19.11.2026
Question sacred ‘proof texts’
There are many who tail what they call the ‘movement’ in the name of some supposed ‘anti-sectarian’ orthodoxy. In reality this means refraining from harsh criticism and abiding by bureaucratic speech controls. Mike Macnair adds to last week’s reports of the Historical Materialism conference
Like Yassamine Mather and Tam Dean Burn, I attended the 2026 Historical Materialism conference at SOAS University in London on November 5-8. The three of us went to different panels, so it is worth my supplementing their reports. In addition, I myself addressed a panel on ‘partyism’ and this, being closer to our political concerns, is worth a slightly fuller report.
As the organisers reported in their thank-you email to participants, there were around 1,600 participants and 317 panels, with the four parallel sessions Thursday-Saturday and three on Sunday running between 19 and 22 panels at a time. I should also say that I did not attend a panel in every session: with only 15-minute breaks between the first and second morning and afternoon sessions, and 30 minutes for lunch and tea, followed by an evening plenary, the timetable was both unworkably tight for attending all the sessions - and exhausting.
The event is basically an academic conference, albeit of the academic left, and with some opportunities for panels and presentations which address the concerns of the political-activist left. The format of panels is the standard one for academic conferences - of three or four papers, with a short period for questions/interventions afterwards; the design aims not to draw out differences, but to provide panellists with feedback and opportunities to improve their work for subsequent publication. This aim is less appropriate to the book launches (several of the panels), but still works for them.
The evening plenaries were more clearly immediately addressed to politics: Thursday on ‘revolutionary feminisms’, Friday on Bruno Leipold’s Deutscher lecture on politics as the ‘terrain’ of class struggle, Saturday on the ‘anatomy of fascism’, and Sunday on anti-imperialism. The Deutscher lecture is an annual fixture; the final plenary fitted the conference theme: “Planetary warscapes ablaze: imperial mutations in infernal times”; the themes of ‘revolutionary feminism’ and fascism, together with imperialism, evoked 1970s far-left politics and themes which remain dominant among the far left, but did not address the return of the politics of class in recent years (as was also true of the introduction at pp1-2 of the conference programme).
This political agenda in a sense suited the composition of the conference, which seemed to me (merely impressionistically) to be composed of a combination of 1970s veterans (my own age and above), plus postgraduate students and junior academics, without many in the middle; this, of course, is characteristic of the left in general at the moment.
Bruno Leipold’s lecture developed further the argument of his 2024 book, Citizen Marx, which won the Deutscher Prize last year.1 Here, he strengthened the emphasis on the idea of ‘terrain’ as a battleground; and argued that Marx’s original belief that universal male suffrage would produce working class rule was falsified by practice in the later 19th century. He shifted from there to Kautsky’s arguments in 1904-05 in ‘Constituency and party’ and the series, ‘Republic and social democracy in France’ (at this point I thought that he should have acknowledged Ben Lewis’s translations).
From there he went to Lenin’s shift from his Kautskyan polemic of December 1916 against the ‘Youth International’, to State and revolution and ‘Can the Bolsheviks retain state power?’. But, though Lara Douds’ 2018 Inside Lenin’s government showed that real authority was initially given to the Central Executive Committee, by mid-1919 the Bolsheviks had moved to the idea that the dictatorship of the proletariat had to be the dictatorship of a single party; and, as Lenin himself recognised in his last years, they had failed to transform the inherited administrative apparatus. The existing state is not democracy, but has appropriated the word; one-party government, as in China, bars popular accountability of rulers. We should, perhaps, argue for ‘popular government’, meaning that citizens rule actively and in turn, and that citizens in office are accountable.
Leipold
I made the point in my review of Leipold’s book last year2 that he understated the civic republican aspects of the English constitution before the mid-19th century, with the result that capital needed to reduce these elements - in favour of judicialisation and bureaucratic hierarchy - as the suffrage was expanded. This was also present in the lecture, where I thought that - though he drew attention to Kautsky’s scabbing in World War I - he missed the role of Kautsky’s decision in 1917 to back the Entente, on national self-determination grounds, and dated Kautsky’s opposition to October 1917 too late. More generally, the lecture seemed to me to remain within the frame of constitutional arrangements in a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat in one country’.
The ‘Anti-imperialism’ plenary featured Adam Hanieh, Ashok Kumar, Costas Lapavitsas and Shahrzad Mojab. Adam Hanieh argued, I think rightly, that imperialism is normal to capitalism, and needs to be theorised through the global rather than a sum of national parts. There has been a crisis of global order since 2008, which the great-power rivals attempt to navigate; the Middle East has been central to US domination, through control of oil and petrochemical products. The US is trying to manage its relative decline through increasing its control; hence its backing for the Israeli genocide in Gaza and the war on Iran. But, though we oppose US and Israeli aggression, this does not mean we should defend the political character of the regimes targeted by the US and Israel.
