17.03.2011

Mysteries and controversies

David Douglass continues the debate about the miners' Great Strike

I had thought my review of Ian Isaac’s When we were miners was balanced (‘A Militant take on the Great Strike of 1985-85’, November 25 2010). Ian’s reply in last week’s Weekly Worker clearly suggests he was far from happy with it (‘Tactics and the Great Strike’, March 10).

Without wanting to bore the arse off readers with minutiae or literary ping pong, let me first clear up some minor issues. I did not spell his name wrongly. It was supposed to read ‘Ian Isaac’s When we were miners’, as it does in the second paragraph of that review, but instead the apostrophe was omitted [this was partly the fault of the Weekly Worker team - ed]. The word “slim” in my phrase, “slim, but vital volume”, was meant as a description, not a criticism (180 pages, taking into account the breadth of the subject being taken on - in much the way my own book Ghost dancers is described as a ‘weighty tome’ at 510 pages, though it covers 30 years).

I considered the title of Ian’s book a bit limp, given the dynamism of the descriptions it contains and the wealth of experience inside. This matters because people are often drawn to a book by the title, but, as Ian says, this is an entirely subjective judgement. Reviews are rarely free of subjective comment and are always a personal ‘take’ on someone else’s work. Ghost dancers as a title and reflection does refer to North American ‘Indians’ and other cultures and ethnicities wiped out in the teeth of obstinate resistance, but again whether that choice of title grabs the theme of the book or not is purely a subjective opinion.

Disagreements

More seriously, the question of Orgreave is an important issue. Nothing Ian says in his reply demonstrates to me that he knows how that situation came about. Contrary to his assertion in the book that “I don’t think it was Arthur Scargill” who was the “controlling mind”, it actually was.

I have only one real criticism of the way Arthur conducted himself and led the union in the strike - and that was Orgreave. Arthur ended the agreement we had with the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation and the steelworks, whereby agreed shipments of coke to keep the furnaces intact would be provided and in exchange no steel would be produced. The danger of collapse of the Scunthorpe oven linings led directly to the scab runs into Orgreave, following a written plea from the plant and the ISTC to the National Union of Mineworkers national executive. This is all documented in my book.

The end of the agreement opened up a second front across Britain, as we then went into action against steelworks and docks - which drew us from the scab coalfields, import wharfs and power stations. It stretched our limited number of pickets and opened up the field to armies of blackleg lorries. Until Orgreave, like a champion snooker player, we had all those pockets covered with minimal pickets and total support. There is not room here to debate Arthur’s thinking, except that he planned for the re-creation of a Saltley Gate situation. Yes, we needed such a situation, but not by knocking a hole in the dyke when we were already up to our bollocks in water.

If Ian does not accept this explanation - and my review of his book spells it out - then really he should tell us how and why Orgreave did come about. Why steel workers who had been holding the line and had stopped steel production, why the ISTC - which was on national and regional joint union coordinating bodies to take the strike to victory - suddenly turned into the enemy? Ian says he does not think it affected the long-term outcome of the strike, but it certainly did not help. It distracted us from more strategic targets - the scab pits and the power stations (the latter were hanging on by their fingertips and nudged total shutdown on numerous occasions).

Ian has misread what I wrote about his past. I said that he left Cowley car works to work in the coal industry and then went to Ruskin College. He says: “I worked at Cowley between 1971 and 1974. I started in St John’s Colliery, Maesteg in August 1974 and went to Ruskin College ... in October 1976.” That’s the same thing, isn’t it? I never said Ian was a militant steward and longstanding member of the Communist Party: I said his dad was [another error that crept in during proofing - ed].

My refutation of Ian’s assertion that Yorkshire mines had “factory-like conditions” stand. Although the point that Ian makes that the incentive scheme divided men along area lines (and often according to the relative conditions they worked in and money they earned) is correct, it ain’t necessarily so. Kent and Yorkshire voted heavily for strike action and took strike action, official and unofficial, more regularly than any other coalfield, but were among the top earners. But the general point is accepted.

I will not restate my objections to Ian’s interpretation of syndicalism in the coalfields and The miners’ next step - we do not agree. 1912 was one of the most revolutionary periods in recent history, a time which posed a serious revolutionary challenge to capitalism on many fronts - not least the mines, with nearly one and a quarter million miners on strike. Again, the miners’ strike of 1984-85 could indeed have posed a revolutionary challenge and a catalyst for all-out class action, at least to the point of ousting the government and imposing progressive demands on the state. Though it did not have the same ideological and organisational strengths as 1912, which was an advancing movement, not a defensive one.

South Wales

We also disagree over a question of fact - a crucial question actually: that of Lewis Merthyr in 1983. Lewis was rolling forward in a branch and area strike, as had the movement of 1981, which completely stopped the first Tory closure programme in its tracks. Pits were picketed out in the same fashion. Yorkshire area voted at its council meeting to strike alongside Lewis and bring out 68,000 miners. At this crucial stage, the NEC calls for a national ballot on closures, centred on the Lewis dispute. Who asked for this national ballot? I cannot say definitively, but one assumes it was the South Wales executive. We hold a national ballot (of course, it is held in each respective area, as the national ballots of 72 and 74 were, but the votes are counted nationally).

