02.09.1999

Inconsistent democracy

Steve Riley opposes Jack Conrad’s arguments for a British-Irish federal entity in a united Ireland to exercise self-determination

The Weekly Worker is, no doubt, beginning a vociferous exchange on the national liberation struggle in Ireland and strategies for neutralising the Ulster loyalists.

The argument revolves around Jack Conrad’s position that consistent democracy in Ireland means “the protestant - British-Irish - minority having self-governing autonomy up to and including the right to separate” (Weekly Worker July 1). Since then this position has been the subject of fierce debate in a Party aggregate (July 11), a follow-up article by Marcus Larsen (Weekly Worker July 15), letters from supporters, four sessions at Communist University and, latest of all, comrade Conrad’s theses of August 26.

The new thinking has come about at a time of change in the circumstances of the Irish struggle. Its revolutionary situation is in an advanced state of being resolved in favour of imperialism. This also at a time when the politics of the CPGB are refocusing on democratic questions, assisted by talks with the Revolutionary Democratic Group and Alliance for Workers’ Liberty. Dave Craig of the RDG publishes regularly in the Weekly Worker, explaining his model of the ‘democratic revolution’. He influenced the CPGB in developing its policy for a federal republic of England, Scotland and Wales. Sean Matgamna is one of many AWL comrades to have spoken at CPGB forums. He has written in favour of repartitioning Ireland as a democratic solution to the loyalist problem. To be fair to comrade Craig he is not in favour of self-determination for the Ulster Protestants, reasoning that national rights are for nations only, and they are not a nation.

Through the pages of the Weekly Worker and its predecessor The Leninist is documented a history of principled communist propaganda, agitation and solidarity work in support of the Irish national liberation struggle. There is precious little in print however on the protestant working class, and still less on the loyalists. It is therefore perfectly apposite to develop our policy and programme in a manner that attempts to resolve the problem caused for revolution by the existence of loyalism.

According to CPGB orthodoxy, the identity of the Ulster Protestants is as an integral part of the Irish nation. The economy of the Six Counties is separate from that of Britain, and its culture has more in common with the rest of Ireland. The separate parts of Ireland are different in a manner akin to partitioned Korea, Germany and Vietnam. Local and British bourgeois rulers cemented the position of the protestants as a privileged labour aristocracy captured for loyalism. Obviously the character of the Protestants is not fixed. However, changes brought about during the ‘troubles’ have been towards greater xenophobia and sectarianism rather than towards revolution. In fact, with continued separation it is possible that the Six Counties could develop into a separate nation over time, in say 200 years (Jack Conrad, ‘Ireland’, part II The Leninist November 1984). Conrad now chooses to stress the differences and separateness of the Ulster Protestants, for different reasons.

Loyalism has been the only significant political movement to come out of the protestant working class in Ulster since partition. It emerged as the reflection of unionism in the class mirror: exclusive and brutal. Even where loyalism developed an antagonism to bourgeois unionism it has remained within the unionist paradigm, protecting the privilege it holds against the Catholics, who constitute for it a subclass.

Alan Merrik captured the character of the ‘class conscious’ loyalist well in a pair of articles, in 1987. The first was about a favourable interview in the Morning Star of Gusty Spence, UVF commander in Long Kesh and later a leading member of the Progressive Unionist Party. Then as today the PUP said that it would talk with the IRA, if it gave up the struggle for national liberation. Nevertheless, that has not stopped them targeting uninvolved Catholics for torture and assassination, as a means of instilling terror. The Merrik article characterised Spence and the PUP as ‘Strasserite’, the trend within the Nazi party that favoured a more workerist approach than that adopted by the Führer (The Leninist April 3 1987).

The second article was, remarkably, an interview with Gusty Spence’s brother Eddie, who had married a catholic and lived in a nationalist area of Belfast. His denunciation of the PUP as a semi-fascist organisation full of bigots could not be clearer. About his brother he said,

“I’m not saying that [he] didn’t try to break from sectarianism, but he never had the means … He didn’t see that the only real alternative is Marxism … He’s [now] gone back to the old ways of thinking. Loyalism, you know, is a reactionary thing. If you think you can change it from the inside you cannot break from sectarianism” (The Leninist July 17 1987).

