04.03.2004
Iran: mullahs in crisis
Victory for the ultra-right in the Iranian elections, far from strengthening the theocracy, has only served to expose its fragility. Addressing the CPGB's London Communist Forum on February 29, Mehdi Kia of the Organisation of Revolutionary Workers of Iran looked at the elections and the forces for change
The Iranian regime has two quite distinct structures. One is the theocracy - the ‘caliphate’ - on top of which sits the supreme leader, who has absolute and complete, almost divine power over all aspects of society. He is the direct interpreter of the word of god. In addition there exists a quasi-parliamentary structure - quasi-parliamentary because the theocracy controls the entire electoral process and vets the delegates to the majlis (parliament). The electorate is comprised of people over the age of 15, including women, but their choice is very much limited by the fact that the theocratic structure determines who can stand and therefore who can be elected. And even then all laws passed by parliament have to be accepted by a body called the Council of Guardians, which itself is appointed predominantly by the ‘supreme leader’.
One might ask, what is the point of having elections to a parliament which has no power whatsoever? In fact the regime needs elections for one very important reason: to allow it to claim popular legitimacy. That is why it can get everyone to vote - either by telling them it is a religious duty, or threatening that they will lose their right to university or a passport and so forth. Voting may not be compulsory, but there is enormous pressure and the numbers game is crucial. After the February 20 election, supreme leader Khameini said 50% of the people voted, which demonstrated that the regime is legitimate.
One might further ask, if parliament has no real power and all its actions are subject to the approval of the Council of Guardians, then why bother to vet the candidates? The reason is that parliament is the open forum for factional infighting - the place where the relative strength of the various factions is determined. Therefore it is quite important for each faction to try and get as many of its own people in as possible. The regime has always had factions and always will have. The simple reason for this is that it consists of an array of mullahs who believe they are interpreting the word of god. When such individual interpretations are translated into real-life policy, they inevitably result in the formation of factions. Whenever economic or political decisions relating to such matters as foreign policy have to be made, these factions also come into play.
Parliament, therefore, has essentially two main functions. First, through elections, it acts as a legitimiser of the regime. Secondly, the balance of the various factions within it determines who will fill certain positions and influence the policies to be pursued and so on. So, even in a parliament that really has no rights in terms of producing laws, it is still important that one’s own supporters are represented. The ultra-rightwing faction made sure it won control this time round by excluding 2,000 candidates, including 87 who had seats in the previous parliament. It was clear to most people that the right would see to it their own supporters were returned.
We can usefully look at the official figures for turnout in the seven parliamentary elections that have been contested since the islamists came to power. In the first election, 52% voted - quite low, but this was at a time when parts of Iran were almost outside the control of the regime: for example, Kurdistan. In subsequent elections, the respective turnouts were 64%, 60%, 57%, 71% and 67%. The last of these (the sixth election) was the occasion when the reformists got in and took over almost the entire parliament. This time, however, the turnout dropped markedly to 50.5% - the lowest ever.
It is interesting to focus on the figures for the big cities. For those living in a small town or village it is very difficult not to vote: they can cast a blank vote, but actually not to vote at all would be obvious to everyone. Remember that the Iranian revolution was essentially an urban revolution and that the urban population represents some 70% of the population as a whole. Taking this into account, let us compare turnout figures in the seven parliamentary elections for the country as a whole with those for Tehran: 61%, 60%, 43%, 39%, 55%, 47% and, this time, just 28% - a dramatic drop. Or take Isfahan: 61%, 69%, 60%, 49%, 67%, 60% and now down to 32%. In places like Kurdistan the turnout was as low as 18%.
It is clear, however, that, particularly in the smaller towns, there was a degree of ballot-rigging, so that even this 50% overall turnout was inflated, as in previous elections. Furthermore, the number of blank votes must be taken into account. Even the interior ministry concedes that some 15% of all ballot papers were blank and that in Tehran this figure reached 25%. The effect of all this can be illustrated by the fact that in the capital (population: 13-14 million) the best placed candidate actually won just 12.8% of all those entitled to vote - he was elected by one out of every eight of the population.
Although the reformists did not formally favour a boycott until their candidates were barred, the whole country had known since last year’s municipal elections that there would be a boycott this time too. In effect, the reformists jumped on the bandwagon. They did not dare support the boycott until the regime itself gave them a pretext. The regime does retain a base of around four to five million people, on whom they have consistently been able to rely in elections, added to which are those whom they can bully, coerce or bribe.
The fact that the elections were, like last year’s municipal polls, effectively boycotted demonstrates the complete and utter bankruptcy of the reformist movement. People have just given up. In 1997 they elected a reformist in president Khatami, together with a parliament where the vast majority were reformists. The legislation they passed, although lukewarm, was blocked by the Council of Guardians. Not a single piece got through. So why vote for the reformists? They now say they want to go back to the grassroots, but I cannot see people falling for that, given their record.
