WeeklyWorker

28.03.2025
Selling economism: SPEW’s gen sec, Hannah Sell

Zionism opens gates of hell

The Palestinian masses are threatened by genocide and ethnic cleansing, but Israeli settler-colonialism is riven with profound contradictions and can be beaten. Jack Conrad outlines the communist plan

After two months of a fragile ceasefire, Israel has renewed its genocidal war against Gaza. Already many hundreds have been killed and thousands injured. Israel has yet again demanded the evacuation of whole areas and, with a new Israeli Defence Forces chief-of-staff and a new defence minister, there is talk of taking full military control. Secretary of state Mark Rubio has expressed America’s “unequivocal support for Israel and its policies”.1

Benjamin Netanyahu’s excuse for breaking the ceasefire is just that - an excuse. He and his coalition government had cut off supplies of food, medicines and electricity (and thereby desalinated water). Then came the demand, prompted by Donald Trump, that the terms of the first phase of the ceasefire be extended to include handing over all 59 remaining war captives (dead and alive).2 In fact, it had been agreed that this would happen in the second phase, which would entail the complete withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Gaza ... note the continued IDF control over the Philadelphi Corridor.

So, while Hamas has insisted on keeping to the original terms, Israel has always been eager to continue its war in Gaza and extend it into the West Bank, Lebanon and Syria.

We must therefore ask why Israel agreed to the January 19 ceasefire? It was unmistakably US pressure. First Joe Biden. Next, and decisively, Donald Trump. Both the 46th and 47th presidents wanted to be seen as peacemakers for electoral purposes.

But, no, not according to some comrades. Israel had apparently suffered “a heavy defeat” in Gaza because of the brilliant tactics of Hamas and its al-Qassam fighters. Faced with “unsustainable losses and demoralisation”, as well as a “deep economic crisis and social breakdown”, Israel was forced to agree terms.3 In the same panglossian spirit we find those who breezily maintain that Israel “cannot win”, that Israel is “unequivocally losing” its war, or that Israel has already “lost in Gaza”.4 All true … if Israel’s war aims were really about destroying Hamas militarily and bringing home all war captives. However, that was never the intention.

“The idea that it is possible to destroy Hamas, to make Hamas vanish - that is throwing sand in the eyes of the public,” said the IDF’s now former top spokesman, rear admiral Daniel Hagari, in an interview with Israel’s Channel 13.5 Hamas has deep social roots and not only in Gaza. Of course, Netanyahu is perfectly aware of that, but he needs the fiction of destroying Hamas as cover. It is the same with the war captives. They are little more than a domestic nuisance for Netanyahu. He knows it and so do the tens of thousands of relatives, friends and supporters, who have time and again demonstrated in Tel Aviv’s Hostage Square.

If you really want the war captives back from the tunnels, tents and bomb shelters of Gaza, then direct negotiations with Hamas would be an absolute priority. And destroying Hamas and negotiating with Hamas are, to put it mildly, mutually incompatible.

No, the real war aim of Netanyahu, his war cabinet and his Likud-led coalition is to uproot the entire Palestinian population in Gaza in what is yet another carefully calculated step towards realising the Zionist dream of a Greater Israel. When the opportunity arises, that means expelling as many Palestinians as possible - a second nakba - the obvious route, when it comes to Gaza, being a forced exodus into Egypt’s Sinai. Hence, the significance of the Philadelphi Corridor … otherwise ominously known, in Israel, as the Philadelphi Route.

Bezalel Smotrich, finance minister and leader of the far-right National Religious Party, is reported as saying that Israel’s security cabinet approved proposals to organise “a voluntary transfer for Gaza residents who express interest in moving to third countries, in accordance with Israeli and international law, and following the vision of US president Donald Trump.”6 Sudan, Somalia and Somaliland have been mooted … all entirely improbable destinations.