The basis of Conrad’s new position is that he does not restrict the right of self-determination to nations. Indeed, Scotland and Wales are not ‘nations’, but ‘nationalities’, and the protestants are, he claims, sufficiently nation-like to warrant similar consideration. But how ‘nation-like’ are the Protestants? Often in these debates it is useful to refer to JV Stalin’s five features of nationhood (1913).

These are: (i) a stable community; (ii) a common language; (iii) a common territory; (iv) economic cohesion; (v) a collective character.

To deal with the easy one first; it is easy to say that the Ulster protestants have a common language. It is English. It is the common parlance shared by much of the rest of the world, including the 26 counties, but it is the language of the Ulster Protestants. The Ulster Protestants have much that is collective in their character too: they share a religion; they share a range of cultural outlooks, including an affinity with the UK and an historical background which looks to Scottish and English settlers and to William of Orange; they support Linfield and don’t play GAA football. It is difficult to see this as decisive, however, when the Six Counties Protestants have so much in common with the nationalist population of the Six Counties and the population of the other 26. For instance a mythology that shares Fionn mac Cumhail and Cuchulainn, a history which includes the United Irishmen, much in traditional music, a liking for good stout and whiskey, and a deep seated suspicion of the Brits!

If we are to consider the stability of the community of the Ulster protestants, we must first justify leaving the protestants in the rest of Ireland out. Then we must justify leaving out the protestants in the rest of Ulster, because those under consideration are in only six of the nine Ulster counties. Since the resurgence of the war in 1969 there have been several suggestions of repartition from politicians in the north, south and Great Britain, which would redefine the community in an instant. It is clear then that the ‘Protestants of Ulster’ are a product of the 1921 partition, and are defined by the politics of the day. We need not add to this the issues of emigration, of non-observance and conversion to see how mutable is the community of ‘Ulster Protestants’. While undoubtedly a core of people have for 100 or more years called themselves ‘Ulster protestants’, this by no means reflects a ‘nation-like’ stability among a common people.

The claim to have a common territory is subject to the same political considerations as is ‘community’ above, with the additional complication that this changeable territory never has been contiguous anyway. The sizeable minority, which may even constitute a majority by 2015, is dotted about the whole of the Six Counties in its own community areas. Protestant Belfast contains catholic West Belfast, which in its turn contains the protestant Shankhill Road. Protestant Portrush is next to catholic Portstewart. Coleraine, Enniskillen, Lurgan, Lisburn, Derry and almost every other sizeable town you wish to mention is made up of segmented zones where Catholics live and other ones where Protestants live. Often one cannot tell whose ghetto you are in except for the colour of the painted kerbstones. To get to work one might have to walk through a hostile area or take a long detour. Yes, a head count in the Six Counties for the present would reveal a larger number of Protestants than Catholics, but to talk of the Ulster Protestants occupying a common territory is absurd. They share it with a sizeable minority not much fewer in number than themselves.

Neither is it possible to talk of an ‘Ulster protestant economy’, since economic activity in the Six Counties is not segregated in this fashion, except for the now dwindling Belfast and Larne engineering works. However, the economy of the Six Counties, has been far from cohesive. Subsidy from the UK and EC (excluding military expenditure) rose steadily from £74 million in 1970 to £3,448 million in 1997 (O Gay and B Morgan Northern Ireland: political developments since 1972 House of Commons research paper 98/57 1998). The balance of trade with the rest of the world is consistently and significantly negative and, while most Six Counties export goes to Britain, there is significant trade in both directions with the south (B Rowthorn and N Wayne Northern Ireland, the political economy of conflict Cambridge 1986). Farm work straddles the border, giving rise to constant efforts to stop the army closing roads.

It is clear that the Six Counties is unable to produce equal to its own needs: it is massively dependent upon economic aid, and despite the efforts of successive unionist administrations it remains economically engaged with the south. This latter fact is specifically recognised in the currently developing settlement. The Belfast agreement of April 10 1998 contains provision for a north/south ministerial council to legislate on common matters, including agriculture, education, transport, environment, waterways, social security, tourism, EU programmes, inland fisheries, marine matters, health and urban development.