Ashok Kumar gave us a version of the triumphalist narrative of a part of the left about the Iran war, in which survival is victory. The left must reject moralising hostility to regimes which are making actual sacrifices in the struggle against imperialism. As we have said in this paper before now, the judgment that Iran is winning is premature - like assessing that Germany was winning in 1915. The argument that the sacrifices made by Iranians mean that we should shut up about the character of the Iranian regime is worthless.
Costas Lapavitsas, like Adam Hanieh, made the point that “money and guns are one structure of capitalist competition”, and similarly rejected “campism”: ie, political endorsement of regimes targeted by the USA. He argued that, although US productive dominance had declined, its financial dominance continued. A real anti-imperialism had an irreducible domestic (class) component: it is necessary to argue for deglobalisation, definancialisation, reindustrialisation and the restoration of national sovereignty; and, though the state seemed like an immovable object, it was paramount to accept that it is a terrain of class struggle.
Shahrzad Mojab, I think, also argued against campism. The problem was that her paper flew so far to the abstract that it did not really return to the concrete.
Panels
I chose in three sessions to attend panels on legal theory, which were largely theory-oriented, and of interest to me as an academic lawyer - but less so, I think, to readers of this paper.
A Thursday panel on ‘Marxism and the question of organisation’ sounded like politics, but was actually more about Marxism in the ‘organisation theory’ of business schools. ‘Problems of political Marxism’ dealt with historical issues of the transition to capitalism, taking as its starting point (and for some of the panellists, object of critique) the ‘political Marxism’ of Robert Brenner, Ellen Meiksins Wood and others. I indulged myself by going to the (delayed) book launch for Tom Geue’s 2025 book, Major corrections, an “intellectual biography” of Sebastiano Timpanaro, whose On materialism I enjoyed when reading it in the 1970s, as an antidote to Althusser and the ‘post-structuralists’.
More immediately political was the book launch for Florian Wilde’s biography of Communist Party of Germany leader Ernst Meyer, Revolution as realpolitik: Ernst Meyer (1887-1930) - biography of a KPD chairman.3 The panel was titled ‘The united front strategy: historical and current perspectives’, and featured the author, Florian Wilde, his doctoral supervisor, Reiner Tosstorff, and Marx21/Die Linke activist Laura Lipinski. The discussion was largely in the frame of the British Socialist Workers’ Party’s conception of the united front.
On Sunday in the first session I went by accident to the book launch panel for Teemu Ruskola’s The unmaking of the Chinese working class: how communism built a capitalist superpower.4 As presented by the author and commented on by Ralf Ruckus and Tim Pringle, this appears to be a very serious political economy of class in the evolution of China since the 1949 revolution. It would be good to get a review of it for this paper.
Partyism
I participated in a round-table discussion (really, just another panel) with the exaggerated title, ‘Building a mass party in times of increasing imperialist tensions: resurgent partyism after Your Party’, with Charlie Porter, Jon Benson, Sylvia McCheyne and Anahita Zardoshti.
The panel title was exaggerated because, in spite of the initial mass interest, Your Party never approached being a mass party, and the projects of the left in YP were not at all like projects for one; meanwhile, ‘partyism’ - the advocacy of a communist party, as opposed to broad-front parties and competing communist splinter groups - remains a minority of a minority of a minority.
I have included my own contribution below. Charlie Porter gave an outline of what is, in his view, meant by ‘partyism’: a mass, democratic, multi-tendency party on the basis of a minimum strategic agreement, as opposed to doctrinal unity (the far-left groups) and tactical unity (the broad-front projects). He counterposed the party idea to the overt argument for spontaneism of Phil Neel’s 2025 book, Hellworld, and to the ‘functionalist’ disaggregation of the tasks of a party offered in Salar Mohandesi’s article, ‘The party as articulator’, or Rodrigo Nunes’s 2021 Neither vertical nor horizontal.5
Jon Benson offered, essentially, a narrative of Your Party and its sterilisation by top-down control-freakery, which he characterised as ‘Labourism’; and the various efforts to build proto-branches and other structures, and to promote more democratic opposition formation; the whole being a missed opportunity.