In fact, it is all none too subtle code for the ethnic cleansing of Gaza’s entire civilian population, but dressed up as realising Trump’s vision. His ‘Riviera plan’, unveiled at a White House press conference on February 4, alongside a beaming Netanyahu, proposes that the US would “take over” and “own” Gaza. There may have been some confusion about whether or not US troops might be involved. The same goes for US tax dollars. But what was crystal-clear is that the Gazan population would be removed in its entirety before redevelopment work begins … and they will never return, because, in Trump’s words, “they’re going to have much better housing ... a permanent place for them”.7

Famously, Trump shared an AI-generated video on his Truth Social page, showing a ghastly, glitzy, garish ‘Trump Gaza’, featuring Dubai-style skyscrapers, golden Trump statues, bearded belly dancers, and Trump himself lounging in the sun alongside Netanyahu. All set to upbeat music and these lyrics: “Donald’s coming to set you free, bringing the light for all to see. No more tunnels, no more fear: Trump Gaza’s finally here.”8

There were those who treated the whole thing as a joke, albeit in bad taste. A mistake. Trump’s vision has been warmly embraced across the board by Zionist opinion in Israel, especially by the right and far right. Why? Because it has nothing, absolutely nothing, to do with the US stationing troops, nothing to do with a US “takeover”. No, what is being welcomed is greenlighting the forcible removal of the 2.1 million Gazan population … and an Israeli “takeover”. What applies to Gaza applies to the West Bank too. Israel wants to push, drive, stampede its 3.4 million Palestinian population over the other side of the Jordan river as soon as the opportunity arises.

True, a second nakba risks the collapse of the Egyptian and Jordanian regimes: their peace treaties with Israel would certainly be “thrown into the abyss”.9 But Israel cares little about that. Perhaps the same goes for the Trump administration … we shall see.

Seen in this light, while it is true that Israel has not achieved its real war aims yet, it perhaps stands on the threshold of achieving them. A joint Israeli-US strike against Iran would provide the perfect means of mass distraction, when it comes to global public opinion. There have already been airstrikes on the Houthis (Ansar Allah) in Yemen. Trump threatens that any retaliation against Red Sea shipping will bring “dire consequences” … for Iran.10 His national security advisor, Mike Waltz, warns that things are “coming to a head” and that “all options are on the table”.11 Alarmingly, the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group is set to join the Harry S Truman carrier strike group in the Red Sea in April.

Fragile

Though Israel is a Middle Eastern superpower, it cannot be described as internally united, stable or calm.

Even with the return of Itamar Ben-Gvir and his Jewish Power back into the coalition government, it is clear that Netanyahu’s position is far from secure. Not only does he face an ongoing trial over charges of bribery, fraud and breach of trust: there is the ‘Qatargate’ investigation into two of his aides by Shin Bet (Israel’s equivalent of MI5).

Predictably, Netanyahu has dismissed Qatargate as a “desperate attempt to fabricate evidence of a non-existent crime”: no less to the point, his government sacked Ronen Bar, chief of Shin Bet. Netanyahu’s opponents claim that ousting Bar involves more than unwelcome corruption investigations. The claim is that Netanyahu is determined to block the truth about events leading up to October 7. Earlier this month Shin Bet released a report which acknowledged it should have prevented the attack, while criticising Netanyahu for helping to create the conditions for October 7.

In turn an “Israeli official” accused Bar on Channel 12 of doing nothing to stop Hamas, even claiming that he knew it was going to happen:

“Ronen Bar preferred not to attend the government meeting [tonight] dealing with his case, simply because he was afraid of giving answers,” asserted the official, whom Channel 12 identified as prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself, “and especially of answering one question: Why, after you knew about the Hamas attack many hours before it happened, did you do nothing and did not call the prime minister - something that would have prevented the disaster? If Ronen Bar carried out his role like he is now clinging on to his job, we would not have reached October 7.”12

