25.11.1999

Freedom for Aceh

Aftershocks from the revolutionary events of 1998 and the separation of East Timor continue to undermine attempts to stabilise capitalist relations in Indonesia. Economic crisis fuels political-constitutional crises which threatens to tear Indonesia into its countless ‘national’ units.

Just two weeks ago around one million - 20% of the population - demonstrated in Aceh, on the northern tip of the island of Sumatra, demanding a referendum on self-determination for the province. For more than a decade, an armed movement has fought for independence from Indonesia in the face of, at times, brutal oppression by central government.

The new president, Abdurrahman Wahid, known as Gus Dur, was forced to cut short an overseas trip and announced vague promises of some sort of referendum in around “seven months”. But the newly elected house of representatives (DPR), dismissed this, insisting on the “integrity of the unitary state”. Instead, the DPR has suggested increased autonomy and a “comprehensive trial of individuals responsible for human rights abuses” in the province. Large areas have been under effective military occupation, with reports of massacres and abuse emerging. Almost 300 people, including 88 Indonesian soldiers, have been killed in clashes in Aceh since late last year.

Subsequently, Wahid has said that the referendum will not be on independence, but on the introduction of sharia islamic law. This statement outraged independence activists, who have given the government until December 4 - the 23rd anniversary of the formation of GAM (Free Aceh Movement) - to include independence in any referendum or face a three-day strike and the raising of the outlawed GAM flag.

In the aftermath of the East Timor crisis, regionalist and national tensions are emerging throughout the archipelago. Bourgeois commentators are beginning to contemplate - in fear - the real possibility of the break-up of Indonesia.

For decades, the centralising Javanese-dominated state apparatus around the dictatorship of the Suharto-Golkar regime had kept a lid on dissent through a combination of the iron fist and nationalist ideology. In May 1998, that system of rule collapsed and a vacuum was created which the divided ruling bloc has been trying to fill. So far they have been relatively successful, though the room for initiative from below has been dramatically increased.

With the election of Gus Dur as president, alongside the populist Indonesian nationalist Megawati Sukarnoputri as vice-president, the representatives of capital will be hoping that this alliance will lead to a stable civil society and a market-oriented consensus. But the centrifugal forces unleashed by the inability to rule in the old way, the democratic movement and the separation of East Timor are likely to get stronger.

The military and police are suggesting a ‘limited’ martial law in parts of Aceh in the lead-up to the promised pull-out by the army. But, according to general Roesmanhadi, national chief of police, this was because police were “not prepared to take over from the combat troops being withdrawn”. With such deep division and uncertainty obvious not only between president and parliament, but between the military and police, tensions are bound to increase. Such is the tinderbox nature of the situation.

A separate identity in Aceh dates back to before the successful war against the Dutch colonialists. However, after independence, the project of national unity became increasingly a process of the Javanisation of the ‘outer islands’. When Suharto took power in 1966, the process became increasingly draconian and bloody, leading to the invasion and ultimately failed incorporation of Indonesia’s ‘27th province’ - East Timor.

Amien Rais, a leading opposition figure during the 1998 upheavals, has raised the flag of autonomisation, arguing that the maintenance of the unitary state will lead to its disintegration. By contrast to this solution from above, the working class and peasantry must fight for a revolutionary democratic outcome to the ongoing constitutional crisis. Central to this must be the fight for the unity of the working class throughout the archipelago, with the championing of the right to self-determination as a key issue.

The Acehnese themselves are divided as to what they want to come out of any referendum. Some want independence, while others want some sort of a federal structure. Previously, sentiment for increased autonomy (formally - though not practically - granted in 1959) largely rested on a separate religious culture. There have been calls for the implementation of Islamic law in the province - something shunned by the secular-oriented military.

Since the discovery of natural gas and oil, the separatist sentiment has taken on an economic aspect, with a local elite wanting an increased say over local mineral wealth.

Aceh is now one of the richest areas in Indonesia. Much of the working class has been moved in from other areas, as there was an insufficient skill-base in Aceh itself for industrial growth. Indeed, some of the propaganda of GAM has had an aggressively chauvinist flavour to it, with some recent leaflets calling for non-Acehnese to leave.

It is highly unlikely that the Acehnese could be considered a nation. Clearly then, for inconsistent revolutionary democrats they should be denied self-determination. But the Indonesian state is threatening to step up repression. The response of revolutionary democrats must be to take up the call for voluntary unity - and that can only be based on each people with a clear territory and an historically established national antagonism or grievance having the right to secede. We have no need to create an endlessly elastic definition of nationhood in order to fight for the right to self-determination of the Acehnese - or for that matter the people of West Papua, East Kalimantan and Riau.

Whether we should advocate independence, autonomy or a federal solution in Aceh is an open question. But central to a democratic solution to the national question in Indonesia is the winning of the Javanese masses - the biggest national group - to the demand for self-determination and voluntary unity - and oppose the anti-democratic enforced unity that presently exists.

Marcus Larsen