It is important to understand that in Iran there is no such thing as a political party in the way that people in Britain would understand it. It is more appropriate to think of groupings or gatherings of politicians. They are not distinct entities: more circles that intermingle with one another. The edges are blurred.
There are, though, three major blocs. First, the arch-conservative or ultra-right bloc, which has its hands on not just all the unelected powers of the state, but also now all the elected powers. It controls the army, the Revolutionary Guards and the judiciary - in fact everything. Secondly, there are the reformists, who work within the structures of the islamic republic. They want to reform these structures, to reduce the power of this or that organ, but they nonetheless accept the overall constitution. I want to reiterate that these two blocs are not separate entities. They actually overlap with each other. Thirdly, there is the movement which stands outside the official structures, the movement that wants to go beyond the islamic republic and establish a secular state.
It is essential not to think of these things as rigid, but as a dynamic process, in which people can and do move between the different blocs and back again, depending on the power structure, policies and so on.
Looking beyond this to the broader political picture, there are, for example, some 500 NGOs, dealing with issues such as women and children, ecology and what have you, which have formally been recognised. Then there are thousands and thousands of circles that have developed over the last 10-20 years, but more especially during the last six or seven years - people gathering together for education, political discussion or whatever. Huge, very fluid gatherings, whose real nature is sometimes intangible. Then you have the nationalities, who are also forming their own structures, some with highly chauvinistic and nationalistic agendas. There are some inklings of working class organisation - again very fluid and often primitive.
Then there is the external opposition. The monarchists, which contains a number of different tendencies, ranging from those favouring autocracy to those wishing for a constitutional monarchy, are relatively strong. The right republicans are essentially people who would like a state based on the western model, while the left republicans, consisting of a wide range of groupings and individuals, seek a form of democracy from below.
But perhaps a better way of looking at both those inside and outside the country is in terms of particular policies. In this respect it is possible to identify three large groups. One clearly views the Iranian people as backward, and the country as not amenable to any kind of internal reform. What is required is an outside force, capable of establishing a new order - essentially a colonial solution, as in Iraq or Afghanistan. Supporters of this model are quite clear - they want the US to intervene and take control. This group contains some of the monarchists, but also some republicans, illustrating how the complex divisions between monarchist and republican, religious and secularist, fall down when it comes to actual policy.
A second strand believes in a kind of liberal democracy. Its proponents would like some separation of religion and state, although they probably not averse to retaining some religious laws - on inheritance and so on - and allowing religion a certain privileged position, as in Britain, for example. They would like to repeal some, but not all, of the repressive laws, and set up a top-down parliamentary democracy, as in the west.
You can see two tendencies within this second strand. One thinks that the only problem is that there is no leadership. People are ready for this kind of model, but there is nobody to enforce it, so they too look towards America, Israel and the western countries to help them out. But they also have criticisms of these countries and cannot be viewed as simple stooges. The other tendency is slightly more radical. It models itself on Poland. It would like to see a popular movement, but one that is controlled in such a way that it will deliver a conventional parliamentary democracy.
Finally, there are those who want to create real grassroots democracy: self-organisation and control from below, both politically and in production and distribution, together with respect for diversity and the rights of the individual, alongside the rights of the group. Of course, this desire to stimulate the self-activity of the people at grassroots level must find articulation in concrete policies. It certainly means accepting plurality, both in terms of ideas and of society itself. Of course, creating this voluntary solidarity within a country will not make sense unless it is seen on a global scale of voluntary solidarity among people struggling for that same self-government.
The victory of the right has ramifications when it comes to relations with the US and the question of the so-called ‘axis of evil’. There is no doubt that the ultra-conservative leadership wants to deal directly with the Americans on such questions as nuclear capability. The clumsy effort to end the duality of the regime should perhaps best viewed in this light. In an effort to persuade the USA and Europe to deal with it, the regime has already been very helpful as regards Iraq (where it has promised millions towards reconstruction) and even more so as regards Afghanistan, where its has held back its clients in the west of the country. But the fact is that an islamic state, however pliable, does not correspond to the requirements of the neo-cons, if their intention is to create political hegemony in the region.
The ultra-conservatives in power model themselves essentially on the Chinese model: a certain amount of liberalisation, allowing foreign capital more scope to operate, but with everything remaining under a very tight grip. But, whereas China has the party, Iran lacks unitary political forms, and is handicapped by its fractional structures, so that any attempt to liberalise the economy along the Chinese model would surely weaken the hold of the existing regime.
Despite its victory in the elections, the regime is becoming more and more fragile. This does not mean that it is going to quickly fall, but I do not think it can survive in the long term. The regime rests on two pillars. Although it claims authority from god, it was born out of a revolution, and must therefore constantly seek to create the appearance of popular authority too. So the ‘democratic’ side is as vital to the regime as the religious side. The very fact that elections have been shown to be a sham and that there has been an effective boycott following the collapse of reformism weakens the regime. Effectively one pillar has been taken away.
The regime is hobbling on one leg and must inevitably fall. The issue, for the left, is who will push it over.