WeeklyWorker

06.08.2008

Neither AKP nor junta

Those hoping for a new, benevolent democracy to be handed down by the AKP government are in for a rude awakening, writes Esen Uslu

Since April 2007, the pace of political life in Turkey has quickened dramatically. Let me recap the events that have taken place in order better to understand the present situation.

As last year’s presidential election approached, the secular nationalists of the military-state bureaucracy began to mobilise against the possibility of a Justice and Development Party (AKP) candidate being elected.

A series of ‘flag demonstrations’ were organised by so-called ‘civic society’ associations: that is, Kemalist NGOs run by retired generals, staffed by nationalist-fascist intellectuals, secretly financed through the use of state funds and strongly supported by the pro-junta Kemalist section of the media. A handful of nationalist publications suddenly appeared (they had a strong resemblance to leftwing journals from the 1970s). Even a couple of special satellite TV channels were started up.

Instead of opting for a conciliatory candidate close to the military or civilian bureaucracy, the AKP nominated Abdullah Gül. He is an avowed islamist, a founding member of the AKP, a former prime minister and the foreign minister at the time. On top of that, his wife insists on wearing an islamic headscarf. Such a person as Gül was ill suited to occupy this ‘non-partisan’ position, complained the secular nationalists.

Army warning

On April 27 2007 the army top brass issued a midnight statement, effectively declaring that anybody who opposed Kemalism was an enemy of the state. This was understood by everybody as a veiled threat of a military takeover.

The Republican People’s Party (CHP), affiliated to the Socialist International, was the prime beneficiary of these moves, since it pursued a virtually identical position in parliament. The CHP joined forces with the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), the party of the infamous Grey Wolves, in a boycott of the parliamentary sessions called to elect the new president.

When the AKP proceeded with the presidential poll and got Gül elected, the CHP took the matter to the constitutional court. It asked for the election to be declared null and void on the grounds that the parliamentary session had been inquorate because of the opposition boycott. The constitutional court quickly concurred, making the overtly political ruling that no president could be elected unless two-thirds of MPs took part in the vote. In other words, the majority would either have to agree to a president acceptable to the military or try to increase its representation to the level of the quorum.

The AKP responded by attempting to amend the constitution so as to make the president electable by popular vote. However, as it did not have sufficient MPs to secure a change to the constitution either, the outgoing president called for the amendment to be put to a referendum in the autumn of 2007.

The AKP also tried to strike a deal with the military top brass, with prime minister Tayyip Erdogan secretly meeting the armed forces chief of staff at Dolmabahce Palace in Istanbul. While just about every other political detail has been leaked in recent months, what was said at that meeting has still not been revealed. However, you can be sure that the effects of the deal are being felt today. Maybe we can come to our own conclusions as to what was agreed.

The AKP bent to pressure on the call for an early general election, which was held in July 2007. The pro-junta nationalists had expected to make gains and be able to form a coalition government of the CHP and MHP. They were confident that the massive ‘flag demonstrations’, as well as the dark warnings coming from the military-civilian bureaucracy, would be enough to carry them to victory.

However, the AKP got 46% of the vote - sufficient for a clear parliamentary majority, albeit smaller than previously. The first crack appeared in the nationalist front as a result of this setback. The MHP agreed to attend the sessions held to elect the president, ensuring the necessary quorum to elect Gül. This caused huge disquiet at the top of the civilian and military bureaucracy. Some generals refused to attend official functions and openly snubbed the president’s wife.

But by then a strange legal situation had developed. The constitution had been amended so that the 10th president could be elected by popular vote and a referendum was to be held to ratify the amendment. However, the 10th president had already been elected by parliament. So the AKP rushed through an amendment to the yet-to-be-approved constitutional amendment!

The prime minister made a quite conciliatory speech, stating that the AKP would respect the views of the whole population, and started a new initiative to amend the constitution from top to bottom, so that all legal and structural realignments required by the European Union could be met.

