WeeklyWorker

12.12.2024
Happy times: Assad and Putin in December 2017

Deserted by friends of convenience

Iran and the Axis of Resistance have suffered yet another defeat. Yassamine Mather looks at the background and assesses the likely consequences of the fall of the House of Assad

When Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father, Hafez, in 2000, it initially raised hopes for reform in Syria, but in 2011 he violently repressed peaceful protests, triggering a civil war. With critical support from Russia and Iran, Assad has previously managed to crush rebel forces. Not this time.

The collapse of his regime is seen as a blow to Iran, which had relied on Syria as a key link in its regional influence - the only Arab government that has been its ally since 1979. Hezbollah, already weakened by the current conflict with Israel, now faces an uncertain future, while Iran’s Axis of Resistance, which includes militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen and Hamas in Gaza, has been significantly weakened. However, relations between Tehran and Assad were in turmoil long before last week.

Although fighting had stalled for four years, western sanctions weakened the Syrian state. It is alleged that to offset its financial woes, the Damascus government turned to large-scale drug trafficking. However, meaningful reconstruction seemed possible only with Gulf petrodollars and political pressure on western powers. This is what drove the United Arab Emirates to reopen its embassy in Damascus in 2018 after a seven-year hiatus, with Abu Dhabi also facilitating Syria’s re-engagement with former adversaries, including Saudi Arabia.

The dynamics shifted after the October 7 2023 attack on Israel, which prompted Hezbollah to open a ‘support front’ against Israel. UAE reportedly pressed Assad to stay out of the conflict. Soon after, Syria shut down the diplomatic mission of Yemen’s Ansarullah (the Houthis) in Damascus - part of efforts to strengthen ties with Saudi Arabia. The move was notable, since the Houthis had become a key player in the Axis of Resistance, attacking Israeli shipping and disrupting global trade via the Red Sea.

Assad’s priorities

As Israel escalated attacks on Iranian targets in Syria - hitting Quds Force command centres and even the Iranian diplomatic compound - Damascus remained largely silent. Similarly, Assad’s muted response to Israel’s killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah reflected a broader strategy. Despite Syria’s position within the Axis of Resistance, Assad appeared to prioritise diplomatic rehabilitation with Arab states over active resistance against Israel.

Some Iranian officials have also claimed that Assad refused Iran’s request to use those parts of the Golan Heights still under Syrian control, at the time when Hezbollah was being attacked. So contrary to reports in the western media, Syria under Assad was not a serious contributor to the Axis of Resistance.

By the middle of last week, it became clear that Iran had changed its position regarding Assad’s future. The first signs were obvious when bizarre articles appeared in the Iranian press - especially those sections that are close to the supreme leader and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The newspaper Ham-Mihan reported the advances by the rebels in a very positive light - in the past Iran had referred to them as jihadists, Salafists and takfiris (an Arabic term that refers to a Muslim who accuses another of being an apostate) as enemies of the Syrian people. This change in tone was picked up by the rest of the media inside Iran. No accident: the official line had changed. In the same papers, we also had pictures of the rebels along with the slogan, “On the road to Damascus”. There was considerable speculation about what was called “Iran’s sham enigma” (Sham is the Arabic word for Syria).

The Iranian government moved its embassy and military staff out of Syria at least 36 hours before the collapse. No doubt Iran’s military capabilities were reduced after Israeli bombings and it did not want to waste any more missiles or drones defending Assad.

The phrase, “Syria was traded”, reflects the sentiment of one Iranian-linked fighter stationed at the shrine of Ruqayya (daughter of Imam Hussein) in central Damascus. In a widely circulated social media video, he tearfully explains that Iranian forces have withdrawn from Damascus, paving the way for Assad’s overthrow.

There is, however, an apparent lack of coordination regarding Syria. Soheil Karimi, a journalist close to Iran’s Quds force, criticised the lack of Iranian military intervention to support Assad, calling out foreign affairs minster Abbas Araghchi for failing to confront “terrorism at its source”. Karimi expressed hope that Iranian leaders would not abandon Syria, warning that the collapse of the Assad regime would have profound negative consequences for Iran’s influence in the region.

Amid this turmoil, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, leader of Hayat Tahrir al Sham  (HTS), urged Iran to end its support for Assad and engage with the Syrian people. His comments appeared to suggest that Iran can build relations with a post-Assad Syria if it wants to maintain any influence there.

Iran damage

Economically, Iran faces potential financial losses. Over the years, Tehran has invested heavily in Syria. With the regime change, these may have to be written off. But the main problem for Iran is strategic.

The collapse of the Assad regime severs Iran’s ‘land bridge’ to Hezbollah in Lebanon. This coincides with the deaths of key figures in the Axis of Resistance, including Qasem Soleimani, and setbacks faced by Palestinian factions like Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

We should remember that Iran’s intervention in Syria stemmed from a pragmatic partnership. Alawites are not Shia and a secular Assad (and in particular his unveiled wife) would have faced arrest in Iran. However, relations between the Assad family and Iran’s Islamic Republic began with Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s father. He strengthened ties with Iran, supporting it even as other Arab nations sided with Iraq during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. This ‘brotherhood’ continued under Bashar, especially after the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. The Arab Spring in 2011 marked a critical point, with Iran intervening militarily to support Assad against growing opposition. Backing intensified, as jihadist groups gained strength, transforming Syria into a fragmented battleground for rival regional and global powers.

