09.05.2007

Class-consciousness and the naked king

Russian communist Boris Kagarlitsky, founder of the Moscow-based Institute of Globalisation Studies, speaks to Mark Fischer about Yeltsin, Putin, the liberal opposition and the workers' movement

The death of Boris Yeltsin was an opportunity for the western media to tell us what a political giant had left our midst. What was the reaction of the political establishment and wider society in Russia?

It is interesting and amusing. On the one hand, in the past Vladimir Putin had expended a lot of effort trying to distance himself from Yeltsin. However, this was done in a very hazy, unarticulated way, in a manner that did not drawn sharp lines of political demarcation. He constantly seemed to be trying to send almost subliminal messages to the public telling them, 'We are not the people of Yeltsin times - we are statists and opposed to individual robber capitalists'.

Pro-Putin journalists assiduously talked up the differences with Yeltsin to emphasise their man's merits and the liberals complained about those very same differences. Yet Putin himself never made any clear political statement distancing himself from Yeltsin in public. Despite this, much of Putin's popularity has been based on an idea that was never clearly articulated by him - that he was different, something new and a break with Yeltsin.

When Yeltsin died, Putin was forced to state the exact opposite. Instead of emphasising his differences, he felt obliged to tell everyone how he was the continuation of Yeltsin - his successor in fact. In this, there was an interesting convergence of the liberal opposition and those they oppose, those in power. Both sides were completely united that Yeltsin had probably been the greatest statesman Russia had produced in the 20th century, that he had led us to freedom and so on.

All nonsense, of course - but it was interesting that both sides were sharing this nonsense.

What about mass sentiment?

Following the death of Boris Yeltsin various polling organisations conducted surveys on how Russians regarded him. Asked what they saw as Yeltsin's main achievement, 33% of respondents answered: "He left office voluntarily in December 1999." All his other achievements were within the statistical margin of error. The majority of those surveyed did not consider that Russia's first president had any achievements at all.

That was very interesting.

I want to ask you about the recent furore around Berezovsky. What we found notable in Britain was the relatively muted response of the government. This seems very much in keeping with its generally cautious approach to Russia. For example, we can see a vivid contrast between the Litvinenko affair and Soviet-era assassinations in London of the past - poison tipped umbrellas spring to mind. What has been the impact and significance in Russia of Berezovsky's comments about the forcible overthrow of the Putin regime?

In fact Russian authorities pay far more attention to Berezovsky than he deserves. There are two reasons for this. First, through such diversionary tactics, the administration attempts to distract attention from real social and political problems. Society is meant to be diverted by the 'Berezovsky threat' and the 'London conspiracy'.

It makes for good propaganda. It stands very much in the tradition of Stalin's periodic hunts for spies and saboteurs as a solution to real social problems in the USSR. These needed to be explained through examining the dynamics of society itself - something neither Stalin nor Putin could do and remain in power, of course. In the same vein, the administration is consciously overplaying the importance and effectiveness of the liberal opposition around Drugaya Rossiya (Another Russia) rather than trying to talk it down.

The second reason has a more venally capitalist taste to it. There are literally hundreds of functionaries in the Russian administration and in government-sponsored NGOs whose only job is to fight against Berezovsky. They have immense budgets and very nice salaries - five to ten thousand pounds a month without tax. Clearly, their jobs rely on the continuation of this 'London conspiracy' myth.

Of course, all of this publicity is also good for Berezovsky himself. He needs to be at the centre of public attention. He is eager to cast himself as a political émigré rather than as an ordinary criminal (in fact he is both). The Russian authorities assist him in achieving his goals and - quid pro quo - he helps them achieve theirs.
Both sides are happy with what is - essentially - a symbiotic relationship.

But is Putin strong or weak? Yes, we saw the small Another Russia demos - but isn't this actually a sign of weakness? He still scores 80% approval rates, but how much is this premised on an economic growth fuelled by high prices for natural resource commodities that are very susceptible to global market fluctuations? Would economic downturn signal an upturn in struggle?

You have to keep in mind the difference between public opinion and the real balance of class forces - these things are not the same. If you look at Putin's public opinion ratings, you see a very strange paradox.

When people are asked if they support any specific aspect of Putin's policies, you find that nothing he stands for enjoys much support in wider society. Even the more popular ones are scoring only 20%-30% approval rates.

At the same time, when you ask whether people generally support president Putin as an individual politician, then you get a very positive response. So, in that sense, the perception of Putin in Russia is very much depoliticised and extremely disconnected from the actual policies and actions of the government he heads. Ironically, therefore, what we could say is that Putin is seen by large swathes of our society as a sort of symbolic constitutional monarch.

