internal power struggles and regional rivalries are likely to unleash yet more conflict and suffering, says Esen Uslu
Bashar al-Assad’s regime finally crumbled to dust before our disbelieving eyes. It was all over in just a couple of days. Propped up by the Russians and Iranians since 2011 through the thick and thin of a bloody civil war, it was rotten to the core. When circumstances forced its backers to withdraw support, Assad simply scuttled off to Moscow without even addressing the Syrian people, let alone consulting his Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party colleagues. Nobody - that is, apart from the determinedly deluded - is weeping: ‘Good riddance to the bureaucratic dictatorship!’ is the cry.
However, what has happened in Syria is an indicator of the changing balance of forces both in the region and globally. Russia and Iran are the apparent losers, Israel and USA the winners. Behind the scenes, Russia and the US had cut a deal where Russia saved face by allowing a relatively ‘bloodless’ toppling of the regime, and promises to keep its naval and airforce bases on the Mediterranean coast unmolested - for the time being.
It is possible that there is a Ukrainian element in the deal, which may be presented to the world by the triumphant Trump after taking over the presidency. If eventually Russia loses its bases in Syria, it would disappear as a power in the Mediterranean, and its influence in Africa would be limited to the Sahel region, where it has been replacing the ousted France.
Israel and the US have been determined to pursue a joint plan to demolish Hamas and Gaza, as well as destroying Hezbollah in Lebanon. By directly attacking Iran, as well as selected targets in Syria and Yemen, they have put a stop to Iranian expansionism, or its ambition to create an area of influence in the eastern Mediterranean by utilising forces linked to the Shia population. Eventually the US, Nato and Israel have emerged in a situation where no meaningful forces stand against them.
The US war on Iraq created opportunities for Iran, as the ascendance of Iraqi Shias helped opening direct routes towards Syria. Now all of those supply lines have been cut off and Iranian options have shrunk. Having seen what was coming, Iran may also have been involved in cutting a deal with the US-Israeli axis in regard to leaving the Assad regime to its fate. (There are several indicators to that effect, but it is too early to draw firm conclusions.)
While the US-led sanctions imposed against Syria crippled its economy, the regime had been unable to control a large part of the country for years. The oil-rich region from the eastern bank of Euphrates to the Iraqi border has been under the control of the Kurdish-led Syrian Defence Forces (SDF) and US troops. The area surrounding Al-Tanf base close to the Jordanian and Iraqi border was under the control of US forces. That is the area where US-trained units of the Free Syrian Army took part in the offensive against Damascus, together with Druze and other militia.
In the north, Idlib province was under the control of the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which had emerged victorious from a bloody internal war of domination among the Sunni Islamist militias. At the same time, on the instigation of the US, Turkey has helped make them more acceptable to the ‘international community’. They formed a civilian government aiming to improve the life of internally displaced people now sheltering. Meanwhile they managed to forge a trained and equipped army. However, they maintained a rather distant relationship with Turkey.
Contrary to the HTS, the Syrian National Army (SNA), based in the Azez and Afrin areas, was developing a much closer relationship with Turkey and remained dependent on it. They were also trained and equipped by the Turkish military, yet remained comparatively small among the northern opposition forces.
When the HTS started its campaign to cut the road connecting Damascus to Aleppo, the Turkish-led SNA moved towards the east to capture the Tel Rifaat-Manbij area - previously under the control of the SDF, and a constant headache for Turkey on the western bank of the Euphrates (Turkey’s several previous attempts to capture the area had failed because of the intervention of Russia and the US).
However, the SNA was not able to oust the Kurdish-led SDF forces. Turkey joined the fray by providing long-range artillery support, as well as launching drone and airforce attacks. After the bloodiest clashes in recent days, the SDF has been forced to retreat. The advance of the SNA/Turkey has been checked by the deals between the US, Russia and Israel. Interestingly the HTS does not seem very keen to give any support to any SNA attacks.
Major player?
Most international observers think that Turkey is the major player and winner in the latest episode in Syria, but that may not be the case. Before hostilities started, Turkey had been manoeuvring to find an accommodation with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Even the leader of the minor partner of the coalition supporting Erdoğan’s government, the MHP (Nationalist Action Party of the infamous Grey Wolves), has openly called for Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned former PKK leader, to be released from solitary confinement and for negotiations to be opened that may lead to the PKK declaring an end to guerrilla activity.
Turkey seems to have been wrong-footed, unless all this is part of the deal that was negotiated between the major powers - which is quite possible, taking into account the relationship between Turkey, the US and Israel. However, when things were going differently, Turkey had tried to maximise its gains against Kurds by using whatever cards it was holding. So, while the HTS was advancing towards Damascus, supported by the Southern Operations Room coalition of various Syrian opposition groups, Turkey and its cronies were trying to move eastwards. Meanwhile president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan put an end to attempts to find a peaceful solution by declaring that the SDF would not be allowed to take part in negotiations on the future of Syria.
If I have read things correctly, the Kurds of Syria will emerge from these struggles in a better position. According to unconfirmed reports, the military leader of the SDF was invited to Trump’s inauguration ceremony. If this turns out to be true, US support for the Kurds maintaining a semi-independent structure within Syria becomes quite possible. That would require putting considerable pressure on Turkey to check its aggression, but eventually Turkey would have to acquiesce.
The Biden administration has already started to apply pressure on Turkey: US defence secretary Lloyd Austin, secretary of state Antony Blinken, CIA director William Burns and national security advisor Jake Sullivan are all said to have contacted their counterparts in Turkey, asking them to stop military actions against the Kurds.
Yet another indication of the current state of affairs has come from Lindsey Graham, a senator close to Trump, who said in a social media post:
If Turkey takes military action against Kurdish forces in Syria, it will jeopardize America’s interests dramatically. In the past I have drafted sanctions targeting Turkey if they engage in military operations against the Kurdish forces who helped president Trump destroy Isis. I stand ready to do this again in a bipartisan way.1
Israel also speaks positively about the SDF, and asks Turkey to halt any military action against the Kurds, while SDF leaders have stated that they appreciate Israel’s stance.
Meanwhile, the Alawi population, mainly concentrated on the Tartus-Latakia coast, has opened negotiations with the HTS, and sheiks calling themselves the ‘Council of Alevi and Ulama’ have issued a declaration asking the HTS to declare an amnesty for all military personnel of the Assad regime, thus disarming all groups apart from the ‘legitimate’ security forces and opening a new page for the future of Syria. Practically this stance means that Alevis, who stood alongside Assad’s army, should go unmolested in return for tacit support for the HTS-led regime.
HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani had talks with the former prime minister and vice-president in Damascus and then appointed his prime minister of Idlib’s regional government as interim prime minister until March 2025. He has been tasked with forming a transition government that should draft a democratic constitution guaranteeing the rights of minorities. However, his regional government’s justice minister, who is most likely to be appointed in that post for the transitional government, has said that Sharia law would be implemented across Syria. Considering the al Qa’eda and Islamic State background of the HTS, such a fundamentalist approach had been expected (and dreaded). However, if that line of thought gains ascendance, the past experiences of chaotic and bloody civil wars in Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan and Yemen will be repeated yet again in an already fragmented Syria.
In the meantime, Israel has sought to extend its gains. The IDF has established a buffer zone on the eastern slopes of the Golan Heights. Meanwhile, its warplanes hit hundreds of targets, including army and naval bases.
All this means that the quick and relatively easy toppling of the Assad regime may be the harbinger of a prolonged bloody conflict.