29.06.2011

Wolf in liberal disguise

Esen Uslu looks at the situation following the AKP victory in the June 12 general election and the good showing for the leftwing BDP

As might have been expected, the much hyped June 12 general election failed to resolve any of the key questions facing Turkey - not least the perennial demand for Kurdish self-determination.

The decision by the supreme election council (YSK) to bar a newly elected Kurdish MP, Hatip Dicle of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), from taking up his seat symbolises the continuing impasse. Less than two weeks after the election, the YSK ruled that Dicle’s election was invalid, since he had recently been convicted of “disseminating propaganda” for the banned Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and he is still being held. Meanwhile, the flight of thousands of Syrian refugees into Turkey has not only exacerbated tensions between Ankara and Damascus - as troops from both sides have been mobilised near the border - but also highlighted the Kurdish question. Government officials have claimed that the PKK may be infiltrating its militants among the refugees.

Winner and loser

June 12 resulted in a third successive election victory for the soft Islamist AKP (Justice and Development Party) - not to mention an impressive showing from the Kurdish freedom movement. The AKP’s vote increased by around 3%, compared to the previous general election, and the party won nearly half the vote, although its parliamentary representation was actually reduced. This was due to several factors, including the higher number of representatives apportioned to the provinces to reflect the country’s changed demographics - in Kurdistan the AKP lost seats, for instance.

Also, the undemocratic 10% threshold aimed at keeping smaller parties out of parliament this time worked against the AKP. Despite assuming an increasingly nationalist stance and parading a hangman’s noose to win over a few percentage points from the fascist MHP (the infamous ‘grey wolves’ of the Nationalist Action Party), the AKP spectacularly failed to keep the MHP under the threshold - it picked up 13% of the vote and won 53 MPs. Had the ploy been successful, the AKP would have gained many more seats, but, in the event, its nationalist stance alienated possible Kurdish swing voters. Nevertheless, the AKP still has 326 out of the 550 seats - in 2007 elections it won 341.

Despite the fact that the AKP has a clear majority, these figures are important. Its principal aim during the next parliament is to amend the constitution imposed by the military junta in 1982 - or else replace it with a brand new one. But to do so outright requires a two-thirds majority (367 votes), whereas a constitutional amendment passed with between 330 and 367 votes in favour has to be put to a referendum.

So the AKP is in an invidious position: either it has to buy a few MPs to get enough votes to put its new constitution to an uncertain referendum, or it has to seek consensus with the other parties. And among them is the BDP, which made a strong showing in the election, but its MPs are threatening to boycott parliament unless Dicle is reinstated.

The BDP is the main component of the Labour, Freedom and Democracy bloc, supported by a number of small left parties and eminent individuals around the pillar of Kurdish freedom. Its candidates stood as independents in order to bypass the 10% threshold and won 36 seats after an impressive campaign (its share of the overall vote was 6.6%).

Initially the eligibility of all BDP candidates was questioned by the supreme electoral council, but following massive protest action they were allowed to stand. Both the protests and the campaign itself were the object of police violence. Demonstrations were banned, or attacked when illegal slogans, such as “Vote for the guerrillas!”, were chanted.

The AKP’s own electioneering gradually descended into howling anti-Kurd nationalism, with calls for the re-adoption of the death penalty, specifically so that the original death sentence imposed on jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan could now be carried out. However, the painstaking organisation of young Kurdish militants - and especially the steadfastness of the Kurdish women - triumphed against all odds.

The bloc ran well known figures of the Turkish left as candidates. In Istanbul Levent Tüzel, the former chair of the Party of Labour, and Sirri Süreyya Önder, an artist, orator and activist since the 70s, were elected; in Mersin on the south coast, Ertu?rul Kürkçü, the last leader of the Revolutionary Youth (Dev-Genç) organisation of 1960s and the only survivor of the notorious Kizildere massacre of March 1972, were also successful.

However, the bloc’s main candidates were leading Kurdish activists, including six who have been remand prisoners for the last two years. One of them is Kemal Akta?, who was elected as an MP for Van province. He was arrested following the 1980 coup, charged with treason and sentenced to death in a show trial of PKK militants. This was later commuted to life imprisonment and he spent 21 years in jail until his release in 2001. He then became active in several legal Kurdish political parties - all closed down one after another. He has been a remand prisoner for the last two years awaiting trial for his role in the allegedly ‘terrorist’ Kurdish Communities Union (KCK). Eleven of the bloc’s MPs are women - some of them the first ever elected in their provinces - and among them is Leyla Zana, who has spent 10 years in jail for her role in the struggle for Kurdish rights. Barred MP Hatip Dicle was himself re-elected despite being held in the KCK case.