There are also indications that Russia was frustrated by Assad’s refusal to negotiate with opponents. Russia, Turkey and Iran were involved in talks trying to find a deal between HTS in Idlib and the Assad regime. Iranians always complain that Russia has been much more active in supporting Syria than Iran. This is to a certain extent because the jihadists, in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere, are not just a danger in the Middle East: quite a lot are Chechens or Turkish-speaking from the southern borders of Russia, and Putin sees wars in Syria as revenge for Chechen attacks on Russian territory.

While Assad’s removal is celebrated, there is widespread concern about what follows. HTS, with roots in al Qa’eda, has attempted to rebrand itself as a nationalist movement, but its social roots and ideological outlook raise fears of further instability, even chaos in Syria. Its leader, Abu Mohammed Al Jolani, is now a ‘responsible military leader’.

In the last few days, we have heard many contradictory messages from Jolani and other senior HTS commanders. Last week, addressing Iran, he was telling the leaders of the Islamic Republic that they should reconsider support for Assad, adding: “We have nothing against you. We can be as friendly to you as Assad.” However, another commander from the same group was quoted by the Israeli press as telling the Zionist state: “We are your friends. Our only enemies were Iran and Hezbollah, and it was Assad. And now he’s gone.”

Unlike Hamas’s leaders we should not believe anything that this political group says. It is therefore difficult to predict what road it will pursue in post-Assad Syria. So far the interim government is entirely Islamist. There are many contenders for power, including the Syrian National Army - a coalition of Turkish-backed forces primarily intent on fighting the Kurds. On December 11, HTS forces took full control of the eastern city of Deir ez-Zor, after clashes with Kurdish-led forces who briefly held it after pro-Assad soldiers fled. Signs that the partial autonomy of the Kurds during Assad’s rule is under serious threat.

Soon after the fall of Assad, we heard Netanyahu’s triumphant speech telling everyone that this would not have happened if Israel had not weakened Hezbollah and Iran. And that is true - the rebels would not have considered extending their reach if Iran and Hezbollah had not suffered so many military setbacks.

Israel supported armed groups like Islamic State and al Qa’eda during the Syrian conflict, providing medical aid to wounded fighters in field hospitals within the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. However, after these groups succeeded in ousting Bashar al-Assad, Israel shifted its strategy. It began targeting residential areas, government sites and supply depots around Damascus. Initially expanding its control near the Golan Heights under the pretext of creating a ‘buffer zone’, Israel eventually launched a full-scale invasion into Syrian territory.

Air strikes

On December 10 Israel attacked Syria’s naval fleet as part of what it calls “efforts to neutralise military assets in the country after the fall of the Assad regime”. The IDF said it had targeted ports where 15 vessels were docked. According to the BBC, by December 11 the Zionist state had carried out “350 air strikes on targets across Syria, while moving ground forces into the demilitarised buffer zone between Syria and the occupied Golan Heights”. Some say that Israeli tanks are just 20 miles from Damascus. The IDF is now telling the world that there are dangerous weapons in some of these bases and they might fall into the hands of jihadists. Concluding from this, some Israeli papers have asked the question: “So was Assad less of an enemy than the jihadists?”

Israel has taken over parts of the Golan Heights that were under Syrian control, with its military warning residents in five Syrian villages to remain indoors. Netanyahu stated that this move was necessary to protect Israel. In other words what was originally taken as a ‘buffer zone’, now needs its own ‘buffer zone’.

Israel initially captured part of the Golan Heights during the 1967 Six Day war and later annexed it - a move recognised only by the US. But on December 8 Israeli tanks established positions well into Syria. Meanwhile, a unit of Israeli commandos seized observation posts atop Jabal al-Shaykh, the highest peak in the Hermon range. There are also reports of 58 US air attacks in Syria. Again we have to ask, what were their targets and why does the US consider them more of a danger, now that Assad has fallen?

Clearly we cannot ignore the long-term involvement of the US. The resurfacing of the White Helmets ‘humanitarian group’, with its well-documented connections to UK and US security forces, suggests that there is probably some sort of special forces’ operations underway.

It is possible that Joe Biden, in his last weeks in office, is seeking to create a real legacy in ‘remaking the Middle East’. Of course, he is not doing so with boots on the ground, or even through US bombs, but through letting the Israelis do what they want - not only in Gaza, but also about Lebanon, Syria and, of course, the main target: Iran. Biden’s legacy could be helping Israel ‘establish secure borders’ by expanding its reach - first knocking out Syria as any kind of state and then actually attacking Iran before Trump gets in. All that, and establishing a military base in Somaliland, would make Israel into a sub-imperialist power.

Contrary to what sections of the ‘soft’ pro-Nato Iranian left keep saying, we are witnessing the redrawing of the map of the Middle East. The target is not just the regime in Tehran, but Iran itself. One plan is to divide the country into four or five separate states - a trigger for all manner of civil wars, which would see Iran joining the other failed states of the region. Those who ignore such an obvious danger are either ignorant or are paid agents of the US/Israel.