06.02.2025
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Firewall and hot air
Migration is the number one issue. While almost all parties are marching to the right ahead of the February 23 general election, Die Linke’s slight move to the left might well justify a critical vote, argues Carla Roberts
If you want to know how fragile international capitalism currently is, just look at Germany. Europe’s power house is seriously creaking and likely to go into recession (defined as a fall in gross domestic product in two successive quarters). GDP contracted by 0.2% in the last three months of 2024 and a similar result is expected for the first quarter in 2025. Mass layoffs, including in the mighty German car industry, have shaken the country - and more is to come if Donald Trump’s tariffs are really imposed.
Politics is in flux too. The German ‘centre ground’ - symbolised by the Mutti der Nation (‘mother of the nation’), former chancellor Angela Merkel and her famous political ‘flexibility’ - has dramatically shifted to the right in the last couple of years, with almost all political parties joining in the increasingly brutal attempt to blame refugees and migrants for the economic malaise. They seem to want to outdo the increasingly popular far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). Merkel’s decision in 2015 to allow a million Syrian refugees to settle in Germany - hailed as a great success by everybody at the time, especially companies looking for cheap labour - is now universally seen as the ‘worst decision ever’.
Sahra Wagenknecht, leader of the ‘left’ breakaway party, the BSW (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht), has been doing her best to keep up and stop the slide of the BSW in the polls (currently at around 4% - down from a massive 20% just after its launch), by proposing in the last couple of days a national referendum on the migration question, which, she hopes, would limit annual numbers to a “manageable” 50,000.1 For reference, in 2024 there were 250,000 people who applied for asylum, plus another 175,000 actual migrants. As one of the cleverest and best-educated people in politics, Wagenknecht knows very well that, at a federal level, the constitution allows for binding referendums for only two purposes: changing the constitution and the creation or restructuring of states. It was nothing but a cheap and nasty PR stunt.
As all this demonstrates, the February 23 federal election looks as though it will be dominated by one issue alone: migration. The results will have worldwide implications, especially if Germany makes serious moves to build a ‘fortress Europe’. The climate catastrophe, war and increasing inequality will create more and more refugees, but ‘keeping them out’ is clearly not a strategy that can work in the medium or even the short term. Incredibly, only Die Linke now dares cling to yesterday’s common sense - migration is happening, is actually necessary and should be positively welcomed and financially managed, with communes that house refugees receiving adequate support, etc.
The rise of Reform UK (now leading the polls for the first time) shows that this question will become an even bigger issue in Britain too, especially when elections are on the horizon. The Guardian reports that a group of 89 Labour MPs has just been set up to put pressure on Keir Starmer to become “tougher on illegal migration especially” - not because migration as such is a problem, but to “stop the growth of Reform”.2
And it is affecting the left, too: The Socialist Party in England and Wales, for example, argues in the latest issue of The Socialist:
The trade union and workers’ movement should fight against every injustice of the racist immigration laws. Control of decisions about whether or not to grant asylum cannot be left in the hands of a capitalist government. We demand that elected committees of working class people, including from the trade unions and migrants’ organisations, have the right to review asylum cases and grant asylum.3
In other words, they positively favour immigration controls to protect ‘our Britain’, but give it a left spin. A dangerous dead end.
Brandmauer
It has become almost impossible to predict the outcome of the elections. This is unparalleled in a country whose constitution was written after World War II precisely in order to prevent political unpredictability (overseen as it was by the USA).
Just a couple of weeks ago, Friedrich Merz looked like a mere shoo-in for the position of chancellor. Polling consistently around 30% for many months, his conservative Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) were way ahead of the unpopular government coalition of Social Democrats (16%) and Greens (14%), with their junior partner, the Free Democrats (FDP), likely to be kicked out the Bundestag altogether. Newcomer BSW polled at around 20%, while Die Linke looked like it would not get back into parliament either. The big winner is, of course, likely to be the rightwing AfD, which has been polling around 20% of the vote for many months now.
That support has grown somewhat in the last few weeks - and, with every outraged comment by a bourgeois politician, every refusal to invite the AfD to a political chat show and every warning of the danger of ‘fascism’, its support continues to increase.
As an aside, in our view the AfD is not a ‘fascist’ organisation, nor is fascism ‘on the rise’ in Germany, the USA or elsewhere. For a start, there is no unresolved revolutionary situation and no powerful working class movement that prevents the ruling class from ruling in the old way. Capitalism turns to fascist gangs and demagogues in the attempt to save itself. Reform, the AfD, Trumpism, Meloni are certainly an expression of the global rise of rightwing populism and they will no doubt make life extremely miserable for migrants and the working class - but fascism is something else. That does not mean we do not fight those dangerous populists, of course. But we should be clear in our definitions.