Netanyahu has sought to shift responsibility for the colossal failure onto the shoulders of the security establishment, arguing that he was not woken up in the hours before the October 7 attack despite impending signs being picked up. Crucially he denies buying into the “conception” that Hamas was more interested in governing Gaza than attacking Israel. Note, for years Netanyahu considered Hamas a strategic ‘asset’ in keeping the Palestinians institutionally divided, with two rival regimes in Gaza and the West Bank.13 Indeed Qatari funds were allowed to flow into Gaza and Israel issued work permits for Gazans and ordered limited responses to armed actions by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In its investigation - much of which remains classified - Shin Bet blames the IDF for not handling intel properly, for organisational overlap and the fact that Hamas acted, on October 7, “like an army”.14

Not surprisingly there has been a proliferation of conspiracy theories to the effect that Netanyahu and his cronies were in some way “deliberately” complicit in allowing the whole thing to happen.15 It was, after all, a year in preparation and involved all manner of practice runs.

Anat Saragusti is, however, convinced that a whole string of false conceptions provides the best explanation. That is, Hamas could be safely contained through money; that targeted assassinations would prevent serious armed resistance; that the IDF is so strong and so sophisticated that it is unbeatable on any front; that Hamas is so chaotic it could never organise anything that amounted to a coordinated military action; that Israel’s Intelligence Corps and its generously financed Unit 8200 is fully aware of what is happening in Gaza, with “every conversation monitored, every meeting photographed and every move known in real time”. Of course, Israel did know “every conversation”, etc, etc, but failed to interpret the information correctly because of its colonial contempt for the Palestinians as a subject people.16

Storm

The sacking of Bar has raised a storm of protest within the country and saw attorney general Gali Baharav-Miara telling the government that it could not remove Bar from office until its factual and legal foundation had been “fully clarified”. Now the government has passed a vote of no confidence on Baharav-Miara herself. Mass protests have been joined with the threat of a general strike from Yar Lapid (Yesh Atid) and Yair Golan (Democrats) if the government defies the courts.

The constitutional crisis, temporarily suppressed by October 7 2023 and Operation al-Aqsa Flood has thereby resurfaced with a vengeance. Liberal and soft-left opinion - inside Israel and out - unhesitatingly sides with the judiciary against the government. They picture Zionist opposition parties, such as Yesh Atid and the Democrats, fighting a brave rearguard action against Netanyahu’s government and its growing despotism. More than that, the pro-judiciary movement, which began in January 2023, is presented as a beacon of hope for democracy - even socialism - in Israel.17 A throughgoing misreading of Israel’s political dynamics.

There can be no doubt that Israel is steadily shifting to the right. A predictable social and electoral phenomenon to be expected in any active settler-colony. Let us add that Israel does not have anything like the UK’s ‘first past the post’ election system. Despite a cynical 3.25% entry threshold to the Knesset - designed to bar Arab-based parties - representation is strictly proportional. Hence, with just over a half of the seats in the Knesset, Netanyahu’s coalition represents just over half of Israel’s electorate. And in the name of that rightwing Zionist majority Netanyahu and his coalition are determined to assert government control over judicial appointments and end the situation whereby judges overrule Knesset votes.

In other words, the ‘judiciary versus the government’ constitutional struggle does not have the judiciary on the side of democracy. An altogether odd idea for anyone even vaguely on the left. Rather the judiciary, and the parties which back its self-perception of standing in between the executive and individual liberty, are defending a constitution which embodies the function of the courts - crucially the supreme court - to act as a check, a block, a balance against the democracy of the Israeli-Jewish majority (as of today, yes, still bribed and thoroughly duped). Its Arab population are second-class citizens and those in the occupied territories are, almost needless to say, effectively rightless.

Former head of the supreme court Aharon Barak gives the game away when he says, “We have to prevent the tyranny of the majority”.18 A term commonly traced back to Alexis de Tocqueville, who used it in his book Democracy in America (1835 and 1840). It appears in the title of chapter 14: ‘Causes which mitigate the tyranny of the majority in the United States’: he specifically cites the “temper of the legal profession” and how it serves as a “counterpoise to democracy”.19 From there the idea goes through John Stuart Mill (On liberty - 1859), Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, all too human - 1879), before arriving at Ayn Rand, who wrote about how individual rights should not be subject to a public vote, and that the political function of rights is precisely to protect minorities from oppression by majorities and “the smallest minority on earth is the individual”.20 In Britain similar warnings against an “elective dictatorship” were issued in 1968 and 1969 by former Tory minister Quintin Hogg (later Lord Hailsham).21 He feared for the constitutional loss of authority by the judiciary and the House of Lords.

