04.06.2008
Stages or combined tasks?
In the first of two articles, Torab Saleth calls for a re-examination of Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution
When Leon Trotsky summarised his theory of permanent revolution in a book of the same title in 1929, he emphasised three aspects: “To dispel the chaos that has been created around the theory of the permanent revolution, it is necessary to distinguish three lines of thought that are united in this theory.”1
The first aspect - according to Trotsky himself, “the central idea of the theory” - deals with “the problem of transition from the democratic revolution to the socialist”: “there is established between the democratic revolution and the socialist reconstruction of society a permanent state of revolutionary development”; and that “the democratic tasks of the backward bourgeois nations lead directly, in our epoch, to the dictatorship of proletariat and that the dictatorship of the proletariat puts socialist tasks on the order of the day”.2
In its general form this theory has been most helpful in explaining how in our epoch revolutionary movements in backward countries, even when seemingly beginning around democratic tasks, can grow over into socialist revolutions. It is this central aspect of the theory of permanent revolution that is our concern here. More precisely, the aim here is to investigate how useful this theory is today for formulating a revolutionary strategy for the periphery of the world capitalist system. Let us emphasise: the other two “lines of thought” within this theory - dealing with the revolutionary process of transition to socialism itself and the need for its extension internationally - are neither particularly specific to Trotsky nor in contention here.3
Furthermore, the superiority of this theory, when first expounded in 1904-06, in relation to both Menshevik and Bolshevik views of the impending Russian Revolution has as proof October 1917 itself and is not being questioned here. Whichever way you look at it, and despite all that has been written on the subject, what actually happened in the Russian Revolution was closest to Trotsky’s analysis. There was obviously some core insight in Trotsky’s method which allowed him to point to the socialist character of the Russian Revolution better than and before everybody else.4 Equally obviously, the fact that we must extract and keep that core is not debatable either.
This core has been invariably linked to Trotsky’s theory of uneven and combined development of capitalism. Although this was a crucial analysis, without which the concept of permanent revolution cannot be understood, in itself it cannot, however, be considered the main consideration behind Trotsky’s revolutionary strategy. After all, this theory was not exclusive to Trotsky. How come Kautsky, who was probably the first to refer to it, did not arrive at the same conclusions?
A much more convincing approach is that of Hillel Ticktin, who argues that Trotsky’s strategy cannot be understood without his implicit theory of capitalist decline.5 This is indeed the axis along which one must highlight the contemporary importance of Trotsky’s theory for developing a revolutionary strategy: “The concept of permanent revolution itself is a statement that only the working class as the universal class can change society, and society is ripe for overthrow; but until it is overthrown the world is doomed to endure one struggle after another, one repression after another, until the final victory.”6
It has to be added here that in relation to Lenin not enough attention has been paid to the question of how precisely he arrived at the need for a socialist revolution after February 1917. Trotsky himself refers to a “convergence” of views. But the question of exactly how and along which lines this convergence came about has not been fully explored. Trotsky himself in the above summarisation of 1929 does not cover this crucial point. A closer examination of Lenin’s writings of the period indicates it was not so much a convergence but rather like arriving at the same destination via different routes. Thus the route taken by Lenin must also be of interest to any Marxist study of revolutionary strategy today.
Indeed it must be said that if we are to go beyond the historical debate in Russia over a century ago and try and summarise the key elements determining a particular strategy today, then some core ideas of Lenin must also be taken into account. In particular importance for the theory of revolutionary strategy must be Lenin’s analysis of revolutionary class alliances and its changing dynamics in relation to changes in the class character of political power, which Trotsky himself praised on numerous occasions.7
Finally it must be said, whatever the shortcomings of the theory of permanent revolution today, its revolutionary credentials - as opposed to the class-collaborationist and stagist apologies offered by the Stalinised Comintern during the Chinese revolution, cannot be overemphasised. We have also witnessed how this very same Stalinist ‘theory’ has been utilised for a whole historical period to justify the most treacherous counterrevolutionary alliances and how for that very same period there has been nothing but the theory of permanent revolution which has allowed revolutionaries to see through such betrayals.
