14.11.2002
Same horses, new riders
Aziz Demir analyses the mounting contradictions behind the November 3 elections in Turkey
For seasoned observers, for the working class left and for the Turkey-watchers of international finance capital, the overwhelming victory for the moderate islamists was the expected result. The previous national coalition government had been formed and kept together as a result of behind-the-scenes pressure from the National Security Council, which is nothing but the uniformed section of Turkish finance capital. It was hardly able to function as a government, and adopted only those measures deemed essential by the finance capital of Turkey and its international partners. The most significant act of the government had been to fend off two major economic crises by adopting the IMF's economic programme and coopting Kemal Dervish, the former vice-president of the World Bank, as the supra-finance minister, a kind of governor-general of all public finances on behalf of the IMF, in an attempt to secure the necessary substantial new loans. The second noteworthy act of the coalition government was to frantically pursue Turkey's bid to join the European Union over the last year. As the deadline for the enlargement process loomed closer, the administration was forced to hastily implement its promises to comply with the EU programme. After dithering for a long period over such thorny questions as the abolition of the death penalty, it grudgingly adopted some window-dressing legislation on human rights, although it dragged its feet on other issues, such as the ongoing occupation of northern Cyprus. However, the government's actions in both these spheres did not go down very well with its core supporters. The Nationalist Action Party (MHP), the ultra-nationalist, anti-Kurdish and pro-violence party of the infamous Grey Wolves, was obliged to change tack and voted to abolish the death penalty. In practice this meant commuting the death sentence on Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Kurdish uprising, resulting in a severe dent in the MHP's credibility - it owed much of its support in the previous election to its pledge to "hang Apo". It changed tack once again after the election was called, voicing opposition to EU membership and demanding that the constitutional court annul the decision to abolish the death penalty. Unsurprisingly such political zigzags did not help the electoral fortunes of this party at all. Collapse of coalition The Democratic Left Party (DSP) of the former social democrat, Ecevit, was exposed as a hapless stooge of the IMF and lost the last remaining remnants of the support it had clung onto in the previous elections. The younger and more ambitious rats tried to jump the DSP ship before it foundered, including the foreign minister and deputy prime minister. They resigned from the government, together with the IMF 'governor-general', precipitating the early election. They intended to form a new political party, in the anticipation that Dervish would join them before the elections, thus substantially boosting their chances. However, international finance capital did not deem this a viable project, and Dervish was asked to remain in post until the elections. He joined the Republican People's Party (CHP), which has emerged as the standard bearer of the social democrats, a very electable alternative. Denied their prize possession, the DSP opportunistically sought an electoral pact with the True Path Party (DYP), their traditional nemesis, which was also in the electoral doldrums. Again unsurprisingly, this attempt did not help the electoral fortunes of either of these parties. Political arena The elections were called in a situation where the Kurdish nationalist movement had been rapidly transforming itself from a guerrilla force into a political organisation. It saw an opportunity to achieve through Turkey's EU membership application a limited part of their national aspirations, such as mother-tongue education. However, a looming court case to close down the People's Democracy Party (Hadep) forced them, just before the elections, to establish a new front party, Dehap, with the participation of a couple of relatively small left parties. The Supreme Council of Elections, the state agency charged with running elections, received complaints that the newly formed Dehap did not comply with some qualifying requirements of electoral legislation. However, the state did not want to be seen preventing the participation of a Kurdish party - or, according to some cynics, it was happy to see Kurds wasting their votes - and decided to examine this complaint after the election. As for the islamists, the courts had closed down the main Welfare Party, and two smaller parties had emerged in its place. One of them, the Happiness Party (SP), remained true to the established tenets of islamist politics, and loyal to the previous leaders. This party remained rather stunted, as nobody saw any future in the old type of politics and leaders. However, the other new-born islamist grouping, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), with its rather young and more modern leadership, has since flourished. The AKP leader is the former mayor of Istanbul, and despite various