Everything in Germany is now up in the air, thanks in a large part to the now world famous political manoeuvre performed by Friedrich Merz, designed to shore up the vote for his CDU. He really should have learned from the FPD’s current dire straits. After all, the early election had only become necessary after the FPD pulled out of the government coalition last year, hoping to boost its own profile by attacking SPD chancellor Olaf Scholz. Instead, the manoeuvre entirely backfired and the FDP has fallen from 11.5% at the 2011 election to around 3.5% in the current polls (which means it would not clear the 5% hurdle required).
Although he probably will not say it publicly, Merz too will no doubt regret his decision to call a number of parliamentary votes to tighten German asylum and migration laws. First proposed in September 2024, the CDU paused its Zustrombegrenzungsgesetz (full title, ‘Law to Limit the Illegal Inflow of Third-Country Nationals to Germany’), when the government coalition of the SPD, Greens and FDP fell apart in November. Speaking in the Bundestag on November 13, Merz promised that, for the last few months of the parliamentary term,
We want to agree with you, the Social Democrats, and you, the Greens, that we will only put decisions on the agenda of the plenary session on which we have previously reached agreement, so that neither in determining the agenda nor in voting on the matter here in the House will there be even a single accidental or actually achieved majority with those of the AfD.4
Merz was basically strengthening the already existing Brandmauer (firewall) that separated ‘respectable’ parties from the far-right.
In 2018, the CDU first took the official position to “reject coalitions and similar forms of cooperation”5 not just with the AfD, but also Die Linke - a position that was also adopted by most political parties and media outlets. Not relying on the AfD to win a vote in parliament is a step up from that - and a promise Merz obviously has come to rue.
Last month, a failed Afghan asylum-seeker awaiting deportation flipped and knifed two people to death, including a two-year old boy. That was enough for Merz to change his mind - he feared being outdone by the AfD in the February elections and wanted to make sure he is seen as the most ruthless, when it comes to keeping out refugees. In his argument for tabling the laws, Merz claimed that they had become necessary to stop “the daily gang rapes from the milieu of asylum-seekers”.6 Media outlets were quick to point out that this is an entirely made up accusation, which could have come straight out of the mouths of the most extreme wing of the AfD milieu.
Five points
On January 29, Merz first presented a ‘five-point plan’ - most of which has already been implemented, including stopping asylum-seekers at the borders if they do not possess “valid entry documents” - which most refugees do not, for one reason or another. That vote achieved a majority of only four votes. AfD voted in favour, as did the Free Democrats and six independent MPs (the BSW abstained on this occasion, with all other parties voting against). Merz ignored criticisms, because he could claim he was not reliant on AfD.
And so he pushed ahead with another vote on January 31, this time presenting the much more detailed Zustrombegrenzungsgesetz, which would bar, for example, family members from joining migrants and refugees in Germany, even if their appeal for asylum was successful or they have otherwise secured the right to live in the country. As an aside, many German politicians have argued that this could not actually be enforced in any case, as it contradicts EU law. I suspect implementation was not the key point in Merz’s mind in any case. It was supposed to be a public relations coup.
Merz knew in advance that he could only hope to win the vote with the support of AfD, as most other parties had announced they would be voting against (apart from the BSW, which proudly announced beforehand that it too would be voting in favour). This time Merz lost by 11 votes, owing to some members of his own fraction voting against.
The very next day, Angela Merkel led the public outrage, making an extremely rare critical statement, in which she called his decision “wrong”.7 Even Bild, the most rightwing paper in Germany, fumes: “That really was not worth it, Herr Merz.”8 The biggest damage so far is the very public exit from the CDU of Michel Friedman, pope of Zionism and former leader of the rightwing Zentralrat der Juden, who the German establishment look to as its ‘spiritual guide’ on all things Israel-related.
Merz has since doubled down on his decision, which is all he could do, so close to the elections. An apology would have been interpreted as weakness, a fatal one perhaps. He is still gambling that some AfD sympathisers will vote for the more ‘respectable’ CDU instead. And, while he has assured the German public (as well as international capitalism) that “We will not work with the AfD - not before the election, not after - never”, he cannot tell AfD MPs how to vote now, can he?
It is highly unlikely that there is going to be a CDU-AfD coalition - at least not in the near future. The blowback in the last few days has been too strong. However, Merz and his colleagues will no doubt be considering the possibility of forming a minority government - quite possibly in a coalition with the eager Green Party and ideally with the FDP - if they manage to get into parliament. Together they could come to around 44%-48% and so would need some of the other parties voting for such a coalition (though, as mentioned above, that could change dramatically in the next couple of weeks).
