11.07.2024

No solutions on offer

Masoud Pezeshkian was elected on a wave of unenthusiasm. Yassamine Mather looks at the challenges facing the new president

A bit like Keir Starmer, Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s newly elected ‘reformist’ president, did not make many concrete promises during his election campaign. The 16.4 million votes (55%) he received were as much against Saeed Jalili, his rival in the second round, as opposed to an endorsement of him.

Jalili was seen as the continuation of the regime under the much hated, ultra-conservative former president, Ebrahim Raisi - he was and remains an opponent of Tehran’s 2015 nuclear pact with the major western powers. A few years before the deal, Jalili had served as Iran’s top nuclear negotiator for five years from 2007 - a period during which Iran took an aggressive and uncompromising approach in discussions. This coincided with the first tranche of major sanctions imposed on the country.

However, as many people have pointed out in recent weeks, sanctions, far from punishing Iran’s political leaders, have created opportunities for many of them and their relatives to become multi-millionaires - in some cases billionaires. Most of these people regularly move their ill-gotten gains abroad into accounts held by relatives or offshore bank accounts, with no risk of facing any sanctions. Meanwhile, ordinary Iranians suffer, as price rises and rampant unemployment or underemployment makes life extremely difficult for them.

Second round

On the morning of July 6, the day after the second round, most of those who were celebrating Pezeshkian’s victory seemed relieved that the two main conservative candidates and representatives of a corrupt bunch of reactionaries, Saeed Jalili and Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, were defeated. Soon afterwards, the various factions of the conservative camp began recriminations, blaming their adversaries for failing to unite. According to the Amwaj website,

Conservative political figures have confirmed a previously rumoured intervention by the commander of the Quds Force [international branch of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Command (IRGC)] ahead of the elections. [Revolutionary Guards general] Esmail Qa’ani is said to have attempted to convince Jalili to step aside in favour of Qalibaf - a move which may come to haunt the military commander.

No-one has any doubt that Qalibaf was the candidate of the much-hated IRGC.

However, as I wrote last week,¹ no-one should expect much from the new administration. Supporters of the Islamic Republic’s ‘reformist’ factions tell us the fact that Pezeshkian was allowed to stand - and that votes were not ‘manipulated’ to bring about a conservative victory - proved that supreme leader Ali Khamenei is keen to make a deal with the USA. There is no doubt that with a ‘reformist’-led government in office, Khamenei can now show flexibility in foreign policy without losing face (more difficult under Raisi).

Nevertheless, in his statement congratulating Pezeshkian on his electoral success, the supreme leader advised the president-elect to “follow the path” of Raisi and “make use of the abundant capacities in the country”. This was followed by a five-hour meeting between Khamenei and Pezeshkian. We will know more about Iran’s direction once Pezeshkian nominates his cabinet.

There is a lot of speculation that, given the important role of former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif during the presidential elections, he might be offered the same post once again. At a campaign rally in support of Pezeshkian on July 3, Zarif told voters to “send home those who have accomplished nothing for the country but sanctions, humiliation and misery”. Writing on Twitter a day after the results, Zarif commented that Iran under Pezeshkian will be “more unified, resolute and prepared than ever to tackle its challenges, strengthen its relationships with neighbouring countries, and reassert its role in the emerging global order”.

However, it is unlikely that Zarif will be acceptable to the Iranian majles (parliament), currently dominated by the conservatives and led by Qalibaf - unless there is direct intervention by the supreme leader. The president-elect also held a meeting with his former rival, Qalibaf, who is the speaker of the majles, so we assume its role in approving or rejecting ministerial nominees was discussed.

Limitations

Pezeshkian will soon find out all about the limitations of the top executive post in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The experience of his predecessors, ‘reformists’ Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) and Hassan Rouhani (2013-21), give us plenty of examples.

First of all, he will have to be prepared to confront the obstacles created by the more conservative factions. During his presidency Khatami regularly faced protests and demonstrations by groups like Ansar-e Hezbollah, shroud-wearing protestors, and bassij (militia) motorcyclists, angry at what they called the government’s tolerance of ‘anti-Islamic’ behaviour, as well as the arrest and imprisonment of journalists (even some supporters of the president, as well as critics). All created huge problems for the government.

