05.09.2024

Test launch of Shahab 3 ballistic missile

Don’t bank on ayatollahs

There are those, including on the ‘left’, who credit the Islamic Republic with being a bulwark of ‘anti‑imperialism’ and potentially the nemesis of Israel and US hegemony, writes Yassamine Mather

The ongoing genocide of Palestinians has both short-term and long-term consequences for the Middle East and maybe the rest of the world.

One of the most obvious immediate effects of Israel’s assault on Gaza has been the collapse of the Abraham Accords. These were a series of treaties aimed at normalising diplomatic relations between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco, facilitated by the US administration between August and December 2020.

In the span of five months, four Arab states joined Egypt and Jordan in “making peace with Israel”.¹ The expectation was that Saudi Arabia would also join the accords. They were isolating Iran’s Islamic Republic as the rogue ‘anti-Israeli’ state in the region. The agreements were called the Abraham Accords in honour of Abraham - the mythical patriarch of Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

However, the events immediately after October 7 2023 put an end to all this. Some have argued that Hamas’s attack on Israel was aimed at stopping the Abraham accord, as well as obtaining the release of a large numbers of prisoners held by Israel. If that was the case, they achieved the first part of their aim. For all practical purposes the Abraham Accords are dead and buried.

No Arab state, however much under pressure by the US and its allies, will be able to admit to the normalisation of relations with the Zionist state openly. Even without such steps, authoritarian states in the region, including the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, are threatened by the growing anger in the streets of their towns and cities. These days any talk of diplomatic relations with Benjamin Netanyahu’s genocidal government in Jerusalem would be political suicide.

The second and less talked about consequence of 11 months of uninterrupted killing of tens of thousands of Palestinians, with the direct support of the US and the approval of most of its allies, has taught any country thinking of ‘dissing’ the hegemon power a bitter lesson: if the US and its allies decide that you should be flattened by bombing and military attacks, there is nothing you can do about it. You might complain to the United Nations, but do not pin any hope of hostilities ending, even if several UN agencies and the secretary general intervene on your behalf. Many countries had learned this lesson after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. However, the relentless massacre of Palestinians has been a serious reminder of what awaits those who do not follow the US diktat and this includes Iran’s Islamic Republic.

There are those, including those on the ‘left’, who bank on Iran and see it as the leading element in the so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’. They picture Iran as a bulwark of ‘anti-imperialism’ and the potential nemesis of Israel and even US hegemony in the Middle East. This is more than foolish. Not only is Iran no ‘anti-imperialist’ power, it is determined to secure a deal with imperialism. It longs to end its isolation and once again to be allowed to rejoin the ‘international community’.

More than that. As I shall show, Iran is desperately weak according to almost every conceivable index.

Diplomatic

By early 2024, after a few years of pursuing a policy of rapprochement with China and Russia, Iran’s supreme leader decided that the regime could not take the threat of a US attack lightly. He was well aware that the country’s military arsenal is old, and in desperate need of upgrade/replacement. He knows that the regime could not survive any US military intervention and furthermore even the Chinese ‘Belt and Road’ way to economic development depends on the removal of at least some of the western sanctions imposed by the US and its allies.

Signs of this change of heart were present before the accident that killed former president Ebrahim Raisi and his foreign minister in May. Secret (and not so secret) negotiations with US officials had started in early 2024 and current changes in the Iranian government show a major shift in ayatollah Khamenei’s position.

In other words, the lesson from the onslaught in Gaza is felt all over the world, including in Tehran. The message is loud and clear: there is no room for any dissent against US rule. Iran’s Islamic Republic continues using slogans about the ‘Great Satan’, but at the same time, contrary to all false reports about its role in the ‘Axis of Resistance’, the supreme leader and his newly selected ‘reformist’ president are pursuing political and economic rapprochement with the west for two obvious reasons:

They are scared of what might happen if they engage in a war with the Zionist state and the US comes to the ‘rescue’, as promised repeatedly by the Biden administration and echoed by presidential candidates, Donald Trump and Kamala Harris. The US could attempt to bomb the country back into the stone age, not least by using bunker-busters to destroy the precious nuclear industry.
They need the removal of some sanctions for the country’s economy to survive.