But we do still have to answer a simple question: can this “central” aspect of Trotsky’s theory - ie, “the problem of transition from the democratic revolution to the socialist” - be applied to revolutions today, or does it require modifications or abandonment? A question which will inevitably also involve a re-examination of its original validity.
Permanent revolution today
Given the fact that this theory was developed for a specific period in history almost a century ago, it could very well be outdated and inadequate for the current situation.8 Of course, this has to be investigated through serious examination. The fundamental features of the epoch of decline have not changed, but a number of developments in the world capitalist system itself, especially during the last half a century or so, have dramatically altered the class structures within the periphery.
Although a faithful application of this theory today, even in the most developed capitalist countries (for which it was not written), can be harmless, in so far as it is still a revolutionary theory which proves the necessity of a socialist revolution, we have nevertheless seen time and time again how in the hands of some of its defenders it has also been turned into a tool for justifying exactly the same conclusions as the most zealot defenders of revolution by stages. True, in most cases this paradox dissolves when you dig deeper and realise the theory is actually being misunderstood, misused or blatantly misrepresented. There is no way any serious analysis could ever draw class-collaborationist conclusions from Trotsky’s theory, but, given the increasing frequency of such misuse by the vast majority of today’s ‘Trotskyists’, the propensity of this theory to misuse also needs examination.
The case of the Iranian revolution of 1977-79 is of particular importance here. Ever since the Chinese revolution, which forced the first major international debate around this theory, if there ever was an historical event in which we could have again fully tested the theory of permanent revolution in practice, it is indeed this revolution. Those who think it can be fully explained by this theory must also explain why the vast majority of its followers actually stood on the same side of the barricades as the staunchly Stalinist Iranian Tudeh Party. We are not talking here about some odd sects. We are not talking of some small tactical mistakes either. In so far as the question of the characterisation of the capitalist regime of February 1979 and the attitude of the working class towards it were concerned, history offered a rare occasion for all the disparate Fourth Internationalist tendencies to come together in making the same fundamental mistake of tail-ending the counterrevolution.
The differences between the various currents jumping on the bandwagon of class-collaboration were simply quantitative: from calling for “cooperation” with this counterrevolution to giving it “critical support”, and ending in descending degrees of support on the left wing, which only gave it “material, but not political” support (as if material support to a counterrevolution is not the worst political treachery!)9. And all this was argued whilst swearing allegiance to the theory of permanent revolution.
Let us repeat: the only reason Trotsky revived the debate around this theory was to combat those using Lenin’s formula of the democratic dictatorship to justify collaboration with the Kuomintang, whilst some of Trotsky’s epigones today are parroting this theory of ‘transition’ from democratic to socialist revolution to justify capitulation to a capitalist counterrevolution. Leaving emotions aside for the moment, this fact alone should be of serious concern for defenders of the theory.
Frankly, when, say, the American or the British Socialist Workers Party theoreticians - coming from such different traditions, but both claiming to be defenders of the theory of permanent revolution - take exactly the same position towards the anti-imperialism of the Iranian regime as those still flying the Stalin flag in Iran (even worse - they are to the right of Stalinism), is it not time to wonder if there is still value today in defending this division? In fact it was the Iranian Trotskyists who rightly said in 1981: “In the hands of a worrying number of sections of the FI today the theory of permanent revolution has in fact become the last refuge of the Stalinist revolution by stages.”10
One thing is obvious. Trotsky himself certainly linked this theory to a definite epoch - the epoch of imperialism, the epoch of capitalist decline and decay. Indeed the whole theory of uneven and combined development which underpins Trotsky’s strategy was itself derived from a certain definition of this epoch and the particular way it combines backward, pre-capitalist elements with modern capitalist ones. But ‘the imperialist epoch’ itself has definitely changed now, and not by a small degree, but following around a century of international capitalist development, ending in what we call ‘globalisation’ today.
