09.01.2025
Mounting dangers and fears
The ‘axis of resistance’ has come apart. Israel is brimming with confidence and is just itching to attack. Yassamine Mather looks over the wreckage and criticises the failures of the Iranian left
We are still a couple of weeks away from Trump’s presidency and it isn’t clear whether he will initiate new negotiations with Iran’s Islamic Republic or allow the Zionist regime to launch an attack on Iran’s nuclear plants. We don’t know what he really thinks of ‘regime change’ from above and how he will proceed.
However, there is no doubt that the ‘axis of resistance’ led by Iran is facing a major crisis. The assassination of several senior Hezbollah leaders and the carpet bombing of their military bases have weakened the organisation’s defensive and offensive capabilities.
Within Hezbollah, there are increasing calls for redefining the movement’s strategic objectives, and there is a push to recalibrate its image by emphasising a stronger Lebanese identity. This shift would involve moving away from traditional slogans and taking into account the complex domestic situation in Lebanon. Such a transformation would also require a revamped political and media presence prioritising Lebanese domestic issues over broader regional agendas, aiming to establish symbolic and practical distance from external entanglements.
According to a Lebanese source quoted on Amwaz.media, this emerging rhetoric will focus on pragmatism, ensuring domestic interests take precedence over expansive regional ambitions. While many uncertainties remain, one thing is clear: the notion of a ‘Unity of Fronts’ has come apart and definitively been laid to rest.
The overthrow of the Syrian dictator and the coming to power of a jihadi group that show signs of wanting friendship with Israel have added to Iran’s problems.
As I have written before, there is now sufficient evidence to show that Assad was not a reliable ally of the Islamic Republic. Despite the crucial support he gained to stay in power, he failed to show decisive support for Hezbollah (and therefore Iran) in their hour of need. All this explains the Islamic Republic’s reluctance to help him in December 2024, as spelt out in a number of speeches by ayatollah Ali Khamenei in recent weeks.1
US-Israel attack?
The main question for 2025 is whether the defeats of 2024, the weakness of Hezbollah and the loss of its ally in Syria have paved the way for a military attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Writing in Foreign Affairs, Richard Nephew, a Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, tells us that for two decades, Washington hawks have advocated military action against Iran’s nuclear programme. However, these calls have consistently been rejected in favour of sanctions and diplomacy. Initially, the case against strikes was clear: Iran’s nuclear capabilities were underdeveloped, the international community was unified in demanding transparency from Tehran, and sanctions effectively pressured Iran into negotiations.
According to Nephew, today, however, the situation is more complex. Iran’s nuclear programme is now advanced, and Tehran faces greater vulnerabilities, with its regional alliances weakened and its deterrents eroded, particularly after Israeli attacks in 2024. Meanwhile, the international consensus has fractured, as countries like China, India, and Russia routinely circumvent sanctions. Some argue that strengthened ties between Iran and Russia complicate efforts to isolate Tehran, and there is no doubt that such an attack, which will inevitably need US direct military support, will pose significant risks including destabilising the Middle East. US military advisers warn of high costs and uncertain outcomes.
While the US and Israel may have the capability to destroy Iran’s main nuclear facilities, there is no assurance of eliminating all nuclear material or equipment, as some could be hidden in deeply buried or secret locations. Tehran might pre-emptively or swiftly respond to strikes by relocating highly enriched uranium to undisclosed sites, retaining the capacity to produce multiple nuclear weapons rapidly. Military strikes on Iran are unlikely to lead swiftly to diplomacy; and regime change, if it occurs, offers no guarantee of a better outcome. A collapsed Islamic Republic could be replaced by an even more wayward regime or result in chaos, which many Iranians fear, as seen in Iraq, Libya and Syria. While few would mourn the fall of the ayatollahs, the risks of instability are significant.
The next round of nuclear talks between Iran and the three European powers - France, the UK and Germany - is scheduled for January 13 in Geneva, according to Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Kazem Gharib Abadi. The last discussions were in November, the first such engagement after the US presidential election. They followed Tehran’s frustration over a Europe-backed resolution that criticised Iran for insufficient cooperation with the United Nations nuclear watchdog.
In response to the resolution, Tehran notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its intention to install additional uranium-enriching centrifuges at its facilities. In December 2024, the three European powers accused Iran of amassing high-enriched uranium without providing “any credible civilian justification”. They also signalled the potential reinstatement of sanctions to deter Iran from further advancing its nuclear programme.
The state-run news channel, Islamic Republic of Iran News Network (IRINN), reports that in response to the threats of war the country’s air defence forces launched the initial phase of the “Air Defence Drills of Power 1403” on January 7 with the aim of protecting the Natanz nuclear facility. The operation is led by brigadier general Qader Rahimzadeh.
Khatam-al Anbiya oversees joint air defence operations for Iran’s regular army and the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC). According to IRINN, the drills are designed to simulate defending Natanz - also known as the Shahid Ahmadi Roshan nuclear enrichment facility - against a range of aerial threats in challenging electronic warfare conditions.