Sylvia McCheyne gave an introduction to the Ebb/Prometheus project, in which she is involved, having started from the Ebb side; their common approach involving “no compromises with chauvinism”, but also pushing towards the ‘merger formula’ (merger of socialism and the workers’ movement), the maximum/minimum programme, and the need to break with the endless series of quick fixes. There is a need to develop a ‘state within a state’ approach, like Gary P Steenson’s account of the SPD, and a radical culture, like Vernon Lidtke’s discussion of SPD culture; but with the recognition of the diversity of the modern working class.
Anahita Zardoshti saw YP as having given a “practical education in party building”, albeit negative in outcome. The central takeaway was the necessity of democracy; but democracy is insufficient without a revolutionary programme. Her experience in the Islington proto-branch was that there was a real attempt to go beyond a merely electoral machine; but the centre had deliberately set out to make it difficult to act. It is necessary to recognise the fundamental difficulty of having revolutionaries and reformists in the same party. Fighting over democracy contributed to depoliticisation. The movementist left brings urgency to the table, but lacks accountability; the revolutionary left is organised by rigid and inward-looking dogma. We were right to intervene in Your Party, but the left should stop depending on yet another big leader.
The discussion from the floor and the speakers’ replies to the discussion were brief, and not, I think, very productive. Several speakers, starting with Ian Allinson, maintained the dominant left point of view (originally from the Molinier-Frank tendency in the 1930s) that you must first build a broad ‘class struggle’ party and then seek to build a ‘revolutionary’ party (meaning a larger Trot group) within it. Al Green made the useful point that Jeremy Corbyn and his supporters are not traditional Labourites, but post-Eurocommunist left populists who model themselves on Podemos or La France Insoumise.
From my own point of view, our present task is to build a communist party not at first on a mass scale, but on the scale of the old ‘official’ CPGB. That involves breaking with the Trot model of a ‘revolutionary’ party, which is actually a version of Mikhail Bakunin’s ‘invisible dictatorship’; and also abandoning the idea of first building a mass ‘class struggle party’ before fighting for a ‘revolutionary’ party.
My contribution
In my view, the episode of ‘Your Party’, demonstrated yet again that the division of the far left prevents it from acting effectively in relation to the broad left. On the one hand, the limited unity achieved in the Grassroots Left slate came closer to success in the central executive committee elections than multiple campaigns would have (though its actual victory would fairly clearly have led the Corbyn wing to split the party); on the other hand, it was cobbled together at short notice and did not survive the outcome of the election, and the upshot was merely a prelude to an offensive by the Corbynistas.
This is all the more true in relation to the working class masses. The broad masses cannot take the kaleidoscope of competing small left groups seriously. The underlying reason for this is that the most fundamental objective interest of the working class as a class is in its own united action in spite of disagreements: so that, for example, we do not have separate Protestant and Catholic trade unions. This objective interest is directly opposed by the multiplication of competing groups with very similar communist/socialist/anarchist politics.
Conversely, voluntary choices of relatively small groups to unify can create a ‘snowball effect’. This was the pattern of construction of the mass parties of the Second International, and of the CPGB and CPUSA among other ‘official’ communist parties. It has also been visible - abortively - in more recent unity efforts: the Brazilian Workers’ Party, Rifondazione Comunista, the Scottish Socialist Party, Syriza, Podemos, and - in aspiration if never reaching the level of these others - in Your Party. The same logic is involved. The hope of something unitary is consistent with the objective needs of the proletariat as a class, even if the political platform of the initiative is a dead end (the dead end will appear as collapse rather than as initial failure).
The history shows us that the problem of the splintered far left is a problem of agency, not of structure, or, to put it another way, a problem of subjective choices, not of objective circumstances. Competing small left groups have been equally present and equally paralysing under conditions of mass working class offensives and revolutionary crises. Take, for example, the British, French or Italian far left in the period after 1968, or the Chilean or Argentinian in the same period, or the Portuguese during the 1974-76 revolution. Nor does entry into some mass party solve the problem: consider, for example, the several antagonistic, competing entry groups in the British Labour Party between the 1960s and Socialist Appeal’s recent ‘Healyite turn’ to launch ‘the revolutionary communist party’.
What subjective choices? There are several. Notable are anti-factionalism, and in particular the argument that prolonged faction struggles are a diversion from mass work; far-left versions of managerialism; and diplomacy towards the ‘official’ lefts. There is a series of proof-texts from the classics of Marxism, treated as sacred texts. These are sometimes flatly wrong (thus Trotsky on permanent factions as a ‘scourge’6) or misleading (thus Lenin’s 1902 claim that ‘without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement’7), and sometimes do not mean what current left usage makes them say. I propose in this paper to address only one: a misreading of the text of the Communist manifesto on the relation of communists to other workers’ parties, which produces an ‘anti-sectarianism’ that is, in practice, … sectarian.