Military

The Iranian airforce is in desperate need of new equipment after decades of international sanctions. The regime has been prevented from accessing the latest advanced military technology. As reported by Reuters:

The airforce only has a few dozen working strike aircraft, including Russian jets and ageing US models acquired before the Iranian Revolution of 1979 ….

Tehran has a squadron of nine F-4 and F-5 fighter jets [bought between 1971 and 1979], one squadron of Russian-made Sukhoi-24 jets, and some MiG-29s, F7 and F14 aircraft …. The Iranians also have pilotless planes designed to fly into targets and explode. Analysts estimate the country’s drone arsenal to be in the low thousands.²

Iran has developed at least 10 different models of suicide drones, designed to explode on impact. These drones can be as accurate as ballistic missiles, but with the advantage of flying lower to evade radar detection. Smaller models, such as the Shahed-136, carry approximately 45 kilograms of explosives. One of the smallest models, the Meraj-521, carries only about three kilograms of explosives.

Due to their slower speeds, many of these drones are easier targets for anti-aircraft batteries, fighter jets or missiles. Their operational ranges vary significantly, from as short as five kilometres to as long as 2,500. Iran’s largest suicide drones, like those in the Arash series, can carry nearly 260 kilograms of explosives and have ranges of up to 2,000 kilometres. However, both the range and the accuracy of this type of drone were seriously challenged after Iran retaliated against the Israeli attack on its Damascus consulate in April.

In addition to suicide drones, Iran possesses more than a dozen models of combat and surveillance drones, capable of attacking ground, sea or air targets before returning to base. Larger models, such as the Shahed-149, have operational ranges of up to 2,000 kilometres and can carry payloads of up to 500 kilograms. It is also believed that Iran has more than 3,500 surface-to-surface missiles, some of which carry half-ton warheads (the number capable of reaching Israel may be lower).

When it comes to naval power, the combined forces of the Iranian navy and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps patrol the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Although they have been relatively effective in defending Iranian waters, it is unlikely they can do much beyond these coastal zones. In addition, the navy has seven frigates, 49 patrol boats, 31 amphibious ships, 17 auxiliary ships, 19 submarines, and 54 aircraft.

Again Iran has no particular naval capabilities to defend itself against the United States and the dispatch of several aircraft carriers to the region over the last few months is mainly aimed at warning Iran.

According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in 2013 the regular Iranian army was estimated to have 357,000 personnel (167,000 conscripts and 190,000 professionals) plus around 350,000 reservists for a total of 700,000 soldiers.

Of course, no-one envisages a land attack on Iran and US generals constantly warn how foolish it would be to launch such an operation: Iran is a big country, approximately four times the size of Iraq, with diverse and challenging terrain, including mountains, deserts and dense urban areas. The Zagros and Alborz mountain ranges, along with the vast Dasht-e Kavir and Dasht-e Lut deserts, create natural defensive barriers that would make large-scale ground operations extremely challenging. Also the country’s large size provides it with significant strategic depth, allowing its military forces to disperse and operate from different parts of the country, complicating any invasion plans. Conducting a land invasion would require establishing and maintaining long supply lines across hostile territory.

However, if the US pursues a policy of regime change from above, military occupation on the ground will not be necessary. Destroying the country’s infrastructure might lead to the collapse of the current Shia regime. That is why Iran’s Islamic Republic has no intention of responding to Israel’s successive attempts to draw it into a hot war and the supreme leader aims to avoid an US attack no matter what.

Economic

Another reason why Iran is desperate to improve relations with the west relates to the country’s economic situation. In his first television interview as the new president, Masoud Pezeshkian said that his government needs more than $100 billion of foreign investment to increase the economic growth from 4% to 8%, but he admitted that solving the economic problems will depend on foreign relations.

He referred to problems such as power cuts and pressure on factories, adding: “What experts and economists say is that we need $200 to $250 billion of investment to achieve 8% economic growth. However, we need investment to achieve growth.”

Blaming the previous government for the current deficit, Pezeshkian added: “They said that we inherited a good economic situation, but we don’t have enough. I don’t want to complain, but we got permission from the leadership to take some amount from the national fund and settle some debts.”

One of the most pressing structural issues facing Iran in recent years has been the significant deterioration of its economic and civil infrastructure.

