05.12.2024
Regional causes and effects
Civil war has erupted once again in Syria. Turkey is clearly a prime mover, but what about Israel? Then there is Russia and Iran. Yassamine Mather investigates what is a tangled web
On November 27, rebel forces launched the biggest challenge to the Syrian government in recent years. Within three days, they had gained control of large parts of Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city. Now there is an advance on Hama. This surprise offensive prompted Russia to conduct airstrikes on Aleppo for the first time since 2016, while the Syrian army hurriedly withdrew.
The takeover of Aleppo was led by the Islamist group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which has a long history in Syria’s civil war. HTS was initially founded in 2011 under the name Jabhat al-Nusra, as a direct affiliate of al Qa’eda. Abu Bakr al‑Baghdadi, the leader of the so-called Islamic State, also played a role in its formation.
At that time, al-Nusra was considered one of the most effective and deadly groups opposing Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. However, its main driving force was not revolutionary aspirations, but a thoroughly reactionary Islamism. This led to conflicts with the main rebel coalition fighting under the banner of the Free Syrian Army.
In 2016, the group’s leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, publicly severed ties with al Qa’eda, dissolved al-Nusra and formed a new organisation. A year later, this new entity merged with several similar groups and adopted its present name, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
Control
So who controls Syria today? Over the past four years, its civil war seemed to have ended. Assad’s government faced little opposition in major cities, though some areas remained outside his control - including predominantly Kurdish areas in the east, which have largely been outside Syrian government control since the early years of the conflict.
However, in the south, where the uprising against Assad began in 2011, sporadic but limited unrest continues. In the vast Syrian Desert (Badiya), remnants of IS remain a ‘security threat’, particularly during the truffle-harvesting season, when locals venture into these areas in search of the lucrative fungi. Meanwhile, in the north-west, the Idlib province remains under the control of extremist Islamist and rebel groups, who were driven there during the peak of the civil war. The dominant force in Idlib was HTS.
Until last week’s attacks, HTS had shown little sign of attempting to revive Syria’s civil war. The group had long consolidated its power base in Idlib, effectively running the local government. However, its efforts to gain legitimacy have been hindered by allegations of human rights abuses. Since breaking ties with al Qa’eda, in its official propaganda HTS declares its goal of establishing a fundamentalist Islamic state in Syria. It no longer seeks to create a broader caliphate, as IS once aimed to achieve.
Over the years, Idlib has remained a battlefield, where Syrian government forces have tried to regain control. However, a ceasefire brokered in 2020 by Russia (a key Assad ally) and Turkey (a supporter of the rebels) has largely held. Around four million people live in the region, most of whom are displaced from areas recaptured by Assad’s forces during gruelling and deadly battles.
Aleppo was one of the bloodiest battlegrounds in Syria, marking one of the biggest defeats for the rebels. Assad’s victory relied heavily on Russian airpower and Iranian ground forces, mainly via Iranian-backed militias, including Hezbollah from Lebanon.
Conflict
After 14 tumultuous months in the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran and its allies face challenges not only in Gaza and southern Lebanon, but now also in Syria. Alarm bells are ringing in Tehran, as the regime’s leaders see this as part of Israel’s long-term plans to redraw the map of the Middle East, after attacking Iran. The Assad regime is at its weakest, mainly because over the last few months Israel has managed to eliminate dozens of senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders in Syria, considerably weakening IRGC power in the area. After months of Israeli attacks, Hezbollah is not in a position to help the Syrian army (and here we should not forget last week’s ceasefire deal between the Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel). All this has paved the way for this latest attack.
Of course, Iran has other allies in the region and by December 2 pro-Iran Iraqi militia forces were reportedly being deployed to Syria to support Assad’s government forces in northern areas. According to Reuters, citing Iraqi and Syrian sources, hundreds of fighters from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias entered Syria overnight.
Two Iraqi security sources told Reuters that at least 300 fighters, primarily from the Badr Corps and the Islamic Resistance Movement of Nujaba, crossed into Syria on Sunday night, using dirt roads and unofficial routes. Separately, a senior Syrian army source confirmed that dozens of fighters from the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), aligned with Iran, entered Syria through a military crossing near Al Bukamal. The source noted that these reinforcements included members of the Iraqi Kata’ib Hezbollah and the Afghan Fatemiyoun Division, who were sent to bolster northern front-line defences.
Two other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada and Ansar Allah al‑Awfiya, announced their readiness to join operations in Syria, further highlighting the escalation in regional involvement. As far as Iran and its allies are concerned, the issue is not so much defending Assad as making sure there are no threats to Iran. They remember very well the IS slogan, ‘Damascus today, Tehran tomorrow’.
