21.05.1998
A bold step forward?
SML liquidation into nationalist swamp
We reproduce extracts of ‘For a bold step forward’ (from the Socialist Party’s Members Bulletin No28, April 1998). It is the reply of the executive committee of Scottish Militant Labour to the Taaffe leadership (see Weekly Worker April 16). Clearly the battle lines have been drawn between a compromising and politically impotent Taaffe and the Scottish national socialism of Alan McCombes and co. Having failed to fight SML’s unprincipled formation and thus abandoning the position of ‘one state, one party’, having conceded SML’s programmatic turn to a break-up of Britain scenario, Taaffe is reduced to mere technical arguments in his desperate attempt to prevent SML formally breaking from the Socialist Party of England and Wales and in due course its Committee for a Workers International. The SML leadership are thereby allowed the luxury of posing as Marxists and Leninists as they swap British reformism for a Scottish version of Pilsudskiism
1) We are writing to express our disappointment at your response to our statement, ‘Initial proposals for a new Scottish Socialist Party’.
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4) As we indicate in a separate letter, we do not fully accept that our proposals came as a “bombshell”. However, we do recognise that the proposals, if implemented, would signify a radical new turn for the forces of Marxism in Scotland - in effect, a ‘Scottish turn, part two’.
5) Nonetheless, we believe that the proposals are entirely consistent with the traditions of Marxism and Trotskyism internationally. We are sure that the British EC would not dispute the fact that the history of the Marxist movement internationally is not solely a history of arithmetical progression. At different stages, fusions, mergers and amalgamations have been carried out in order to enlarge the active forces of socialism and to expand the influence of Marxist ideas.
6) The British EC acknowledges some of the historical examples that we have provided, including the example of the founding of the Communist Party of Great Britain in 1920.
7) However, the comrades then go on to present an over-simplified and misleading version of the story of the formation of the CPGB.
8) The comrades effectively gloss over the political differences that existed among the various groupings that came together to form the CPGB. The biggest of these forces was the British Socialist Party which, in turn, evolved from the Social Democratic Federation - which subscribed to Marx’s economic analysis, but which Engels had described as “a sect which has ossified Marxism into a dogma”. It had opposed strikes and denounced the trade unions as reformist organisations which diverted the working class away from the struggle for socialism.
9) Later, a section of the BSP leadership had supported the first world war. Even at the time of the formation of the CPGB, the BSP leadership was extremely weak politically, its weakness reinforced by the departure of its only leader of any real standing, John McLean, who characterised the BSP as “a heterogeneous mixture of anarchists, sentimentalists, syndicalists, with a sprinkling of Marxists”. Leaders of the BSP included Cecil Malone, previously an active anti-socialist who just two years previously had been elected to parliament as a Coalition Liberal.
10) Other groupings which combined to form the CPGB included branches of the reformist Independent Labour Party; syndicalists from the Socialist Labour Party; and assorted sectarians and centrists (defined by Trotsky as those trends that are between reformism and Marxism).
11) When the new party was formed it had 5,000 members - a much smaller organisation proportionate to the population than the likely size of the Scottish Socialist Party that we have proposed.
12) It is true that the new party formally accepted the “programme, perspectives and statutes of the Communist International”. But it is an oversimplification to suggest that what emerged was “a politically unified party on the basis of clear principles”.
13) In fact, syndicalist and sectarian methods continued to hold sway for the first few years of the CPGB’s existence. Thus in the East Woolwich by-election in March 1921, the CPGB launched an abstentionist campaign, denouncing the Tories and Labour as “two of a kind” - even though Lenin and the Communist International had argued strongly for communist participation in the Labour Party The CPGB even boasted that their campaign had cost Labour the seat (by 683 votes out of 27,000). This, of course, was at a time when Labour had never been in power; and when a radicalised working class was turning en masse to Labour. Numerous other examples could be cited to illustrate the political inexperience and weakness of the leadership of the CPGB in that period.
