29.09.2022

Not one man! Not one penny!

Demands for peace must be linked to the abolition of standing armies, a popular militia and the aim of ending capitalism. Mario Kessler celebrates the anti-militarism of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg

It has become common to mention Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg together - as radical internationalists, as revolutionary Marxists and as founders of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). Indeed, their lives often crossed paths - they both walked part of the same path together. In fact, their lifespan covers exactly the same period - from 1871, with the founding of the German Reich, to 1919, the establishment of the Weimar Republic. They even died on the same day at the hands of the same murderers.

Leftwing

It was only in 1900 that Karl Liebknecht became both a member of the SPD, the German Social Democratic Party, and an active politician - he was a Social Democratic city councillor in Berlin from 1901 to 1913. In 1908 he became a member of the Prussian House of Representatives, and in 1912 of the Reichstag, the German parliament. As one of the leaders of the leftwing, he passionately opposed the immobility and fatalism of the party bureaucracy, supported the mass strike strategy, the anti-militarist education of youth and the struggle against war. In 1907, he was elected president of the liaison office at the first international conference of Socialist Youth Organisations.

Liebknecht published his most important book, Militarism and anti-militarism, in 1907 - primarily intended to serve the socialist education of youth. He consciously placed himself in the tradition of his father, Wilhelm, who, as an independent candidate (the Social Democratic Party was still banned) before the Reichstag elections in 1887, had declared: “Not one man! Not one penny for militarism!”¹ The book was immediately banned and Liebknecht was charged with high treason.

Liebknecht understood militarism not only as an instrument of external aggression, but also of internal oppression. He wrote:

Militarism … is not only a defence and a weapon against the external enemy: it has a second task, which, with the sharpening of class antagonisms and the growth of proletarian class-consciousness, is coming ever closer to the fore, determining more and more the external form of militarism and its internal character: the task of protecting the ruling social order, a pillar of capitalism and of all reaction against the liberation struggle of the working class.²

He gave an overview of the historical emergence of militarism, its manifestation in different capitalist countries and the struggle of the respective social democratic parties against it. Finally, he sharply distinguished the proletarian anti-militarism of social democracy from the petty-bourgeois anti-militarism of the anarchists:

The ultimate aim is the same for both anarchist and social democratic anti-militarism ...: elimination of militarism … externally, as well as … internally. However, social democracy, in accordance with its conception of the nature of militarism, regards the complete elimination of militarism alone as impossible: only with capitalism - the last class social order - can militarism fall at the same time.

Liebknecht continued:

Social-democratic anti-militarist propaganda is class-struggle propaganda and therefore addresses itself fundamentally and exclusively to those classes which, in the class struggle, are necessarily enemies of militarism ... It educates in order to win … the interests of the proletariat in the class struggle [over] the role of militarism in the class struggle and the role that the proletariat plays and has to play in the class struggle ...

On October 9-12 1907 the treason trial against Liebknecht took place before the German high court in front of a large audience. On the first day, Liebknecht argued that imperial orders were null and void if their purpose was to break the constitution. In contrast, the high court later emphasised in its judgement that soldiers’ unconditional duty of obedience to the emperor was a central provision of the empire’s constitution. On the third day of the trial, he was imprisoned for ‘preparation of high treason’.

A detailed report of the trial was sent to emperor Wilhelm II after the verdict was pronounced, but Liebknecht was not sent the written verdict until November 7. His defence at the trial earned him great popularity among Berlin workers, and he was led to prison through a throng of supporters. Despite the immediate ban on writing by the Prussian judiciary and his sentence to 18 months in a fortress, Karl Liebknecht emerged from the trial as the moral victor. He had defended himself and in doing so had become the prosecutor.

In 1908, while still imprisoned, Liebknecht was elected to the Prussian House of Representatives and remained a member until 1916. He was also able to win the so-called ‘Kaiser constituency’ of Potsdam - a traditional stronghold of die-hard monarchists - in the 1912 Reichstag election.

Although he saw World War I at the outset as being “brought about jointly by the German and Austrian war parties in the darkness of semi-absolutism and secret diplomacy”, he nevertheless voted for war credits on August 4 1914 because of party discipline. But the SPD’s war policy was an unimaginable blow for Liebknecht - politically and personally.

