07.04.2016
Who are the ‘moderate’ opposition?
Amongst the chaos, new alliances are taking shape, reports Yassamine Mather
Last week the Syrian army recaptured the ancient city of Palmyra and this week it regained the central town of al-Qaryatain once again, with the help of Russian airpower, Hezbollah fighters and Iranian special forces. By all accounts, this was a significant defeat for the Islamic State jihadists, yet, as Robert Fisk pointed out in The Independent, Cameron, Obama and other western leaders were silent:
I could not help but smile when I read that the US command claimed two air strikes against Isis around Palmyra in the days leading up to its recapture by the regime. That really did tell you all you needed to know about the American ‘war on terror’. They wanted to destroy Isis, but not that much.
Fisk is absolutely right to point to the lacklustre approach of the US and its allies. Every time Daesh commits an atrocity (if it happens to be in Europe or America), leaders of the ‘free world’ compete with each other on who can use the strongest language in condemnation, yet on the ground there is little sign of any serious effort to defeat IS. On the contrary, aid is still flowing to the 97 Syrian groups deemed to be ‘moderate’ by the US administration; there is no sign of any effort to reduce IS’s financial transactions, aided and abetted by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf countries; there are no plans to impose sanctions against the individuals and governments who support IS … However, like many other critics of US foreign policy, Fisk falls into the trap of praising Iranian, Hezbollah and Russian interventions, none of which is progressive.
Iran’s intervention is part of the country’s unambiguous regional ambitions, at a time when the economic miracle promised by the government following the nuclear deal with the P5+1 powers has yet to materialise and the majority of the population continue to suffer from the disastrous effects of sanctions. The government - or, more precisely, the Revolutionary Guards - are busy buying up property in Shi’ite majority areas of Damascus and, in addition to military advisors and fighters, the government is also exporting construction workers , including Afghan refugees, to Syria. The idea being that ownership of land and property will guarantee Iran’s long-term role in Syria and, of course, supreme leader Ali Khamenei and his supporters have always maintained that keeping Assad in power is one of the priorities for Iran’s Islamic Republic.
So, while many leftwing Iranians abhor Tehran’s intervention in Syria, ironically the rightwing middle and upper class nationalists tolerate - indeed support - this adventure. They consider it a legitimate part of the centuries-old ambition to recapture land that once belonged to the Persian empire. Given the increasing involvement of Iranian special forces, as well as growing economic ties, it is not surprising that Bashar al-Assad seems to be losing the support of sections of the Alawite community.
According to a document circulated to the press and unnamed western embassies, a group of community and religious leaders from the Alawite community are “dissociating” themselves from the Assad leadership, stating they are committed to “the fight against sectarian strife”.1 They also make it clear that they adhere to the “values of equality, liberty and citizenship”, and call for secularism to be the future of Syria, and a system of governance in which Islam, Christianity and all other religions are equal. The supporters of the document claim they represent a third model (not Shia, not Sunni, but “within Islam”).
Signatories of the declaration accept they share some formal religious sources with Shia Islam, while stressing differences over notions such as the fatwa. Indeed they denounce previous fatwas, by leading Shia clerics, that seek to “appropriate the Alawites and consider Alawism an integral part of Shi’ism or a branch of the latter”.
Moderates
When it comes to the Syrian conflict one of the main issues is the absence of a credible alternative to the current regime. For all the talk of ‘moderate’ opposition groups supported by the west, the reality is that after four years of conflict the secular forces are few and far between. The overwhelming majority of the so-called ‘moderate’ opposition are various offshoots of Islamic currents, including al Qa’eda. Far from being a viable force, they are a very loose and constantly changing alliance of political and armed groups dominated by Syrian Sunni Arabs. In December 2015, the Syrian opposition convened in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, with 34 groups participating. As in other such gatherings, the most notable absence was the only force with any credibility in fighting IS, the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its affiliates.
It is said that until late 2014 and the dominance of Islamic State and Al Nusra, there were as many as 1,000 armed opposition groups in Syria, although most had only been operating on a regional or even local level. However, as the two major jihadist groups became more powerful, the smaller units lost support and their fighters and supporters have since dwindled still further.