He will want to avoid bringing the SPD on board, which has - rather unfairly - been blamed for causing the economic problems of the country. SPD chancellor Olaf Scholz does not help himself by refusing to link the exploding costs for energy - one of the key reasons for the slide into recession - to the increasingly unpopular war in Ukraine and the CIA’s blowing up of the Nord Stream pipeline, which would have supplied German industry with cheap gas. One of the key reasons for the success of the AfD - besides its anti-immigration populism - is precisely that it has taken a very strong stand against the Ukraine war and demands that the pipeline be repaired and reopened.
A black-green government coalition might sound strange to those who believe the Green Party in Germany (or elsewhere for that matter) is on the left. But regionally in the 16 federal states, this has been repeatedly tried, tested and found entirely practical. The old fight between ‘Fundis’ und ‘Realos’ has well and truly been won by the latter - the Greens are, for example, the most gung-ho party in the German parliament when it comes to the war in Ukraine, and it was them who pushed for the increase in financial support and weapon deliveries to Zelensky.
In an interview with Bild after the July 31 vote, the current super-realo leader of the Greens, Robert Habeck, confirmed that they continue to be keen to govern with the CDU - and the fact that the Green MPs voted against the law should not be misunderstood as softness towards migrants. He outlined his own party’s “10-point plan to solve the migration crisis”, which contains plans for the “early detection of threats: the initial medical examination of asylum-seekers must now also include tests for mental illnesses”9 (many refugees will no doubt suffer from mental health problems, considering what many of them have gone through in their home country or on their way to Europe). It is unlikely that the Greens want to make sure they receive particularly good healthcare in Germany. No, the obvious plan is to deny those with “mental illness” the right to asylum and send them back.
To reassure its more liberal voters and members, the Green Party and the SPD took part enthusiastically in the mass demonstrations that followed the January 31 vote. More than 700,000 people demonstrated against Merz’s move in various cities across Germany. The main march in Berlin attracted around 250,000 and was led by people carrying large banners that declared, ‘Wir sind die Brandmauer’ (‘We are the firewall’). Not surprisingly, among those participating in the protests named Aufstand der Anständigen (Uprising of the ‘decent’!) - at least those in leading positions - the need to restrict migration and tighten asylum laws has become common sense. Die Linke seems to be the exception. It is now, incredibly, the only party in Germany that has withstood the shift to the right - and has actually moved to the left, at least by a fraction.
A few months ago, it looked like the long-term decline of Die Linke could finally end in what felt like an overdue death. For decades an eager participant in local and regional government coalitions, the party has proven beyond all doubt that it has no qualms when it comes to enforcing budget cuts, slashing public-sector workers’ pay and generally being a loyal servant of capitalism.
In the last few years, under the bureaucratic leadership of Janine Wissler (formerly of Linksruck, the German section of the Socialist Workers Party), Die Linke had tried to take a ‘balanced’ approach to most political questions, including Ukraine and Palestine, so as not to put off either its more conservative Ossi supporters or the more liberal Wessi left. But, rather predictably, it drained support in both camps, especially because Wagenknecht and her supporters were rebelling loudly. When the leadership around Wissler decided not to participate in a huge demonstration against the war in Ukraine, because “some unpleasant elements” around the AfD were expected to attend, the die was cast. Wagenknecht finally left in October 2023, setting up the BSW and reducing Die Linke to about 3% in the polls.
When the new leadership of Ines Schwerdtner and Jan van Aken was elected a year later, they immediately launched a ‘listening exercise’, in which party members visited tens of thousands of households across Germany. Perhaps they really learned something there or perhaps they just needed a timeout to discuss how to reorientate the party - who knows? In any case, they seem to have positioned themselves slightly to the left as a result.
Manifesto
For example, this year’s election manifesto carries the headline, ‘Alle wollen regieren. Wir wollen verändern’ (‘Everybody wants to govern. We want to change things’).10 Further on, it explains that “the millions of people who want real change, you are our coalition partner”. As mentioned above, the idea that you have to be ‘prepared to take over government responsibility’ used to be an absolutely unshakable assumption in Die Linke. So the new line could just be PR waffle, of course, and based on the realistic understanding that the party has been so down in the polls that there is little chance of it being asked to join a government coalition any time soon.
