21.05.2008

Mirage of bourgeois democracy

The crushing of workers' opposition and suppression of the Kurds shows that the state has not relaxed its grip. Esen Uslu examines the situation in Turkey against the background of economic crisis and military plot

Turkey has passed through a crisis-ridden year. The attempts by the ruling class to resolve those crises have had severe consequences for working people, the Kurds and other minorities, as well as Cypriots. The war in Kurdistan reached a new stage; the attack on the rights and freedoms of working people intensified; and the hopes for unification of Cyprus within the framework of the European Union were dashed once more.

However, in none of these major problems has Turkish finance capital been able to gain the political initiative or obtain public support for its policies. As the interests of finance capital are clearly against the interests of the majority of working people, it has been unable to achieve its targets through the ‘normal’ processes of bourgeois democracy. It has needed deception and occasionally brute force to maintain its ascendancy over society’s divergent forces.

Economic assault

In order to achieve its economic aims Turkish finance capital has needed the full support of international finance capital. And to receive the necessary credits to meet Turkey’s international debt repayments compliance with International Monetary Fund stipulations was demanded.

The IMF programme imposes tighter financial discipline on the public purse and calls for the harmonisation with international norms of Turkey’s antiquated and nationalistic policies and practices, which have hindered the free flow of international capital, financial services and profits. In fact this programme is fully in line with the needs of Turkish finance capital, even if it cannot be openly presented as such to the working people. It will inevitably erode living standards, acquired rights and freedoms - even if it had been imposed during a boom the continued acquiescence of the working class could not be maintained during a recession.

Until last year’s major hike of oil prices economic circumstances were indeed favourable. Industrial output and growth increased. The newly adopted European method for calculating income per capita showed that it had risen above $7,500. Export earnings were also on the rise.

However, that rosy picture hid some nasty realities. Imports were rising faster than exports and consequently the financing of the ever increasing deficit through short-term borrowing and hot-money circulation in and out of the country was putting more and more strain on overburdened public finances. With the credit and mortgage crisis in the major capitalist countries, the economic downturn became apparent. Fluctuations in the value of major currencies started to put a brake on exports. The downturn will adversely affect the expansion areas of finance capital, and the Turkish economy may grind to a halt yet again.

Moreover, despite the economic upturn the unemployment rate was not getting any lower. As new investments took up the slack, labour productivity rose in line with increased production, and new jobs were insufficient to make any impact on this chronic problem.

These economic circumstances added to, and made more visible, that part of the working class that is employed by the big international companies, especially in the automotive sector. They are mostly younger workers, educated in vocational schools, selected from a pool of students and trained as apprentices, and they are highly skilled. They receive comparatively high wages and work in better conditions. However, they are not only selling their labour-power: their hearts and minds belong to the company as well. Despite their individual and collective skills, they do not make use of their potential to defend their own interests in an organised and creative manner. Being non-unionised is the norm for these workers and until the next severe economic crisis that is highly unlikely to change.

However, the main bulk of working people have been chasing the ever decreasing number of employment opportunities with their reduced wages and lack of rights. They are forced to accept ‘irregular’ work - that is, no social security or tax deductions, and cash wages in return for unprotected labour in unspeakable conditions. They are sackable at the slightest whim of the boss. This sector, the ‘black economy’, operates beyond the record and control of the state authorities. Not only are its workers outside the taxation system: they have no health insurance, pension or minimum wage protection.

A prime example for such employment conditions can be seen in the shipyard district of Tuzla, which is about 30 miles east of Istanbul. During the last year at least two accidents took place every week in one of the shipyards, and nearly two workers died every month. Each shipyard, with their numerous subcontractors and labour agencies, has only a few regular employees. The rest of the workers have no protective equipment nor health and safety training, and they work 12-hour shifts without any basic amenities. On top of that most are forced to perform unpaid overtime.

No health or safety measures are available apart from those absolutely necessary for show purposes. Neither the state nor municipal inspectors visit the shipyards. If they arrive, the shipbuilding companies may offer to pay a comically low fine, in exchange for the inspectors’ agreement not to enter the shipyards. Not even a parliamentary committee that was visiting the region was allowed to see the conditions with their own eyes. This is the situation in shipbuilding, which has been recognised as one of the growth industries of recent years.