That upset many people too. The so-called social democrats of the CHP leapt to the defence of the present constitution, which had been drawn up in 1982 by the fascist junta. They claimed that any liberalisation in the constitution would mean the end of secularism as they and other Kemalists understood it. However, the proposed new constitution was also opposed by arch-conservative islamists in the AKP, who have a considerable power base among believers in the poor districts and rural areas. Eventually the new constitution was put on the back burner.

War in Kurdistan

However, the rabid nationalism fanned by the war in Kurdistan gave the AKP another chance to regain the initiative. The army deployed a major force to the south-east and spent the whole spring and summer poised to strike into Iraqi Kurdistan. The opportunity came with the Daglica raid carried out by the PKK. About 250 guerrillas attacked Turkish military positions and blew up a bridge. During the ensuing fire-fight 12 soldiers were killed, many were injured and eight were captured and taken over the border into Iraqi Kurdistan.

The kidnapped soldiers were released through the ‘good offices’ of MPs of the Kurdish-based Democratic Society Party (DTP). The soldiers were put on trial on the grounds that they did not fight to the last bullet instead of surrendering to the PKK, thus humiliating the army. The incident was used to fan the flames of nationalism and whip up support for an aggressive, militaristic stance on Kurdistan.

Some months later, however, it became known that quite precise intelligence about the PKK operation had been obtained in advance and relayed to the military commanders in the region. Nobody knows why the number of troops at the particular position under threat was reduced, or why shortly before the PKK attack all hand grenades were taken into store and the promised replacements not issued. Or why on the day of the raid the unit commanders were on leave attending private functions.

Whatever the reason, the PKK operation gave the military the pretext it was looking for. It was soon demonstrating its newly acquired capability to conduct low-level air raids at night over mountainous terrain. More than a dozen raids were carried out, and military cooperation with Israel reached a new stage with the provision of Israeli unmanned drones; they can remain airborne over the target area for a considerable time, gathering intelligence day and night. The army also utilised domestically produced long-range artillery to target the escape routes of the guerrillas.

Those devastating air raids were complemented with an incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan - with the approval of the US, as well as the Iraqi government, and with the tacit support of the leaders of Kurdish autonomous region. The latter saw the PKK as hindering their own aim of establishing an autonomous state in northern Iraq.

The Turkish army operations into Iraqi Kurdistan took place at the same time as Iranian attacks in the Iran-Iraq border region and into Iraqi Kurdistan - later Turkish commanders admitted they had coordinated their actions with Iranian forces.

Sweetening the army

The AKP government emerged from all this in a stronger position - the rift with the top brass seemed to be healed. In addition a range of sweeteners were offered to the military:

In exchange for these toys for the boys, tacit approval was given for the prosecution of former top generals for their illegal mob-style activities beyond the control of the top brass. All this has informed speculation about the nature of the secret agreement reached at Dolmabahce between the AKP and the military.

Legal moves

The pro-AKP and ‘pro-democracy’ press found a new lease of life, and a range of covert operations came to light, from targeted assassinations to the funding of junta activity through drug smuggling.

Suddenly the grindingly slow-turning wheels of justice began to accelerate and a number of people, including former generals, were arrested. Also detained and arrested were the leaders of the Workers’ Party (IP), a former Maoist outfit turned nationalist. In addition, prominent journalist and industrialists were detained, questioned and released.

All this happened without a peep from the army top brass. As the press dug deeper, it became apparent that the junta was very much divided - some top commanders had been most reluctant to support any military takeover, especially one which would undermine the hierarchy and discipline of the army. Some junta officers were forced into retirement amidst great animosity.

However, the AKP overplayed its hand: while it was ready to forego an overhaul of the entire constitution, it insisted on an amendment allowing university students to wear headscarves. This caused consternation amongst the military and civilian bureaucracy - especially as some AKP MPs were openly discussing the possibility of extending the right to wear a headscarf to state employees and school students.