It is not being proposed here that we must change our analysis of the epoch as one of capitalist decline. However, as emphasised above, we are not concerned here with the permanency within the socialist revolution itself or the process of world revolution as such, but the first aspect of Trotsky’s theory or the starting point of this process in the countries of the periphery. Just one commonly accepted change within the world system is fundamental enough on its own to call into question the usefulness of Trotsky’s “transition” theory today. I am referring here to the change in the class character of the state within the backward countries, which is of course crucial in any Marxist analysis of revolutionary strategy.
Trotsky - both in 1904-06, when he developed the theory, and in 1928-29, when he was defending it against the Stalinist attacks - was obviously referring to pre-capitalist countries ruled by non-bourgeois classes. Why else should he say in 1906 that Russia was “approaching the bourgeois revolution”11 if indeed the bourgeoisie had already achieved state power? Thus in the eyes of Trotsky himself the whole concept of transition depends on the starting point of a non-bourgeois state. But, in how many countries of the periphery today do we have similar conditions to Russia or China of the early 20th century? Who has seriously claimed that countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Iran, India, Philippine, Egypt, etc are still dominated by pre-capitalist economies with pre-capitalist ruling classes?
Leaving aside important questions of how some countries got pushed to the periphery of the world economy or how backward they still are, one important fact is clear and must be our starting point - and that is the transformation, invariably from above (and not via bourgeois democratic revolutions), that has taken place over the last century in the class nature of the state in these countries. It can clearly be said today that in more or less all the backward countries we have a bourgeois state. In the vast majority of the backward capitalist countries today, most democratic tasks have not been resolved - there has not usually been revolutionary change involving the masses, but transformation from above - but nevertheless, the class nature of the state and the dominant relations of production have been ‘bourgeoisfied’ precisely due to their further integration within the world capitalist economy - a process which in its international spread has been particularly noticeable since the 1960s.
These societies as a whole may still be backward - call them ‘dependent’, ‘neo-colonies’ or whatever you like, but they are backward, ‘dependent’, ‘neo-colonial’, capitalist economies. A ruling class which rules by reproducing backwardness must, of course, be even more backward than what it defends; it may even be created out of thin air from a combination of the most odd historical characteristics; but it is nevertheless a bourgeois ruling class which pays its dues, in lesser or larger degrees, to remain a junior member of capital’s global club.
To cut a long story short, this fact alone is enough to back up the claim, therefore, that there is hardly anywhere left in the world today where the first aspect of the theory of permanent revolution can be usefully applied. If you have a bourgeois state, what you have ahead of you is called a socialist revolution and not a growing over, or the transition, of the democratic to the socialist revolution.
Permanent or combined?
The fact that we still have plenty of historically postponed democratic tasks facing backward countries today does not make the impending revolution democratic when the very state that the revolution will face is itself a bourgeois state. Whatever ‘bourgeois’ democratic tasks remain can only be resolved by the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.
There are still many unresolved democratic tasks - in the advanced capitalist countries too. Has, for example, separation of religion from the state or the abolition of hereditary rule been achieved everywhere? Has the national question been resolved in a ‘united’ Europe? In any case, to call all democratic tasks ‘bourgeois’ is itself a historical confusion. For a start where and when did the bourgeoisie on its own initiative ever bring about democracy? Just because democratic demands by definition do not call into question bourgeois domination it does not mean they are bourgeois demands.
Any proletarian revolution anywhere, including in the G7 countries today, will face combined democratic and anti-capitalist tasks. The difference is only one of degree. The revolutionary strategy in backward capitalist countries with a bourgeois state can therefore be nothing but a proletarian revolution with combined tasks. What is then left of the need for a theory explaining the way a democratic revolution grows over into a socialist one?
Of course, it can be said that Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution is in fact equivalent to calling for a proletarian revolution with combined tasks. Agreed. Indeed this is more or less what Trotsky himself said in Results and prospects. If we can replace the concept of transition from democratic to socialist revolution with a proletarian revolution with combined tasks, then all is fine and nothing more drastic is being proposed here. But part of the current confusion is precisely because of the concept of “transition” between two revolutions.