This system works because behind those workers stand the millions of unemployed (and unemployable). A recent striking example was provided by a journalist visiting a small town in Kurdistan. The journalist saw young men sitting on their heels in the main square, and asked them what they were waiting for. They replied that they were waiting for police work. The startled journalist asked if they were all eligible to be appointed as policemen. They corrected him, saying that they were waiting for newly appointed police officers to move into their quarters so that they could carry in their furniture, and remove the belongings of those leaving town. They expected this would be the only opportunity for gainful employment for some time.

Health and pensions

Turkish finance capital, faced with this situation, has been trying to reduce social spending. The tax and contributions base has been reduced by the fact that taxation was so high in the first place, thus fuelling the black economy. In addition, state economic enterprises, which previously brought in revenue, if not profits, were sold off during the privatisation drive.

All this has adversely affected welfare. For example, although state pensions are very low, the ratio between the number of people paying a contribution and those receiving a pension has been turned upside down: intake does not meet the cost of pensions paid. The accumulated assets of the social insurance system had already been raided to finance state expenditure in a period of high inflation and credit squeeze. The pension system is in crisis, with obligations being met by transfers from the budget.

Similarly the decrepit public healthcare system has been deprived of investment for a long period. The solution chosen was the removal of restrictions on private healthcare provision. Private hospitals quickly mushroomed across Turkey, and officially employed people - ie, those who are paying insurance contributions - were granted access to those hospitals, provided they made a hefty contribution to their own medical bill. A very Blairite solution to reduce the waiting list maybe, but it was also a hidden transfer of public funds to the private health sector. While that was presented as a major achievement of the government, the ever increasing price of private healthcare, and the growing bill paid to the pharmaceutical industry, put still greater strain on public finances.

Such leakage from the treasury was unacceptable to Turkish finance capital. The money accumulated in the public purse is supposed to be used for cheap credit and subsidies for itself, and spent on the infrastructure required to create a ‘healthy’ investment environment. Therefore healthcare and the pension system must be reorganised by shifting a greater burden onto the workers. Thus the IMF programme called for urgent action to control public spending through a new insurance and pensions bill. The government hesitated for a while, but in the end decided to bite the bullet.

Its draft bill, eroding the acquired rights and benefits over a period of many years, was put before the trade unions for discussions. After a few short sessions, the non-islamist unions walked out, and campaigning against the bill gathered momentum. However, the divided structure of the union movement was a major obstacle to unified action, although the public sector unions, despite their very limited rights, were more influential in reshaping some aspects of the draft law because of their political connections.

The political division of the trade union movement has played into the hands of the government. The islamist trade unions of the HAK-IS confederation were on the rise thanks to government assistance, while the left in DISK, and the traditional rightwing unions within TURK-IS were losing membership and influence because of the government’s blatantly obstructionist policies. HAK-IS supported the draft bill and got some token concessions from the government in exchange.

During the winter months a prolonged campaign was waged. Many demonstrations were held in all cities across Anatolia and in Ankara, and the campaign peaked in mid-March, when a two-hour walkout was held. The calls for a general strike from the left were never picked up by the unions.

After May Day, the government’s draft finally became law. Both the period of insurance contributions for pension qualification and the retirement age were increased. Many other rights, protections and fringe benefits for women, children, the handicapped, etc were removed or slashed. Reductions in widows’ and self-employed pensions and farmers’ health insurance were also imposed, together with the tightening of entitlement conditions.

Now the next stage of the package is due to be introduced. Seniority benefit (a lump-sum payment made to retiring workers, based on their final wages and the period spent in the workplace) will be the first target. The second target will be the law regulating trade union activities, including union recognition, collective bargaining and regulations for strikes, redundancies and lockouts.

Brutality on May Day

May Day came at the peak of the campaign against the insurance and pensions bill. One of the main reasons for suppressing the May Day demonstration had been the heightened discontent of the workers at the end of a long campaign against the new laws. On April 6 a major demonstration was held in Istanbul and although there was stormy weather it was one of the best attended rallies of recent years.

The AKP (Justice and Development Party) government - despite its liberal credentials, which were very handy when it was talking against the ban imposed on the hijab - was adamant. It would not give an inch to the demands of the unions for a demonstration in a central square of Istanbul, where the glorious May Day demonstrations of the 70s had been held. The unions from different confederations were unable to maintain a unified front in the face of the increasing pressure of the government, and TURK-IS withdrew from the preparations. The leadership of the remaining confederations put their trust in negotiations with the government, instead of organising the workers and instilling them with a healthy distrust of the state. They calculated - or hoped - that they could get a last-minute concession, as happened over the May Day demonstration of 2007.