financial scandals he gained popularity in the face of prosecution by the secular military authorities. More importantly, he openly flirted with Turkish and international finance capital and persuaded them that the party had curbed its former islamist extremism in favour of free market capitalism. He developed a populist election platform on unemployment, price hikes, and the unjust distribution of income. However, he remained banned from taking part personally in any elections thanks to an old court order. The AKP was attempting to occupy the traditional centre-right of Turkish politics. The existing contenders for this position, the Motherland Party (ANAP) of the governing coalition and the opposition DYP, were rapidly losing support. Election results Turkey's electoral legislation is a remnant of the 1980 military junta. The junta thought that the extremely restrictive laws it introduced were essential in order to safeguard the 'controlled democracy' it devised, and to ensure the formation of strong governments by avoiding any proliferation of political parties that would bring about unstable and undesirable coalition administrations. Despite several amendments enacted by the constitutional court since then, current electoral legislation still requires any political party to win at least 10% of country-wide valid votes in order to win a seat in any constituency. It is worth noting that this stipulation has since proved rather counterproductive for the designs of a military wishing to run the country from the shadows. Previous elections have thrown up a badly split Grand National Assembly (parliament). On one occasion the military felt impelled to come out into the open in order to oust the islamists from the government through a 'postmodern coup' (this is the military's own term, describing the events of February 1998, when the military pressurised the coalition government, where islamists were preponderant, into resigning through a show of force). On another occasion, again when the GNA was deeply divided, the military intervened to twist the arms of disparate political parties into forming a kind of national coalition government. Nevertheless, the 10% threshold was a major handicap for many parties in this election and it achieved its intended result. However, when it came to democratic representation, it was quite another matter. While 17 parties contested, only two ended up in parliament and the stipulation also ensured that Kurdish parties were kept out of the GNA. The two parties represented received the votes of only 40% of all the registered electorate - 51% of those who voted. Thus the electoral system permitted only one half of all voters a voice in the GNA, and kept the other half out. The system also produced a grossly distorted distribution of seats, completely disproportionate to the actual electoral support of the parties. The AKP got 10.8 million out of 32.6 million votes (33%), but these votes gave it 363 parliamentary seats out of a total 550 seats (66%). This is just short of the two-thirds majority needed to change the constitution. Similarly the CHP got 6.1 million votes (18%) and ended up with 178 seats (32%). The Kurdish provinces voted overwhelmingly for Dehap. But the two million votes it received county-wide (6%) were well below the national threshold and consequently kept it out of parliament. However, it is now the first party in 13 Kurdish provinces, with votes ranging from 20% to 56%. Furthermore it was either second or third in five other Kurdish provinces, with between 9% and 15%. The legislation, while keeping out parties with mass support such as Dehap, worked well for the independent candidates. They were supported by less then one percent of all voters, yet nine independents won seats (two percent of the GNA). Most are chieftains of Kurdish clans in the south-eastern provinces of Turkey, supported by their own tribal votes. (It must also be pointed out that tribal chieftains were not only elected as independents. There are 10 other Kurdish tribal leaders in the new parliament who were elected on an AKP or CHP ticket.) Furthermore, at least two of these tribal leaders declared their occupation as 'chief of village protectors' on their nomination papers. In other words they sided with the government during the uprising led by the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party), and their tribal forces were armed and deployed in counter-guerrilla roles by the state security apparatus. The remaining tribal leaders who were nominated decided that openly declaring their involvement in the counter-guerrilla offensive was not a good idea. At least two well-known sheiks (ie, leaders of religious orders) were also elected from Kurdish provinces. However, one prominent 'independent' candidate who failed to get the expected support was Necmettin Erbakan. Formerly the undisputed leader of islamist politics in Turkey, he was banned by a court order from becoming a founder, member or candidate of any political party. However, he utilised a quirk provision of the electoral legislation, and stood as an independent candidate in Konya, an islamist stronghold. As with the old-style islamist party, the SP, Erbakan also failed to gather electoral support in the face of a