10.12.2015

Principals and proxies

Ankara’s regional influence is under threat, writes Esen Uslu

Day by day, before our eyes the principal global powers are taking over the war effort in Syria and Iraq from their local proxies. As the joint Russian and Iranian intervention has become more and more visible and muscular, the Syrian and Iraqi battlefields have been changing.

It is apparent that the redistribution of spheres of influence in the Middle East has entered a new phase. The end game could well mean redrawing borders and carving new states out of old ones. So the scramble is on to get a ‘fair’ share of the action.

The proxies that were formed, dissolved and re-formed during the last four years have reached the end of their usefulness. The infamous ‘IS threat’, organised as a Sunni state straddling the border between Syria and Iraq, could eventually and gradually become an acceptable entity, if it reduces its preaching and practice of terror to the acceptable levels of Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

The rump of the Syrian army controlled by Assad has survived, and has even recaptured Homs, thanks to Iranian and Russian support. However, as it was pushed out from the east and north of the country the main port facility of the Russian navy in the eastern Mediterranean came within the firing range of the Islamists.

The al-Nusra Front, the former al Qa’eda in Syria, which is nowadays pretending to be a moderate Islamist force, has failed to provide the axis around which the others could gather. The various reorganisation, training and equipping campaigns failed to bring any concrete result.

And, finally, the grandiose illusions of Turkey’s ruling clique have also come up against reality: open and clandestine forms of Turkish diplomacy have utterly failed. The ruling party may have run a brutal election campaign last summer, but it has been unable to achieve the objectives it set for itself in Syria.

Despite the financial support of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and training, logistics and transport supplied by Turkey, it is not these states that are calling the shots. Russian domination of Syrian airspace - to the exclusion of Turkish planes - has been firmly established. Every day Russian fighter bombers attack targets near the Turkish border, but there are no longer Turkish patrols to counter them. And its supply convoys are under constant threat of bombing.

However, we should not underestimate the influence of Islamism across the Mediterranean seaboard, which has reached to unexpected corners of the world with deadly consequences. And, while the barbarous assault of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen goes on without receiving any international attention, radicalisation in the predominantly Muslim countries continues unabated.

Needless to say, the response of the western powers - employing devastating military might - has been exposed as futile and its time may now be coming to an end. The participation of French and now British air forces in the bombing operations is oriented towards both placating their own national concerns and creating a combined operation of ‘US-led’ and ‘Russian-led’ coalitions. Their bombing campaigns will give them a seat at the tables of international diplomacy.

Two cards

Facing economic sanctions imposed by the Russians after Turkey failed to apologise for shooting down their Su-24 plane, and fighting a shooting war with a resurgent Kurdish opposition, which is attempting to control the major cities and towns of Kurdistan, Turkey has two trump cards: its military potential and the refugees massed within its borders.

It has shamelessly played both cards. Turkey deliberately let the refugees rush in only to unleash them across seas and borders, in the process creating panic in the European Union. And it seems to have achieved what it was seeking: substantial financial aid, as well as a solemn promise of progress in its EU membership negotiations. However, Turkey has been keeping those cards close to its chest - it knows that Cyprus and Greece will veto Turkey’s admission if their own demands are not met. And it permitted the refugee crisis to escalate to remind the EU that it is awaiting concrete proposals to get round that veto.

Its military potential is another matter. A new 120-kilometres-long ‘defensive wall’ has been built along the Turkish-Syrian border, which will be completed next May. That is in addition to the ditch and razor-wire defences recently enhanced. It is claimed the wall will stop Islamic State infiltration, but it is actually a device to keep the eastern section of Rojava around Kobanê separated from Afrin in the west. In fact, the Turkish demand for a ‘terrorist-free zone’ along the Syrian border was rebuffed by both the US and Russia.

The Turkish military presence in Iraqi Kurdistan since the early 90s was aimed at keeping Iraqi and Syrian Kurdistan separated, as well as hemming in the PKK guerrilla operations along the Turkish border. An armoured brigade is based in the old airfield at Bemerne in the Kurdish autonomous region. It is used by the Turkish forces to maintain reconnaissance positions to the south of the mountain range along the Turkish-Iraqi border. They have also had bases at Kani Masi, Batufe, Begova and Sheladiz since 1996, when there was an armed conflict between the PKK forces and the peshmergas of the Kurdish Democratic Party. However, since 2011 their legality has been disputed by the Iraqi government.

Since the fall of Mosul to IS forces, Turkey has maintained a foothold to the north-east of the city in Ba’ashiqah, where it set up training for peshmerga fighters almost two years ago. They proved their effectiveness during the recent operation to relieve the city of Sinjar from IS occupation.

And now the next target is Mosul - the jewel in the crown. Together with Kirkuk, it makes up the main oil production centre, as well as providing the hub of the transport network. Whoever controls the city will have a major bargaining chip for long-term negotiations.

The Turkish government in its wisdom decided to reinforce its training force, supplying additional armour and men. However, this move backfired. While the former governor of Mosul and the Kurdish regional government are on Turkey’s side, the Iraqi central government, with Iranian and Russian support, has demanded that Turkey remove its soldiers, which they regard as an occupying force. A new set of diplomatic moves followed, and a block on trade between Turkey and the Iraqi provinces was imposed.

For its part, the US government, exasperated by the unilateral and uncoordinated actions of the Turkish government, joined in the chorus of disapproval. So long as there is some prospect of joint action between Iran, Russia and the US-led coalition, the unilateral actions of Turkey are seen as an impediment.

As the principal powers take up new positions calling for joint action and diplomacy, Turkey’s influence in the region is under threat - its strong-arm diplomacy may be coming to an end and it may be punished for its gross overestimations of its power.