Of course, we are what Marx called extreme democrats. We positively advocate the dictatorship, the decisive rule, of the working class through winning a thumping communist majority in the House of Commons. With that in mind, we should exercise extreme caution before supporting any pro-judiciary movement anywhere, let alone in Israel.

Civil war

Israeli public opinion is deeply divided both over judicial reform and the war in Gaza. Indeed there is an almost exact match between those who oppose judicial reform and those who oppose breaking the ceasefire. Together they constitute the party of Liberal Zionism.

Unsurprisingly therefore the IDF is experiencing huge problems in calling up urgently needed reservists. Some units claim 25% of reservists not reporting for duty, others as much as 50%. Reservists basically do not want to fight in a war that they consider unprovoked and unjust. They certainly know that the renewed assault on Gaza has nothing to do with rescuing war captives. Nor do they want to risk their lives for a government of the far right.

Showing the government’s weakness, caution, lack of confidence, refuseniks are dismissed from the IDF, not charged and sent for trial (incidentally the same goes for the tens of thousands of ultra-Orthodox Haredi who have been called up - only a few hundreds have agreed to be conscripted).

Given that Israeli forces are engaged on four fronts - Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon and Syria - this matters. The 170,000-strong standing army relies on the 450,000 reservists, when it comes to fighting wars. There is, needless to say, universal conscription (discounting, of course, the Arab minority).22 That explains why Israeli military doctrine favours short, sharp wars. Reservists are, however, not only vital for the military. They are vital for the economy too.

Does that mean that Israel faces imminent military and economic collapse? Leftwing wishful thinking. True, the Gaza war has cost Israel dear - the Bank of Israel estimates some $55.6 billion. Meanwhile economic growth has shrunk … but there has, note it, been economic growth. Instead of the expected 6.5%, there has been a much more modest 2% increase in GDP. In part this is down to the mobilisation of reservists, in part the barring of Palestinian workers coming in from Gaza and the West Bank.23 But the situation is sustainable.

The same goes with the military.

Some 800 Israeli soldiers have been killed and at least 6,000 injured (with many more suffering post-traumatic stress disorder and other mental health problems). And then there are the refuseniks. But Israel’s armed forces are vastly superior, compared with any Arab country or any conceivable combination of them. It is not a matter of total numbers under arms or the undoubted sophistication of home-produced and American weapons systems. Israel’s armed forces are better led, better trained and better motivated. That is what makes Israel a modern-day Sparta.

Haim Bresheeth-Žabner calls the IDF “an army like no other”.24 The IDF constitutes the spinal cord of Israel’s national identity. Not country of origin, not religious sect, not political affiliation. Such is the historic effect of the IDF’s mamlachtiyut ideology: a Hebrew expression conveying both ‘sovereignty’ (power) and the ‘norm’ of state consciousness.25 The IDF has thereby, yes, forged the “new Jew” envisaged by Theodor Herzl from the “base elements” coming from middle Europe, the Soviet Union, the Arab countries, Ethiopia and America.

There have been many recent accusations of planned judicial coups, coups by Shin Bet, coups by Netanyahu, even Israel coming “closer to civil war” (former prime minister Ehud Olmert).26 However, what needs to be understood is that civil wars, like every other war, require armies to fight them and at the moment, and for the foreseeable future, Israel only has one army. Indeed, we are reliably told that till recently the IDF exercised an “almost total control of the political agenda”; that the military therefore poses no “direct threat” to the country’s political elite.27 Military tops definitely exercised a veto, when it came to annexations on the West Bank, striking against Iran’s nuclear facilities, reoccupying southern Lebanon, etc.