surging AKP. Robber baron party A new party was formed by the Uzan robber baron family - a dominant force in the media sector through private TV channels, telecommunications companies, etc over the last 10 or 15 years. European readers might have heard of them due to criminal court cases in New York and London over charges of defrauding Nokia and Motorola of millions of dollars through a mobile phone company in Turkey. This type of fraud is of course routine business practice in Turkey. For example, over the last decade privatised banks have been purchased with state credits - using the 'good services' of state-employed cronies. The available funds of these banks are channelled into subsidiaries belonging to the vendor companies in the form of unsecured loans. The loans are not repaid and the banks go bankrupt. As bank deposits are under state guarantee, the state takes over the bankrupt banks, but fails to recover a penny from the companies concerned. Beginning in April 2002, Uzan's holding company organised a series of 'concerts' with a star cast and used them as a platform to launch the Young Party (GP) in July. One of the Uzan clan, who has been under criminal indictment, became the leader. To be elected to parliament would mean parliamentary immunity from any legal proceedings, unless and until such immunity is removed by parliament. Shortly after the formation of the GP, an early election was called unexpectedly, and the project momentarily went off the rails. Uzan was unable to meet the electoral qualifying provisions, which only allows parties established a certain time in advance, and organised in more than half of Turkey's provinces, to take part. However, Uzan got round this by buying out the leaders of an existing party, muscling in on an extraordinary congress, where a 'merger' was organised. Uzan ran a shameless rightwing campaign, with the blessing of the MHP leaders. The concert-cum-election propaganda events, held at the largest venue in every province, continued, giving vent to nationalist, religious and anti-IMF sentiment. They made a mockery of the legislation intended to prevent private media companies unfairly influencing elections. A series of complaints to the Supreme Election Council and Supreme Radio-Television Council fell on deaf ears, and no action was taken against the Uzan companies. Their TV station was punished after the election, when its broadcasts were suspended for a short period. Uzan made wide use of unsolicited SMS messages through their own mobile phone company to make propaganda on behalf of their party. Complaints were ignored by the authorities - especially by the fascists in state employ, who were hoping to cling onto power after the elections when it became obvious that the MHP would lose. Uzan poured millions into the election campaign and was confident they could reach the 10% threshold and take over the fascist standard from the MHP. However, in the end, they got only eight percent, although 2.3 million represented the fifth highest total. Uzan finished just behind the MHP, which gained 2.6 million votes. They failed to get elected themselves and helped keep the MHP out into the bargain. Riders changed While the AKP nearly doubled the islamist vote in comparison to the vote received by Welfare Party (RP) in the previous election, it has toned down its islamism. It emphasises its pro-business, pro-IMF, pro-EU policies. The AKP leaders are taking it slowly and trying to allay the fears of secular sections of Turkish society. However, there is still considerable unease about the future course of the AKP government, especially concerning the secular aspects of the regime, and its relationship with the declared defenders of secularism, the armed forces. The general chief of staff is visiting the USA - whenever there is a critical political development in Turkey, members of the top brass are sure to be on a visit to the USA - and he has spoken guardedly about the election. He emphasised that the elections were fair and democratic, and held without any violence, that everybody would respect the will of the nation and that democratic procedures would be followed. At present the mouthpieces of Turkish finance capital are trying to calm jittery nerves. They have received a chorus of support from international finance capital - the US, EU and IMF have all indicated their willingness to work with the new government, stating that they would judge the AKP on its deeds, not its rhetoric. We should also bear in mind that a sword of Damocles is hanging over the party's head. A court case is still pending where the prosecution is demanding closure of the party on the grounds that it represents a continuation of a banned organisation. If the AKP does not tread gently and meekly do what finance capital requires, than this case could be brought back to life in order to bring the government down at once. Constitutional etiquette requires the president to invite the leader of the winning party to form a government. However, this time the leader in question is not even allowed to be a member of parliament. For the moment everybody is showing how flexible they are by attempting to find solutions to these kinds of difficulties. Communist Party of Turkey This election had also