14) We have to ask the comrades to contrast the role of that leadership with the track record of the existing leadership of SML and to pose the question point blank to the British EC: “Do you seriously believe that the formation of a new party, led primarily by the existing leadership of SML (with 150 years’ collective experience of the Marxist movement embodied in the eight-strong SML EC alone), will lead unavoidably (our emphasis) to the ‘erosion of a principled commitment to the perspectives, programme and strategy of revolutionary Marxism’”?
15) Such extreme pessimism and lack of confidence in the leadership of SML stands out in dismal contrast to the approach of Lenin, Trotsky and the other leaders of the Communist International who worked with material in Britain and in many other countries which was far less experienced and far less tested and proven in action than the current leadership of SML. We will return to this point later in the reply.
16) The EC reply, we believe, artificially counterposes the concept of a revolutionary party to the idea of a broad socialist party in a rigid and undialectical fashion. First of all, there is no such thing as a chemically pure revolutionary party. There can be, it is true, at different stages of history small, tightly-knit, homogenous, Marxist organisations. Some of the international sections of our own organisation are precisely at this stage of development.
17) At the other end of the spectrum there have existed, and continue to exist, broad workers’ parties which are, in effect, loose coalitions. The early Labour Party is perhaps the most clear example of such a formation; indeed, Lenin suggested that the British Labour Party was “not a party at all in the ordinary sense of the word”.
18) However, in between these two polar opposites there can exist transitional formations in which the features of a revolutionary party and those of a ‘broad socialist party’ coexist side by side.
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32) When the Communist International was formed with the enormous prestige of the victorious Russian Revolution behind it, a diverse range of formations gravitated towards it. These included the Norwegian Labour Party; the 500,000-strong Italian Socialist Party; the 150,000-strong French Socialist Party; the million-strong Spanish anarchist trade union federation, the CNT; and other large anarcho-syndicalist movements in Italy and France.
33) Of course, this was a revolutionary period where the Russian Revolution exerted enormous gravitational pull. Nonetheless, it is important to recognise that the parties and organisations which came together to form the Communist International consisted of a diverse ragbag of Marxists, anarchists, syndicalists, left reformists, centrists, and ultra-left sectarians.
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38) Yet all of these diverse formations, many of which were themselves awash with internal tendencies and factions, were welcomed into the Communist International. Few of them could be characterised as pure revolutionary parties with political cohesion on all issues of “perspectives, revolutionary strategy, strategy on the national question, tactical methods of struggle and methods of party building” (to quote from the EC letter). Most were broad parties with a mass membership and influence. Yet they were simultaneously, in a very general sense, revolutionary parties dedicated to the overthrow of capitalism.
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40) This is not to argue that conditions in Scotland correspond exactly to the tumultuous decades of the 1920s and 1930s. We have come through a period of prolonged political stability - which will eventually make way for a rerun of the mighty class battles of the past. But we are still in a preparatory period rather than a revolutionary period. Consequently, the construction of a party of socialist revolution will be a more protracted process.
41) We do not pretend that we are on the verge of creating either a mass revolutionary party or a broad, mass socialist party in Scotland. The forces which we are working alongside and discussing with are relatively small, although not insignificant. However, there are general lessons to be learnt from the approach of Lenin, Trotsky and the leaders of the Comintern. Lenin warned of “communist vanity that claims to know everything and is too infatuated with itself” - and argued for engaging with forces outside the ranks of the communist movement.
42) Yet, paradoxically, the task of organisationally and ideologically delineating the forces of revolutionary Marxism from other socialist currents was in the period 1919-1920 a much more crucial task than is the case today.
43) At that stage, with the battle lines being drawn across Europe between the forces of capitalism and the forces of socialism, strategic and even detailed tactical questions assumed life or death importance. It is precisely in a period of that character that the differences that separate revolutionary Marxism from other socialist trends take on potentially monumental significance.