So, even though Israel formally practises what is called an ‘instrumentalist model’, meaning that its military follows policies set by the government, there is another less formal model: namely ‘political-military partnership’. In practice “the military has been a weighty partner in determining government policies even beyond the narrow field of security”.28

This has caused much fury and frustration on the far right, with accompanying calls for a thorough-going purge. Indeed that is what appears to have happened, albeit on the quiet. With recent personnel changes at the top, there has been what liberal critics call an “overenthusiastic effort to ingratiate themselves with the right” by the general staff.29 So, if there is going to be a judicially triggered army coup, that would have to rely on a rebellion by middling to junior officers and rank-and-file IDF personnel. Would Liberal Zionism take such a risky course? Maybe, but unlikely.

SPEW economism

Recently Joseph O’Connor Meldau wrote a useful letter to the Weekly Worker.30 Useful, because it allows us to repeat and clarify our strategic approach.

I am not going to discuss his utterly unprincipled willingness to “fudge” programmatically between revolution and reform or his naive faith in Tusc and how a putative-alliance with the trade union bureaucracy will deliver socialism. No, I shall concentrate on what he believes are “essentially” the same positions of the CPGB and his Socialist Party in England and Wales, when it comes to Israel-Palestine.

It is certainly true that both the CPGB and SPEW want socialism, consider that the Hebrew working class should not be written off as irredeemably reactionary and demand that Israeli forces ought to immediately quit the West Bank and Gaza. But what he spectacularly misses it that, while there are various points of intersection, we actually approach the Israel-Palestine question from exactly opposite directions and advocate radically different political methods to arrive at our goals.

Comrade O’Connor Meldau opens by ‘correcting’ me, when I write that SPEW is committed to a “socialist two-state solution”. The comrade seriously claims that this is “misleading”, because SPEW is, in fact, committed to “an independent, socialist Palestinian state, alongside a socialist Israel, with guaranteed democratic rights for all minorities, as part of the struggle for a socialist Middle East”. But that is exactly what I said: SPEW is committed to a “socialist two-state solution”. True, I could have added the stuff about “guaranteed democratic rights for all minorities, as part of the struggle for a socialist Middle East”. However, it makes no difference. SPEW’s strategic point of departure is the struggle to realise a “socialist two-state solution”.

Not quite socialism in one country: rather socialism in two little countries with a combined population of just around 15 million (much less than Greater Cairo’s 23 million). Anyway, why on earth two such socialist states would remain separate, especially given the shared geographical proximity, long-established economic ties, widespread bilingualism and a common interest in resisting imperialist-sponsored intervention, is something of a mystery as far as I am concerned. Perhaps comrade O’Connor Meldau would care to enlighten us.

Presumably, once achieved, in the imagination at least, the results would be so marvellous, so attractive, that the masses of the Middle East would be clamouring to emulate the “socialist two-state solution” in Israel-Palestine. Except they probably won’t. Not only is a “socialist two state-solution” utterly delusional: if by some fluke it happened, the results would not be peace and plenty, but war and poverty. The tragic fate of the Soviet Republic in Russia.

In Israel-Palestine there is no overwhelming oppressed national majority ready for revolution. There is not even the threat of a Palestinian Samson bringing down the temple. The odds are completely stacked in Israel’s favour. That is why Hamas resorts to desperate guerrilla actions and the Palestine Liberation Organisation and Fatah are reduced to impotent verbal gestures, pathetic diplomatic pleading … and collaboration. Recognising this, Hannah Sell’s SPEW and its various breakaways, such as Socialist Appeal/Revolutionary Communist Party and Socialist Alternative, clutch at the “progressive”, pro-judiciary “democracy” movement, Hostage Square protests - that and joint economic struggles in Israel, which are supposed to weld together Hebrew and Arab workers into a lever for social change.31 It amounts to classic Militant Tendency economism, which combines tailism with routine trade unionism.

In fact, as I have repeatedly explained, Zionism acts to keep workers inside Israel structurally divided. That means legal, political and material privileges for Israeli-Jewish workers - privileges they will hang onto for dear life … unless there is something much better on offer (Israeli-Jewish workers, especially those at the bottom end of the labour market, have no wish to compete with Arab-Israeli/Palestinian worst paid labour as equals, that is for sure).