So who are the groups described as ‘moderate’ in the terminology used by US officials?
Supreme Military Council of the Free Syrian Army: once led by brigadier-general Salim Idris, an East German-trained expert in electronics radars who defected from Assad’s army in 2012 and was considered a leading figure among the ‘moderate’ elements of the armed opposition. But in December 2013 Idris was reportedly driven out of his headquarters in northern Syria by the Islamic Front and went into exile in Doha.
SMC affiliates include a number of Islamic groups, such as the Martyrs of Jabaal al-Zaniyah Brigade, formed in 2011. This group changed its name in 2012 to the Martyrs of Syria Brigades
Aurar Souriya Brigade: came to prominence when, as a faction of the Free Syrian Army, it took part in fighting in the north-west of the country and was involved in what became known as the ‘November 18 statement for the establishment of an Islamic state’.
Northern Storm Brigade: another Islamic group that is part of the FSA, known for its control of a major border crossing between Syria and Turkey. In September 2013, it fought against IS for control of the city of Azaz.
Syrian Martyrs Brigades: yet another unit of the FSA. It is claimed that the group’s leader, Jamal Maarouf, personally shot down one of two Mig jet fighters it downed. However, support for the group has dwindled over the last three years following allegations of criminal activity.
Syrian Islamic Front: a Salafist umbrella organisation of Islamist rebel groups fighting the Assad government. The group was originally created through a merger of 11 Islamist groups in December 2012, but seven of them - Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya, Jaysh al-Islam, Suqour al-Sham, Liwa al-Tawhid, Liwa al-Haqq, Ansar al-Sham and the Kurdish Islamic Front - departed in November 2013, declaring that they were forming the largest rebel alliance yet in the current Syrian conflict, fancifully claiming 45,000 fighters.
They said the new Islamic Front was an “independent political, military and social formation” that aimed to “topple the Assad regime completely and build an Islamic state”. The new command structure was supposed to be shared between the seven.
Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam): formed of 50 Islamist factions, based in and around the Damascus suburbs. Zahran Alloush, a Salafist whose group, Liwa al-Islam (Battalion of Islam), is the most prominent and powerful member of the alliance, said Jaysh al-Islam had been formed to “achieve unity among the units of the mujahedin and avoid the effects produced by the divisions within the national coalition”.
Saudi Arabia is credited with helping towards its formation - an attempt to counter the growing influence of al Qa’eda affiliates near Damascus. In July 2012 it claimed responsibility for the bombing the National Security Bureau’s headquarters in Damascus, which killed a number of senior figures, including the defence minister and Assad’s brother-in-law.
Suqour al-Sham (Falcons of Syria): formed in the north-western province of Idlib in September 2011. The group has at times called for a moderate Islamic state - “one that is not imposed on society”. In February 2014 IS besieged several hundred Suqour al-Sham fighters in Hama and there was little news of its activities until September 2015, when one of its leaders told Reuters that the group’s camp was struck by 20 missiles launched during two Russian sorties into Idlib. He also admitted that his organisation received support from Washington, while, according to Reuters, its fighters had received training in Qatar and Saudi Arabia.2
Liwa al-Tawhid (Battalion of Monotheism): formed in July 2012 as a front to unite a number of groups operating in the northern Aleppo countryside. It calls for an Islamic state ruled by civilians and guaranteeing the protection of minorities. Despite its claims of moderation, however, the group has kept good relations with more hard-line Islamist groups, such as Harakat Ahrar al-Sham and the al-Nusra Front. In addition to its military operations, Liwa al-Tawhid has medical and media ‘foundations’ and claims to have thousands of civilian ‘administrators’ helping to run areas under its control.
Liwa al-Haqq (Battalion of Truth): formed in 2012 by Liwa al-Ansar, who is a hard-line Islamist, although the United States considers it to be a moderate group.