One of the problems with this theory, as with most others, is the fact that its core must be separated from the way the author arrives at it. When Trotsky chose to use this term rather than the straightforward ‘proletarian revolution’, he probably had the same assumptions as Lenin or Martov. The starting point of all Russian Social Democrats at the time was the ‘fact’ that Russia was facing a ‘bourgeois revolution’. Of course, Trotsky alone argued that to succeed it would have to grow over into a socialist one, but his starting point cannot be detached from the method he arrived at for this theory.
He clearly states that by calling the Russian Revolution a bourgeois revolution he meant that “the immediate objective tasks of the revolution” consisted in the creation of “normal conditions for the development of bourgeois society as a whole”.12 You can question whether this alone was enough to call the impending revolution bourgeois, but at least Trotsky had a need for the term permanent to explain the “transition” from this bourgeois revolution to a socialist one. What need does that term serve today when we are faced with combined anti-capitalist and democratic tasks against a bourgeois state?
If you forget for a moment the first part of Trotsky’s theory about the “transition” from the democratic to the socialist revolution and concentrate on the second part, which states, “… the democratic tasks of backward nations lead directly, in our epoch, to the dictatorship of proletariat”, this in fact is nothing but a proletarian revolution with combined tasks. Even if we agree that Trotsky’s starting point of the “impending bourgeois revolution” is no longer relevant today, what in fact he is saying is still valid regardless of that starting point: only a proletarian leadership of the revolutionary movement and the establishment of the dictatorship of proletariat can solve the remaining democratic tasks of backward nations. Thus, even if the revolutionary movement begins around bourgeois-democratic demands, it will only succeed if it leads to a socialist revolution, which will both solve the democratic tasks of the revolution and embark on the transition to socialism.
What needs to be said today is not dissimilar. In the backward countries, any revolutionary struggle around any democratic or anti-capitalist demands, single or combined, can only be successful if it ends in socialist revolution. Surely, even if this is called just another interpretation of Trotsky’s permanent revolution, then it makes all the more sense to stick to this clearer formula and not muddy the waters with the insertions of the concept of “transition” into revolutionary strategy.
In fact, not only Trotsky’s own original formulations, but also his earlier defences of his own position after the October revolution, or even his later returns to the subject when in exile, all point more to this ‘combined’ character of the Russian Revolution rather than a “growing over” or a “transition” of a democratic revolution to a socialist one. So where and how does this “transition”, referred to in 1929 as a “central” idea of the theory, actually occur?
Here it has to be said that within the Russian Social Democratic literature of the period it seems the usage of the term ‘democratic revolution’ is somewhat broad. It is used to refer to three related, but entirely different, phenomena. It is employed as a reference to bourgeois democratic revolutions per se (ie, a revolution after which a bourgeois state is established), but also to describe a mass revolutionary movement around democratic demands (for example, the mass movement against autocracy or the peasant movement for land reform), or the actual activity of carrying out democratic tasks (for example, the solution of the agrarian question after the October revolution).
So when Trotsky says in 1904 that what we have in front of us is a “democratic revolution”, what he really means is that the revolutionary movement in Russia is mobilised around democratic demands. Let us not forget that in 1904, after a series of humiliating defeats in the war with Japan, an unprecedented revival of political activity was seen in Russia against the autocracy, led mostly by the zemstvo (local elective bodies dominated by liberal landlords) which organised an open convention in November in St Petersburg demanding a democratic constitution.
The flexible meaning attached to democratic revolution is even more confusing in Lenin. For example, three years after the October socialist revolution, when talking about the first few months of the revolution, he says: “Was the revolution a bourgeois revolution at that time? Of course it was, insofar as our function was to complete the bourgeois revolution …”13 Obviously he does not mean Russia had a bourgeois revolution after a socialist revolution; he simply means the anti-feudal tasks of the revolution were carried out during the first few months of the dictatorship of proletariat.
Therefore, bearing in mind the above qualification, there is definitely a possible and, one could say, well backed interpretation of Trotsky’s idea of transition from one revolution to the other, which will occur historically at the moment the dictatorship of the proletariat is established. In this view Trotsky’s permanent revolution becomes very close to a kind of democratic revolution with proletarian leadership.