He now began his close collaboration with Rosa Luxemburg, who had already founded the Gruppe Internationale (International Group) that later gave rise to the Spartacus League and the Communist Party. In the autumn of 1914 the two travelled throughout the country to win over other SPD deputies to oppose the war. Liebknecht also visited Belgium, where German troops had carried out mass reprisals against the civilian population - he denounced them, together with Belgian socialists. This earned him accusations of “treason against the fatherland” - not only from the government and the army, but also from members of his own party.

Anti-war

Rosa Luxemburg, who as a woman was not allowed to vote or stand for the Reichstag, was the theoretical and political head of the socialist opposition to the war; the most important articles and pamphlets came from her pen. Liebknecht, who had certain, albeit extremely limited, immunity as a member of parliament, was its public face and its driving force.

It was simply inconceivable to Luxemburg and Liebknecht that a party that had set out to help freedom, equality and fraternity to triumph everywhere in the world could agree to the self-destruction of humanity. Liebknecht’s ‘no’ vote in the Reichstag on December 2 1914 was the necessary consequence.

On December 3, Vorwärts - at that time the most important SPD daily newspaper - published a terse statement by the executive committee of the Reichstag fraction on its front page:

… comrade Karl Liebknecht voted against the war loan bill, contrary to the old custom of the fraction, which was renewed by an explicit resolution for the present case. The executive committee deeply regrets this breach of discipline, which will still occupy the fraction.

The editorial board of Vorwärts added:

The custom of the fraction in voting is that no vote may be taken contrary to the decision of the fraction; the individual members of the fraction are free to leave the hall without it assuming the character of a demonstration.³

The imperial state immediately retaliated. In February 1915, Karl Liebknecht (although already 43 years old) was drafted as an “armoured soldier”. From then on, he had to do hard physical labour on the western and eastern fronts, and was forbidden to engage in political activity. However, he was granted leave to attend the sessions of the Reichstag and the Prussian House of Representatives, the Landtag.

This enabled him to vote ‘no’ again on March 20 1915 - this time together with Otto Rühle - and on January 12 1916, the Social Democratic Reichstag faction voted to expel him by 60 to 25.

In April 1916 he wrote an appeal, ‘Let’s celebrate May!’, which was illegally circulated by the Spartacus group as a leaflet:

On May 1, across all border barriers and battlefields, we extend our brotherly hand to the people in France, in Belgium, in Russia, in England, in Serbia, in the whole world! On May 1 we call out with many thousands of voices: ‘Away with the nefarious crime of genocide! Down with its responsible perpetrators, agitators and beneficiaries!’ Our enemies are not the French, Russian or English people: they are German Junkers, German capitalists and their executive committee: the German government! To the struggle against these mortal enemies of all freedom, to the struggle for everything that means the good and the future of the workers’ cause, of humanity and of culture!⁴

He was arrested again and put on trial for treason on August 25 1916. Once again Liebknecht turned the tables. Addressing the prosecuting counsel he said:

Prison! Loss of honour! Well, well! Your honour is not my honour! But I tell you: no general ever wore a uniform with as much honour as I will wear the penitentiary smock. I am here to accuse, not to defend. Not truce, but ‘War against war’ is the slogan for me! Down with war! Down with the government!⁵

He was sentenced to four years in prison.

As Liebknecht pushed for total class struggle against the war and his own government, he ever more sharply opposed not only the conservative-nationalist party executive, but also the increasingly compromising politics of those who came together in the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (USPD) in 1917. He identified more and more with the Bolsheviks.

Revolution

In October 1918, he was released as part of a general amnesty. Liebknecht and his comrades - above all Rosa Luxemburg - believed that revolution could no longer be prevented and would lead not only to the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a bourgeois republic, but a soviet republic.

On November 9 1918, Liebknecht proclaimed the German socialist republic from a balcony of the Berlin City Palace in front of an immense crowd. But leading Social Democrats around the future Reich president, Friedrich Ebert, had long since allied with key forces of the old regime. They succeeded in bringing the workers’ and soldiers’ councils, which had sprung up all over Germany in the days of the revolution, under control. The fate of the revolution was sealed with the decision by the councils to support elections for a National Assembly. That happened on January 19 1919.

The half-measures of the November Revolution and the unwillingness of the Social Democratic leaders to go beyond the framework of a bourgeois republic and the failure of the USPD, the Independent Social Democratic Party, to adopt a clear revolutionary position, saw the Spartacus League reconstitute itself as the Communist Party of Germany at the onset of 1919. At the founding party congress in the Prussian House of Representatives, Liebknecht spoke on ‘The crisis in the USPD’. However, against the urgings of Liebknecht, Luxemburg and others, an ultra-left majority prevailed, a majority which on principle rejected participation in the elections to the National Assembly and oriented itself exclusively towards extra-parliamentary forms of struggle.