While Stalin’s ‘check list’ is not the be-all-and-end-all in debates on issues of national status, on this occasion it does show us that the Ulster protestants cannot reasonably be considered as nation-like at all. Much of the difficulty arises from the protestants being a religious faction, not a people, and also that their ‘Ulster’ is an administrative and political convenience of imperialism, not an historically constituted territory. Comrade Conrad says that he too does not think that the Ulster Protestants are a nation, but that he extends to them the right of self-determination anyway.

The right, however, to break away and form an independent state as a separate people must depend on some approximation to nationhood in the sense discussed. After all, one would not consider Nation of Islam, the Boy Scouts organisation or the inhabitants of Moss Side suitable candidates for separatism, even should they present their case with some justification. It is sensible not to be dogmatic on the precise definition of what a nation is, but we should still be aware that what is being conferred here is a status which most normally resides with nations. The further one stretches the definition, the better one’s reasons ought to be.

There is a danger within this argument of treating all Ulster Protestants alike, whereas it is only those who are prepared to raise arms against revolution, the loyalists, who are the problem. The danger even arises in framing the original proposition, that it is the ‘Ulster protestants’ and not the loyalists who are entitled to break away and form their own state. It may be that this is a polemical device to carry the politics further than would otherwise be sustainable, or else it is from a belief that, no matter how unlike a nation the Ulster protestants are, they are still sufficiently nation-like for the proposition to hold. No matter: it is still the loyalists, not the Protestants that have to be neutralised.

Several historical episodes figure in the development of counterrevolutionary loyalism: most notably, the Carsonite rebellion of 1912, the Ulster Workers Council strike of 1974 and the strike against the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1986.

In September 1912 the Liberal government of Henry Asquith, backed by a sound majority in the Commons, submitted the Home Rule Bill. Edward Carson, who raised and armed a 100,000-strong Ulster Volunteer Force, organised through the Orange Order and backed by the Conservative Party and unionist establishment, opposed this. The rebellion threatened to split the British army and the colonies. Forty thousand rifles were smuggled into the north of Ireland. The rebellion lasted until August 1914 when Asquith was forced to abandon the bill.

The second of these three episodes was the UWC strike of May 1974. The UWC was set up to organise loyalist resistance to two measures: power- sharing with the Catholics in a Six Counties executive; and the Council of Ireland, which would involve the government of the 26 counties. The UWC was a grass-roots organisation, drawing its support almost entirely from the working class. It organised roadblocks and welfare through the UDA, UVF and street committees. The assembly and the executive collapsed and direct rule from Westminster was re-established.

Lastly is the strike in March 1986 against the Anglo-Irish Agreement of the previous November. The 24-hour strike saw roadblocks and demonstrations, but these were mainly in the loyalist heartlands of Larne, Carrickfergus and east Belfast. The impact of the strike was patchy and marked by loyalists actively intimidating their own working class protestant communities into compliance. The agreement remained intact. The attempt to repeat the victories of the UWC strike had failed.

Several threads flow through these events which epitomise loyalist resistance in the eyes of the protestant communities themselves. It is not necessary to relate the stories of pogroms, death squads, Shankhill butchers, discrimination and intimidation to establish that the loyalists will use whatever terror they can to maintain their privilege. And neither is there need to tell of security forces, Bloody Sunday, shoot-to-kill, internment, Diplock courts, supergrasses, gerrymandering and a general level of harassment to demonstrate that the state supports that. The threads to follow are the waning of establishment support for loyalism, a need for working class loyalists to organise on their own initiative and an uncertain support from the mass of the protestant working class in recent years. The failure of the Drumcree stand-off to force an Orange march down the Garvaghy Road is a further pointer in the same direction.

Of course, there is no telling in advance the level of reaction there will be within the Ulster protestant communities to a resurgent revolution in Ireland to come. Will loyalism rebuild its mass working class base? Will the establishment back loyalism, Carson-style, in a revolutionary crisis? Who knows? The important point however is that loyalism is counterrevolution, is fascistic; not a force to be co-opted or bought off with promises of favours. The Ulster protestant working class has too close a relationship with loyalism, but they are not synonymous. The protestant community has historically been prepared to defend its sectarian privilege against democratic change, but it is not monolithically reactionary.

