13.11.2025

2,400 years jail threat

Erdoğan’s governing coalition is deeply split and many predict defeat or a new coalition. Meanwhile, Ekrem İmamoğlu, his closest rival, faces a lifetime in prison. Esen Uslu looks at the shifting political alignments

Old Turkish sagas, which tell the stories of long-gone dynasties and states which had vanished after flourishing briefly, generally start with the phrase, ‘Many signs have appeared’, to indicate their impending demise.

Nowadays, the almost quarter-century-long rule of president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seems to be approaching quite quickly to such an inflection point, with many signs having appeared. It seems to me that the end of Erdoğan and the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is near.

Of course, this does not mean that they will leave the political scene. On the contrary, they are fighting tooth and nail to maintain their hold on power. Only this month Istanbul’s jailed mayor, Ekrem İmamoğlu, has been charged with 142 offences. If found guilty the Republican People’s Party (CHP) politician - and leading presidential hopeful - faces a prison sentence that adds up 2,430 years. The charges run into nearly 4,000 pages and range from running a criminal organisation, bribery, embezzlement, money laundering, extortion and tender rigging.

Erdoğan’s coalition that has kept him in power - albeit torn, tattered and roughly stitched together - seems to be nearing the end of its usefulness. Forming a new coalition is the order of the day.

The main split is between the AKP and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which has supported Erdoğan through thick and thin, and has been amply rewarded for its loyalty. In recent months the speeches of leading MHP members have contained ambiguous and convoluted phrases, not unnoticed by seasoned observers.

Tensions reached a new level when the MHP declined to attend the October 29 Republican Day celebrations held at Erdoğan’s court, despite being invited. Neither MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli nor any other party member attended - this had never previously happened in the past decade. Nor did they participate in any other activities during the day of festivities. In recent years, to demonstrate the strength of the AKP-MHP relationship to friends and enemies alike, they used to exchange special gifts. This year MHP had an art piece prepared, containing a composition of the Turkish flag and presidential seal, but Bahçeli did not present it to Erdoğan.

Cyprus

As the drift became more apparent, speculation about the reason behind it became rife in the press. One of their recent disagreements concerned how and why the October 19 Northern Cyprus presidential elections were lost, after the all-out effort to ensure the incumbent won. Despite all that, Turkey’s candidate received only 36% of the vote, while the opposition candidate received 63%.

The election outcome surprised everyone, and Bahçeli responded by calling for Northern Cyprus to be annexed to the Turkish state forthwith, while Erdoğan coolly congratulated the elected president. Erdoğan had previously worked with the victorious candidates in 2005-10 and 2015-20 and is quite familiar with the limited impact of their presidency on major political issues. He even presided over the 2004 referendum on the Kofi Annan plan for a united Cyprus, which the Turkish side accepted and the Greek side refused.

Therefore, Erdoğan may attempt to use this position to improve Turkey’s relations with European powers.

Istanbul

However, this does not hide the fact that the AKP failed to win the 2023 general election outright. A body blow for Erdoğan’s prestige. This failure followed three successive election losses to İmamoğlu and the CHP in Istanbul. His arrest being met with CHP outrage and mass demonstrations across Turkey. Many went beyond CHP control and took on a life of their own (but, like the Gazi Park protests in 2013, they were uncoordinated and soon fizzled out). Amongst the charges İmamoğlu faces include faking his university degree, which could lead to him being barred from running for president. Indeed there appear to be moves afoot to ban the CHP - denied by the Istanbul prosecutor’s office.

Note, CHP was once Turkey’s ‘natural party of government’. Founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the father of modern Turkey, in September 1919, it is the country’s oldest political party. Today it is an associate member of the Party of European Socialists and a member of the Socialist International. That means being pro-EU and pro-Nato … in other words it is for the moment out of tune with Donald Trump’s new world order.

Meanwhile, it is, though, perfectly understandable why Erdoğan is trying to maintain the current coalition until conditions are right for a new one, in order to secure yet another electoral victory. Erdoğan is attempting to pull together smaller parties that have emerged from the AKP following previous election failures. This is the crux of politics for the immediate future.

