03.04.2025
Escalation on the cards
After the exchange of letters, maximum pressure sanctions and the almost comical revelations of ‘Signalgate’, Yassamine Mather warns that Trump might soon give the green light for a punishment war against Iran
The constant toing and froing in the Iran-US conflict over the last few weeks has once again raised the possibility of war. It all started with Donald Trump’s letter to Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei in early March, trying to negotiate a new agreement with Tehran to limit its fast-growing nuclear programme, and replacing the deal he pulled the US out of during his first term.
On the day he sent the letter he claimed: “We have a situation with Iran that something’s going to happen very soon. Very, very soon. Hopefully, we can have a peace deal, I am not speaking out of strength or weakness. I am just saying I would rather see a peace deal than the other. But the other will solve the problem.”
In the era of instant messaging and the internet, the letter took more than a week to reach Tehran - presumably because the content was to remain secret. More than three weeks later, the exact content of the letter remains unknown, although there have been several alleged leaks. One thing is clear though: Trump has promised economic and political rapprochement if Iran ends or reduces its nuclear programme and stops supporting what the US claims to be its ‘proxies’.
According to Iranian officials, the written reply by ayatollah Khamenei himself was sent on March 30. It is assumed a letter was delivered to Oman’s representative, reflecting Iran’s choice of Oman as a long-standing intermediary, rather than the United Arab Emirates - a country that has normalised diplomatic ties with Israel. While Tehran has rejected ‘direct negotiations’, it is clear that the supreme leader favours negotiations via a third party.
On the same day, Khamenei told crowds gathered for Eid Fitr (end of Ramadan) that “external actors were threatening the country with malicious acts”. However, he downplayed the likelihood of open aggression, claiming that any external intervention would result in a “devastating blow to the perpetrator”. On the same day, Trump repeated threats of military action if diplomacy fails to secure a new nuclear deal.
The response to Trump’s threats came from brigadier general Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards’ aerospace force: “Someone in glass houses does not throw stones at anyone.” He added: “The Americans have at least 10 bases with 50,000 troops in the region, meaning they are sitting in a glass house.”
Before we look at the potential risks of another war in the Middle East, it is essential to remember that Iran’s nuclear bases are mainly installed underground and last week the country unveiled an underground ‘missile city’. I have not watched the full propaganda video, but, according to the website of the ‘Foundation for Defence of Democracies” (FDD), the Iranian government “showcased multiple types of medium-range ballistic missiles”. The video also showed a land attack cruise missile, some of which had “featured in the April and October 2024 Iranian missile attacks against Israel”.1
In the same article, Ryan Brobst a senior research analyst in FDD, tells us:
While the United States and Israel have demonstrated an impressive ability to shoot down Iranian ballistic missiles, the depletion of interceptors remains a risk. The Pentagon should ensure that any troops sent into harm’s way deploy alongside air defences to protect them against Iranian attacks, whether conducted by ballistic missiles, cruise missiles or drones. The deep craters and destroyed sleeping quarters at Al-Asad Airbase after Iran’s 2020 attack should serve as a potent reminder of the dangers facing US forces.
Given a punishment war - there will be no ground invasion - we should expect the sustained use of bunker-buster bombs, such as the precision-guided 30,000-pound GBU-57, presumably delivered by US B-2 stealth bombers (they can carry two of them). Such bombs are designed to penetrate layers and rock, steel and concrete. The USAF only has 20 of these hugely sophisticated aircraft - ominously six of them openly on display on Diego Garcia. In the last few months the USAF has used them against underground Houthi targets in northern Yemen. Israel, of course, has no such planes.
US-EU conflict
Meanwhile, European Union leaders have been reminded of the significant economic losses they incurred after severing ties with Iran. These followed the EU’s failure to uphold commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, when member-states directed their banking, industrial and financial sectors to cut off engagement. Of course, European countries would have faced secondary sanctions by the US, had they continued economic deals with the Islamic Republic.
When it comes to Ukraine, Iranian state television and radio have covered the Oval Office meeting between Ukrainian president Vladimir Zelensky and Donald Trump and JD Vance, relaying the facts, while emphasising Zelensky’s “humiliation.”
The coverage also highlighted Russian reactions to the dispute, quoting former president Dmitry Medvedev’s remark that Zelensky had been “slapped hard” and foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova’s accusation that Zelensky’s claim of Kyiv being “alone” in 2022 was the “biggest lie”. The hard-line Tasnim News Agency, affiliated to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, echoed this narrative, framing the event as “Russia’s delight and Europe’s anger” over Zelensky’s treatment.