For comrade Conrad, the Ulster Protestants should have “self-governing autonomy up to and including the right to separate”. But what does this mean? Among Conrad supporters there is considerable confusion, giving rise to three versions already. Each version lays claim, alongside Conrad himself, to be in pursuit of ‘consistent democracy’. After all, comrades, we are all consistent democrats now. For this author, the Conrad assertion can practically mean only one thing - the repartition of Ireland - which in my humble opinion under foreseeable circumstances cannot serve consistent democracy. We now know that repartition is precisely what Conrad has in mind. Nevertheless, let us look briefly at the alternatives as discussed by Conrad’s supporters.

The first of these I will call ‘anarchistic self-determination’. Several comrades have expressed support for the Conrad line because they understand it to mean the utmost extension of democracy, where no-one, loyalist or Irish nationalist, will be forced into a state against their aspirations. This, its supporters acknowledge, would lead to a proliferation of micro-states. When pressed on the real ghettoisation of the Six Counties, they are forced to concede that their interpretation means every town, every street, every house, every bedsit has the right to separate and form its own state. Then no-one would be an oppressed minority. This, comrades, is not socialism; it is not consistent democracy: it is out-and-out anarchy. It is gibberish from start to finish, from which Conrad was quick to dissociate himself.

The second alternative is the hoary old question of cultural national autonomy. It might appear surprising that this issue should resurface at the current juncture, but a bit of analysis reveals how it flows from Conrad himself. Lenin’s argument against cultural national autonomy has been treated in detail elsewhere (see LA Bates, ‘Autonomy, federalism and centralism’ Weekly Worker February 20 1997), but we will refresh our memory. In 1903, the organisation of Jewish workers in Russia, the Bund, was defeated in its bid to be the sole organiser of Jewish workers in a federal structure with the rest of the RSDLP. Lenin argued that the Jews are not a nation, and to separate from other workers in the same state would be to disorganise the working class. In 1912, the Bund made another bid, along with the Menshevik liquidators, on the same issue and around the elections to the duma.

Throughout these arguments, the opponents of Lenin leaned on the definition of nation and self-determination developed by Otto Bauer. He and others were working on the problem of self-determination for the many nationalities within the Austro-Hungarian empire. They concluded that a multinational state should be established wherein nationality is determined extra-territorially by cultural association. In the programme of the Austrian Social Democratic Party, this was resolved by “absolutely autonomous” “national parliaments” made up of “self-governing regions of one and the same nation” (JV Stalin Works Vol 2, Moscow 1952, p334). The remit of the national parliaments would be the cultural affairs of each nationality, such as education, literature, art and science, the formation of academies, museums, galleries and theatres, whereas ‘political’ matters would be left to the overall imperial parliament.

Now we come to the link between the unfortunate proponent of cultural national autonomy for the Ulster Protestants, who thought he was following Conrad, and Conrad himself. Conrad conforms to Bauer’s definition of a nation more than to Stalin’s: the reason is as follows. Since the claim to a common territory and common coherent economy are so tenuous for the Ulster Protestants, and since Conrad insists that they are in any case sufficiently nation-like to be accorded national rights, Conrad must consider a common psychology or character to be sufficient qualification for national rights. This is precisely the assertion made by Bauer, when he says that “A nation is a relative community of character”, and national character is “the sum total of characteristics which distinguish the people of one nationality from the people of another nationality - the complex of physical and spiritual characteristics which distinguish one nation from another.” (ibid p310). So, while rejecting the state-organisation form of cultural national autonomy espoused by the Austro-Marxists, Conrad is forced back on the definition of nation on which cultural national autonomy is premised. This is non-scientific, it is not Marxism and it is not even consistent democracy.

The third version of self-determination is the obvious one to which this author first alluded: the repartition of Ireland. It is also the one that Conrad himself thinks most workable. A national state must have a territory, and it must hold to some concept of a majority people. The British knew this in 1921 when they partitioned six counties of the original 32. Partition has been the primary feature of Irish politics since it happened. It defeated radicalism in the end of the 1918-21 war of independence from Britain; it was central to the treaty over which the 1921-24 civil war was fought. Through partition was bought the clientship of the labour aristocracy in the Six Counties. The threat of the loss of economic and political advantage was enough to break the unity of the organised working class on many occasions since. The revolutionary war of the Provisional IRA and INLA was fought over the partition of Ireland by British imperialism.

