06.03.2025

Ending armed resistance

There is a new phase opening up along with new challenges. Esen Uslu explains the call for the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve itself in favour of ‘normal’ political activity

Since last autumn, there has been a buzz about Turkey’s policy towards Kurds. Devlet Bahçeli, of all people, the leader of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP, the infamous Grey Wolves), suddenly changed his rabid anti-Kurdish stance by extending his hand to MPs of the pro-Kurdish People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) at the opening of the Grand National Assembly. Just a few weeks before that he had been demanding the banning of DEM - or at least the immediate secession of state support given to it as a parliamentary party. Bahçeli had been prime partner in president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s coalition and initially Erdoğan stood aloof from his move.

But in mid-October 2024 Bahçeli upped the ante: in a speech to his party’s parliamentary group, Bahçeli said that Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the Kurdish freedom movement, who has been imprisoned and kept on the Imralı prison island in the middle of the Marmara Sea since 1999, should be allowed to come to parliament and speak to DEM. That is, if he is willing to dissolve the banned Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) once and for all.

Such sudden schizophrenic policy shifts are quite rare in Turkish politics and, when they do occur, they are normally the other way round: demonising legal political parties and declaring them front organisations of a ‘terrorist’ organisation; banning them and imprisoning their leaders on trumped-up charges.

It was apparent that something was cooking, as happened 12 years ago. Most observers believe that behind-the-scenes negotiations are underway, possibly leading to a new peace process with the Kurds. However, it is not clear who is involved and what is the extent of the negotiations. At the same time the Erdoğan government and its judiciary have been turning the screws on Kurdish mayors and councillors elected for DEM in Kurdish municipalities, as well as those elected for the opposition People’s Republican Party (CHP) in areas of cities such as Istanbul under the so-called ‘city consensus’ collaboration between the two parties. Also, the remnants of independent press and journalists who dared show some independence, were being put under pressure by the judicial arm of Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP). For a while all kinds of confusion reigned in the media and political circles.

Then DEM asked for permission to send a delegation to Imralı to have talks with Öcalan, and this was graciously granted. The lead figure was to be Sırrı Süreyya Önder - currently one of the deputy speakers of the Grand National Assembly, who had been one of the members of negotiation team in 2013 too.

During the last decade, Önder’s life has been quite indicative. In 2015 he took part in the preparatory process of the so-called ‘Dolmabahçe Accords’ negotiated with Kurdish MPs, and was ready to sign when Erdoğan at the last moment abandoned the negotiation table, plunging Turkey into yet another dark and dirty war. In revenge, Önder was sentenced to 48 months imprisonment on the pretext of a speech he had made in 2013. He was jailed again in 2018 and spent almost a year behind bars before being released when the Constitutional Court quashed the sentence on the grounds of freedom of speech. Later, in 2023, he was elected as an Istanbul MP.

Önder and Pervin Buldan, the former co-chair of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP, which in 2023 was incorporated into DEM), went to Imralı for talks with Öcalan in December 2024. On their return they announced, at a press conference, Öcalan’s willingness to take part in the initiative and his desire for “peace and democracy”.

The PKK leadership in the Qandil mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan declared its support and stated that there is nothing for Erdoğan to be afraid of, since neither Öcalan nor the Kurds have any intention of dividing Turkey and toppling the state. They also issued a statement from Öcalan, calling for a new process of transformation and restructuring, involving all parties in the conflict.

During this time, we learned that Öcalan had sent letters to European organisations, as well as the PKK leadership, and received positive replies. The co-chairs of DEM visited İmralı on February 27, and on their return held a press conference in Istanbul, where they distributed a photograph of Abdullah Öcalan showing him reading his statement at a table, surrounded by the DEM delegation. They also distributed photos of his hand-written statement, to avoid any doubts.

Öcalan’s ‘Call for peace and a democratic society’ urges the PKK to convene a congress to end the armed struggle and dissolve itself (see the full text below). An important proviso on what is to be expected from the regime was verbally stated by Önder at the end of the press conference: “In putting forward this perspective, there is no doubt that in practice it requires the laying down of arms and the PKK’s self-dissolution, democratic politics and the recognition of the legal dimension.”

It was greeted, as expected, from within Kurdish circles with enthusiasm, and in a couple of days the PKK leadership issued a statement fully endorsing Öcalan’s call and declared an immediate ceasefire. European affiliates of the Kurdish freedom movement also supported Öcalan’s call enthusiastically. They demanded the ending of Öcalan’s isolation, so that he could lead the organisation of a congress, etc. They also emphasised that this would not be the end of the struggle, but the beginning of a new phase.

The road forward is full of pitfalls, and it is obvious that there are some circles within the Kurdish freedom movement as well as within the state security apparatus that are not happy with the latest developments.

What is important is that Öcalan’s call came within a new international situation, where the US and Russia seemed to have tacitly agreed to settle the ongoing wars in the Middle East as well as in Ukraine. The first consequence of this new setting was the downfall of the Assad regime in Syria and the abandoning of the Palestinian cause, while fully supporting Israel. The other aspect is the Oval Office’s trashing of yesterday’s ally. The Turkish regime, note, is about to have a face-off with Israel, as it enlarges its occupation deeper into Syria.

The Syrian Defence Forces - which in essence is made up of the Kurdish freedom movement’s forces, supported by the USA - still control a large swathe of the country, including important oil and gas fields. Are they part of Öcalan’s call? The leader of the SDF, Mazlum Abdi, was trained by Öcalan and has a strong loyalty to him. However, he stated that the call is related to the Kurdish movement in Turkey, and had nothing to do with the SDF. The latter is negotiating with the new Syrian regime to reintegrate the country, while continuing to repulse the Turkish supported militia, the Syrian National Army.

The Turkish regime is also at loggerheads with its Iranian counterpart, and the diplomatic shenanigans between them are increasing. The never-ending Turkish occupation of northern Iraq and the Kurdish region is draining Turkey’s resources, while achieving nothing apart from ‘body count’ propaganda. Every day Kurds are killed by Turkish artillery, with military statements announcing ‘success’, as the number of ‘neutralised terrorists’ increases - while in reality nothing has changed in the occupied territory.

Then there are the diminishing fortunes of the Erdoğan government because of the hardships imposed by its ‘Islamist economics’, with rampant inflation eating into the minimum wage and pension increases. No wonder he is looking for some kind of ‘success story’ - and maybe the ‘peace process’, disguised as a success in the ‘war against terror’, may improve Erdoğan’s electoral chances in the next presidential elections.

At this historical juncture any chance of replacing military action with internal political activity could present an important opportunity. It seems that left organisations have in general accepted that reality and would support Öcalan’s line, despite their objections to the theoretical justification and rhetoric praising Erdoğan and Bahçeli. They are almost ready to accept those as tactical moves and are looking to the end result.

Both Turkey’s politics and those of the region may have a new phase in front of them if things proceed smoothly. However, here in Turkey, such smooth processes are very rare!