The government, however, refused to give ground, and warned it would use “controlled force” to prevent any unlawful gathering. There was a massive degree of preparation, including the deployment of police officers and equipment from far-flung corners of the country, as well as a massive presence of the gendarmerie as a back-up force.

On May Day itself, the police erected a ring of steel around the square and did not allow anybody in. They launched wave upon wave of baton charges, backed up by the liberal use of tear gas and water cannon from the very early hours, thus preventing marchers from gathering outside DISK headquarters. Even people walking together in the vicinity were attacked and sent packing in the most brutal manner.

Towards midday the DISK leadership gave up and abandoned the action. However, the revolutionary core of youth and workers continued to clash with the police late into the night. More then 500 people were arrested, although many were released the next day.

TV channels broadcast the police brutality live, and the next day a whole range of bourgeois politicians were criticising the government’s handling of the impasse and the police behaviour. Within three days, however, it was as though everything was forgotten, and business was back to usual. The action of two police officers was found to be ‘below the highest standard’ and they will now face a disciplinary hearing. There is also a parliamentary motion to censure the minister of interior affairs - which will, of course, be voted down by the AKP majority.

Past and present

The tension between the AKP government and the top echelons of the military and civilian bureaucracy and security establishment has reached a stage where it can no longer be hidden. On the other hand, a new spirit of cooperation has also been found.

The innuendos and hints mentioned en passant in the bourgeois press over the last few years have now built up into a torrent. We recently learned that in 2001, 2004, 2006 and 2007 military juntas have attempted to change the government or take it over directly. On several occasions the top brass has met with business leaders to sound out support. Invitations were requested from influential lobbyists to visit the US in order to gather backing for such projects. Detailed plans were prepared for operations Moonlight and Blonde Girl. Meetings were held where plans were presented to prospective supporters.

One of the generals involved even kept a diary covering these plans, which has since been published in the journal Nokta (Point). The editor was charged with “disseminating false information” and the owners were put under pressure to close the weekly. The case concluded in the acquittal of the editor, but not before it was established that the information published was indeed from the computer of the said officer.

It was also revealed that members of the junta had used rightwing Turkish Cypriot politicians to pre-empt negotiations in order to foil the government’s attempts to gain European Union membership status for Cyprus, and to find a solution to the Cyprus question within the EU framework.

When the generals failed to gain sufficient support either internally or externally, they set about building up the necessary momentum through terrorist tactics, including assassinations. They organised the bombing of newspapers and the murder of a judge. They also used secretly acquired public funds to set up several NGOs (!), buy TV stations and even attempted to buy a daily newspaper. The previous year they had organised a series of nationalist mass rallies. These were part and parcel of the psychological warfare aimed at creating a general mood of insecurity and instability, plus a desire for peace and order; and to organise mass support for nationalist, racist and xenophobic causes.

In the end they forced a face-off. This resulted in the infamous press release of the chief of general staff that was placed on his website at midnight on April 27 2007. While that statement put pressure on the highest court to overturn any possible parliamentary action of the AKP government, it also had the effect of stopping the attempted military takeover which might have undermined discipline within the armed forces.

However, the early election the junta forced last summer produced far worse results for it than its most pessimistic predictions. The AKP government came back with vengeance, and the nationalist parties the junta had hoped to see victorious failed miserably. The junta was knocked off balance and failed to act to stop the appointment of an islamist as president.

With all this information now available, you would think that in any democracy worthy of the name these scum would be put on trial. Not under Turkish democracy! Here the army top brass, high-level bureaucrats and security services have immunity from such irritants. Only a few minnows, including retired officers, were arrested and put on trial. The leaders are well protected and still occupy influential positions in society at large as well as within the bureaucracy.

By contrast the AKP, along with the DTP (Democratic Society Party), has been summoned before the supreme court in a hastily drawn up indictment to close them down. In other words, the two parties which during last year’s election were supported by an overwhelming majority in the provinces that may be described as Turkey’s Kurdistan are now facing closure, yet the junta leaders remain at large.

War in Iraqi Kurdistan

The AKP made a deal with the top brass after the foiled military takeover last year. They gave the army command a free hand in Kurdistan. The quickly changing international situation, especially the new priorities of the USA in Iraq, provided an opportune moment for the Turkish military. The US had shifted its policy during the ‘surge’ and started to place a greater emphasis on obtaining and maintaining the support of sunni Arabs.