44) This point was made very effectively by Peter [Taaffe] during the name-change debate in England and Wales last year. During this debate, the leadership of SML supported the name-change proposal from the outset. It is worth quoting one of Peter’s central arguments in favour of the name change in detail, because the wider political points are highly relevant to this discussion:
45) “The 1930s was a period of intensified struggle between the classes when the choice before a number of countries was either revolution or counterrevolution. This was the case in Germany, Italy, France at certain stages, and in Spain. We also had the existence of the first workers’ state, the Soviet Union, which, despite the Moscow Trials and the one-party totalitarian regime, still attracted the advanced workers through the existence of the planned economy. There was a broad socialist consciousness and a big layer of advanced workers who considered themselves not just socialists but revolutionaries and Marxists. Trotskyism’s main task was to differentiate itself from reformism and Stalinism... The main task facing us now is to win support for a socialist programme and for socialist ideas generally,” (‘Name change debate’ Members Bulletin No18).
46) Peter did correctly go on to say that we also faced the task of building a revolutionary party; however, in all of the written and verbal discussions during the name-change debate, the task of rehabilitating the basic programme of socialism was correctly given the strongest emphasis.
47) The British EC also promoted the idea during the name-change debate of building a “small mass party numbering tens of thousands, particularly in the next two, three or four years”. This perspective was dismissed as ridiculously over-optimistic by opponents of the name change. However, although we are not in a position to judge exactly what the prospects are in England and Wales over the next two to three years, we can say that there is at least a strong prospect of building a ‘small mass party’ in Scotland during the next period.
48) Given the population differential, a party in Scotland numbering 2,000 would be the equivalent of a 20,000-strong party across Britain as a whole. It is not pie in the sky to suggest that such a party could be built, given the looming political developments in Scotland and given also the central role which our organisation now plays on the left of Scottish politics.
49) However, we would have to add the proviso that there are two predconditions for accomplishing such a task: firstly, the unification of the existing forces of the Scottish Socialist Alliance (and, as far as possible, other socialist forces) into a more tightly-knit and cohesive party structure; and, secondly, the redirection of our existing apparatus towards the single-minded task of building such a party.
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75) The British EC letter takes us to task for suggesting that our organisation has also “adapted politically and organisationally” to new conditions. We did not anywhere state that “we have abandoned key ideas which were at the heart of the Trotskyist tradition”. That suggestion in the British EC letter is a misrepresentation of our position. We are not sure if the comrades are attempting to deny that “partly in response to external conditions, and partly because we have been more and more involved in the living struggles of the working class (we have) been forced to adapt politically and organisationally”?
76) It is an indisputable fact that we have made radical political and organisational changes, especially in the past seven years. We changed our long-term orientation to the Labour Party and launched independent organisations fighting elections in Scotland, England and Wales. In Scotland we have made far-reaching changes to our policy on the national question. We have no need to be defensive about these changes: any organisation which does not exist in a state of rigor mortis will regularly adapt and change as conditions themselves evolve.
77) In the article, ‘Future electoral strategy in Scotland’ (from Militant Labour Members Bulletin No12), written in September 1995 - before the SSA even existed - we made the point: “There are important political divisions within the left which could not be overcome simply by declaring a new party. At this stage for example, groups like the Scottish Socialist Movement and Communist Party of Scotland are cautious about advancing a full-blooded socialist programme for Scotland. They are also inclined to expect that significant reforms can be achieved by a Scottish parliament. And, in addition, the national question will inevitably be a source of debate and contention within the left generally in Scotland.”
78) Perhaps we were unfair in our political assessment of these comrades who are now our allies within the SSA. Or perhaps they have shifted. But one point is clear: within the SSA there are now no differences of opinion on advancing a full-blooded socialist programme. Nor are there any illusions that Labour’s devolved Scottish parliament will be capable of introducing radical reforms.
79) And on the national question itself, there is now general agreement. Our latest policy document which advocates an independent socialist Scotland with an internationalist outlook - and which appeared in a condensed version in the Scottish Socialist Voice - has generally been welcomed within the SSA and within the left generally. We have even had ex-Labour Party members joining SML on the strength of that document; and SNP activists moving into the orbit of the organisation, because they agree not just with the conclusions we draw, but with the Marxist analysis we provide on the national question.
80) With perhaps a few isolated exceptions, we believe there is today a much greater degree of political cohesion than was the case when the above article was written. And we should also add that the article itself predicted: “On the basis of experience, these organisations could be won to accept our analysis and be won to our programme. Ultimately a fusion may be possible, on a much more clear-cut political programme than it would be possible to agree at the present time,” (Militant Labour Members Bulletin No12, September 1995).