Do comrades imagine that in a conflict which bears the possibility of repartitioning Ireland, a conflict which involves the expulsion of British imperialism from a revolutionary Ireland, and the possibility of a revolutionary Europe, do you imagine that imperialism, counterrevolution, would fail to place the fight for repartition centre stage? Of course they would. Then, having achieved repartition, the nationalist minority would be locked into a more securely partitioned Ireland for as long as imperialism was able and willing to sustain it. That then is the nature of partition. It is no mere organisational gimmick, to be played with to unlock the consciousness of the Protestants. Although we should understand that it is indeed a key, a key to their reactionary consciousness as labour aristocrats, oppressors, loyalists and counterrevolutionaries.

Comrade Conrad has however made a concrete proposal, so let us have a look at it. He suggests that Ireland should be repartitioned with Co Antrim, north Tyrone, south Derry, north Armagh and north Down all within the new protestant state. He includes one county and four parts of counties, as if he has put some thought into it. Conrad has simply undertaken the same kind of assessment the British did in 1920, when segregating the Six Counties: in what territory can the Protestants hold a majority? Sadly the proposal falls down before the reality of Ireland: that repartition, like partition before it, defies the interpenetration of populations.

Consider the following, not exhaustive, list. Co Antrim includes the Ballycastle-Cushendall-Cushendun gaeltacht area, where Catholics are more than 75% of the population. It contains the east shore of Lough Neagh, where Catholics are about 50% of the population, also the Toom Bridge-Randalstown, area where Catholics are more than 50% of the population; North Tyrone includes the Castlederg-Newtonstewart area, where Catholics are about 50% of the population; also the Coalisland-Cookstown-Magharafelt area, where Catholics are more than 50% of the population. North Armagh includes Lurgan district, where Catholics are about 75% of the population. It also includes Drumcree. The redrawn border misses out Coleraine and Enniskillen, towns which figure highly in protestant consciousness. In addition, if Derry were to be partitioned Bogside to Waterside, a là Berlin, it would also leave the north of Co Derry with no land links to the rest of Ireland. It could communicate only across the waters of Lough Foyle. Clearly, the attempt to define a democratic protestant contiguous territory is pie in the sky. Conrad should learn from the mistakes of British imperialism, not repeat them.

Having imagined a circumstance where imperialism defends itself against revolution, we should try to imagine what the reaction of the loyalists would be. These are the Black Hundreds, the Falange, Unita, the Contras. Can an appeal be made to the loyalists to give up counterrevolution by telling them that they have a right to repartition Ireland? Hardly! Can then the protestant working class support base be cut out from beneath the loyalists by making that offer? This seems to be the nub of the question.

Can the protestant working class be won to a democratic programme or to our minimum programme - a revolutionary democratic programme, to borrow a phrase - by recognising their right to self-determination? Well, it is not going to win them to revolution. There is not one ounce of revolutionary content or intent in the repartition of Ireland. Aspirations toward protestant self-determination will be a strong incentive to act against the danger of a revolution that threatens their privilege. What then of its democratic content? Is that going to win them? Certainly this is the reason it has Conrad’s support, but should it have communists’ support?

“The right of nations to self-determination (ie, the constitutional guarantee of an absolutely free and democratic method of deciding the question of secession) must under no circumstances be confused with the expediency of a given nation’s secession. The Social Democratic Party must decide the latter question exclusively on its merits in each particular case in conformity with the interests of social development as a whole and with the interests of the proletarian class struggle for socialism” (VI Lenin CW Moscow 1968, Vol 19, pp417-31).

This is the justification made by Conrad in posing the issue of self-determination for the Ulster Protestants. Just like with our demand for a federal republic of England, Scotland and Wales, the argument goes, we are supporting the right to self-determination while opposing separation. The point about recognising this right for Scotland and Wales, is that if these unions were to become enforced by oppression or military might, we would then support a revolutionary struggle for independence. There are democratic deficits in the relationships between England on the one hand and Scotland and Wales on the other. Scotland and Wales are unambiguously nation-like. There is no minority upon whose oppression the domination of the majority relies. There is every reason for communists to expect to win the argument for continued unity in a federal republic. Moreover, if we lose it is not a disaster, but a precondition for unity at a future date. As nation-like entities Scotland and Wales are not like the occupied Six Counties of Ireland.