Thus, he rises above responsibility for anything bad that is happening in the country. Instead, he is seen as representing the country abroad and showing off our strength and power. However, when you look deeper at the real balance of forces in our country, the picture is much more complicated than this 'beauty contest' approach to politics might suggest.

Putin was extremely successful in balancing between different groups and coalitions in the bureaucracy and playing one off against another. Through a skilful manipulation of this process, he made himself a lynchpin - the indispensable element needed to keep the whole edifice in some sort of equilibrium. Whilst, for example, he attacked individual enemies such as Berezovsky, it was not because these people were his personal enemies. He had actually created a situation in which these sorts of individuals were seen by the bulk of the ruling class as troublemakers who were trying to disrupt the balance of forces at the apex of society in an irresponsible way, a way that might to lead dangerously unpredictable consequences.

That's why Putin had a real basis of support amongst the majority of the Russian business class and bureaucracy that stood behind him. That is why, for example, the majority of the liberal opposition to him - people like Khodorkovsky, Berezovsky and so on - are entirely marginal. They represent peripheral groups that were defeated in the power struggles within the ruling elite.

The liberal intelligentsia keeps saying that Putin is 'bad for business', that he retards the development of capitalism in Russia because he is statist and his regime is rigid with bureaucratism. At the same time, if you look at investment indexes you see why the Russian business sector is extremely happy with what is going on under Putin. Their confidence has never been higher.

Putin's Russia is very much like the tsarist Russia of the early 20th century. Capitalist, but bureaucratic; strong corporations, but weak economy; advanced bourgeoisie incorporated into global capitalism, but an impoverished population and industry dependent on foreign investment. This is a very unstable country that can be kept together only by an authoritarian government which is permanently haunted by a nightmare of revolution - even when there are no real revolutionary forces around.

We'll talk about those 'phantom' forces later, but like tsarist Russia it is instructive that important sections of the liberal intelligentsia and political trends are in opposition. Are they as anaemic as their forerunners?

Well, Putin is not as strong as he looks, but the liberal opposition is a joke.

Paradoxically, it is very much dependent on the government's repression to stay alive and retain any purpose for existing. It is not supported by people, it has no ideas to offer to wider society except a programme that is more or less identical to Putin's, only in some way 'better'.

I have already mentioned the dichotomy people have in their minds between the popular president and the deeply unpopular duma and government that are hated for the policies they implement. Putin's policies, of course. The irony is that the politics of the liberal opposition are a mirror image of this widespread confusion in society. It is not against Putin's key policies, but it attacks Putin personally. No surprise - this doesn't work.

Recently Drugaya Rossiya changed its approach somewhat and started attacking current social policies. This brought it results in St Petersburg, where it was backed by some social movements and even by members of the genuine democratic left (anarchists, some trade union people, even Marxist intellectuals like Artemy Magun). But the basic approach has not changed. Drugaya Rossiya isn't saying that it is going to change social policy: it is simply protesting against concrete acts of particular bureaucrats (and never capitalists). It is attracting fascist groups to its united 'democratic' front on the grounds that these groups also suffer from police repression (and this is true, as long as these groups are in alliance with Drugaya Rossiya). It is hardly surprising, given its incoherent nature, that Drugaya Rossiya is not trusted. Outside St Petersburg it has never succeeded in attracting many people.

But doesn't it draw some sustenance from international capital's attitude to Russia? Despite the levels of investment, surely this is an extremely cautious one? Clearly there are concerns over the extent to which Russia is actually governed by anything that could be equated with the rule of law. I have in mind not simply the recent murders of Kozlov, Politikovskaya and Litvinenko. Perhaps more tellingly, the way power was wrenched back from 1990s, Yeltsin-style oligarchs - Yukos oil, arbitrary arrests, etc. Doesn't the liberal opposition have a point: isn't Russia a rather dangerous place to 'do business'?

But everybody is confident that there is a kind of rule of logic rather law here. The logic of capital, in fact.

These type of arrests are completely illegal, but they are very much within the logic of the system. They don't contradict it on any level.

Take, for example, the Yukos affair that you mention. After this, western investment into Russia increased dramatically "¦

Why would that be?

First because westerners were given very clear indications that the spat amongst the Russian oligarchs would not affect them - they were not part of that conflict and, as long as you don't become involved in Russian politics, especially in the illegal manner of Yukos, you won't get your head chopped off.

Any Russian company could be taken over by the state in this way. But they were not. In order to defend the rule of capitalism in today's Russia it is not opportune to implement the rule of law - at least not for another 20 years while this generation is alive. If you have a society that has even a minimal respect for the rule of law, or for human rights, then you have to throw most of the present-day Russian elite into jail.