another interesting aspect. For the first time in the history of the Republic of Turkey a legal Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) took part. As readers may know, in June last year the Socialist Labour Party, an organisation with roots in the 1970s Turkish Workers Party, assigned a group of its members to form a legal Communist Party. That party was warned by the public prosecutor to change its name within a certain period of time on the grounds that forming a party bearing the name 'communist' would be against the law. Then in autumn, two parties joined forces and adopted the name, TKP. The public prosecutor warned the party again, but this did not sit easily with the government's attempts to bring Turkish legislation into line with the EU, as the TKP had anticipated. Legal moves ground to a halt and the TKP was allowed to contest, since it complied with the required qualification provisions of the law in other respects. The unexpected and opportunistic move by these legal socialists to form the TKP, without seeking principled unity based on a communist programme, has provoked loud protests from other communist organisations, which claim to be the rightful owners of this name. They are the remnants of the illegal TKP of the 1970s, each of them organised today around a legal publication. They have held occasional discussions for years on how to come together in one party, preferably a legal one. However, the talks between these organisations have never come to any positive conclusion. This legal TKP declined to take part in any electoral pacts with other left or Kurdish groups and obtained about 60,000 votes (0.2%). The Communist Party of Turkey issued an election statement, asking its members to vote for the legal TKP, as it has been the first party to use this name openly in elections. The CPT statement pointed out the legal-socialist aspects of the programme of the TKP and the inadequate nature of its organisation, and instructed its comrades to engage in constructive criticism of these aspects. The CTP called on its members to raise the demands of its revolutionary programme during the elections. It also reminded the TKP of its historical obligation to seek the unity of communists - an obligation that was assumed automatically when the name 'Communist Party' was adopted. The statement also pointed out that all parties taking part in the elections, from islamists to 'leftists', were engaged in support for the economic programme of Turkish finance capital, presented as the 'IMF economic programme'. The CPT said that the bourgeoisie would seek to consolidate and deepen its integration with imperialism. The attempt by the state to meet the requirements of finance capital has resulted in very high public borrowing. This never-ending debt has traditionally been charged to the working class and toiling masses in the form of high inflation. The latest economic crisis laid bare the extent of this debt and the economic programme imposed by finance capital was designed to shift its burden onto the working class by increasing taxation, reducing public investment in social services, privatising public services and laying off public sector workers. In its quest for integration with imperialism, finance capital wants to convert Turkey into a lucrative investment environment for world capitalism. This means reducing the wages of the working class to the levels prevailing in the underdeveloped countries that are competing directly with Turkey. In order to achieve this, it intends to intensify its attacks on rights and liberties. It wants to hamstring the trade unions, and increase the use of sub-contracting labour agencies and temporary labour, which are not covered by employment protection legislation. For the working class and toiling masses of Turkey, this would mean increased unemployment, poverty and the destruction of public services used by the working people - in short intensifying their exploitation and disarming them. While the working class wants decent living standards, respect for basic human rights, democracy and participation in the administration, the bourgeoisie offers them worse conditions, poverty, oppression and exclusion from the decision-making process. Same interests The deep contradictions of Turkey as a weak link of imperialism will not allow for the smooth running of a controlled democracy, because the working people are not prepared to accept the policies and programmes of finance capital. Today an islamist group has assumed a new role in representing the best interests of Turkish finance capital. But the road it intends to travel is full of potholes - it gained its mandate on the basis of a programme supported by workers and toilers against poverty, unemployment and dissatisfaction with the old political forces. There is nothing new this party can offer to the majority of working people. In a very short period of time the sham promises and real nature of its policies will be apparent. In the face of increased popular opposition, the inherent internal contradictions of this party will come to the fore and lead to an inevitable collapse. However, the question is, will the communists and other revolutionary forces be ready to meet such a challenge when it comes?
Worker