One of the most important previous challenges came in a letter from 24 senior IRGC commanders to the then-president. After an incident at Tehran University in July 1999, they warned that “our patience has run out” and, if the student protests were not stopped, they would take action. This letter was a veiled threat against the second most powerful figure in the Islamic Republic and was seen by some as hinting at a coup.

During Hassan Rouhani’s presidency, problems and challenges manifested differently. What were described as ‘autonomous’ groups became active and there was public expectation of improved economic conditions that would come with what Rouhani claimed would be ‘the government of hope’. The incompetence of the government led to the bloody protests of 2017 and 2019, as well as a series of strikes.

The economic failures arose partly because the government based its plans on the nuclear agreement. Once this failed - following Trump’s withdrawal - the president was faced with a parliamentary resolution blocking the path to a revival of negotiations.

Although, as I have pointed out, Pezeshkian did not make many promises during his campaign, he did say: “I guarantee that the entire government will stand firmly against mandatory patrols, censorship … and external pressures”.

Not straightforward

Many of those who voted for him presumably believe that taking measures against the ‘morality police’ and censorship should be a priority. However, success in these areas is not straightforward, because, according to officials, issues like the mandatory wearing of the hijab are a ‘governmental obligation’ and Khamenei has repeatedly emphasised that he will not compromise on that issue. In early 2022, Ebrahim Raisi issued an executive order called the ‘Hijab and Chastity Plan’ to executive and law-enforcement agencies, and a bill with the same name has been approved after several rounds between the majles and the Guardian Council. Its implementation was only delayed due to the parliamentary elections last year and the recent presidential election.

Although six out of 13 members of the committee that controls the ‘filtering’ of the internet and social media are from the government, the other members, nominated by unelected agencies, seem to have more influence. On May 15, the then minister of communications stated: “Internet restrictions are not in our hands, and the ‘filtering’ committee must be responsible for lifting what blocks websites and social media platforms.” In such circumstances, it is unclear how Pezeshkian can overcome these “external pressures” when it comes to censorship.

On the question of the ‘morality police’, if they continue the crackdown on women who refuse to wear the full hijab on the street, how will the president react? Will he keep his promise?

Beyond the immediate challenges, the new president is also faced with a long list of long-term political and economic issues, some related to foreign relations. Very similar problems persisted during Rouhani’s administration and remained unresolved by the end of his term.

Before the presidential elections, economics professor Saeed Laylaz remarked that Pezeshkian’s candidacy was approved because of his potential to “resolve the severe economic imbalances in Iran”. Laylaz said that addressing economic problems requires a government with maximum legitimacy, and a ‘reformist’ government would better facilitate a solution. During the campaign, Pezeshkian linked some of his economic promises to improved foreign relations: his aim was 8% economic growth, which depended on attracting $200 billion in annual foreign investment.

Although Pezeshkian has pledged to do his utmost to remove Iran’s name from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist, my understanding is that this is related to Iran’s financial support for Hezbollah. Given the current instability in the Middle East and a possible escalation between Israel and Hezbollah, it is difficult to see how the new president will reduce Iran’s financial contributions to the Shia group.

When it comes to relations with the US, Ali Abdolalizadeh, head of Pezeshkian’s campaign, has promised to “negotiate with Trump to lift the sanctions. He is a businessman, and we understand the language of commerce well.” It could be that the new president has been given the green light by Khamenei, but, if not, Iran’s foreign relationships will remain very limited (to the likes of China and Russia).

Economist Hadi Kahalzadeh has told BBC Persian that one of Pezeshkian’s significant challenges is that the government has practically been stripped of its policymaking powers in economic, welfare, health and social domains, leaving Iran virtually in a state of “non-government”. Kahalzadeh noted that the government’s ability to make policies and solve national issues has therefore been drastically reduced.

The government’s financial resources are limited too and its expenses are very high, which means it continues to face a budget deficit. This has squeezed resources. So will Pezeshkian do what other Iranian presidents have done and borrow from the central bank, which in turn fuels inflation?

As I have noted many times, while we should not expect regime collapse any time soon, it is hardly in a secure or stable situation.

1. ‘Don’t expect much’, July 4: weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/1498/dont-expect-much.↩︎