In a recent interview with Entekhab, a reformist website, economist Amirhossein Khaleghi highlighted the severe challenges in maintaining critical services operational, pointing to a lack of electricity and a shortage of gas as key examples. Khaleghi noted that the sanctions have had a profoundly negative impact on these sectors, leading to power cuts in the summer and issues with providing heating in the winter.

Bourgeois economists inside and outside Iran have given the same message for the last few years. They state that domestic laws have to be adapted to the ‘rules and standards’ of the Financial Action Task Force so as to remove obstacles to trade and foreign investment.

Sanctions

The latest round of US sanctions began in November 2018. The White House was adamant they were not aimed at regime change, rather at compelling Iran to alter its regional policies, cease its support for “militant groups” and “end its ballistic missile programme”. However, the close relations between the Trump administration, Israel and their well-financed exile stooges did point to sanctions aimed at triggering ‘regime change from above’.

In September 2019, a US official announced that sanctions would be imposed on anyone engaging in trade with Iran or purchasing its oil. That same month, following a suspected Iranian attack on key Saudi Arabian oil facilities, Trump instructed the treasury department to “substantially increase” sanctions on Iran, with a focus on the national bank. A senior Trump administration official later indicated that these new sanctions specifically targeted the financial assets of the supreme leader’s inner circle. However, Tehran denied any involvement in the attacks on the Saudi oil facilities, according to The New York Times, and in August 2020 the UN security council blocked the US attempt to re-impose ‘snapback sanctions’ on Iran.

In September 2020 the US claimed that UN sanctions against Iran were reinstated - a position rejected by Iran and the other remaining parties to the JCPOA nuclear agreement. The following day, the US imposed sanctions on Iranian defence officials, nuclear scientists, the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, and anyone involved in conventional arms deals with the country. Then in October of that year the US expanded its sanctions on Iran’s financial sector, targeting 18 Iranian banks.

In February 2023, the German state-owned broadcaster, Deutsche Welle, reported that the pressure on Iran had diplomatic costs for Washington and could ultimately lead to an increase in oil prices, in light of the rise in Iran’s oil exports. It is assumed that this prompted the Biden administration’s latest moves in terms of the relaxation of sanctions regarding Iranian oil sales.

However, the basic effects of the sanctions have contributed to a wide range of adverse macroeconomic effects, including sharp currency devaluation, severe trade and fiscal deficits, high inflation and increasing poverty rates. Successive Iranian governments have struggled to effectively counter the economic pressures resulting from these sanctions.

The EU has also imposed sanctions against Iran in response to its human rights abuses, nuclear proliferation activities and military support for Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine.

In 2011, the EU introduced a series of sanctions in response to what it called “serious human rights violations” in the country. The restrictive measures have been renewed annually since then and were last extended in April 2024. Since October 2022, the EU has drastically increased restrictive measures, adopting 10 packages of sanctions.

There is no doubt that there are “serious human rights violations” in Iran’s Islamic Republic. However, it is debatable whether they are worse than those in pro-western authoritarian regimes in the Middle East or the apartheid, colonial-settler state in Israel, all of whom benefit from EU political and financial support.

The combined EU and US sanctions have significantly impacted Iran’s logistics infrastructure, exacerbating existing challenges, while also imposing new hurdles. Below is a general overview of how sanctions have affected Iran:

1. Shipping and maritime trade: There are shipping line restrictions: major companies like Maersk and the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) have scaled back or stopped operations in Iran due to sanctions, complicating international goods transport for the country and driving up costs and transit times.

Many shipping firms avoid transporting Iranian goods due to sanction risks, leading to increased costs. Moreover, international insurers often refuse to cover vessels that dock in Iran, further isolating the country from global trade networks.

The sanctions have also resulted in increased congestion at Iranian ports. With fewer shipping options available, bottlenecks form, causing delays in importing essential goods, including food and medicine.

2. Aviation sector challenges: There is limited access to aircraft parts. Sanctions have drastically reduced Iran’s ability to acquire spare parts and modern aircraft, causing airlines like Iran Air to struggle with maintenance, leading to flight cancellations and reduced options for both domestic and international travel.

There is reduced international connectivity: Many airlines have discontinued their routes to and from Iran, further isolating the country. This impacts both passenger travel and the transport of goods.