Kataib Ansar al-Sham (Supporters of the Levant Brigades): mainly active in the northern provinces of Latakia and Idlib. According to researchers in Stanford, the group’s leaders include Abu Omar, a veteran of the Afghan war, and Abu Musa al-Shishani, a Chechen.
Kurdish Islamic Front is an alliance of seven separate groups, backed and supported by Saudi Arabia.
Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF): consists of 20 groups and it too is considered ‘moderate’ by the US and its allies, although it contains a variety of forces, including ultra-conservative Salafists.
Independents
Ahfad al-Rasoul (Grandsons of the Prophet): another coalition of some 40 small groups mainly in the northern province of Idlib. In the past it has received support from both Qatar and the west. IS fighters forced it out of Raqqa in 2013.
Asala wa al-Tanmiya: formed in November 2012. In March 2016 it claimed it had been able to capture about 10 villages north of Aleppo that had been held by IS, having been “partially armed by the United States”.3
Durou al-Thawra Commission: formed by an alliance of a few dozen small factions in Idlib and Hama provinces. Its roots go back to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, although the group describes itself as an Islamic-democratic alliance, while acknowledging it has received support from the Brotherhood.
Tajammu Ansar al-Islam: formed in 2012, has recently suffered a number of splits.
Yarmouk Martyrs’ Brigade: linked to the SMC. It operates mainly near Syria’s borders with Jordan and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
National Unity Brigades: claims to be active in all of Syria’s provinces, aiming for a “civil, democratic state for all ethnicities and social identities”. There are reports that some the group’s fighters were from the minority Alawite and Ismaili sects.
Syrian Democratic People’s Party: claims to be a socialist party which played a “key role” in the creation of the SNC. It emerged in 1973 from a split within the Syrian Communist Party. Until 2005, it operated under the name of ‘Syrian Communist Party (Political Bureau)’, but in 2015 declared it had abandoned communism and was now a social democratic party.
Supreme Council of the Syrian Revolution: grants local opposition groups representation within its national organisation.
Syrian Democratic Turkmen Movement: consists of Syrian Turkmens and was formed in March 2012.
Confusion
In the midst of all the mess in Syria, where a key US ally, Turkey, is clearly implicated in supporting IS, there are further signs of confusion. The positive comments by Steve Walker, US consul general in Basra, about the Popular Mobilisation Units (which includes an Iraqi faction belonging to Muqtada al-Sadr’s group) were interpreted as yet another policy twist. The US had fought this militia in the aftermath of the Iraq war and in general the administration’s attitude towards it has been negative, with repeated demands on the Iraqi government to exclude it from combined efforts to ‘liberate’ areas and cities under IS control. But, according to Walker, “The US and Iraqi people are very, very proud of you.”
Of course, this new positive spin is not shared by US regional allies. The Saudi ambassador to Baghdad has called the PMU a “sectarian organisation with a criminal agenda”. However Walker’s remarks seem to reflect a shift by sections of the US administration in terms of its alliances. Following the nuclear deal with Iran, US policy has clearly changed - Washington has distanced itself from its old friends, most notably Saudi Arabia, and moved closer to Iran. On March 12 Barack Obama criticised Saudi Arabia for funding the Wahhabist madrassas, religious seminaries that teach “the fundamentalist version of Islam”. He added that the Saudis need to “share the Middle East”, including with their “Iranian foes”.
The ink is not yet dry on the Iran deal, and most of the sanctions have yet to be removed. Indeed there are doubts about the new relationship - all Republican candidates in the US presidential elections have promised to “tear up the nuclear deal” - and they are supported in this by the more conservative factions of the Islamic Republic. Especially those who benefited financially from the sanctions and lost out in Iran’s recent parliamentary elections. According to the rightwing paper Kayhan, “The wisest plan of crazy Trump is tearing up the nuclear deal”. Once again Iran’s conservative clerics and rightwing US Republicans have found common cause.
yassamine.mather@weeklyworker.co.uk
Notes
1. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-35941679.
2. www.rferl.org/content/syria-us-backed-groups-bombed-by-russia/27283508.html.
3. www.heraldnet.com/article/20160322/OPINION04/160329805.