Iranian newspapers seized the opportunity to critique US diplomacy. The state-aligned Jaam-e Jam daily portrayed Zelensky’s reported “expulsion” from the White House as emblematic of Washington’s “unreliability.” Hard-line news agencies Student News Network and Fars repeated this line, with the former calling the confrontation a “historical lesson on why trusting America is a mistake”. Fars specifically targeted advocates of direct US-Iran negotiations, insisting that the supreme leader’s insistence on indirect talks with Washington was the right approach. Khamenei had reiterated his stance in February after Trump reinstated “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran.
Iranian ‘reformist’ figures, including former vice-president Mohammad Ali Abtahi, also cautioned against directly engaging with Trump, with Abtahi posing a rhetorical scenario: “Imagine president Pezeshkian sitting across from him [and facing similar treatment].” The debate underscores ongoing tensions within Iran’s political landscape, as Pezeshkian (often described as a moderate) faces hard-line resistance to any US engagement amid renewed sanctions.
Two articles
Last week a significant security breach dubbed ‘Signalgate’ erupted after The Atlantic published two articles by American journalist Jeffrey Goldberg. These revealed confidential discussions involving senior US officials, including Vance.
The breach originated when Goldberg was accidentally added to a restricted communications group, granting him unauthorised access to classified operational plans such as US bombing strategies, drone strike protocols and target selection data. The lapse intensified scrutiny over the government’s reliance on unsecured platforms and its protocols for safeguarding sensitive information.
Internationally, the disclosure of military intelligence has damaged diplomatic trust, with allies questioning US operational security. Critics argue that the administration’s defensive posture - prioritising damage control over systemic reforms - has exacerbated the crisis.
Iran has inevitably joined the fray. Foreign minister Abbas Araghchi wrote on X: “People around the globe - including Americans - now see how US officials look at world affairs. Some highlight severe incompetence and, more importantly, total disregard for human life in decision-making.”
There is another reason to take the recent political overtures with a huge grain of salt. Iran’s leaders are hoping that the regional consequences of a Iran-US war will deter the Trump administration from launching a military attack. In my opinion, they are mistaken, as the Trump administration is not exactly known for acting with caution. However, it is important to consider these risks:
-
Escalating regional instability in the Middle East:
Iraq - Likely to re-emerge as a primary conflict zone. With continued US military presence and Iran’s entrenched influence over Shiite militias, confrontations, proxy warfare and widespread destabilisation are anticipated.
Syria and Lebanon - A risk of renewed escalation. Iran-aligned groups, such as Hezbollah, could renew strikes against Israeli or US targets, potentially triggering broader regional hostilities.
Yemen - The conflict may escalate further, with Iran-supported Houthi forces expanding attacks on Gulf states and US-linked infrastructure.
-
Global energy markets at risk:
The Strait of Hormuz - a critical chokepoint for 20% of the global oil trade - faces heightened risks of disruption via blockades or assaults. Such events would trigger immediate oil price surges, destabilising economies worldwide. US allies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE could face retaliatory strikes from Iran or its allies, jeopardising their oil production and export capabilities.
-
Surge in proxy warfare and asymmetric threats:
Iran’s regional supporters (I refuse to call them ‘proxies’) - including Haste Shaabi, Kataib Hezbollah (Iraq), Hezbollah (Lebanon) and the Houthis (Yemen) - are poised to mobilise. Attacks on US diplomatic missions, military installations and allied nations would likely escalate.
-
Israeli military engagement:
Israel could enter the conflict if directly targeted by Hezbollah rocket attacks or Iranian missile strikes. A multi-front war involving Israel, Hezbollah and potentially Iran would exacerbate instability, spilling over into Palestinian territories, Jordan and Egypt.
-
Humanitarian catastrophe:
Civilian populations in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Iran would endure intensified bombardment, resource shortages and mass displacement. Refugee crises would worsen, straining neighbouring states like Turkey and Jordan, with ripple effects reaching Europe.
Iran is hoping it can exploit perceived US isolation (eg, European resistance to Trump-era confrontational tactics) to erode international adherence to sanctions. However, the EU’s antagonism with China and Iran’s close association with Brics might hamper such plans.
We can envisage several scenarios. For example, the current stalemate might be maintained. Although this looks unlikely, it could be that the continuation of the war in Ukraine, the situation in Gaza and the economic consequences of tariff wars will delay a war on Iran: we have witnessed an extended deadlock, marked by intermittent clashes (cyber operations, maritime confrontations, etc), but without large-scale escalation.
There is a possibility that, faced with crippling sanctions and war, leaders of the Islamic regime, known for their pragmatism, will accept some of Trump’s demands - we currently have a temporary negotiated resolution, which has been helped by indirect diplomacy, facilitated by EU/Omani mediators.
We might witness targeted military action to force Iran to accept all of Trump’s demands: eg, a limited US strike (against nuclear infrastructure, say), provoking calibrated Iranian retaliation, although this scenario might escalate into regional conflict.
The US administration is also relying on internal collapse: intensified US sanctions could well worsen Iran’s economic crisis, encouraging mass protests that threaten the regime’s stability.