While he advocated with Luxemburg the participation of the new party in the elections to the National Assembly, he came closer to Lenin on the question of terror. The proletariat does not want terror. But we have to expect, he said, that

the ruling classes will defend their positions of power tooth and nail, and that the task of the proletariat is to crush this resistance of the ruling classes and all counterrevolutionary attempts with all ruthlessness, with an iron fist.⁶

Liebknecht and many others expected a second revolution when in early January 1919 there were spontaneous mass protests by Berlin workers against the dismissal of popular Berlin police chief Emil Eichhorn by the SPD-led government, But instances of armed struggles, confined to Berlin, mistakenly known as the ‘Spartacus Uprising’, were crushed in what turned out to be an orgy of counterrevolution.

In view of the defeat of the insurgent revolutionaries in the “bloody week of January”, Liebknecht, akin to the prophet in the Old Testament, finally proclaimed the dawn of a new day - a day of victory - and of revenge in his last contribution to the communist daily newspaper, Die Rote Fahne:

We have not fled, we are not beaten … Under the roar of the approaching economic collapse, the still sleeping multitudes of the proletarians will awaken ... For Spartacus, that means fire and spirit; that means soul and heart; that means will and deed of the revolution of the proletariat ... the fighting determination of the class-conscious proletariat … means socialism and world revolution!

For Liebknecht, politics was not only the art of the possible - but must be bound to the dialectic of the possible and the impossible: “The possible is only attainable by striving for the impossible.” The higher the set goal, the more energetically comrades work and higher aims are achieved: “Wanting the objectively impossible is not foolishness or fanaticism, phantasmagoria or delusion, but practical work in the eminent sense.”⁷

Veneration

Now to Rosa Luxemburg: some historical figures are so entwined with myths that hardly anyone takes the trouble to penetrate the thicket. This is the case with Luxemburg. Legends know her as a bloodthirsty and violence-glorifying politician; alternatively as peace-loving and a friend of flowers and animals; as a martyr and a revolutionary. The latter label is the most appropriate and tends to get lost in the darkness of veneration.

What most interests us here is her ceaseless work against war and the manner of her political intervention. She asks how it was possible to transform an internationalist, strong workers’ party, which consciously stood up for peace, into a stooge of capital and, accordingly, to make the people enthusiastic about war. Her intentions are practical in nature: ie, identify what was missed or done wrong in the past in order to learn for future policy-making. This makes her analysis surprisingly up-to-date.

In 1899 in an early argument with the reformist Social Democrat, Max Schippel, while she was editor of the left’s Leipziger Volkszeitung, she wrote:

The most general point of view from which Schippel starts in his defence of militarism is the conviction of the necessity of this military system. He ‘proves’ the indispensability of standing armies by all kinds of arguments of a war-technical, social and economic nature. And he is right from a certain point of view. The standing army, militarism, are indeed indispensable, but for whom? They are indispensable for the present ruling classes and the present governments. But what else follows from this [is] the abolition of standing armies and the introduction of the militia: that is, the arming of the people … And if Schippel … regards the militia as an impossibility and an absurdity, he thereby only shows that he himself also stands on a bourgeois standpoint on the question of militarism …⁸

In January 1904, after the start of the Russo-Japanese war, Luxemburg wrote in the Polish social democratic journal Czerwone Sztandar (Red Banner):

Blood flows in the Far East. The criminal policy of the tsarist government has brought about the war between Russia and Japan, and the working people of both countries must murder each other for the good of the tsar and Japanese capitalism. The whole proletarian and bourgeois world is watching the course of the war with anxiety. For it is not only Russia and Japan that are at stake here … In the present situation of world politics, every war between two powers threatens to turn into an armed clash of the conflicting interests of all the powers, threatens to become a general bloodbath ...

