03.07.2025
Looking back at the 12-day war
People rallied in defence of the country, not the regime. They complain about the lack of preparation, the incompetence and the shortages. Meanwhile, says Yassamine Mather, the foreign media remains clueless
As we enter the second week of a fragile ceasefire between Iran and US-Israeli aggressors, the G7 foreign ministers have issued a joint statement, calling for the immediate “resumption of negotiations, resulting in a comprehensive, verifiable and durable agreement that addresses Iran’s nuclear programme”. This is in the context of negotiations between Iran and the US that have been ongoing for a few months.
Contradicting the G7’s call, Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi stated in an interview with CBS that he does not expect talks between Iran and the US to restart any time soon. There are good reasons for this reluctance. Iranian officials believe they were duped by the Trump administration - while US special envoy Steve Witkoff was talking to them in Oman and Rome, Israel was preparing for war and the US administration was well aware of this. Of course, Trump’s narrative is that he had given a 60-day ultimatum to Iran and the Israeli attack took place on the 61st day!
Irrespective of such squabbles, no-one can doubt the cooperation between the US and its regional ally, Israel, regarding the execution and timing of the Israeli attack.
As damaging as the war was for Iran, it could have lasted longer and become far worse. On the last night before the ceasefire, many feared the worst - until it became clear that Iran’s attack on US bases in Qatar had been meticulously choreographed. Not only was a warning issued, but the US military was also informed in advance, allowing civilians and personnel to evacuate targeted bases.
While some missiles penetrated Israel’s defences, the main conclusion at the end of the 12-day war is that Iran’s air defence capabilities have been damaged considerably. If another attack occurs, Iran’s ability to defend itself will be significantly diminished.
When it comes to nuclear installations, Trump insists Iran’s nuclear programme is now destroyed. If that is correct, the US and Israel will need new excuses for another war. Of course, no-one in their right mind should think the current conflict was about nuclear enrichment. However, if we assume that was the case, as the media keep telling us, and if Trump is correct that Iran’s nuclear programme has been “obliterated”, what is there to discuss?
On the other hand, the International Atomic Energy Agency and leaked documents from the CIA contradict the repeated claims of ‘obliteration’ made by Trump and his ministers.
The IAEA claims Iran is months away from restoring its pre-war nuclear capacity. Some speculate centrifuges were moved, as radiation levels remain undetectable. Satellite imagery confirms surface damage, but the full extent is unclear.
Strategic outcome
Inside Iran we are witnessing a nationalist surge, with huge crowds gathering in Tehran for rallies. After rumours about his death or illness, Khamenei appeared in a pre-recorded speech from a bunker, obviously signalling heightened security concerns.
Both Israel and Iran accuse each other of espionage. However, evidence suggests the location of many Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders and scientists assassinated by Israeli drones was pinpointed by electronic detection (eg, hacked phones) rather than human spies. The government’s internet shutdown worsened the crisis, cutting off access to warnings and foreign communication.
For the past two weeks, many Iranians have been torn between conflicting feelings: a duty to protect their homeland versus a profound aversion to the ruling regime. Yet for the moment they have united not to defend the government, but their country, and to ensure mutual support. Reports describe a strong sense of solidarity that has arisen among the populace.
People in rural communities have opened their homes to those escaping the bombing of urban centres. Some shopkeepers have offered essential items below standard prices, and neighbours have checked in on each other to see if assistance is needed.
Nonetheless, many citizens recognise that Israel was aiming for regime change - an outcome also sought by numerous Iranians. Still, the majority of Iranians differentiate between internally driven change and that which is orchestrated and enforced externally.
As tensions escalated during the latest round of conflict, Iranian civilians found themselves caught between external threats and internal unpreparedness. One of the starkest expressions of this came in a widespread public outcry over the absence of any basic civil defence infrastructure. Social media were flooded with posts asking, “Why are there no bomb shelters in Tehran?” and “Where are the sirens to warn us?” - questions that reflected decades of neglect in public safety planning. The government’s response was inadequate: officials half-heartedly pointed to Tehran’s metro system as a potential shelter network, yet many of these stations remained locked at night, lacked water or ventilation systems, and had no trained personnel for emergencies.
Adding to the chaos were cyberattacks and widespread internet disruptions, including what appeared to be deliberate blackouts. Multiple banks experienced brief outages and were rumoured to be hacked, prompting panic-driven bank runs in several cities. The Central Bank of Iran issued vague statements urging calm and denying systemic risk, but their reassurances - phrased in boilerplate language like “The situation is under full control” - only fuelled public scepticism.
The panic has been further intensified by external pressure. Donald Trump’s ominous social media warning to - “Leave Tehran now” - was widely interpreted as a signal of impending US military action. The Iranian government was thrust into a lose-lose dilemma: ordering evacuations would signal internal instability and validate foreign threats, while maintaining the status quo risked civilian lives. They chose silence - a decision that led to confusion and fear. Rumours swirled across Tehran and other major cities about potential bombings, drone strikes, and targeted attacks - none of which were officially addressed.
Deeper crisis
This paralysis of the state highlighted a deeper crisis of legitimacy. Decades of economic mismanagement, sanctions and repression had already completely eroded public trust. The recent failure to protect civilians - not just from foreign threats, but from the consequences of the state’s own opacity - amplified the sense of abandonment. As one Iranian journalist put it bluntly, “The government can shoot protesters, but it can’t protect its own people from a drone strike or a blackout.”