How many Ulster Protestants will be convinced of the higher democratic unity of the whole of Ireland above the ‘democratic’ unity of a protestant Ulster? I dare say some will. A majority in a plebiscite may even be possible. But how many communists will gamble our support for a loyalist repartition on the outcome of that plebiscite? Are we therefore prepared to support an armed struggle against the unity of Ireland by loyalist separatists? To ask the question is to answer it. If it is your intention to recognise the right of self-determination now, and then condemn the fight to gain it against the majority Irish in the future, that is the lowest form of opportunism I can think of: it is mere trickery and deceit.

Unfortunately more of this follows. The next suggestion is that repartition does not necessarily mean the oppression of the remaining minority. Well then, notwithstanding the automatic denial of the right to self-determination of the whole of the people of Ireland, and also notwithstanding the rights of the repartitioned nationalist minority, let us have a look at it.

Comrade Conrad suggests that there can be no right of the “present-day Northern Ireland” to self-determination. We are not for “expelling Northern Ireland from the union”, but for the “withdrawal of the British state and British troops” and “a united Ireland” (Weekly Worker August 26). From this we can understand the scenario Conrad has in mind, although he does not express himself in such terms: it is for a successful expulsion of British imperialism from the whole of Ireland, aided by revolutionary democratic forces of the Ulster protestant working class. Only then will the argument be opened whether repartition takes place.

Such a unity based on the promise of the right to self-determination is wishful thinking bordering on self-delusion. The Ulster Protestants already have their statelet: not how they really want it, but better than the one-and-four-half-counties on offer from comrade Conrad. Comrade Conrad cannot aid them in overcoming their democratic deficit, since it is they themselves who are someone else’s democratic deficit. Comrade Conrad cannot protect their privileges: in fact he wants to take them away! So it turns out that comrade Conrad is no comrade in the fight for repartition at all; in fact he’s a sneaky little communist who wants to deliver the Protestants into a united Ireland. Comrade Conrad has nothing to bargain with. In unlocking protestant consciousness with the repartition key, he locked himself out. Repartition would be on loyalist terms. Whither then the rights of the nationalist minority?

It is the contention of this author that partition is inextricably linked with the reactionary ideology of Ulster loyalism. Also that repartition has this same relationship, if standing somewhat in a rearguard position. If there is any democratic content to the claim to self-determination for the Ulster Protestants, then it disappears under the mass of oppression that partition, and repartition, by their very nature bring down upon the catholic minority. The containment of a catholic minority would be unavoidable. It would be opportunistic folly for the Communist Party to attempt to purchase the adherence of the Ulster protestant working class to such a ‘democratic’ programme. They have nothing to gain from that perspective, whereas we have everything to lose.

On a final note, while this article has attempted to trash the Conrad proposal on Ulster protestant self-determination - and no doubt more effort will be required before it finally does sink - it is without irony that I welcome this incursion into the political problem of the Ulster loyalists. Hitherto, the approach from the left has been inadequate to the task. The economists have always relied on ‘working class solidarity’ and ‘normal politics’ to overcome the divide. The revolutionary left has understood that partition is like a metaphor for the working class condition in Ireland: partition itself is the obstacle to working class unity.

While James Connolly was no prophet, he was an astute revolutionary politician. It was through the efforts of Connolly and James Larkin that major inroads were made against orange bigots in the working class in Belfast. So it is worthwhile repeating what Connolly said about partition in 1914 when it was first mooted:

“Such a scheme as that agreed to by Redmond and Devlin, the betrayal of the national democracy of industrial Ulster, would mean a carnival of reaction both North and South, would set back the wheels of progress, would destroy the oncoming unity of the Irish labour movement and paralyse all advanced movements whilst it endured” (J Connolly Collected Works Vol 1, Dublin 1987, p393).

Communists must redouble the search for positive programmatic proposals to neutralise the loyalists, to win the protestant working class to a revolutionary transformation of society. Notwithstanding that we think we know the lessons of Connolly, this could still be a worthwhile starting place. In the meantime there should be a counter-proposal to that of Jack Conrad. If removal of the partition of Ireland, and opposition to its repartitioning, is not part of the minimum programme of the Party, then we should conclude that the Party believes there is no longer any revolutionary content in the demand for national self-determination for the people of Ireland as a whole. We will have subordinated this long-standing revolutionary principle to a vain, opportunist attempt to buy off the protestant working class.