Kurds

What will the Kurdish freedom movement do? The AKP and Erdoğan have recently attempted to subdue it by setting up a parliamentary commission, but for almost six months the government has not taken any practical or positive action. After endless talks and taking the opinions of various groups into account, the commission is now considering ways to delay further progress.

Bahçeli and the MHP are calling for a small committee to be elected from the commission to visit the Kurdish leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in Imrali prison. The AKP and Erdoğan were non-committal. CHP seems to be supporting the idea. So, in the near future we may witness yet another first: a parliamentary committee comprising representatives from all parties talking directly to Öcalan.

Bahçeli is keen to push the idea forward. He has referred to Öcalan as the “founding leader” several times. This is quite a change from calling him a “mass murderer”, a “baby killer” and the “chief of terrorists”, whenever Bahçeli et al were obliged to talk about him. However, the AKP and CHP have not improved their rhetoric about their opponents and still use the old statist-nationalist jargon.

Another important aspect of these deteriorating relations is that corruption investigations - especially those into illegal betting and the misuse of state funds - have started to touch on circles that have been under the protection of the MHP. While the MHP has shown token opposition to the misuse of the judiciary by Erdoğan to crush the CHP - especially by preventing them from working in municipalities - the party’s displeasure has become more apparent, now that the same powers have been turned against their own protégés.

The MHP has demanded a high price for supporting Erdoğan’s continued rule, and has now become more difficult to satisfy. As it has become the unruly partner of the coalition in the eyes of public opinion, a partnership with the pro-Kurdish People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) now appears more attractive to it. Their price is clearly the freeing of Abdullah Öcalan and agreed provisions for former PKK fighters to integrate into ‘normal’ political life in Turkey.

As Erdoğan needs time to form the next coalition and cling on to power, he will continue to court both far-right Turkish chauvinists and Kurdish freedom movement simultaneously - just as he has done in international relations. By joining the US in Syria and improving its relations with some Muslim countries, he was able to abandon Russian support and reach an £8 billion deal with the UK for buying those 20 Typhoon fighter jets.

As government inactivity seemed to stall the peace process, the Kurdish freedom movement made a further bold move. It declared that its forces had withdrawn from Turkey and the border areas. Erdoğan was now forced to accept this step and directed the chief of the National Intelligence Agency and the military intelligence service to monitor developments and submit a report to the commission. He coined a new term for the Kurdish freedom movement in its current state: a “dissolved terrorist organisation” (PKK, the Kurdish Workers Party, formally dissolved in May 2025 following a historic call from Öcalan).

Europe

Erdoğan reluctantly came to support Bahçeli’s position of allowing a committee elected from the commission to visit Imralı prison and meet Öcalan face to face. He also praised Bahçeli for this support in an attempt to defuse tensions. However, Bahçeli is pressing on with his demand for the release of former CHP leader Selahattin Demirtaş, who recently received a favourable ruling from the European Court of Human Rights. Erdoğan and the AKP are not willing to fulfil the ECHR’s orders, especially as they are very keen to keep CHP mayors and other politicians in prison on trumped-up charges brought by members of the judiciary whom he has selected and appointed over the years.

It would not be surprising, however, if some Kurdish prisoners are released, while CHP mayors and other left-wing intellectuals remain imprisoned.

Ultimately, the old adage is true: it is not advisable to change horses while crossing a river. Erdoğan and AKP know that they will soon have to cross the Rubicon - the point of no return. The Kurdish peace process, with its links to northern Iraq and northern Syria, must be addressed. There is no turning back. So, when the accumulated signs appear, the end is nigh. However, will it be a total collapse of the coalition, or will a new coalition be formed quickly to keep all interested parties together and maintain stability?

While the AKP and Erdoğan are not in an enviable position, the Kurds may have no choice but to accept the situation in order to avoid jeopardising the peace process.