81) At that stage, there was no opposition forthcoming from the British EC, which would suggest that either the comrades have changed their opinion on tactics; or that they are prepared to accept the possibilities of fusion, merger, etc, in the abstract - but as soon as the issue is posed concretely the comrades recoil.
82) We also have to pose the question: ‘What is a revolutionary party in the present era?’ Is it a party that describes itself as a ‘revolutionary party’? Clearly that is not the case: neither the Socialist Party nor Scottish Militant Labour would meet that criterion.
83) In England and Wales, even the name Militant was dropped because of its aggressive connotations in the eyes of the broad mass of the public. The comrades also argued that the description ‘revolutionary’ in the context of Britain (although not in the context of France, for example, with its different traditions) would be even more ultra-left. Indeed, whenever Scottish Militant Labour has used the word ‘revolutionary’ in our paper or other publications, we have been taken to task by the British EC for posing our political aims in an ultra-left fashion.
84) Clearly, a new Scottish Socialist Party is not going to describe itself as a revolutionary party. And of course, no serious socialist or Marxist organisation would fail to declare its aim of achieving a broad base of membership and support.
85) Therefore, from a purely formal point of view it would be possible to conclude that we are dissolving the ‘revolutionary party’ in favour of a ‘broad party’. But if the comrades were to examine the proposals in a more rounded out, dialectical way, they would surely draw radically different conclusions.
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106) We also have to say that the comrades appear to have a light-minded attitude to the electoral possibilities that are posed. We can debate the exact wording of the original statement; frequently socialists - not just in Scotland - are accused of exaggerating the potential that exists. But what cannot and should not be disputed is the key importance of election results and successes in the eyes of the broad mass of the working class.
107) The comrades suggest that we are “gambling the whole future of our organisation on achieving a unified platform”. Leaving aside the wild exaggeration of the comrades, the fact is that “achieving a unified platform” is just one consideration out of many that we have to take into account.
108) A serious possibility is now presented of creating a sizeable socialist party in Scotland with significant forces, some trade union links, a clear revolutionary programme and outstanding electoral potential. That is the prize that we are fighting for in the short term. But in order to win that prize it will be necessary to display a certain degree of organisational flexibility, and to consider transitional arrangements which may not conform exactly to the recent norms of our International.
109) Specifically, we are proposing that, subject to political agreement with the other forces involved, we consider merging the apparatus of SML with the apparatus of the SSA and possibly of other socialist forces. It is premature to attempt to set out detailed criteria for negotiation at this stage, before we have even begun to seriously raise the general principle.
110) Of course, once we have established broad agreement to enter into negotiations, and when we know exactly who is prepared to participate in these discussions, we can then proceed to work out more detailed proposals as a basis for further negotiations. No one is suggesting that we write a blank cheque, to be filled in by our negotiating partners. At each stage, we would seek the agreement of the organisation before entering into any commitments.
111) On the other hand, the implication by the comrades that we should at this early stage, before the general idea has even been seriously floated, draw up a list of demands and preconditions would be completely counterproductive. Of course we can set out some general preconditions, most of which are self-evident in any case.
112) For example, the existing programme and policies of the Alliance will almost certainly be accepted as the political basis of a new Scottish Socialist Party - although we will probably want to insist on a more clear-cut policy on socialist independence, given the increasing intensity of the national question.
113) We would also insist on a proper branch structure which provided political education and coordinated campaigns, recruitment, fund-raising, etc. We would obviously also argue for tighter political cohesion than currently exists within the SSA, including a commitment to ‘unity in action’.
114) And of course we would oppose the monolithic type of structure which has proven so disastrous for the SLP; instead, we should argue for a more open structure which, as well as allowing for affiliation of trade union organisations, will also guarantee the right of tendencies, factions and other groupings to exist and to produce their own publications and circulate their own material. Other aspects of the constitution, including internal elections, leadership accountability, and democratic policy-making procedures will also have to feature on the agenda of future negotiations.