Writing in New Lines, Asef Bayat summed up what many of us have heard from friends and relatives in the last few days:
Many of Tehran’s residents sought refuge in nearby towns and villages or in the northern provinces of Gilan and Mazandaran along the Caspian Sea, leaving behind their homes, jobs and everyday routines. But most stayed. Not only because they could not afford to leave, but because they felt a responsibility to protect their city ... During the two-week war with Israel, stories of resilience, mutual care and quiet heroism abounded once again …
A woman posted on social media that she refused to leave Tehran - but offered to help the elderly and sick, to bring groceries or simply call to check in. Many joined her. When someone posted a plea for medicine, dozens responded. A car mechanic rode his motorbike across the city, helping stranded drivers on their way to safety. And a restaurant in Shahryar - my old rural district outside Tehran - announced it would serve free meals to a thousand people every night for as long as the war continued.1
They say truth is the first victim of war; we could say that is also the case when conflict continues after a ceasefire. In the case of the US-Israel war against Iran you have the additional complexity of media outlets financed and therefore managed by warring regimes.
We had little expectation when it came to the state media in Iran or the Mossad-financed, Persian-speaking media. However, in some ways they are less of a danger, as their commentary is so obviously biased - no-one in their right mind takes them seriously. The real danger comes from media outlets claiming to be impartial, including the BBC World Service, financed by the British government’s foreign office.
Here I am not talking of David Lammy, who is clearly incapable of making head or tail of things when it comes to the complexities of a Middle Eastern war. I am talking about seasoned experts, professional civil servants with expertise on the Middle East. Here the message they want to spread comes across with more subtlety, repeated by editors and journalists who might repeat the ‘line’ either in complete ignorance, or because their jobs and indeed the continued operation of their channel depend on following it.
The US agenda is to downgrade and weaken Iran, in order to counter Iran’s Islamic Republic’s gains on the Arab street. So in the days immediately after the ceasefire, BBC World Service was giving lots of coverage to two stories. Firstly, relatives of BBC Persian staff are facing intimidation in Iran. I am sure they are, but there is nothing new here; those of us who opposed the Islamic Republic as members of leftwing organisations are very familiar with such stories - it isn’t exactly news. Of course, some of those BBC Persian staff were collaborating with Islamic Republic media outlets when threats against some leftwing activists in exile started in the 1970s (I can’t remember any of them expressing any concern).
The second story repeated endlessly is that the Islamic Republic will kill hundreds of political prisoners as revenge for the war. I am sure it is capable of such atrocities, but so far there is no sign of it. So why are you propagating this story? It might not happen, as this regime is keen to survive and such an action would be suicidal at this stage.
So far it is the Israeli air force that, far from ‘saving’ Iran’s political prisoners, has managed to kill them. On June 23 airstrikes targeted Tehran’s Evin prison - known for housing political prisoners and foreign nationals. The attack resulted in at least 71 fatalities, including staff, nearby civilians, as well as prisoners and visiting family members. We know of two female political prisoners killed.
Regime change
It is quite clear that, after this new wave of nationalism, regime-change candidates relying on foreign military intervention are facing a humiliating defeat. According to one former ally of Reza Pahlavi (the ex-shah’s son), who remains an ardent supporter of Israeli Zionism, the 12-day war “has delayed regime change by 15 years”. She blames Israel’s timing of the attack and the fact that it was not coordinated with the opposition for its failure.
In the meantime, Reza Pahlavi, whose campaign in support of the IDF burst like a balloon in the first hours of the war, continues to meet rightwing politicians in Europe - Nigel Farage being the latest in a long list.
Last week, more as an exercise and for the sake of deluded reporters in the Persian-speaking exiled media, I asked several AI tools if “Reza Pahlavi was a serious alternative for regime change in Iran”, asking them to answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Elon Musk’s X, ChatGPT and DeepSeek all came out with a straightforward ‘No’, with the response on DeepSeek reading: “Reza Pahlavi lacks the consolidated support, viable movement and internal influence necessary to be considered a serious, practical alternative for regime change at this time.”
For the time being, the ceasefire is holding; however, in Iran most people are expecting new air raids. The regime has survived, but it has been weakened by 12 days of relentless bombing. Iran’s airspace is even more vulnerable than it was before. True, Iranians have rallied to support their country, but they have not changed their mind about this unpopular, corrupt regime.
Questions also remain about the economic cost of punitive sanctions imposed by the US and its allies regarding the country’s nuclear and ballistic programmes, and about the regime’s inability to defend its population.
Few in Iran believe the government propaganda that its forces were ‘victorious’ in this war. Internal conflicts continue within the many factions of the regime, with each group blaming opponents for the failures during the war. Meanwhile, the ‘reformist’ president, Masoud Pezeshkian, and his cabinet are keen to pursue a policy of tolerance of social behaviour to maintain ‘national unity’ (hardliners want a return to the ‘good old days’ of the Raisi presidency, imposing strict restrictions on social and political life).
Meanwhile, the left in exile is as lost as ever, continuing to predict imminent collapse of the regime without presenting a coherent programme for the working class.
In the midst of all this uncertainty we also have to see what Trump and Netanyahu will do to further degrade the Islamic regime.