The argument is that ‘placing the interests of your group above the interests of the movement as a whole’ or ‘separating yourself from the mass movement’ is the essence of sectarianism. It is the common view, explaining why other groups are sects, of a great many ... sects.
Manifesto
The proof-text of this concept of ‘sectarianism’ is in the English version of the Communist manifesto. The passage is famous, and was already used as an argument against the separate existence of communist parties by Harold Laski in the Labour Party’s 1948 edition of the Manifesto8:
In what relation do the communists stand to the proletarians as a whole? The communists do not form a separate party opposed to the other working class parties.
They have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole.
They do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement.
The communists are distinguished from the other working class parties by this only:
1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality.
2. In the various stages of development, which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.
There is a further passage which is not usually quoted by the advocates of this sort of ‘anti-sectarianism’:
The communists, therefore, are, on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working class parties of every country - that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the lines of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.9
The immediate aim of the communists is the same as that of all other proletarian parties: formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat.
In the first place, in point 2, the reference to “the movement as a whole”, written by Marx and Engels in German, was: “dass sie in den verschiedenen Entwicklungsstufen, welche der Kampf zwischen Proletariat und Bourgeoisie durchläuft, stets das Interesse der Gesamtbewegung vertreten”. Here “the movement as a whole” - the “Gesamtbewegung” - is the ‘movement’ in the sense of historical process as a whole: the dictatorship of the proletariat as the road to communism. It is not the ‘movement’ in the sense in which we speak of ‘the workers’ movement’ or ‘the trade union movement’ in modern English.
Once the whole passage has been quoted, it should be apparent that it is on its face internally contradictory. The communists “do not form a separate party”; yet, on the other hand, the communists “are distinguished from the other working class parties ...” Moreover, the Manifesto is precisely the manifesto commissioned and adopted by the Communist League (in modern terms a distinct party) and section 3, ‘Socialist and communist literature’, is characterised by an excoriating criticism of much of what existed as a socialist movement at the time.
To understand this, we need more context. The Communist League emerged as a tendency which imitated and built on the politics of the left wing of the Chartist movement, attempting to apply this Anglo-American working class politics in the continental European context. The link to Chartism is transparent in the July 17 1846 ‘Address of the German Democratic Communists of Brussels to Mr Feargus O’Connor’, congratulating O’Connor on his election to parliament, and saying:
The contending parties have their respective battle cries forced upon them by their interests and mutual position: the middle class - “extension of commerce by any means whatsoever, and a ministry of Lancashire cotton-lords to carry this out”; the working class - “a democratic reconstruction of the constitution upon the basis of the People’s Charter”, by which the working class will become the ruling class of England.10
The background to the League and the Manifesto in left Chartist politics has been more elaborately discussed, on the basis of full use of the Chartist and related press, by Salvo Mastellone in his 2003 book, Mazzini and Marx.11 Chartism had invented the new idea of a workers’ political movement, founded on a short summary statement of principles with the six points of the People’s Charter (1838). The organisational form of the movement remained that of the existing Whig and Tory parties - loosely associated local clubs and groups.
Chartists
Section 4 of the Manifesto, ‘Position of the communists in relation to the various existing opposition parties’, begins with the statement that “Section 2 has made clear the relations of the communists to the existing working class parties, such as the Chartists in England and the agrarian reformers [National Reform Movement] in America.” These were closely connected movements.12 No other party is characterised as an “existing working class party”, not even the Réformistes or ‘Social Democrats’ around Alexandre Ledru-Rollin and Louis Blanc in France - a group to which the Manifesto gives partial critical support. The “existing working class parties” means only the Chartists in England and their US counterparts.
With this, the meaning of the contradiction in section 2 becomes clear. The communists do not form a party opposed to (gegenüber in the German) any actual attempt to organise the working class to fight for political action - general laws and constitutional changes - in workers’ (perceived) independent class interests, however weak the politics - and the politics of the National Reform Movement in the US were substantially weaker than those of British left Chartism. On the contrary, they seek to join and build such attempts. They do organise within, but in a manner not dependent on, these movements, with their own manifesto, membership and organisational forms.
They do not take the same attitude to utopian socialist, statist socialist, etc, movements, which do not attempt to organise the working class to fight politically for its independent class interests: even if they give partial critical support, as in the case of the Réformistes, they do form a party gegenüber these parties.