115) These points can be further discussed and elaborated within our own organisation before and during negotiations. But what we are essentially aiming to achieve is the drawing together of our existing internal organisation and the SSA - the organisation through which all of our public activity is conducted. To achieve that type of merger, it is likely that an organisational compromise will be required; we cannot realistically expect to impose the current structure of SML upon the new party, even if we wanted to.
116) And of course the fact that we have opened up this discussion flows from our conviction that that the current structure of the Alliance is inadequate to carry us forward into the next period.
117) Understandably, the comrades have expressed anxiety regarding the difficulties we have explained about setting affiliation to the CWI as a precondition of any merger. Yes, we can raise the issue in a general way, and have done so in initial informal discussions. But all the indications are that if we attempted to pose the question of affiliation to the CWI as a precondition for the establishment of a unified party, we would not get past first base.
118) This is not a question of disloyalty to our comrades internationally. The greatest disservice we could do to our comrades internationally would be to fail to grasp every opportunity to advance the struggle for socialism in Scotland. Lenin himself made the point clearly that the first task of any internationalist is “to strengthen the revolutionary forces in one’s own country”.
119) Nonetheless, we will make this point crystal clear: we have not at any stage proposed that the existing members of SML break with the CWI. In the original statement we posed one of two possibilities: either forming within a Scottish Socialist Party an organised formation (whether it be called a tendency, a platform, a society or whatever) which would be part of the CWI; which would promote the ideas, literature, etc of the CWI; which would ensure the continuation of at least the existing level of financial support for the CWI; and which would organise meetings, etc with CWI speakers.
120) The other alternative we posed, albeit in a roundabout way (“the new party would become the vehicle ... for maintaining British-wide and international links”), was that the new party itself may affiliate to the CWI. It is quite frankly bare-faced scaremongering for the comrades to suggest that “the document’s proposal is really for the dissolution of our organisation and the detachment of our comrades from the CWI”.
121) On the other hand, we have openly explained that the issue of international affiliations will pose difficulties for us at least in the short term. The British EC appear really unable to comprehend these difficulties. Instead of assisting us address them, the comrades pronounce - again in an extremely formalistic fashion - that this difficulty “precisely points to the underlying political differences that still exist”.
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132) At this stage, the CWI does not possess the authority in Scotland that SML possesses; nor does the Socialist Party. For a layer of activists who work closely with SML there remains a residue of suspicion of London-based political leaders. This in turn partly reflects attitudes and, in some cases perhaps, even prejudices - linked to the national question - which extend into all sections of society in Scotland.
133) We also believe it is necessary to challenge the comparison that has been drawn between the CWI today and the Fourth International and its international forerunners under the leadership of Trotsky.
134) It is true these did not involve mass parties in the way that the Communist International did in its early stages. Nonetheless, during the 1950s, Trotsky’s international organisation was the only anti-capitalist, anti-Stalinist revolutionary International - and it was headed by the most outstanding leader of the October Revolution, who had spearheaded the battle against Stalinism in the Soviet Union, had suffered ferocious repression, including the physical liquidation of his closest collaborators and members of his immediate family, and who was himself so feared by the international bourgeoisie that he was shunted from one country to another in exile.
135) The authority of such an International was clearly on a different plane from that possessed by the CWI today. Even then, as the British EC letter concedes, when the idea of a new party was posed in the USA in the 1930s, the Trotskyist CLA [Communist League of America] did not insist that affiliation to Trotsky’s international organisation be a precondition for the merger. In fact, although Trotsky kept in touch with former CLA leader, James Cannon, the new merged party (the Workers Party of the United States) did not have any organisational connection with Trotsky’s international organisation .
136) Moreover, there are many other historical examples of Marxist parties developing independently of any formal international affiliation. In the USA itself, under the Voorhis Act of 1940, any organisation linked to a wider international organisation was required to turn a list of all its members’ names and addresses over to the government for publication - thereby opening up all members to reprisals by employers, fascists, etc. As a result, the American Trotskyist party - then known as the Socialist Workers Party - formally discontinued its affiliation from the Fourth International. Of course, that did not stop informal collaboration between the leadership of the SWP and the Fourth International.