That shift was noted by the senior Iraqi Kurdish politicians such as Nawshirwan Mustafa who used to be one of the top officials of the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Jalal Talabani’s power base) until he resigned in late 2006. In a press release published by the Hawlati newspaper printed in Suleimaniyah, he said:

“Now, if we look, we see that the weight of Kurdistan is waning in the American balance of power, especially after the shi’ites have reorganised themselves and the sunnis have created the sahwas. American interests in Iraq entail paying greater attention to the shia and sunnis than the Kurds. The role of Turkey in this equation is also important.” (www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2008/5/independentstate2187.htm: the sahwas are the pro-American and moderate islamist ‘awakening councils’ formed as a part of the ‘surge’).

As part of this shift the Americans allowed Turkish cross-border operations to a limited extent, with targets identified by US intelligence and passed to the Turkish side. The Turkish air force showed off its recently acquired capability for all-weather low-level precision bombing raids day or night.

The Turkish side was also to start conducting unmanned reconnaissance flights with the assistance of the Israelis. Combined with the extended reconnaissance and intelligence provided by US forces, precision attacks were unleashed over the strip of land along the border in Iraqi Kurdistan where Kurdish guerrillas used to be free to operate. Now any fixed structure in the region has become a death trap.

Beginning in spring of last year, the army massed soldiers and equipment in the border region, awaiting the opportunity to launch its cross-border operation. Finally a large-scale foray into Iraqi Kurdistan, albeit for a short period of time, was conducted. The attack was supported by long-range artillery based on the border, as well as armoured vehicles and tanks which went into Iraqi territory. Since the first massive operation, several small cross-border raids have also been carried out.

While all this military activity was grabbing the attention, the plan to replace all commando units of conscripts with fully professional soldiers trained in counter-insurgency was put into effect. The recruitment and training of the first batch has now been completed and while they are being deployed, the next batch is being recruited and trained. In this the military has crossed another traditional line of demarcation with the transformation of the citizen army into a mercenary force. Of course all this was implemented free of parliamentary or any other type of public scrutiny.

Despite these large-scale incursions into Kurdistan, the basic problem remains unresolved. Any short-term suppression of guerrilla activity in Iraqi Kurdistan or the driving away of guerrilla command and logistic centres further afield would not remove the contradictions that led to such a prolonged war in the first place. Since 1985 successive generations of young fighters have joined the guerrilla movement, hence maintaining its momentum. The commander of land forces has conceded this point, admitting that, despite military achievements, the state has failed to stop Kurdish youth joining the guerrilla forces in the mountains.

Despite heavy losses the Kurdish guerrillas have maintained the capacity to strike. The most recent example came last week when Kurdish guerrillas raided an army unit stationed near the border, and after a battle that continued all night inflicted severe material damage and loss of life.

The AKP government has no policy other than the military option which has historically failed to provide a solution. The prime minister, basking in the glory of recent military achievements, has issued passionate calls to the guerrillas to come down from the mountains and surrender to save their lives. However, he is still adamant that Kurdish language broadcasting by private media cannot be allowed. Leyla Zana has yet again been put on trial, facing an indictment which calls for 60 sixty years in prison for her speeches in support of jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Despite the peaceful nature of the mass demonstrations in big cities during the spring equinox celebrations on March 21, many were brutally suppressed by the police and gendarmerie.

The only channel left available for legal Kurdish politics, the DTP, is facing a new ban, and Kurdish democrats have already formed a ‘spare tyre’ called the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), correctly assessing that the trial of the DTP will be nothing but a rubber-stamping event. They are determined to maintain the continuity of their legal presence in political life.

The battle will be renewed with the approaching local elections in Kurdish cities and towns. The Turkish nationalist parties, including the MHP (Nationalist Action Party) and the ‘social democratic’ CHP (Republican People’s Party) have been wiped out in the Kurdish provinces, leaving the only viable option against the Kurdish nationalist movement as the AKP, if it manages to win the support of most of the reactionary islamic forces and collaborating tribes. That would be important in maintaining the modus vivendi between the army top brass and moderate islamists.

The rising islamist bourgeoisie of the Anatolian towns, the most reactionary islamist Kurds and mercenaries in the service of the state, together with the ultra-nationalistic, ultra-racist, ultra-secular civilian and military bureaucracy, are all united in the need to defeat the proletarian challenge. In this they are acting as servants of local and international finance capital, despite each in their own way opposing it in their rhetoric.

That has been the success of finance capital: in hitching all the horses to its cart so that they pull together in the same direction at the end of the day. And as long as finance capital maintains that ability, bourgeois democracy in Turkey will remain a mirage.