It is an interesting shift nevertheless - and one that seems to be having its effect in the polls too (Die Linke has gone from 3% to 6%), especially as it is now the only party stating it is “in solidarity” with refugees: “Nobody flees their home voluntarily.” It defines itself as an “internationalist” party of “democratic socialism” that discusses in its programme how to “overcome capitalism and the class system”. Yes, that has been in the programme for some time and expresses a softness for Venezuela, Cuba, as well as Brics (which it shares with the BSW). But, unlike the BSW, at least it does use the word “socialism”, which is not to be found on the entire BSW website - they are fans of “social justice” instead.
BSW is focused on what is good for “all of Germany”: “It will soon be decided whether Germany will continue to belong to the league of leading industrial nations or whether it will irrevocably decline, because it loses important industries and thus the basis of its prosperity.” If capitalism does well, this trickles down to the working class, right? The BSW programme smacks of the kind of nationalism espoused by George Galloway. Like his Workers’ Party of Britain, Wagenknecht’s BSW wants “safe streets and squares, through more police officers and a stop to irregular migration”.11
Yes, on the question of Ukraine, BSW is slightly better than Die Linke. While both explicitly call for an end to German weapons exports, only BSW opposes sanctions. Die Linke continues to call rather naively for “more targeted sanctions that are not directed against the population, but against Putin’s power apparatus and the military-industrial complex”. Both are opposed to Nato, but instead of arguing that Germany should leave, or that it should be abolished, both are arguing in a rather convoluted way that it should be replaced with a “truly peaceful” alliance that includes China and Russia, which means it would become superfluous. Neither shows any understanding that “war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means” (Carl von Clausewitz).
On the question of Israel-Palestine, both parties are equally useless. While Die Linke calls for “a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders”, it does not address the question of the right of return and, like BSW, falls in with the illusion of a ‘viable two-state solution’. Both condemn Israel and Hamas’s October 7 prison break in equal measure. Neither party stands up to the increasingly brutal attempts to criminalise anybody who raises criticism of Israel. Just like in Britain, the German state has made full use of the big lie that it is anti-Semitic to criticise Zionism and Israel, charging many with terror offences.
But there is one final and important difference: despite its many problems, Die Linke remains a relatively democratic organisation that allows members to organise openly and in permanent factions. Repeated attempts to abolish them have always been defeated.
BSW, on the other hand, acts as Sahra Wagenknecht’s private fan club (as the name shows). You cannot actually join the BSW - though you are more than welcome to hand out leaflets, put up posters and become “a supporter” (give money). Its two ‘national party conferences’ were made up of hand-picked supporters known to Wagenknecht and the other nine BSW MPs. There is no internal democracy, no space to challenge the programme, no avenue to hold BSW MPs to account for their voting record. It is, in that respect, much worse even than the Workers’ Party of Britain.
And, as this is now clearly an election fought over the issue of migration, Wagenknecht’s chauvinist-populist proposal to cap migration at 50,000 - in effect, a reduction of almost 90% - BSW has in our opinion become entirely unsupportable and we call on socialists in Germany to vote Die Linke, albeit critically and without any illusions.
It is quite obviously not the kind of party that is needed to effectively challenge and overcome capitalism. But in the current period, its MPs are the only ones who are putting up any kind of opposition to the rightwing stampede in parliament.
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www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/deutschland/wagenknecht-volksabstimmung-migration-bsw-100.html.↩︎
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www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/feb/04/group-of-labour-mps-urge-no-10-to-be-tougher-on-migration-to-fend-off-threat-from-reform.↩︎
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www.socialistparty.org.uk/articles/135087/29-01-2025/what-do-socialists-say-about-immigration.↩︎
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www.buero-bundeskanzlerin-ad.de/erklaerungen/erklaerung-von-bundeskanzlerin-a-d-dr-angela-merkel-zur-abstimmung-im-.↩︎
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archiv.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/dokumente/cdu_deutschlands_unsere_haltung_zu_linkspartei_und_afd_0.pdf?file=1.↩︎
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www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/merz-behauptung-im-faktencheck-tagliche-gruppenvergewaltigungen-von-asylbewerbern-13127299.html.↩︎
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www.buero-bundeskanzlerin-ad.de/erklaerungen/erklaerung-von-bundeskanzlerin-a-d-dr-angela-merkel-zur-abstimmung-im-.↩︎
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www.bild.de/politik/inland/gegenrede-von-bild-vize-paul-ronzheimer-das-war-es-nicht-wert-herr-merz-679b227b103e042fb1b7d831.↩︎
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presse-augsburg.de/habeck-legt-eigenen-zehn-punkte-plan-zu-migration-vor/1011192.↩︎