This approach was already present in the 1846 ‘Address’ to O’Connor. The case for political action of the proletariat - common action at the level of ‘high politics’ - takes a wide variety of concrete forms in the political practice of Marx, Engels and their co-thinkers, but it is the persistent thread which links all these practices together. It is this perspective which Marx and Engels inherited from left Chartism, and which split the ‘Marxists’ from the ‘Bakuninists’ in 1870-71. It is the class intervention at the level of ‘high politics’ which is the point of a party, as opposed to a strike committee, a trade union or a cooperative.13
Effects
The problem with the misreading of the Manifesto to form a proof-text for the claim that sectarianism is separation from the mass movement (in the modern sense of ‘movement’) is that it at once poses two questions. First, what is ‘the movement’ which we must not separate ourselves from? On the one hand, the concept points towards jumping in to tail-end whatever seems to move; on the other, groups can quite legitimately disagree as to whether, for example, the anti-war movement, or the trade unions, or the Labour Party are ‘the movement’ in relation to which separation is sectarian.
Second, how are the communists to connect to ‘the movement’ in order to avoid sectarianism? This is a matter of pure tactics. But on the test set by the misreading of the Manifesto, every tactical disagreement on these questions proves that you are a sectarian. Because your opponents are sectarians, to split from them is to unite yourself with the movement …
In particular, Laski himself received from Clement Attlee the famous put-down that “a period of silence on your part would be welcome”.14 The demand for silence from leftists as a condition for unity - or for politeness in expressing disagreements (meaning toning them down to remain consistent with the right wing staying in charge) - has been a persistent demand, going back to part of the SPD leadership’s temporary boycott campaign against Engels over the publication of the Critique of the Gotha programme15 and to Heinrich Cunow’s criticism of Rosa Luxemburg’s ‘not party-comradely’ attacks on the party majority in 1914-15.16 Are we, by failing to comply with such demands, being ‘sectarians’ in Manifesto terms? The answer is no; it is only the misreading of the Manifesto which supports such an argument, not the document, as it was written.
I said above, this is merely one among several ‘proof-texts’ which support the endless splintering of the left. It is not, therefore, a positive line. Cleaning out these proof-texts is a matter of necessary political hygiene.
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B Leipold Citizen Marx Princeton NJ 2024.↩︎
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‘Very essence of Marxism’ Weekly Worker March 6 2025: weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/1528/very-essence-of-marxism.↩︎
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F Wilde Revolution as realpolitik: Ernst Meyer (1887-1930) - biography of a KPD chairman Leiden 2025.↩︎
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T Ruskola The unmaking of the Chinese working class: how communism built a capitalist superpower London 2026.↩︎
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Mohandesi: viewpointmag.com/2020/09/04/party-as-articulator; R Nunes Neither vertical nor horizontal London 2021.↩︎
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www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1923/12/faction.htm. This was an unwarranted concession to the rising bureaucracy, reflecting the fact that Trotsky had voted for the condemnation of Miasnikov and for the 1921 ban on factions, so that it was politically difficult for him to oppose the party bosses’ anti-factionalism in a clear way. The discussion of the apparatus as a permanent faction in The Third International after Lenin is still affected by this but less so (see chapter 11: www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1928/3rd/ti07.htm#p2-11).↩︎
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www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/i.htm.↩︎
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Labour Party Communist manifesto: socialist landmark London 1948.↩︎
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In German, den Gang und die allgemeinen Resultate der proletarischen Bewegung - again displaying the point that “movement” here means the historical process, not the momentary aggregate of the existing organisations - “this great movement of ours”.↩︎
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K Marx and F Engels CW Vol 6, p59 (originally from The Northern Star No454, July 25 1846).↩︎
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S Mastellone Mazzini and Marx: thoughts upon democracy in Europe Westport 2003.↩︎
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On the link, see the review by Howard B Rock of JL Bronstein’s Land reform and working class experience in Britain and the United States, 1800-1862 (1999): h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=4012; on the Communist League’s attitude to it: K Marx et al, ‘Circular against Kriege’, section 2 (1846): marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1846/05/11.htm.↩︎
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The idea of the importance of a party press is later. The need for workers’ movement papers was well understood from early in the 19th century, as discussed in Stanley Harrison’s 1974 book Poor men’s guardians, and only forgotten through Eurocommunist influence; the idea of a party paper derived from the Sozialdemokrat printed in Switzerland and later London in 1879-90 and smuggled into Germany, which was imitated in the Russian Iskra and in the arguments of Lenin’s What is to be done?↩︎
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en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harold_Laski.↩︎
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Several of Engels’ letters in MECW (vol 49) refer to this.↩︎
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Partei-Zusammenbruch? Ein offenes Wort zum inneren Parteistreit Berlin 1915 (The collapse of the party? An open word on the controversy in the party) p3 (Ben Lewis’s translation).↩︎