This time the threat is more serious, as everyone in the region detects Israel’s role in all this. I am not aware of proof of a direct connection between the Syrian jihadi groups and Israel. However, after 14 months of genocide in Gaza, there have been no demonstrations or protests in support of the Palestinians in areas under the control of the jihadi groups. In fact, the only notable public event last year was their celebration of the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.
On December 1, Mehrdad Farahmand, an analyst of Middle East issues, told a TV channel:
It is not a coincidence that this war started after the ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel. Arming these groups and their supplies is done by Turkey, and perhaps Israel is involved in the coordination between them. In the past the wounded of these groups were treated by Israel, and I had personally prepared a report about this.
However, it is important to note that the attempt to stabilise Bashar Assad’s regime has not worked. He was never going to be an effective ruler - he was hardly the heir apparent of Hafez al-Assad’s Ba’athist reign, but the death of his brother propelled him to the top. His failures are also a reflection of the basic fact that in these difficult turbulent times in the region, Ba’athist nationalism is no longer a serious political force.
Shifting alliances
Turkey, which has supported anti-Assad rebels over the years, has been implicated in the latest developments in Aleppo. While the current offensive is officially attributed to HTS and other Islamist groups, and reports suggested the involvement of Turkish-backed militias based in Idlib, the main issue for Turkey remains its Kurdish PKK and YPG opponents.
There have been clashes between the Syrian army and the Kurdish-led coalition in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor province. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan says he will prevent affiliates of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) from exploiting the ongoing developments in Syria, but denies any involvement in recent events. According to Russian media, Vladimir Putin emphasised in a phone call with Erdoğan “the need for a swift end to the terrorist aggression by radical groups against the Syrian government”.
On December 2, president Assad met with Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi to discuss bilateral relations and regional developments, according to Iran’s state news agency, IRNA. Ahead of the meeting, Araghchi stated: “I am heading to Damascus to deliver the Islamic Republic’s message to the Syrian government. We strongly support Syria’s army and government.” He further emphasised that Iran sees “no distinction” between Israel and “Takfiri [unbelieving] terrorists”, claiming that these groups are part of efforts to destabilise the region following the perceived failure of the Zionist regime.
Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian also called for Islamic nations to address Syria’s crisis, warning against potential exploitation by the US and Israel. At the same time White House spokesperson Sean Savett denied any US connection with HTS, asserting that the US is closely monitoring Syria’s situation and maintaining communication with regional allies.
There can be no doubt that the fall of Aleppo has divided Arab supporters of Palestinians. In the Syrian civil war, Hamas sided with the Syrian opposition - Iran, Assad and Hezbollah were the enemy. However, nowadays Hamas’s only serious allies are the Axis of Resistance. Over the last 14 months, Iran’s Islamic Republic has waged a successful campaign in Arab-speaking social media, presenting itself not as a Shia state, but as the only Muslim country defending Palestinians and all the “oppressed” Arabs. So, if Israel was hoping that the recurrence of the Syrian civil war would divide the Arab streets’ support for Palestine or the Axis of Resistance, this was a miscalculation. By December 1 Arab social media was flooded with a short video of the “martyred” Hamas leader, Yahya Sinwar, recorded before his assassination, calling Iran, Hezbollah and Syria Palestine’s best allies.
Despite the immediate military focus on Aleppo, Iran’s capacity to maintain its regional influence faces significant challenges. Even if Assad succeeds in the short term, Iran’s strategic ambitions in the Mediterranean appear increasingly tenuous, particularly with Donald Trump returning to power.
It is in this light that we should read Javad Zarif’s latest conciliatory article in the journal Foreign Affairs (former Iranian foreign secretary Zarif is currently vice-president for strategy).1 In the article, Zarif writes that Iran’s president Pezeshkian faces many challenges, highlighted by the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh on Iranian soil during his inauguration. Despite this, Pezeshkian envisages a flexible, post-polar foreign policy focusing on “diplomacy, regional stability and economic growth”. He plans to improve ties with Arab neighbours, while maintaining a firm stance against Israeli aggression and pursuing nuclear deal negotiations with the west.
According to Zarif, the Pezeshkian administration emphasises reducing foreign interference in the Persian Gulf and fostering regional cooperation through treaties and policies similar to the Helsinki process. Iran also aims to leverage its shared stance with Arab countries on Palestinian rights to build stronger regional alliances. The article criticises western “maximum pressure” strategies, arguing they have backfired by accelerating Iran’s nuclear advancement.
Clearly, we live in dangerous times.