3. Road and Rail Transportation: Foreign investment in Iran’s transportation infrastructure has been stifled by sanctions. Modernisation projects for roads and rail systems have been delayed or abandoned, reducing the efficiency of the logistics network.

There have been increased operational costs. The reliance on outdated vehicles and infrastructure has led to higher maintenance costs and decreased efficiency for trucking companies, which are crucial for domestic logistics.

4. Supply chain disruptions: Sanctions have driven up the costs of importing goods, disrupting supply chains. Businesses face higher prices for raw materials, which increases production costs and ultimately raises prices for consumers.

Sanctions have led to a significant rise in illicit trade and smuggling. While this may temporarily ease shortages, it weakens the formal economy and can introduce non-standard or substandard products into the market, often resulting in enriching every section of the regime targeted by sanctions.

5. Technological isolation: Sanctions have limited Iran’s access to modern logistics technologies and software that could optimise inventory control and transportation efficiency. This has hampered the development of a competitive logistics sector.

Iran has attempted to develop home-grown alternatives, but these often fall short of international standards, reducing overall efficiency and reliability.

6. Economic consequences: We have seen both inflation and an economic downturn. There have been shifts in trade relations. Sanctions have prompted Iran to strengthen ties with non-western countries, particularly in Asia.

Ecology

A recent article in Eurasia Review entitled ‘Did sanctions cause Iran’s environmental problems?’ explores the multifaceted environmental challenges facing Iran, primarily focusing on the severe water crisis, agricultural practices, pollution, and air quality issues.³

This is my understanding of the situation.

Iran is experiencing a severe water shortage, driven by rapid population growth, mismanagement and unsustainable agricultural practices that consume over 90% of the country’s water. Despite frequent droughts and decreasing water resources, agricultural expansion has continued, relying heavily on non-renewable groundwater.

The drying up of critical water bodies, like Lake Urmia and other wetlands, has been exacerbated by dam construction and water diversion for agriculture. Water quality has deteriorated due to pollution from the agricultural runoff, industrial waste and untreated sewage. Key water bodies like the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf are suffering from high pollution levels.
Deforestation is increasing due to urbanisation, overgrazing and illegal logging, contributing to soil erosion and desertification, and diminishing biodiversity.
Air pollution in urban areas, especially Tehran, is severe, driven by factors such as urbanisation, reliance on low-quality fuels and an ageing vehicle fleet. Cities like Zabol have ranked among the world’s most polluted due to dust storms and other such sources.

Economic costs associated with air pollution, such as for healthcare and lost productivity, are substantial, with Tehran’s air pollution estimated to cost around $2.6 billion annually.

The adverse impacts of international sanctions on Iran’s methanol and oil industries illustrate how these restrictions have led to suboptimal technological choices and significant environmental degradation. Despite having the potential to become a leading methanol producer, Iran’s access to modern technologies has been hampered. Companies like JM and Haldor Topsoe have refused to provide critical auto-thermal reforming technology for Iranian refineries, forcing Iran to use outdated methods that result in higher water consumption and carbon emissions.

For example, the Eslamabad-e Gharb refinery is being launched with older technologies, while neighbouring Turkmenistan successfully operates a state-of-the-art methanol plant. In another case, Haldor Topsoe failed to deliver the necessary equipment for a methanol project, leading to the use of local alternatives that did not meet environmental standards.

The consequences of projects like the oil extraction in Hur Al-Azim, where original designs for wetland drilling were ignored, have resulted in significant ecological damage and increased dust storms badly affecting the local population.

The imposition of sanctions in 2010 on gasoline imports further exacerbated these environmental issues. While Iran managed to increase its local refining capacity, the quality of the domestically produced petrol was severely compromised, with high levels of contaminants. This shift illustrates Iran’s response to sanctions, prioritising short-term survival over long-term environmental health.

Additionally, Iran’s pursuit of self-sufficiency in food production as a national security measure has led to increased environmental degradation due to unsustainable agricultural practices. Iranian leaders view food dependency as a vulnerability. Consequently, similar policies promoting self-sufficiency in other sectors, like car manufacturing and pharmaceuticals, have been adopted, despite their long-term costs to the environment. The overarching consequence is the tension between national security concerns under sanctions and the resulting environmental degradation.