137) Here in Britain our organisation evolved independently of any international organisation particularly in the period 1964 to 1974, the year that the CWI was formed. Even the Bolsheviks’ international links were with the discredited and reformist Second International.
138) However, in case there is any misunderstanding we will repeat the point: we have no intention of “detaching our comrades from the CWI”. What we are suggesting is that insisting on affiliation to the CWI as a precondition for the creation of a new party is in effect to erect a brick wall between SML and all other forces in order to satisfy formal protocol.
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145) The comrades predict “outrage throughout the International” because we have made the point that “the idea has been posed of the new party itself having an open relationship with several or more internationals”. The British EC letter inadvertently, we assume, misquotes this statement so that it reads: “The idea of the new party itself having an open relationship with several or more internationals has been posed in the longer term” (sic). This is not to quibble over words; the original statement actually goes on to say: “In the long term, a broader regroupment on the left in England and Wales and on an international scale could begin to resolve this dilemma.”
146) The comrades are surprisingly silent on this critical point - therefore let us clarify exactly what we meant in the original statement and pose several pertinent questions. First, the idea of an ‘open relationship’ was not posed by us, but by others in the Alliance - precisely because they do not clearly understand the political differences that exist on the left internationally; nor do they understand the necessity for separate organisations which appear, at least on the surface, to have broadly similar aims and objectives.
147) In the past, as we indicated at the National Committee, the same point has been posed in relation to British politics. Peter himself has informally and tentatively pointed out that most ordinary workers would require a magnifying glass to discern the political differences between ourselves and the SWP. This in turn raises inevitably in the minds of many people moving towards political activity: why are these organisations separate and should they not be united?
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153) Lynn [Walsh] in one of his contributions at the National Committee drew a comparison between the type of structure that we are proposing as a transitional compromise to maintain relations with the CWI and the so-called Fourth International Supporters Caucus. This point is repeated in the British EC letter.
154) We do not pretend to be familiar with the details of this organisation. And we accept that the type of structure that we are proposing would not simply be a continuation of SML. It would, in effect, be an extra safeguard to ensure the continuation of a formal link with the CWI and the Socialist Party until such time as a formal link can be established via the Scottish Socialist Party.
155) However, we believe that the comparison with Fisc betrays an obsession with organisational forms. The comrades appear to be suggesting that the source of the apparent disintegration of Fisc is its organisational character. Perhaps that is the case. But then again, perhaps it would be more productive to examine the political track record and outlook of the individuals concerned and compare them with the leadership of the SML.
156) These individuals are, in fact, notorious opportunists who in decades of political activity have failed to build anything. Their political adaptation to the methods of the leadership of the SLP has led these former self-proclaimed Trotskyists into playing the role of the SLP’s in-house KGB.
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181) Trotsky in the 1930s wrote that: “Whenever a movement enters a new higher stage, there are always elements who defend the past. A wider perspective frightens them. They see nothing but difficulties and dangers.”
182) We accept that there are risks and dangers associated with this proposal as there are with any new initiative. But there are even greater dangers and risks involved in accepting the EC analysis: not least of which is the danger that we lock ourselves away in an organisationally pure prison cell. Yes, this would guarantee that we would remain uncontaminated by opportunism, reformism, ultra-leftism, etc; but it would also guarantee that we would fail to move forward and build the type of mass party necessary to defeat capitalism.
185) In the same article quoted above, Trotsky also said: “Long experience has shown that precisely when an organisation is ready to get out of the narrow alley into a wider arena, elements can always be found who have grown accustomed to their alley, know all their neighbours, are used to carrying all the alley news and rumours.” He explained that they invariably justify themselves with terribly “revolutionary” and “principled” arguments.
184) The British EC has in the past, we believe, been prepared to accept and even initiate bold new tactics when the need has arisen. We are, therefore, appealing to you to withdraw your opposition to this proposal, campaign in support of the initiative within the British and international organisations and, on the basis of obtaining agreement from the organisation, assist us to work out the details of how this exciting new leap forward can be implemented.