Note, trade union politics - ie, struggles over wages and conditions - always finds itself cut short by the high politics of war, security, national privilege, etc. Therefore no Histadrut strikes demanding equal civil rights for Palestinians, ending the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and calling for the right of return. Nor should any such development be expected within the narrow confines of Israel-Palestine.

Trade union politics is by its very nature sectional and confined to the relationship between sellers and buyers of the labour-power commodity. Hence in Israel trade union politics as trade union politics does little more than reproduce the division of the working class: on the one side, nationally privileged labour aristocrats and, on the other, a nationally oppressed underclass.

SPEW, it should further be noted, blurs the national division of the working class in Israel-Palestine. In fact, it insists upon treating Israel as a ‘normal’ country: the idea of it remaining a “settler state” is dismissed out of hand.32 That despite the ongoing horror in Gaza and the relentless announcements of yet more Jewish settlements on the West Bank and the Golan Heights - there are already 720,000 Israelis inhabiting the occupied territories (including east Jerusalem), the vast majority of them supporting the politics of the Zionist far right.

By contrast, our strategic starting point begins not within the narrow confines of Isreal-Palestine. No, we start with the high politics of Arab unification … and from there we go towards the possibility of a civilised, democratic solution in Israel-Palestine. It cannot be the other way round.

There are nearly 300 million Arabs in a contiguous territory that stretches from the Atlantic Ocean, across north Africa, down the Nile to north Sudan, and all the way to the Persian Gulf and up to the Caspian Sea. Though studded here and there with national minorities - Kurds, Assyrians, Turks, Armenians, Berbers, etc - there is a definite Arab or Arabised community. Despite being separated into 25 different states and divided by religion and religious sects - Sunni, Shi’ite, Alaouite, Ismaili, Druze, Orthodox Christian, Catholic Christian, Maronite, Nestorian, etc - they share a living bond of pan-Arab consciousness, born not only of common language, but a closely related history.

Let me stress that we are not talking about reviving either Nasserism or Ba’athism. Nor are we talking about something akin to the pan-Slavism of Ľudovít Štúr. No, communists need to take the lead in the fight for pan-Arab unity - as Marx and Engels and their comrades in the Communist League did in the fight for German unity. Such a fight, is, of course, inseparable from the task of building a mass Communist Party - first in each Arab country and then throughout the Arab world. A Communist Party of Arabia (a regional section of a reforged Communist International).

What of rapprochement between Hebrews and the Palestinians? This can only happen in the context of sweeping away the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan, Lebanon’s sectarian warlord plutocracy, Egypt’s military bureaucratic regime and the House of Saud - and the establishment of working class rule in a socialist republic of Arabia.

Only from such a wide salient, even if it is in the process of realisation, can the Israeli-Jewish working class be prised away from the clutches of Zionism. Towards that end we favour a bold declaration that an Arab socialist republic, even if it is initially confined to the Mashriq, would offer the Hebrew nation self-determination, when it comes to joining the project - perhaps, to begin with, with the offer of a voluntary federation. Such an invitation would surely receive a positive response from below.33

Joining the ruling working class - now that would be something.

  1. The Times of Israel March 23 2025.↩︎

  2. In a social media post on March 5 2025, Trump told Hamas to “release all of the Hostages now, not later, and immediately return all of the dead bodies of the people you murdered, or it is over for you” (The Guardian March 6 2025).↩︎

  3. Brarite CPGB-ML leaflet distributed on the London March 15 2025 Palestine demonstration.↩︎

  4. In order: Sophie Squire, ‘Six months of slaughter, six months of resistance’ Socialist Worker April 3 2024; Ofer Cassif of the ‘official communist’ Hadash party in Israel; and US ‘realist’ John Mearsheimer Al Jazeera January 24 2025.↩︎

  5. edition.cnn.com/2024/06/20/middleeast/hagari-netanyahu-destroy-hamas-israel-intl/index.html.↩︎

