11.08.2022

More talk than action

Arab and Iranian solidarity with Palestine leaves a lot to be desired, writes Yassamine Mather

Last week Israel’s latest attack on Gaza killed dozens of Palestinian civilians, including children, as well as two senior commanders of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Hundreds were injured and homes were destroyed. This was a strange affair, however, as by all accounts Hamas, which runs the government in Gaza, did not get involved - and perhaps this precipitated the ceasefire that came about on August 7.

The conflict started last week after Israel arrested Bassam al-Saadi, a leading figure within PIJ, taking him from his home in Jenin. The manner of the arrest, described as an “insult to PIJ”, was probably part of an Israeli plan for escalation of the conflict, as the group’s reaction was predictable: it fired rockets from Gaza and Israel responded by bombing PIJ areas.

PIJ, also known as the Islamic Jihad Movement, was set up in 1981 initially as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, two years after the revolution in Iran, which resulted in the establishment of the Islamic Republic, it was heavily influenced by Tehran, declaring its aim to be the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state within the borders of pre-1948 mandatory Palestine. The group rejects the Oslo agreement and has been responsible for a number of suicide attacks in the occupied territories.

Its armed wing, the al-Quds Brigades, has close links to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and maybe the timing of the Israeli arrest was not a coincidence. It was, after all, the week when the marathon that is the Iran nuclear talks restarted in Vienna, with one of the most contentious items being Iran’s demand for the removal of the Revolutionary Guards (and their ‘international’ section, al-Quds) from the US sanctions list.

Al-Quds’ finances come mainly from Hezbollah and Syria - both Iran’s allies - and the group is listed as a terrorist organisation by the US, EU, UK, Japan, Canada and, of course, Israel.

Hamas’s decision to sit out this latest conflict has precedents. According to Wikipedia,

In February 2012, the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip distanced itself from PIJ. During the March 2012 Gaza-Israel clashes, which followed the Israeli assassination of Popular Resistance Committees leader, Zuhir al-Qaisi, who bragged of kidnapping Gilad Shalit, PIJ and PRC opened attacks on Israel. Hamas refrained from joining PIJ and PRC in attacking Israel.¹

On August 8 a senior Israeli official, speaking to The New York Times anonymously, told the paper that the Israeli policy of offering more work permits over the past year had played a significant role in keeping Hamas away from this round of fighting.²

It is difficult to assess if all this is just propaganda or if Hamas stayed out for other reasons.

According to Hugh Lovatt, an expert on Palestinian politics at the European Council on Foreign Relations, “Hamas doesn’t want war at this moment ... There is a more pragmatic relationship between Hamas and Israel that has developed. To a certain extent, it might be mutual.”³

Israeli daily Ha’aretz has also been speculating on the differences between the two Palestinian groups:

While Hamas sees the rebuilding of Gaza, the economic improvement of its citizens and the building of broad public support as essential stages on the way to achieving its ideological goal, Jihad has no interest in rebuilding the strip, establishing public institutions and welfare or conducting foreign policy beyond what is required to provide it with money and weapons. Against this backdrop, serious differences have emerged over the years between the two organisations, even as they have been forced to cooperate. While Hamas has a major military and economic advantage, Islamic Jihad has the ability to strike at the Hamas monopoly and undermine its control by taking advantage of Israel’s knee-jerk military responses.⁴

Of course, publicly Hamas and Islamic Jihad have expressed solidarity with each other during and after the weekend conflict. However, PIJ officials and their Iranian supporters have accused Hamas of being neutral or, worse, cooperating with Israel and crushing the ‘unity of the ranks of national resistance’. This is a reference to an alliance of Palestinian groups opposed to the Oslo agreement.

Iran’s response was swift. Iran Revolutionary Guards commander major-general Hossein Salami issued a statement on the Sepah website: “Today, all the anti-Zionist jihadi capabilities are on the scene in a united formation working to liberate Jerusalem and uphold the rights of the Palestinian people.”⁵

In the past Israel has accused Iran’s Islamic Republic of smuggling weapons to PIJ directly and via Hezbollah. A blow for Islamic Jihad?

The Israeli air raid on a block of flats in the centre of Gaza City killed Taysir al-Jabari on August 5. He was a senior figure and the commander of the group’s northern region. There were also civilian casualties, according to Gaza’ ministry of health, including a five-year-old girl.

The Islamic Republic makes a great deal of its support for Palestine, but, apart from anti-Israeli slogans and rhetoric, Palestinians from all militant groups except Islamic Jihad complain they have received no financial or military support from Tehran. Islamic Jihad is estimated to have around one thousand fighters and has modest resources, but Iran’s financial commitments to such Palestinian groups are negligible compared to what it spends in Lebanon and Syria.

However, bombarded daily by publicity from US/Israeli/Saudi propaganda, Iranians are given the impression that large portions of the country’s GDP are spent on “Palestine”. That is why on some anti-government demonstrations, the slogan, “Leave Palestine alone - deal with our problems”, is shouted. As always, when it comes to the religious state in Tehran, there is little connection between claims and action.

Tehran has rightly been critical of Arab countries which have normalised relations with Israel, but its own support for the Palestinian cause has been more talk than action.