The result of elections and the conciliatory tone adopted by prime minister Tayyip Erdogan seemed to offer hope that the PKK’s unilateral ceasefire, declared before the election, would be extended and negotiations with Öcalan might bear fruit. However, Turkish military operations have continued and three guerrillas were killed in a clash in Sivas province immediately after the elections.

AKP ‘achievement’

How was Erdogan able to engineer the AKP’s third electoral victory?

A large part of his popular support derives from the ‘Ergenekon trials’, where several serving and retired generals and admirals were charged with organising several attempted coups against the AKP government. This was seen as a valiant attempt by the AKP to rid Turkey of a junta-in-waiting. The plotters were clearly identified with the main opposition party, the ‘social democratic’ Republican People’s Party (CHP) - three of these illustrious defendants were actually elected as MPs on the CHP list.

For seasoned observers, however, it is clear that the AKP government was not acting alone when it initiated the Ergenekon trials. They resulted from a coalition formed by the AKP with sections of the armed forces looking for a clean sweep - and, by the way, wanting an escalation of the war against the PKK. This all-or-nothing policy was soon abandoned.

Another factor in the AKP’s success is the improved state of the economy, especially compared to the pre-AKP period of chronic high inflation. Although the policies pursued were set out before the AKP government was formed, Erdogan has closely followed the agenda of international finance capital: higher taxation, reduced public spending, reduced wages, privatisation and an attack on bureaucracy.

As a result Turkey has paid back the substantial loans it received from the International Monetary Fund in 2001, although the current account deficit has grown to record levels. Unionised labour has been severely undermined, while previously protected professionals, such as doctors, have been subjected to the rigours of a new health market. This has resulted in a reduction in waiting times and better health services.

The freed-up aviation market, with its low-cost airlines and cheaper fares, has increased air passenger traffic. The possibility of flying from one end of the country to the other in one and a half hours at affordable ticket prices instead of a 20-hour coach ride has created a new set of satisfied customers. There are also fast intercity train lines, and more efficient light rail systems in major cities. A rapid programme of building dual-carriageway highways, together with increased car ownership, have also produced improvements, not least for the middle classes.

In addition, increased transfer payments were used to create a patronage of AKP-run charities and municipal services aiding the poorest sections of the people, who have been skilfully manipulated. The same goes for shopkeepers and small businesses, who have benefited from financial support. Then there is the removal of visa requirements thanks to bilateral agreements with many countries in the region.

All these improvements in ordinary daily life were summed up in a single word during the election campaign: “achievement”. Yes, much of it is circumstantial, rather than resulting from AKP magic, and it certainly cannot be sustained. A few years of crisis will surely take the shine out of the AKP’s polish. However, for the present the plot is working.

Liberal disguise

The conservative AKP wolf came in a rather ill-fitting liberal disguise. In fact economic liberalism has most definitely not been matched by political liberalism. The media have been put under immense pressure to toe the AKP line. The time-honoured attitude of appearing to deal with thorny issues while doing nothing tangible has been continued by the AKP in relation to the long-neglected problems, such as discrimination against non-Muslim minorities or the demands of Alevi-Bektashi-Kizilbash sections of the population. The arts have also been treated in an off-hand fashion - to the chagrin of the educated and chattering classes.

The same goes for international politics. The Cyprus question was put on freeze and forgotten. The vocal criticisms of blatantly aggressive Israeli actions were not followed up in deeds. The ascension to the European Union was also put on hold. The major pipeline projects announced with much fanfare came to nothing. Iran has continued to rebuff Turkish attempts to be a go-between so as to resolve its conflicts with imperialism. However, the recent changes in the Arab-speaking world have resulted in a few Turkish brownie points.

The AKP government has made use of the traditional prejudice that ‘rich, infidel foreigners’ are attempting to hold back the development of Turkey as a powerful nation. And the European Union-sponsored reforms which marked the first AKP government were gradually sidelined in the course of the second term. During the election campaign, the achievements of the military-industrial complex, such as the building of F-16 and F-35 aircraft, were paraded instead.

A new spate of ambitious projects for the third term was trumpeted, including two major satellite cities on either side of Istanbul and a shipping canal parallel to the Bosporus. Almost every major city has its AKP ‘crazy project’. Most probably there will not be sufficient finance to see many of them through, but a new construction boom without any regard to the environment, to be followed in the long run by an inevitable bust, is to be expected.

Meanwhile, the strong showing of the BDP and the willingness of Kurdish nationalists to cooperate with the Turkish left are good omens, but there is much to be done. In order not only to maintain the momentum of the election, but to go on to achieve its true potential, the bloc must be transformed into a political party, extending its message of democracy across the whole country.

In order to overcome voter apathy over Kurdish issues, a comprehensive democracy programme should be presented, and particular attention should be paid to the plight and demands of Alevis of central and eastern Anatolia, as well as Thrace.

During the election campaign there was not much chance to discuss these matters, so now is the time for the BDP to take up these vital issues.