At present, this focal point, from which the flame of world war can flare up, has shifted from the Bosporus to Asia, to China. The tsarist government is now fighting with Japan for the Chinese skin, the same skin that all the other powers crave. Hence there is the danger that this war could sooner or later draw the whole capitalist world into its vortex. Hence there is the danger of this war for the whole international proletariat, whose vital interests are directed against the war and for international workers’ solidarity.⁹

The beginning of the 20th century saw a remarkable shift in the thinking of international socialism. The arms race and war propaganda in most European states, especially the important ones, influenced discussions in the international labour movement about armed conflict. If the idea of revolutionary war had taken root in the emerging left since 1792, it was now increasingly seen as a danger to workers, who would suffer most from hunger, misery and death on the battlefields.

An important outcome was the resolution, ‘On militarism and international conflicts’, adopted at the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International in 1907. It included voting against budgets in parliaments that increased military spending, the rejection of standing armies in favour of people’s militias, and arbitration courts for the peaceful settlement of international conflicts.

The resolution ended with an amendment drafted by Lenin, Luxemburg and Julius Martov, which was unanimously adopted. It stated:

If war threatens to break out, the workers and their parliamentary representatives in the countries involved are obliged to do everything in their power to prevent the outbreak of war by the use of appropriate means, which naturally change and increase, according to the aggravation of the class struggle and the general political situation. If war should nevertheless break out, they are obliged to advocate its speedy termination and to strive with all their strength to exploit the economic and political crisis brought about by the war for the political arousal of the popular strata and for the acceleration of the overthrow of capitalist class rule.¹⁰

In preparation for the 1912 Reichstag elections, in which the Social Democracy became the strongest party for the first time, Rosa Luxemburg declared:

The real question, then, which has significance for wider circles of the party, is whether … our party has clearly and consistently represented the fundamental standpoint of social democracy, whether … it has helped to spread among the masses the social democratic conception of the nature of militarism and the capitalist social order, in order to do good publicity work for socialism.

… the friends of peace from bourgeois circles believe that world peace and disarmament can be realised within the framework of the present social order, but we, who stand on the ground of the materialist conception of history and scientific socialism, are convinced that militarism can only be eliminated together with the capitalist class state.¹¹

Rift

However, with the beginning of World War I, the Second International effectively disintegrated - or, more precisely, it was put to the sword by the war-enthusiastic part of its leaderships. For many social democratic leaders the anti-war resolutions solemnly adopted at the international socialist congresses in Stuttgart in 1907, Copenhagen in 1910 and Basel in 1912 were no longer worth the paper they were printed on.

In all the belligerent countries, propaganda sought to present the war as a matter of defence, often with resounding success. Leaderships later justified the failure of large segments of the workers’ movement by arguing that the workers had succumbed to war propaganda, and that the masses had been seduced. Yet, as recent research has shown, there was far less enthusiasm for war among the workers in various countries than among the upper and middle classes.¹² Yet, trained to follow the instructions of their party (or at least not to contradict them), many workers believed that their leaders were doing the right thing when they called for war under the slogan that the fatherland was in danger. However, there were staunch opponents of the war from the beginning.

The rift was not strictly between Marxists and non-Marxists. Old blocs disappeared, while new ones formed. In Germany, not only Luxemburg, Liebknecht, Clara Zetkin, Franz Mehring and August Thalheimer declared themselves against the war. So did Karl Kautsky and especially Eduard Bernstein. In Austria, Victor Adler, Karl Renner and Friedrich Austerlitz, editor-in-chief of the Arbeiter-Zeitung, set the party on a strict war course. In France, hitherto vocal Marxists switched to the chauvinist camp: Gustave Hervé, Jules Guesde and Marcel Cachin.

Immediately after the August 4 vote for war credits, Luxemburg invited people to a meeting in her Berlin flat. The six guests - Hermann Duncker, Hugo Eberlein, Julian Marchlewski, Franz Mehring, Ernst Meyer and Wilhelm Pieck - decided to organise themselves as an opposition within the SPD, the Gruppe Internationale. They were joined in the next few days by Heinrich Brandler, Leo Jogiches, Karl Liebknecht, as well as August and Bertha Thalheimer. They tried to persuade the party to return to its pre-war resolutions and to turn away from its social truce policy, to prepare a general strike for a peace settlement and thus bring closer an international proletarian revolution. But only two SPD local groups came out in their support.¹³

On February 18 1915, Rosa Luxemburg had to serve the prison sentence she had received for a speech delivered in Frankfurt am Main in 1913. She was later sentenced to ‘preventive detention’ and spent three years and four months in prison between 1915 and 1918. During this time she collected news from Russia and wrote essays, which her friends smuggled out and published illegally.