Trump
Iran’s oil exports surged during the Biden administration as the US and its allies claimed they would revive a nuclear agreement with Tehran, building on the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which had been abandoned during Trump’s first presidency. Under Donald Trump, Iranian oil production fell sharply, dropping from 3.8 million barrels per day (mb/d) in early 2018 to under 2 mb/d by late 2020. By contrast, production has rebounded to 3.2 mb/d during Biden’s tenure. China, Iran’s largest oil customer, now sources 13% of its crude imports from Iran.
This is likely to shift significantly when Trump takes office. At the Republican National Convention in July 2024, Trump vowed to slash Iran’s oil exports once again, citing his earlier success through economic pressure. He proposed imposing tariffs of 100% or more on goods from nations buying Iranian oil, with a particular focus on China. According to analysts from Standard Chartered, Iranian oil could become a pivotal factor in Trump’s broader trade strategy toward China. This and the threat of new sanctions have had a dramatic effect on the country’s currency. The yuan falling to a 16-month low.
Meanwhile, Iranian cleric Hojjat ol-Eslam Kazem Seddiqi expressed scepticism about the interim Syrian authorities’ prospects, describing the country’s future as “uncertain”. Speaking during Friday prayers in Tehran on December 27, Seddiqi highlighted the complex situation in Syria, where various groups with conflicting goals are vying for control. He indirectly criticised Turkey for its role in the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, accusing a ‘neighbouring country’, doubtless a reference to Turkey, of collaborating with Israel to train and arm militants in Idlib.
January 3 was the second anniversary of the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, Iran’s military commander in the war against Islamic State. President Masoud Pezeshkian marked the occasion with a sharp criticism of the west, accusing the US, Israel, and Europe of hypocrisy over human rights. Speaking in Tehran, he praised Soleimani’s dedication to defending the oppressed and promoting unity among Islamic nations. Pezeshkian urged adherence to supreme leader ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s policies to prevent internal divisions and vowed that Iran would stand firm against its enemies.
Separately, Ali Larijani, an aide to Khamenei, criticised Syria’s new leadership, particularly Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), for their silence over Israeli occupation of Syrian territory and perceived alignment with US and Turkish interests. He warned that this approach might alienate Syrian society and emphasised that any future Iranian engagement with the new rulers in Damascus would depend on their actions.
The current increased external threats have created a certain rapprochement between some factions of Iran’s Islamic Republic. Some conservatives have supported Pezeshkian’s ‘social reforms’, including postponement of the contentious ‘hijab enforcement law’. This would have imposed harsh penalties on women and girls violating the veiling requirements. The country’s Supreme National Security Council announced in December 2024 that it has requested the process of implementing the law be halted so that a new bill with amendments can be submitted to the majles. In late December the state media announced that a ban on WhatsApp and Google Play would be lifted. This was seen as a first step to scale back internet restrictions - one of Pezeshkian’s election promises. The fact that he is getting approval for minor social reforms is an indication of the kind of realignments that occur every time the very existence of the Islamic Republic is threatened.
Left blocs
Reading and listening to some of the podcasts from the Iranian left, I can find the following three main blocs:
1. Supporters of regime change from above: They openly support regime change from above. They might not carry the Israeli flag, as ex-empress Farah Pahlavi did last week, but they would welcome an Israeli-US military attack.
2. Then we have the shy supporters of regime change, pro-western groups - some call them the ‘Nato left’. Those who celebrated the fall of Assad but failed to write about the Israeli occupation of parts of Syria and the coming to power of gentrified Jihadis. Those who have always tried to justify acceptance of US military support by Syrian Kurdish ‘left /feminist’ groups and who, secretly or openly, hope they will benefit from similar generosity when it comes to Iran. Of course, as we know, the US is likely to sell out the Kurds in a deal with the supporters of the current government in Damascus - Turkey, UAE and Qatar.
3. Supporters of the survival of the regime who bank on the reformist factions. They promote Pezeshkian and Zarif as saviours of the country, and encourage the regime to negotiate with the west. They keep telling the regime to compromise, to delay or stop nuclear developments. In the last few weeks they kept telling their putative allies within the regime to accept the European proposals regarding nuclear negotiations so as to avoid military attacks once Trump takes office. Their opponents remind them that precedence shows the US will see any such move as a sign of weakness and will only speed up a US-Israeli air war. These groups and individuals, some of ‘official communist’ background, advocate rapprochement with China and Russia. Inevitably they have to justify Russia’s capitalist oligarchy and China’s ‘socialism with capitalist characteristics’. What a betrayal of all the aspirations of young Iranians!
However, there remains a sizable group of individuals and smaller groups of the left, inside and outside Iran, who have taken a principled position, opposing unconditionally all US-Israeli operations in the Middle East, while reminding everyone that a corrupt religious capitalist dictatorship, Iran’s Islamic Republic, would become an even worse hell for the majority of its population once it was fully allied to Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.
The struggle for the overthrow of this regime must continue. However, anyone considering shortcuts in terms of US-Israeli military intervention will only lengthen the life of the Islamic Republic.