03.09.2008

Excusing catastrophe

A 'pre-emptive' strike on Iran would kill thousands, writes Jim Moody

For six years the world has known about the Natanz fuel enrichment plant. International Atomic Energy Agency director general Mohamed El Baradei visited the site in February 2003, reporting subsequently that 160 centrifuges were complete and ready for operation, while 1,000 more were under construction there.

Situated halfway between Qom and Esfahan, Natanz is a hardened facility of over 100,000 square metres (almost exactly the same area as is occupied by the new Wembley stadium). Half the underground space of the Natanz complex is taken up by two 25,000-square-metre areas; the rest comprises administrative buildings. It is protected by concrete 2.5 metres thick, with further layers beyond that. In 2004 the roof was hardened with reinforced concrete and covered with 22 metres of earth.

However, steps are clearly being taken to further fortify the facility. A year ago, the “non-profit, non-partisan” Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) issued a report about new deep nuclear facilities at Natanz: “Commercial satellite imagery from DigitalGlobe taken on June 11 2007 indicates that Iran is building a tunnel facility inside a mountain about two kilometres south of the Natanz uranium enrichment complex. The construction activity is taking place in the closest mountainous area to the Natanz site, strongly suggesting that the site is affiliated with Natanz.”

Showing that preparations to defend Iran’s nuclear development are well in hand, the report placed the new tunnelling in the context of ISIS’s 2005 revelations: “Iran earlier built a tunnel complex near the Esfahan uranium conversion facility to protect a range of nuclear-related equipment and materials and natural uranium hexafluoride from that facility. Iran may be constructing a similar facility near Natanz, fearing that the underground halls at Natanz are vulnerable to destruction by military attack. Such a tunnel facility inside a mountain would offer excellent protection from an aerial attack. This new facility would be ideal for safely storing nuclear items, including centrifuge manufacturing and assembly equipment, centrifuge components, natural uranium and low enriched uranium” (www.isis-online.org: ‘New tunnel construction at mountain adjacent to the Natanz enrichment complex’, July 9 2007).

Two months ago, a “former head of Mossad” said that Israel would have to act within a year to prevent Iran securing nuclear weapons. In his words: “The Americans had spies in Iran until they were rounded up in 2003 and now they do not have much by way of ‘humint’ [human intelligence] on the ground. The Israelis have better information. But the Americans went away from the meetings unconvinced that the Israelis have enough intelligence on where to strike, and with little confidence that they will be able to destroy the nuclear programme.” Former defence and intelligence officers “who advise the Pentagon” have also disclosed that the US military is looking into possible outcomes for military attacks “featuring varying levels of American involvement” (The Sunday Telegraph July 5).

Despite the doubts, or maybe because of them, the tempo of events seems to be quickening. Actions speak louder than words, so Israel and its US big brother may well decide to throw caution to the wind and launch an attack sooner rather than later. In their terms, tomorrow may be too late.

Past experience

Bunker-busting bombs have been developed over the years in fits and starts. Two models of high explosive penetrating bombs were produced in Britain during World War II: the Tallboy (five tonne) and the Grand Slam (ten tonne). Although designed to go through rock rather than concrete, in an attack on the Farge U-boat pens two Grand Slams penetrated their 4.5-metre reinforced concrete hardening.

In the following six decades, little or no active military consideration was given to conventional bunker-busting weapons. As a result, during the 1991 Desert Storm operation no British or US forces’ inventory included any conventional bunker-busting materiel. When this became an urgent necessity, within 28 days eight-inch (203mm) artillery barrels were modified to carry 300kg of high explosive each. Using lasers, these guided bomb units (GBU-28) worked satisfactorily, but were subsequently superseded by a succession of GBUs progressively armed with the BLU-109 Penetrator (penetrating 1.8m of reinforced concrete), the BLU-116 Advanced Unitary Penetrator (3.4m), and finally the BLU-113 Super Penetrator (6m).

The last of this series, using the GBU-37 Global Positioning System Aided Munition (GAM), was developed for use with the B-2 stealth bomber. This bomb was brought into operational use in 1997.