In 1916, Rosa Luxemburg entitled her central writing on the war, using the pseudonym, ‘Junius’, The crisis of social democracy.¹⁴ On the one hand, her analysis was concerned with the balance of power, the interests in the struggle for colonies, thus showing with clear arguments the role of Germany in international capitalism. On the other hand, it was concerned with working out the contradictions in which the great powers entangled their imperialist desires until war became the only solution:

The capitalist upswing that had taken hold in the newly constituted Europe after the war period of the 60s and 70s, and which had reached an unprecedented climax in the boom of the 90s … opened up a new storm and stress period for the European states: their expansion around the race towards the non-capitalist countries and zones of the world [and their] energetic drive for colonial conquests.¹⁵

All these “processes created new non-European antagonisms”, she wrote.¹⁶

The social democratic leaderships of Germany and France, by approving the war credits, threw the masses into the arms of imperialist war and put an end for the time being to the hope of uniting the proletarians of all countries. The war meant “suicide” for the European working class: “Another such world war and the prospects of socialism are buried under the rubble piled up by imperialist barbarism.”¹⁷

By deciding to defend the ‘fatherland’ and promising the ruling class to renounce all class struggle for the duration of the war, the leadership of the Social Democracy helped prolong the war. With the denial of the class struggle, it “gave itself the slip as an active political party”, as the “representative of workers’ politics”.¹⁸

Luxemburg rhetorically asked if the bourgeoisie had renounced exploitation for the duration of the war:

Have private property, capitalist exploitation, class rule ceased? Have the propertied classes, in a surge of patriotism, declared: Now, in the face of war, we are giving the means of production, land, factories, into the possession of the general public for its duration, renouncing the exclusive use of goods, abolishing all political privileges and sacrificing them on the altar of the fatherland, as long as it is in danger?¹⁹

Future victory

The outcome of the struggle, however, remained open for Rosa Luxemburg. But, she pointed out,

… the starting point, the first step towards the creation of a new socialist movement in Germany, had to be a … thoroughgoing confrontation with the past. Only from the source of self-criticism, a painfully thorough examination of one’s own programmatic, tactical and organisational mistakes, can clear guidelines for the future be gained ... [Therefore] it was necessary to carry out a political examination of the practice of German Social Democracy and the trade unions …, to expose their main shortcomings in the past …²⁰

“The three years of war”, she wrote at the beginning of 1917, “have, thanks to the failure of the international proletariat, made imperialism and militarism in all the belligerent states the unrestricted masters of the situation …” For her:

Only one power would be able, and was called by history, to fall into the spokes of the rapid slide of society into the abyss of anarchy and savagery: the international socialist proletariat. There is no other way out of the war than the revolutionary rising of the international proletariat to the struggle for power.²¹

The February Revolution of 1917 in Russia created a new situation: dual power. The revolutionary, democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry was realised through the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, while the rule of the bourgeoisie continued in the form of the Provisional Government.

Rosa Luxemburg commented:

The Russian Revolution was the first resounding expression of proletarian class politics since the bankruptcy of international socialism at the outbreak of the world war, and thus the first advance for peace of world-historical significance. On the very day after the victory over the old regime, the action of the Russian proletariat against the war also began. It was directed at first to take away the character of the imperialist war, as it had been waged by the tsarist regiment and the Russian bourgeoisie … The way seemed clear for peace and revolution.²²

However, “A general peace cannot be brought about by Russia alone.” Thus for Luxemburg there was only one conclusion:

The international catastrophe can only be subdued by the international proletariat. Only a proletarian world revolution can liquidate the imperialist world war. And the contradictions in which the Russian Revolution inescapably moves are only practical expressions of the basic contradiction between the revolutionary policy of the Russian proletariat and the cadaver policy of the European proletariat; between the class action of the masses of the people in Russia and the betrayal of the German, English, French working masses of their class interests and of socialism.²³

On November 9 1918, the German Revolution freed Rosa Luxemburg from imprisonment. Karl Liebknecht had already reorganised the Spartacus League and together they launched Die Rote Fahne in order to influence developments.

On November 10, SPD leader Friedrich Ebert secretly agreed with general Wilhelm Groener to cooperate against attempts to disarm army officers and halt a wider revolution. In early December former front-line units were sent to Berlin to thwart any ‘undesirable’ decisions of the All-German Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council assembly, which was to prepare for a new constitution and elections. On December 6, some of these units shot demonstrating workers during street clashes.