  6. edition.cnn.com/2025/03/24/middleeast/israel-approves-proposal-to-facilitate-emigration-of-palestinians-from-gaza-intl/index.html.↩︎

  7. www.ajc.org/news/what-is-trumps-proposal-for-gaza.↩︎

  8. www.instagram.com/realdonaldtrump/reel/DGhfpgHsOg6.↩︎

  9. www.chathamhouse.org/2025/02/negotiating-tactic-or-not-trumps-gaza-plan-has-already-done-irreparable-damage.↩︎

  10. www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/22/every-shot-fired-are-yemens-houthis-a-proxy-force-for-iran.↩︎

  11. cbn.com/news/israel/israeli-forces-heighten-attacks-gaza-lebanon-us-leaders-focus-iran.↩︎

  12. The Times of Israel March 24 2025.↩︎

  13. Ibid October 8 2023.↩︎

  14. Ibid March 4 2025.↩︎

  15. www.eurasiareview.com/15022024-did-israel-deliberately-ignore-warnings-of-an-attack-by-hamas-to-enable-them-to-destroy-gaza-oped.↩︎

  16. A Saragusti ‘All of Israel’s conceptions about managing Palestinian conflict have collapsed’ Haaretz March 9 2025.↩︎

  17. In these pages there has been the English democrat, Steve Freeman: he wrote about “a struggle going on over the nature of Israeli society and its democracy before October 2023 and it is now growing again” (‘Another Israel is possible’ Weekly Worker June 20 2024). Leave aside Israeli “democracy”: there is SPEW too (see A Cohen, ‘Israel: new upsurge of anti-Netanyahu democracy protests’ July 12 2023 - www.socialistparty.org.uk/articles/113436/12-07-2023/israel-new-upsurge-of-anti-netanyahu-democracy-protests). Nor should we forget the Alliance for Workers’ Liberty (for a general overview of their position, see Two nations, two states London 2016).↩︎

  18. Financial Times March 21 2025.↩︎

  19. A de Tocqueville Democracy in America Ware 1998, p108.↩︎

  20. web.archive.org/web/20241012155611/aynrandlexicon.com/ayn-rand-ideas/collectivized-rights.html.↩︎

  21. ipfs.io/ipfs/QmehSxmTPRCr85Xjgzjut6u
    WQihoTfqg9VVihJ892bmZCp/Elective_dictatorship.html    .↩︎

  22. Military service - for both sexes - starts in the late-teenage years and goes on, in the reserves, well into adulthood (40 for regular soldiers, 45 for officers).↩︎

  23. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_impact_of_the_Gaza_war.↩︎

  24. H Bresheeth-Žabner An army like no other: how the Israeli Defence Forces made a nation London 2020, p13.↩︎

  25. N Kedar ‘Ben-Gurion’s mamlakhtiyut: etymological and theoretical roots’ Israel Studies Fall 2002, pp117-35.↩︎

  26. www.palestinechronicle.com/olmert-gantz-sound-alarm-threat-of-civil-war-in-israel-closer-than-ever.↩︎

  27. H Bresheeth-Žabner An army like no other: how the Israeli Defence Forces made a nation London 2020, p374.↩︎

  28. Y Peri ‘The widening military-political gap in Israel: www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020C02.↩︎

  29. Haaretz March 14 2025.↩︎

  30. Letters Weekly Worker March 20 2025.↩︎

  31. Eg, the RCP’s recent pamphlet and this statement: “Only the establishment of a united front between the people of Palestine and the working class and progressive layers of Israeli society will create the possibility of dividing the Israeli state on class lines, opening the way for a lasting and democratic settlement of the Palestinian question” (Israel-Palestine - a revolutionary way forward, p28).↩︎

  32. J Horton Socialism Today February 2 2024.↩︎

  33. A perspective advanced by Jabra Nicola and Moshé Machover in June 1969. See M Machover Israelis and Palestinians: conflict and resolution Chicago IL 2012, pp15-25.↩︎