However, there is a danger of a problematic outcome from the attacker’s point of view when several-metre-thick layers of earth and concrete are used, as exists at Natanz. Even recently developed, augmented high explosives (HE) are not up to the task of delivering guaranteed destruction. Depleted uranium warheads, such as were deployed in Serbia by US forces, would pack a bigger punch. But these are still too limited in effectiveness for sites such as Natanz.

At the end of 2007, the US government received legislative approval for spending $88 million on modifying B-2s so that they can carry the newly developed 13.5-tonne Massive Ordnance Penetrator. This monster bomb is six metres long and encased in 9cm-thick high-performance steel and is designed to penetrate up to 60m of earth before exploding. But despite its impressive specification, even this latest development in HE technique is quite inadequate against tunnels in the depths of mountains.

Current thinking

Coincidentally with the public exposure of Natanz in 2002, the US government launched its Advanced Concepts Initiative. This reported: “There are several nuclear weapon options that might provide important advantages for enhancing the nation’s deterrence posture: possible modifications to existing weapons to provide additional yield flexibility in the stockpile; improved earth-penetrating weapons (EPWs) to counter the increased use by potential adversaries of hardened and deeply buried facilities; and warheads that reduce collateral damage” (my emphasis, p34-35).

Earth-penetrating nuclear weapons have definitely become part of military technology within the last 15 or so years. Indeed, they are currently under active US military consideration for dealing with just such sites as Esfahan and Natanz.

Exploding a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon at a depth of one metre increases the effective yield by a factor of 20. Thus, resulting underground damage is equivalent to what a 200-kiloton weapon would produce if exploded at the surface. Crucially, upping penetration depth to five metres increases effective yield by an additional 60%, to 320 kilotons. What this means is that - in terms of targets underground, let alone within rock - deep penetrating nuclear weapons must be used.

In 2005, three members of the Union of Concerned Scientists wrote: “For example, an earth-penetrating weapon using the 1.2-megaton B83 warhead - the highest-yield weapon in the US nuclear stockpile - could crush underground bunkers to a depth of about 1,000 feet [300 metres]” (www.ucsusa.org: ‘Earth-penetrating weapons’).

Available since 1997, the B61-11 earth-penetrating weapon was not designed to penetrate rock, but was originally intended for attack against certain targets in hard or frozen soil in Russia. However, the US military is refurbishing those B61s still in its armoury (models 3, 4, 7, 10 and 11) under the Life Extension Program (sic), aiming to keep the weapons operational until at least 2025. But this weapon has its operational limitations. In tests it penetrated only six metres in dry earth, even when dropped from high altitude, above 12km. Hence one idea is to combine a small nuclear device with its hardened bomb casing, thus creating a weapon able to penetrate deep ground and then explode with nuclear force.

All this shows clearly the type of weapon that would have to be used against the well protected nuclear facilities at Esfahan and Natanz.

Collateral damage

An Israeli/US attack on Iran, especially one using nuclear weapons, would have far-reaching political consequences (Israel’s possession of such weapons is the worst kept, officially undisclosed, secret in the world). After all, such weapons of mass destruction have not been used since 1945.

No nuclear explosion, when delivered by bomb or missile, could be contained underground - especially one so large as to ensure complete destruction of Iran’s nuclear facilities within mountain tunnels, as well as its earth and concrete protected structures below ground. This is not akin to an underground nuclear test, where containment can be achieved.

Overwhelming scientific opinion holds that a nuclear weapon in the tens to hundreds of kilotons range, used in the way envisaged, would not only kill those in the immediate vicinity. People would be incinerated, blasted and crushed. Aerial nuclear contamination would then certainly kill everyone within a few dozen kilometres. Thousands who are 100 kilometres away from the site would suffer radiation poisoning and die over weeks or months. And people even hundreds of kilometres away could well experience enough radiation to cause premature death or affect their future offspring. Never forget that the plumes of radiation emanating from Chernobyl reached as far as Wales, where years later there were still areas unsafe for sheep to graze. A nuclear attack on Iran would produce results much more dire.

If Israel or USA are to take out Iran’s nuclear facilities, only the nuclear option will do the job properly. All the evidence shows this. Hence those, like Sean Matgamna, the patriarch of the Alliance for Workers’ Liberty, who excuses a ‘pre-emptive’ attack on Iran, are excusing what can only but be a human catastrophe.