The MHP once more supported the AKP, and in the end so did the DTP’s MPs. However, once the amendment had been passed by parliament, the social democratic parties - that is, the CHP and Democratic Left Party (DSP) - jointly appealed to the constitutional court to declare the amendment invalid, on the grounds that the initial articles of the constitution cannot be altered under any circumstances. True to form, the constitutional court decided in its wisdom that the amendment would indeed alter the constitution’s foundation articles, thus drastically changing the nature of state, and the amendment was declared null and void.

To ban or not to ban

Then came the bombshell: The chief prosecutor of the supreme court of appeals placed an indictment before the constitutional court charging the AKP with acting as a focus of anti-secular activity, calling for it to be banned and its main leaders, including the prime minister and president of the republic, to be barred from taking part in political activity.

This was generally viewed as the military-civilian bureaucracy’s counterblow, aimed at stopping the junta trials in their tracks. As the constitutional court clearly had a built-in anti-AKP majority, a ban was considered a foregone conclusion.

However, the AKP government played its hand quite well. It proved to friend and foe how effectively it could clamp down on working class activity. The main 2008 May Day demonstration was brutally suppressed, while the failings of the trade union bureaucracy played into junta hands. Recently, when Istanbul municipal workers went on strike and staged an impromptu demonstration, they were dispersed after the police attacked them with clubs, tear gas and water cannons. Meanwhile, the military hawks continued to enjoy a free hand in dealing with the Kurdish guerrilla movement.

The AKP also mobilised international support, and the US ambassador predicted that the constitutional court would decide not to ban the AKP in August. He was just a bit off the mark when it came to the detail, but correct as far as the content went. The court decided by a six-five majority that the AKP was in breach of the constitution’s secularist principles, and should be punished. However, as the seven-four majority needed to close down the party was not obtained, the court opted to issue a fine instead. Half the funding the AKP was due to receive from the state would be withheld.

The decision pleased everybody: the secular nationalists could claim victory, in that it had been established that the AKP was against secularism. But the AKP could claim victory too, in that it had escaped closure and was able to operate as usual. It had received a sharp slap on the wrist, but was free to continue pursuing its islamist agenda, albeit in a very cautious and gradualist way. It will curb its zeal to ‘democratise’ the state, and seek to patiently overcome opposition to its policies, aided by external pressures from the EU and USA.

‘Democracy’

For those ready to claim the victory of democracy in Turkey, the acid test will be the result of the legal move to ban the Kurdish DTP, which will shortly be announced by the constitutional court. However, for the working class, there is no need to await the result of this case. We are well aware of the nature of Turkish ‘democracy’, irrespective of the military-state bureaucracy’s attitude to the DTP or AKP.

It is apparent that the AKP is a party that serves Turkish finance capital. It has maintained the support of the so-called ‘Anatolian tigers’ - that is, the rapidly growing industrial and exporting sectors based in the central Anatolian towns, which lean towards islamist politics. Such a political party cannot be democratic by definition, because the world outlook of its promoters is revealed every day in the factories and sweatshops: no trade union rights, no health and safety expenditure, no legal restrictions on working hours, no social security benefits, no protection from unfair dismissal, no retraining provision, no decent pensions for their workers - retirement in the grave! Privatise health insurance, they insist. Make the workers pay exorbitant sums for treatment in private hospitals, if they do not want to wait forever for state healthcare.

If you dare to protest at this assault on workers’ rights, you will be met by the clubs, teargas and water cannons of the police and private security companies, backed up by the gendarmerie!

Those who forget such realities and expect a new, benevolent democracy to be handed down by the AKP should be ashamed to call themselves socialists. Yes, it is progress of sorts that some ex-junta members and their murderous gangs are about to be dealt with. But anybody who ignores the fact that such bodies lurking within the crevices of the state are the reserve force of bourgeois democracy will one day face a rude awakening.

Neither the islamist, anti-secular and anti-democratic liberalism of the AKP nor the brutal, naked force of the junta offers anything for the working class. Only the workers’ struggle to topple all the paraphernalia of class rule can provide genuine democracy.

 

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