24.03.2005
Tactical retreat on pensions
With just days to go before the March 23 joint 24-hour strike in defence of pensions by members of Unison, TGWU, Amicus, Ucatt and PCSU - which would have involved between 1.2 and 1.5 million workers - the whole thing was called off. Right up to a week before the strike desperate attem pts by all unions to win some concessions or at least more negotiations were met with intransigent refusal by deputy prime minister John Prescott. According to The Times, Tony Blair then intervened at a cabinet meeting and "blamed colleagues for mishandling the reforms" (March 19). On March 18 Prescott agreed to revoke the regulations being imposed on April 1 that would serve to raise the retirement age for local government workers from 60 to 65. However, 'parliamentary procedure' means this cannot be done until after that date. The retrospective regulations that will revoke this may not happen until after the election and it is not clear how it will work. Alan Johnson, work and pensions secretary, was given the role of opening negotiations. He wrote to Brendon Barber at the TUC asking him to broker talks. So we have a promise to revoke regulations that will nevertheless remain in force, and a promise to talk about something that was supposed to be non-negotiable. In my last article on the pensions dispute I wrote: "It is quite possible that [Unison general secretary Dave] Prentis could pull the plug if offered talks or a minor concession. This is possible with several unions - but Unison is the biggest and most immediately affected. With his eye on the forthcoming general secretary election, Prentis is talking tough, but in reality he is trying his damnedest not to be awkward" ('Political fight to defend pensions', February 24). On the very day that Prescott agreed to revoke the regulations and Johnson wrote to the TUC, Prentis did indeed pull the plug - and was followed by PCSU and the other unions the following Monday, March 21. Some mainstream commentators, as well as some on the left, regarded the government's move as a major climbdown to avoid what would have been two 24-hour strikes by up to eight unions across the whole of the public service in the run-up to the expected general election. Virtually the only factor considered is the relative power of the unions to embarrass a government which is already in election mode. In fact there are a multitude of factors at play. Whilst there are some more considered views on what might happen after the election, the analysis of what has just occurred is generally pretty shallow. The SWP goes so far as to say "had the strike gone ahead, the government could have been forced into total retreat over pensions"(Socialist Worker March 26). Idiots! It will take more than a one-day protest to cause the abandonment of an entire strategy. Now, of course, the battle is merely deferred to a time and circumstances more favourable to the government. Certainly, the extent of involvement and coordination between unions, albeit for a one-day strike, was more solid than the government was expecting. Also - quite unlike the last local government national pay claim that involved a joint strike by Unison, TGWU and GMB, not to mention Unison's laughable London weighting dispute - this time large numbers of non-union members were indicating they would be joining the strike. The importance of this issue to ordinary workers and the potential for it to escalate into a major fight impacts on the thinking of union bureaucracies, employers and government. For the union tops, including the 'reclaim Labour' group, they have to balance between being seen to do something on the one hand, and their horror of a Labour defeat, no matter how remote, on the other. They also wish to enhance their own position as important negotiators who have the ear of the employer and government and can get things done. Of these factors the priority for the dominant 'reclaim Labour' group is the re-election of what they nevertheless regard as their government. The situation for Mark Serwotka is somewhat different. Though not slavish to Labour, comrade Serwotka seems to fear isolation for the PCSU as one of the smaller unions and seems to lack confidence in its ability to sustain a major battle with the government (understandable, given the recent experience of the firefighters). Whilst he does appear less politically compromised, more democratic and more leftwing, his efforts to coordinate public sector unions, I think, display a combination of genuinely wishing to see a united, general fightback and the desire to find a degree of safety in numbers over this one issue. There is a downside to this. The PCSU, though offered negotiations on pensions, is now exposed to government attack on jobs in isolation. Trying to win support from the union bureaucracies may prove difficult. Having seen off the immediate threat of a strike over pensions, it will be easier for the government to decide the circumstances and timing on the question of jobs too. For the government the general election is certainly a consideration - but one of several. This is a climbdown, but not a major one. Its strategy remains absolutely intact and it is a question of adjusting tactics - only in that sense have the unions forced a retreat. But it is a retreat not only to avoid short-term difficulties, but also to take advantage of opportunities. Yes, it would be awkward to have a couple of big public sector strikes in the run-up to an election - even if the overall result is not really in doubt, such factors could contribute to a reduced majority. However, an important and somewhat unexpected strategic consideration has begun to develop. Whilst the government is no doubt confident of the union leaders' deference to its own electoral requirements, the coordination of eight or more major unions, however tentative, is for the ruling class a dangerous turn. In particular, its potential to boost rank and file morale and confidence, the opportunities for activists to link up across unions, the possibility of organising unofficial joint committees and so on - all these are easier to develop during an active struggle and must, for the government and employers, be thwarted at the earliest possible stage. Our weapon is unity in action; theirs divide and rule. The government therefore re-evaluated the current and potential threat and decided on tactics that would give it more room for manoeuvre and more options. It knew union general secretaries were gagging for a compromise - or just more talks. A tactical retreat that eased the pressure, got the union general secretaries in a cosy room, prevented the positive effects of a successful strike and, as a possible side benefit, helped isolate the PCSU and Serwotka was not something to be sneezed at. The government by retreating now has the initiative and the momentum is dissipated. It is now easier to push back pensions and, once the election is out of the way, hammer the PCSU. If successful this would dent morale and confidence generally in the union movement before battle is inevitably rejoined. For Dave Prentis the government's sudden commitment to negotiations "shows social partnership at its best". Is anyone convinced by this and does he really believe it himself? Similarly, very few are taken in by the left's talking up the extent of the climbdown. Like the SWP, the Socialist Party in England and Wales thinks that the government has "caved in, in such a way that will give workers confidence that they can win and force a complete retreat from the government" (SP website). I don't think so. The likes of Prentis have leapt at a deal to help the Labour government win an election, and trade union members know it. That will hardly inspire "confidence" that the leaders are looking after their interests. The most common comment I heard from Unison members at my workplace was "Arse-lickers!" It must be same in the PCSU. The SP tells us it is all down to its militants - a united display of strength forcing a government cave-in. Unfortunately, blowing your own trumpet, like farting in church, can end in a good deal of embarrassment. Preparing and activating the rank and file for a future battle and being able to hold leaders to account is problematic - especially when the two largest left groups, the SWP and the SP, are so clearly not up to the job. Interestingly, indeed unusually, the Unison United Left website carries an unsigned analysis which I suspect was written by defeated general secretary candidate Jon Rogers ('The pensions deal: success or sell-out?'). I do not agree with all of it, but it is a thoughtful attempt to explain where we are and what we should do. Alan Stevens