This is in fact exactly how Trotsky at first developed his theory in 1904.14 He regarded the revolutionary process in Russia as essentially bourgeois democratic, with the bourgeois forces incapable of leading it. The revolutionary working class must therefore take the leadership of this movement and overthrow the autocracy. The subsequent elaborations after the 1905 revolution in Results and prospects do not go beyond this strategy except for one major shift - and that is the introduction of the concept of transition to a socialist revolution. It was now clearly stated that the proletarian rule will not stop at the democratic stage or the minimum programme, but grow over into a socialist revolution.
In the preface to the re-issue of Results and prospects in 1919 this seems to be indeed exactly how Trotsky himself is formulating it:
“… the revolution, having begun as a bourgeois revolution as regards its first task, will soon call forth powerful class conflicts and will gain final victory only by transferring power to the only class capable of standing at the head of the oppressed masses: namely, to the proletariat. Once in power, the proletariat not only will not want, but will not be able, to limit itself to a bourgeois democratic programme … It must adopt the tactics of permanent revolution: ie, must destroy the barriers between the minimum and maximum programme of social democracy, go over to more and more radical social reforms and seek direct and immediate support in revolution in western Europe.”15
But is this really a transition from one revolution to the next or just one revolution with a combination of tasks? Does, for example, the ‘completion’ of the bourgeois revolution have to happen before socialist tasks are placed on the order of the day? Obviously, immediately after October both democratic and socialist tasks were being carried out simultaneously. Lenin, in the same passage quoted above says a few lines later: “… at the same time [ie, at the same time as ‘completing the bourgeois revolution’], we accomplished a great deal over and above the bourgeois revolution for the socialist, proletarian revolution” (original emphasis).
Here again what is being described is nothing but a proletarian revolution with combined tasks. There are two revolutions only if you first equate revolutions with revolutionary movements or with measures in carrying them out, and there is only a transition if you think these tasks must be carried out separately or sequentially.
Notes
1. L Trotsky The permanent revolution and results and prospects New York 1976, p131. My emphasis throughout, unless otherwise indicated.
2. Ibid p132.
3. Marx’s concept of “revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat” is based on the understanding that the transition to socialism is itself a revolutionary period, in which the old social relations are constantly undergoing change. There are also numerous references in both Marx’s and Engels’ writings as to why socialism requires the combined efforts of a number of ‘civilised nations’.
4. Indeed Trotsky’s Results and prospects still remains one of the best applications of the theory of uneven and combined development of capitalism to the question of revolutionary strategy.
5. H Ticktin, ‘Trotsky, 1905 and the anticipation of the concept of decline’, in B Dunn, H Radice (eds) 100 years of permanent revolution London 2006 (also very useful for a summary of the historical debate).
6. Ibid.
7. Detailing Lenin’s change of position is not the issue under discussion here, but suffice it to say that since 1914, and increasingly with his understanding of the nature of the imperialist epoch, Lenin had on a number of occasions made the astute observation that, because the war had sharpened the class conflict between the working class and the bourgeoisie, whole sections of the petty bourgeoisie had now moved into the chauvinist camp. The change in the class character of the state after the February revolution convinced him that this split was now complete.
8. Of course, Trotsky’s occasional returns to this theory itself span a whole historical period, in which many changes within the world capitalist system were being absorbed and integrated into the original formulations. But the comparison being referred to here is one between the world roughly before and after World War II.
9. A la Gerry Healy, Jack Barnes and Ernest Mandel, respectively.
10. From a reply by the leadership of the Iranian SWP to a letter from Ernest Mandel.
11. L Trotsky The permanent revolution and results and prospects New York 1976, p126.
12. Ibid p36.
13. VI Lenin, ‘New tasks and old mistakes in a new guise’ CW Vol 33, Moscow 1966, p22.
14. See L Trotsky, ‘The proletariat and the revolution’ (1904): www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1918/ourrevo/ch02.htm
15. L Trotsky The permanent revolution and results and prospects New York 1976, p31.