The facts (which are detailed in my book) are as follows: the ordinary council meeting of the Yorkshire area, following a lobby of South Wales miners, agreed the following on February 28 1983: “This Yorkshire area of the NUM fully supports the South Wales miners in their fight against pit closures and for the life and shape of our industry. The Yorkshire area will therefore take total strike action as from midnight, Sunday March 6 1983 and will inform the NEC of this decision for their urgent attention.” Two delegates voted against. A lobby of the NEC was endorsed to urge the executive to support the action of Welsh miners on strike against the closure of Lewis Merthyr Colliery.

A special council meeting held on Friday March 4 heard a “very careful and detailed report” from general secretary Owen Briscoe of the March 2 special NEC, which authorised a national ballot commencing on March 8 1983, and agreed to suspend any action called for Monday March 7. The ballot result was 76,540 voting ‘yes’ in favour of a strike and 118,954 voting ‘no’ against a strike (39% for, 61% against). Yorkshire voted 27,597 for and 23,841 against; South Wales voted 11,800 for and 5,500 against.

The call for the national ballot was a disastrous decision. The unofficial action was odds-on to stop the entire country. Following this defeat, we impose the national overtime ban, which is meant to swing the odds back to us and reduce coal stocks in readiness for the big clash we now knew was looming. The decision to hold a national ballot before a de facto national strike was rolling strongly influenced the decision we made one year later, in March 84.

Ian and I do not agree either about the influence of a ‘national union’, as against the devolved, area-confederated union. The NUM is and was an industrial union: one union, one industry. If you are a surface worker, canteen worker, electrician, mechanic, diesel driver or collier, you are in the NUM. It was not, though, a monolithic, single national structure. If the NUM had not been structured the way it was, there would never have been a strike in 1984 - which was a collection of area strikes rolling through the country to create a de facto national strike. The decentralised and autonomist branches, regions and areas were both a strength and a weakness. Though it came down to metal and class-consciousness in the end, not the rule book or structures.

‘Guerrilla action’

Again on violence and sabotage we will not agree. We should be for safety workers while the management respects the union’s authority. Once they try to destroy the union and its authority by bringing in blacklegs to prove they run the industry - OK, let them save the pit with their blacklegs. If they judge the skills and authority of the union are worth more than a few scabs, then we agree to safety workers. Once the police are installed at the colliery, our safety workers leave the pit to them, and to management, who brought them in. Not to adopt this attitude is frankly to let them piss up our backs.

One thing that cannot be said of me is that I would ever “follow a band of urban guerrillas from behind or sit on the sidelines until it’s all over”. That is not me, as anyone involved at the sharp end will tell you. I think, anyway, Ian has taken too literally my suggestion of guerrilla tactics over that of the Charge of the Light Brigade at Orgreave. I was talking of mass pickets, but turning up where least expected, avoiding set-piece battles with the police, never letting them know what we would do and where. That was the only way to challenge their superior numbers and equipment - and if there were any “urban guerrillas” they were all miners and I would usually be in the front rank with them in any situation. Actually our guerrillas were drawn directly from the coalface and the heart of the coal communities.

Paint-bombing, or real bombing, of scab trucks and buses is a perfectly correct tactic if we cannot get them to cease their dirty work through normal channels. What would Ian suggest instead? We did not expect to march to a single field with banners flying and band playing and fight it out toe to toe with armed cavalry, dogs and riots troops, outnumbered three to one. The situation required guerrilla tactics - hit and run, or surprise, mass, flexible engagements, as well as static token pickets at places where we knew they would be respected.

Neither do we agree about the coup de grâce delivered by Nacods, the supervisors’ union. In the 12 hours between the union tripartite ‘bottom line’ deal delivered to Acas, the arbitration and conciliation service, which Thatcher had all but conceded under threat of all-out Nacods national strike, Ian is telling us they walked away and signed their own deal because the mandate for their strike action, which had just been achieved, had been ‘timed out’. Even suppose their rule book did only grant them a few days to implement the ballot result or it was ruled out (I doubt this very much, by the way), why would you put your name to a worthless agreement when we had one ready to deliver which conceded us nearly everything?

I think this rings of someone (not Ian, obviously) trying to come up with an excuse for something that was inexcusable. Even Thatcher in her autobiography does not suggest that one, although she concedes she does not understand the Nacods U-turn. Others might suggest it was crude bribery, but there is no evidence of that.

There are many issues outstanding on the Great Strike, many controversies, many mysteries even, which will keep us all arguing and disputing until we cop our clogs. That we were there, and fought our corners for our class and for justice are the most important thing, and in that I know Ian was as committed and dedicated as I was.