In a December 14 article in Rote Fahne, entitled ‘What does the Spartacus League want?’, Luxemburg demanded that all power should go to the councils, that returning army units be disarmed and re-educated and that “the people” should be armed instead. She wrote: “The struggle for socialism is the most violent civil war that world history has seen, and the proletarian revolution must prepare the necessary equipment for this civil war. It must learn to use it - to fight and win.”²⁴

On January 15 1919, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg were assassinated by the counterrevolutionaries of the Guards Cavalry Rifle Division. Liebknecht’s last article argued that “our programme will live; it will rule the world of redeemed humanity. In spite of everything!”. Luxemburg’s last words were no less impressive:

How does the defeat of this so-called ‘Spartacus Week’ appear in the light of the above historical question? Was it a defeat out of storming revolutionary energy and inadequate maturity of the situation, or out of weakness and half-measures?

Both! The ambivalent character of this crisis, the contradiction between the powerful, determined offensive appearance of the Berlin masses and the indecisiveness, timidity, half-heartedness of the Berlin leadership is the special characteristic of the most recent episode. The leadership has failed. But the leadership can and must be recreated by the masses and out of the masses. The masses are the decisive factor: they are the rock on which the final victory of the revolution will be built. The masses were at the height - they shaped this ‘defeat’ into a link of those historical defeats which are the pride and strength of international socialism. And that is why a future victory will blossom from this ‘defeat’!²⁵

Mario Kessler’s contribution to Communist University was based on this, edited, article - also watch the CU2022 YouTube video

GP Steenson Not one man! Not one penny!: German Social Democracy, 1863-1914 Pittsburgh 1981.↩︎
www.marxists.org/deutsch/archiv/liebknechtk/1907/mil-antimil/a-02.htm. The following quotations are from the same source.↩︎
www.stahlgewitter.com/14_12_03.htm.↩︎
www.marxists.org/deutsch/archiv/liebknechtk/1916/04/maifeier.htm.↩︎
Quote from OK Flechtheim, ‘Romantiker und Revolutionär’ Die Zeit No33, 1971.↩︎
Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht und die revolutionäre KPD (1918) Offenbach 2005, p36.↩︎
sites.google.com/site/sozialistischeklassiker2punkt0/liebknecht/1918/karl-liebknecht-mitteilungen-briefe-und-notizen-aus-dem-zuchthaus-luckau-6.↩︎
R Luxemburg, ‘Miliz und Militarismus’ Gesammelte Werke [Collected works] (cited hereafter as GW), Vol 1, Berlin 1982, p446.↩︎
www.marxists.org/deutsch/archiv/luxemburg/1904/02/krieg.html.↩︎
R Luxemburg, ‘Änderungsanträge zum Resolutionsentwurf August Bebels über die imperialistische Politik. GW Vol 2, p236.↩︎
Rosa Luxemburg, ‘Friedensutopien’ GW Vol 2, pp491-92.↩︎
See J Verhey, Der ‘Geist von 1914’ und die Erfindung der Volksgemeinschaft Hamburg 2000; J Wegner Die Kriegs- und Kolonialfrage in der britischen und deutschen Arbeiterbewegung im Vergleich 1889-1914 Berlin 2014, pp284-343.↩︎
See H Eberlein, ‘Erinnerungen an Rosa Luxemburg bei Kriegsausbruch 1914’ Utopie kreativ No174 (April 2005), pp355-62.↩︎
I follow here F Haug Rosa Luxemburg und die Kunst der Politik Hamburg 2007.↩︎
R Luxemburg, ‘Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie’ GW Vol 4, pp76-77.↩︎
Ibid p77.↩︎
Ibid p163.↩︎
Ibid p126.↩︎
Ibid p124.↩︎
R Luxemburg, ‘Rückblick auf die Gothaer Konferenz’ GW Vol 4, pp270-71.↩︎
R Luxemburg, ‘Ein neues Waterloo des Sozialismus’ GW Vol 4, pp238-39.↩︎
R Luxemburg, ‘Brennende Zeitfragen’ GW Vol 4, pp275-76.↩︎
Ibid p277.↩︎
R Luxemburg, ‘Was will der Spartakusbund?’ GW Vol 4, p444.↩︎
R Luxemburg, ‘Die Ordnung herrscht in Berlin’ GW Vol 4, p536.↩︎