Capitalism does not need democracy or the rule of law in that sense - it needs stability. Berezovsky and his type have simply been excluded from the general amnesty that has been extended to the rest of the criminal elite that today rules Russia.

So let me emphasise my point. Western public opinion is negative about Russia, but investment news indicates a different story as far as business is concerned. Russia is one of the leaders in terms of attracting western direct investment.

Factories are mushrooming. You just walk through a place where a month ago there was an empty field or abandoned barracks and you will see a new factory nearing completion. And they are all foreign-owned. Russian corporations aren't interested in anything except oil, gas and financial markets. While Russian oligarchs are exporting capital, western corporations are taking over the industrial sector and manufacturing.

And speak to foreign business people in Moscow. Do they complain about the Yukos affair? Not at all! They complain that there is not enough office space and hotels are more expensive than in Paris - precisely due to this very same economic boom and a big invasion of foreigner business people. More and more Russian companies are hiring western executives (Russians think they are less corrupt). These people come over to run Russian enterprises without knowing a word of the language for salaries which are 50% higher than those of their Russian colleagues. Not that their Russian co-managers complain, as managerial salaries here are amongst the highest in the world anyhow.

What about the men being touted as Putin's successors - Medvedev and Ivanov? Do you see the potential for movement and progress from below when there is this change at the top?

The problem for the Russian elite is that Putin is necessary and - in one sense at least - 'irreplaceable'.

The bureaucracy is scared of Putin leaving the scene precisely because they know that the next 'player' will not be able to repeat the same trick. That trick was possible to pull only after Yeltsin, when the authority and reputation of the office of president was at an historic low. Anybody that came immediately after Yeltsin was going to look good.

The one who comes after Putin will face the exact opposite problem. Putin created such a hyper-successful image as a national leader - although without real substance or achievement - his successor will look pretty bad by comparison. More than that, once he is replaced, the only element of the state that currently enjoys any kind of legitimacy will go with him. It's not that the next king will be naked - Putin is a naked king, but there is a kind of conspiracy of silence about it in society because of what are perceived as his strengths and achievements.

The next naked monarch is likely to illicit an entirely different response from the people. As you allude in your question, that poses the question of movement and progress from below.

So what is the state of the left and the workers' movement?

Economic growth has resulted in an impressive resurgence of free trade unionism. Just take late April and May this year.

After a successful strike at the Ford factory in Vsevolozhsk, there is a real epidemic of industrial action. Heineken Bier went on strike; there were walkouts at the Coca Cola plant in St Petersburg; the Tuapse port was stopped by a protest strike; St Petersburg postmen demanded a 30% salary increase; Renault in Moscow was forced to recognise a new union; Citibank in Moscow launched a legal case against its workers who were also trying to form a union - these are just the most important instances of labour unrest: many more could be cited.

Another important factor is the level of membership of the new unions, which has seen a massive surge over the last year. Of course, in absolute terms these unions remain small, but they enjoy thousands of new members and in relative terms they are now at least twice as big as a year ago. Take one example. At Renault Russia's Avtoframos factory in Moscow a union was launched. Within two weeks it had 200 applications to join. Management initially tried to deny it official recognition, but after a few weeks they were forced to negotiate. Meanwhile, the old, pro-government unions have been facing workers' revolts against their bureaucratic leadership, such as at the Stinol factory in Lipetsk.

It is important to remember that all this is taking place in the context of strikes being banned in practice and harsh labour laws being specially drafted to prevent new unions emerging (this is why, every time a union appears or tries to do something, it is likely to face legal action from the employers). The dockworkers' union headquarters in Novorossiysk was raided by police in early May and its membership lists seized.

Despite this real repression, the labour movement is growing. For the Marxist left, however, it is important not just to praise this new, spontaneous workers' movement, not just to help it, but to increase its level of class-consciousness and help unite and consolidate its most advanced elements. Integral to this must be the development of some sort of a Marxist transitional programme.

Giving this new workers' movement class-consciousness is a key question. How do we avoid repeating the mistakes the labour movement in the west has made time and again in constructing parties based on Labourism? This is exactly what the union leaders tend to want now - some kind of Labour Party! Not Blair's party, but a version from the 1900s "¦

You should warn them that this is where 1900-style Labourism ultimately ends up "¦

That's exactly the point I keep making to them over and over again! They reply that the British took 100 years to get to Blair, so if it follows the same historical timetable that's fine with them! They all hate Blair, of course "¦

In the Ukraine the Organisation of Marxists was recently launched and this provides us with an interesting example. There have been several failed attempts to build a political party of the left in Russia. Today, this is not the number one item on the agenda, though it remains the longer-term perspective.

The actual task is to organise and consolidate radical leftists in and around this new, spontaneously rising workers' movement as a kind of class tendency.